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ABSTRACT 
Value for money (VFM) assessment has been adopted worldwide as a public private partnership 
(PPP) decision methodology.  In terms of quantitative assessment, this method considers only 
the public sector cost, assuming completion delay does not occur between delivery alternatives, 
so it is difficult to use where systematic completion delays in the conventional delivery are 
expected to occur like in Korea.  Therefore, in this research a Modified VFM methodology was 
developed to consider completion delay as well as public sector cost, using the VFM assessment 
and the Net Present Value (NPV) technique.  In addition, various risks including transferable 
risks (completion delay, construction cost and traffic volume risk) were quantified in order to 
examine the impact of the transferable risks on PPP decisions, through historical observations 
and a literature review. In total six case studies (2 National Highways, 2 National Expressways 
and 2 National Railways) were conducted, reflecting Build-Transfer-Operate (BTO) and Build-
Transfer-Lease (BTL), the most popular PPP options in Korea.  The biggest difference between 
the BTO and the BTL options is that the private sector makes a profit from end users’ tariffs in 
the BTO option, whereas it makes a profit using the annual lease fee from the government in the 
BTL option.        
The most important finding is that a completion delay in the conventional delivery can be a 
decisive factor on the quantitative PPP decisions because of the resulting benefit difference 
between conventional delivery and PPP options.  As this completion delay for conventional 
delivery becomes longer, the probability that PPP schemes are favourable increases.  In addition, 
the critical completion delay, making the Modified VFM zero, varies depending on not only 
whether to include the construction cost risk and the traffic volume risk, but also on the PPP 
options considered.  Another important finding is that, when including construction cost risk, 
the viability of PPP options in roads increases, whereas that in railways decreases.  This is 
because the average winning bid ratio (winner’s price divided by estimated price) of turn-
key/alternative bids in roads, used in the calculation of the asset cost of the public sector 
comparator (PSC) according to the BTL guidelines of Korea, is higher than historical 
observations that include construction cost risk, whereas in railways it is lower than historical 
observations that include construction cost risk.  This difference between roads and railways 
seems to arise from the fact that railways are usually delivered separately using six major work 
element contracts, while roads are usually delivered by a single contract, suggesting that 
separate contracts lead to greater cost overruns than a single contract.  In addition, when 
reflecting traffic volume risk, the most appropriate delivery option, from a Government 
perspective, for road/railway cases with tariffs changes from the BTL to the BTO option.  This 
is because traffic volume risk directly results in a shortfall in revenue, which makes the BTO ii 
option more favourable to the public sector.  However, in the case of railways, the BTL option 
seems to be practically adopted because the revenue stream is so small that the BTO option is 
not affordable for the private sector, even considering the maximum governmental subsidy 
condition.  For the success of a BTO project in Korea, a new traffic volume risk sharing scheme 
is also suggested, sharing revenue shortfall or excess according to the investment of each 
participant.    
Overall, this research suggests that, considering the transferable risks and the revenue stream 
size of each transport programme, the BTL option is the most appropriate for the National 
Railways, whereas the BTO is the most appropriate option for the National Expressways, 
provided that the BTO viability can be achieved in terms of the internal rate of return. With 
respect to the National Highway programme, the BTL option can be considered as an alternative 
to conventional delivery on a case by case basis. Finally, considering the land transport 
programme (roads and railways) of Korea, a meta-analysis indicates that the Modified VFM is 
positively influenced by project size, completion delay, benefit cost ratio, discount rate and 
consumer price index, whereas it is negatively influenced by the five year exchequer bond 
interest rate.  In addition, the BTO option and Gyeonggi province (surrounding Seoul) 
respectively have a bigger positive influence on the Modified VFM than the BTL option and 
Gyungnam province (adjacent to Busan).   iii 
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For decades, and especially since the 1980s, Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) have been 
playing an important role in public infrastructure service provision (Araújo and Sutherland, 
2010), helping governments provide public services within the available budget and within a 
reasonable timeframe (EIB, 2005, Quinet and Vickerman, 2004). In addition, governments are 
expected to obtain several advantages through PPPs, such as better value for money (VFM), risk 
transfer and quality of service, from the innovation and creativity of the private sector (Katz, 
2006, Kwak et al., 2009, Papajohn et al., 2011). In addition, some research around world 
(Arthur Andersen and Enterprise LSE, 2000, Ball et al., 2007, FHWA, 2011, Sarmento, 2010, 
Fitzgerald, 2004, NSW Auditor-General, 2006, Ugrate et al., 2013) supports the superiority of 
PPPs in terms of producing better VFM. 
For these reasons, many countries all over the world have used PPPs as a procurement method. 
Since 1990 more than 5,200 infrastructure projects in more than 139 low and middle income 
countries have used PPPs as a procurement system for public infrastructure; 1,373 transport 
projects have already been implemented by PPPs in such countries (World Bank and PPAIF, 
2013). With respect to the EU region, about 1,540 PPP projects have been awarded between 
1990 and 2011, representing a capital value of more than EUR 250 billion (EPEC, 2012, 
Kappeler and Nemoz, 2010). In Korea, there are 461 PPP projects in progress and the 
proportion of private investment to public investment for infrastructure has grown by 4.5 times 
from 4 % in 1998 to 18 % in 2008 (MOSF and KDI, 2011).  
Furthermore, the role of PPPs is expected to grow because governments need to seek new 
breakthroughs to address the growing demands on infrastructure service in the context of 
declining funds (Girmscheid, 2009). According to the OECD, considering Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) growth and the current existing stock, between USD 269 billion and USD 350 
billion per year is expected to be invested in roads and rail over the period to 2030 in OECD 
countries, and PPPs are recommended as a means of delivering additional finance for land 
transport investment (OECD, 2006, OECD, 2007).  JI HONG PARK    Ch.1 Introduction 
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However, notwithstanding the present popularity and the promising future prospect of PPPs, 
much criticism has been made regarding the justification of the implementation of PPPs as an 
alternative to conventional delivery. This criticism is usually about whether PPP options 
produce greater VFM than the conventional delivery or whether the performance expected was 
achieved, or whether the procurement option selected was appropriate. The main issues can be 
different depending on countries’ precise PPP system, PPP organisational structure and socio-
economic atmosphere.  
For examples, regarding Public Finance Initiative (PFI) projects in the UK, much of the 
criticism is related to failure to provide VFM (GR, 2011), the higher cost than conventional 
delivery (UNISON, 2010, House of Commons Treasury Select Committee, 2011, Shaoul et al., 
2012) and the excessive profit of the private sector (Monbiot, 2010). Pollock et al. (2007) 
claimed that there is no evidence that PFI is more efficient than public procurement in terms of 
cost and time. In addition, Shaoul (2005) and Carrillo et al. (2008) argued that risk transfer 
calculation in the VFM assessment involves a subjective and arbitrary process and Graffney et 
al. (1999) and Broadbent et al. (2003) pointed out that a small change in the discount rate could 
make for a very different result. Other than that, based on British experience, Vickerman (2003) 
claimed that the complexity of organisational structures in transport service provision led to 
difficulties in the introduction of private finance.  
When it comes to Korea, most of the criticism is regarding the failure of traffic volume forecast 
(Jung, 2011, Lee, 2011) and the related minimum revenue guarantee (MRG) cost, which is 
considered to be too excessive for the public sector, in Build-Transfer-Operate (BTO) projects 
(Kang, 2012). In addition, Son (2012) claimed that the construction subsidy in BTO projects is 
excessive, so that it is difficult to determine the merits of PPP projects. In regards to 
construction cost, Lee (2008) argued that unit construction cost per kilometre in BTO road 
projects is more expensive than in conventionally delivered projects. Other than that, the public 
express strong dissatisfaction about the much higher tariff level in the BTO projects than in the 
public sector projects. (Shim and Shin, 2010, Jeon, 2011). Due to this criticism, the question 
whether PPPs could be proper alternatives to conventional delivery has been raised constantly 
from the public in Korea (Lee, 2008, Kang, 2012).  
Fundamentally, much of this criticism seem to be more or less related to the appropriateness of 
PPP decisions; making the right decision seems to be the Government’s essential obligation 
because they need to explain if and why PPPs are better than the conventional option and to 
persuade their taxpayers (Park, 2007). With respect to PPP decisions, although the VFM 
assessment is practically the most common PPP decision methodology on whether to use a PPP 
option or not (Akintoye et al., 2003), it seems impossible to make a unanimous judgement to be JI HONG PARK    Ch.1 Introduction 
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applied to all countries (Grout, 2005) because each country has its own distinctive socio-
economic and cultural environment.  
The VFM assessment, composed of a quantitative and qualitative approach (HM Treasury, 
2006), developed in the UK, mainly compares the public sector cost of the PPP procurement 
and the conventional delivery to select a procurement option for a certain project. Theoretically, 
however, it considers economy (spending less), efficiency (productivity) and effectiveness 
(outcome) (HMSO, 1999), assuming that there is no difference in completion time or 
effectiveness between the delivery systems (Grimsey and Lewis, 2005, Hoose, 2011, MOSF, 
2009a).  
However, seemingly it is very difficult to accept this assumption in some countries where PPPs 
could be the only hope to provide infrastructure services because the public funds are so limited 
that these services cannot be provided on time. In this case, the VFM assessment with the public 
sector comparator could be meaningless for poor developing countries (Leigland and Shugart, 
2006).  
In the same way, in cases where there are systematic completion delays between conventional 
delivery and PPP alternatives, as in Korea, the current PPP decision methodology seems to have 
a limitation in terms of quantitative assessment due to this assumption. With respect to 
systematic completion delay in Korea, according to Ahn (2006), among 197 road projects 
completed between 2001 and 2005, 15 5 projects (86.5 per cent) were delayed, and among the 
delayed projects 134 projects (79 per cent) were delayed due to lack of budget. In addition, 
according to CERIK (2011), due to lack of budget, actual completion is delayed by 46 per cent 
on average, compared with planned construction duration in public works. This is the main 
cause of completion delay due to the unusual national budget system in Korea, the long term 
expenditure contract (LEC) system (Kim et al., 2008b).  
According to the LEC system
1, an infrastructure project starts by reflecting its first-year’s 
expenditure in the Budget Book settled by the National Assembly, even if the total expenditure 
of the project is not secured there. This means that with the LEC system, infrastructure 
construction can start with the yearly expenditure not determined by the National Assembly. 
Using this system, too many infrastructure projects, compared with the size of the budget, tend 
to be implemented by reason of political necessity such as balanced regional development 
                                         
1 LEC is provided in Article 21 of the Act on Contracts, to which the State is a party. The inefficiency of 
LEC is criticised by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) like the Citizen’s Coalition for Economic 
Justice (CCEJ). The CCEJ (2010) criticised it for inducing too many projects to start without considering 
the available size of the budget.  JI HONG PARK    Ch.1 Introduction 
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policy. As a result, each project under construction experiences a budget shortfall and a 
systematic completion delay occurs.  
In addition, regarding the qualitative approach in Korea, several systematic research projects on 
qualitative VFM have been conducted, using interview techniques (Gil, 2012) and analytical 
hierarchy process techniques (Yang et al., 2007). However, reviewing several PPP pre-
qualification reports,
2 qualitative VFM assessment does not seem to be practically implemented 
yet in Korea and the Korean government seems to put a quantitative approach before a 
qualitative approach in the VFM calculation, as most governments do in reality (Grimsey and 
Lewis, 2005). Accordingly, the quantitative VFM result seems to be critical in the PPP decision 
in Korea. 
Therefore, this research will primarily focus on the development of a new quantitative PPP 
decision methodology considering the completion delay of the conventional delivery, and then 
examine the impact of the completion delay in conjunction with other transferable risks, such as 




1.2 Research Objectives 
 
 
Many countries in the world have adopted the VFM assessment, generally divided into a 
quantitative element and a qualitative element (HM Treasury, 2006), in deciding whether to use 
PPPs or not. Though the qualitative assessment has become more important in PPP decisions 
(Grimsey and Lewis, 2005), it seems that factors influencing qualitative assessment are different 
depending on countries (Morallos and Amekudzi, 2008) and no concrete methods of qualitative 
assessment have yet been provided in each country’s PPP guidelines (KDI, 2012). In addition, 
the qualitative assessment could inherently have a credibility issue (Amaratunga et al., 2002, 
Stake, 2010) and  could particularly be vulnerable to a government policy or an appraiser’s 
subjectivity (Lim et al., 2011). Therefore, this research will be restricted to the quantitative 
element.  
                                         
2 Several projects include the Bongdam-Songsan National Expressway project, the Osan-Gwangju 
National Expressway project, the Bujeon-Masan National Railway project and the Sosa-Wonsi National 
Railway project. JI HONG PARK    Ch.1 Introduction 
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This research starts from two questions: 1) How can the completion difference between the 
conventional and the PPP delivery be included in the VFM assessment quantitatively in terms of 
theoretical context? and 2) What impact on PPP decisions can be expected from transferable 
risks, such as completion delay, construction cost risk and traffic volume risk in terms of the 
Korean practical context? 
The first question is related to how it is possible to overcome the limitations of the assumptions 
of current quantitative VFM assessment. Quantitative VFM assessment used in many countries 
takes into account only the public sector cost, assuming that the completion delay does not exist 
between the conventional and PPP deliveries (Grimsey and Lewis, 2005, Hoose, 2011, MOSF, 
2009a). In some countries like Korea, where a systematic completion delay in the conventional 
delivery is expected due to lack of public funds, it seems somewhat problematic to compare 
procurement alternatives by only the public sector cost, although these produce quantitatively 
different social benefits in terms of net present value. In addition, two of the core reasons for 
using PPPs are the reduction of the public sector cost and on-time completion compared with 
the conventional delivery (EC, 2003, EIB, 2005, ADB, 2008), and these can be estimated 
quantitatively. Therefore, in terms of quantitative assessment, it seems to be important to 
consider the public sector cost as well as completion delay in the conventional delivery at the 
same time; this procedure overcomes the limitations of the assumption.  
The other question is related to risk quantification using historical observations. To date, not 
only is PPP research on risk quantification using historical observation very rare, but there is 
also seemingly no PPP research on risk quantification considering the Korean transport 
characteristics. As a result, although it is recommended that quantified risk costs are included in 
the VFM assessment according to Korea’s Build-Transfer-Lease (BTL) guidelines (MOSF, 
2009a), it is practically impossible to do so in Korea. Considering that optimal risk transfer is at 
the heart of PPPs (Arthur Andersen and Enterprise LSE, 2000, Sun et al., 2010), the current 
status of the Korean VFM practice without quantified risk cost seems to have a limitation from 
the viewpoint of a reasonable PPP decision.   
Consequently, the first main objective of this research project is to develop a new quantitative 
PPP decision methodology in terms of theoretical context, taking into account the completion 
delay in the conventional delivery. The second main objective is to examine the impact of 
transferable risks, such as completion delay, construction cost and traffic volume on PPP 
decisions, in three transport programmes (the National Highway, the National Expressway and 
the National Railway) in terms of the practical Korean context, using this new methodology and 
six case studies. The third main objective is that , based on the results from the case studies, the 
influence factors on PPP decisions in land transport (roads and railways) will be scrutinised. In JI HONG PARK    Ch.1 Introduction 
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order to achieve the three main objectives of this research, several sub-objectives are set out as 
follows: 
 
1-1) to identify the features of PPPs and to compare PPP decision-making in Korea with the 
rest of the world  
 
1-2) to develop a new PPP decision-making methodology considering completion delay 
 
2-1) to quantify transferable risks for PPP decisions on roads and railways in Korea 
 
2-2) to examine the impact of transferable risks on PPP decisions on roads and railways in 
Korea 
 
2-3) to explore the most favourable procurement option for roads and railways in Korea 
considering the transferable risks 
 
3-1) to scrutinise the influence of the factors on the PPP decisions in the land transport of 
Korea 
 
Since PPPs were introduced in the world, no quantitative PPP decision methodology taking into 
account the completion delay of a delivery method seems to have been developed to date. 
Therefore, the most important feature of this research is the development of a new PPP decision 
methodology, given the completion delay in the conventional delivery. In addition, in order to 
quantify the construction cost risk in Korea, the construction cost risk is first defined using a 
winning bid ratio and construction cost overrun risk, and the concept of critical completion 
delay, making the most favourable procurement option change, is first introduced in this 
research. Other than that, considering the scarcity of PPP research on risk quantification using 
historical observations because of limited access to data and publication constraints due to 
commercial confidentiality, this research is significant and well worth pursuing.  
As a result, this thesis will make an important contribution to knowledge through the 
development of a new PPP decision-making methodology, considering the completion delay in 
the conventional delivery, and through revealing the impact of transferable risks such as 
completion delay, construction cost and traffic volume on PPP decisions in the transport sector 
in Korea.  
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1.3 Previous Studies 
 
 
Generally speaking, PPPs are closely related to optimal risk allocation and how to manage risks 
in order to maximise VFM (Froud, 2003, Fitzsimmons et al., 2009, Gil, 2011), supplementing a 
lack of public funds with private funds. For the success of a project and the achievement of 
VFM, it is crucial to select a suitable procurement option and a qualified concessionaire. In 
addition, the success of a PPP can be achieved when the responsibilities of the two sectors are 
clearly identified, allocated and maintained (Vickerman, 2002).   
Therefore, the main research on PPPs has been focused on risk, success factor and relationships, 
decision methodology, concessionaire selection and finance (Kwak et al., 2009, Tang et al., 
2010), and these topics are closely interconnected with each other. With respect to this research, 
previous studies regarding PPP decision methodology and risk, among many research topics, are 
reviewed here. 
 
Research on PPP decision methodology 
Many researchers have developed various kinds of PPP evaluation or decision support model to 
examine the feasibility of PPPs for a certain project, and depending on the viewpoint, these 
could be divided into two categories: evaluation or decision support model for the private sector 
and the public sector.  
From the viewpoint of the private sector, PPP evaluations or decision support models are mainly 
related to how attractive a project is because it needs to show how financially feasible or how 
risky it is, so that private investors can decide whether to invest in or not. With respect to 
financial evaluation models, Ranasinghe (1999) analysed the viability of a Build-Operate-
Transfer (BOT) project in Sri Lanka by a financial feasibility model considering total cost, 
revenue and risks. In addition, Ye and Tiong (2000) developed the net present value (NPV)-at-
risk model incorporating the weighted average cost of capital and dual risk-return methods
3, and 
Ho and Liu (2002) used an option pricing-based model in order to evaluate the financial 
viability of privatised infrastructure projects.  
Regarding the decision support model for the private sector, Ozdoganm and Talat Birgonul 
(2000) suggested a decision support framework, including government guarantee and risk 
                                         
3 The dual risk-return method is a common method combining various risks and return on capital 
employed in order to assess the viability of the capital investment decision of private sector. JI HONG PARK    Ch.1 Introduction 
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sharing scenarios, to solve a complicated decision-making problem for a hydropower plant BTO 
project in Turkey. In addition, Salman et al. (2007) identified 21 decision factors, such as 
forecast of future demands and return on investment, affecting the feasibility of BOT projects, 
and analysed their inter-relationships and their effect on the feasibility through the introduction 
of a decomposed evaluation model: it produces the viability index for BOT projects, composed 
of the decision factors and their weights from surveys. Furthermore, Ng et al. (2010) established 
a structural equation model (SEM) to evaluate the feasibility of a PPP project from the 
perspective of all stakeholders, claiming that not only technical but also social aspects are 
crucial to the feasibility of a project.  
When it comes to the viewpoint of the public sector, PPP decision models have usually focused 
on economic efficiency, since they are different to the private sector decision models that 
primarily focus on return on capital employed. In fact, the common methodology for the 
analysis of economic efficiency, such as the NPV technique or cost-benefit analysis, has been 
widely used in addressing transport investment decision-making by many researchers like 
Quinet and Vickerman (2004), Layard and Glaister (1994) and Pearce and Nash (1981). For 
example, Girmscheid (2009) used a NPV model based on cash flow to evaluate the economic 
efficiency of the public sector delivery and PPP delivery with respect to the decision to opt for a 
PPP to maintain municipal streets.  
Other than that, Ahmadjian and Collura (2012) developed a four-step decision-making 
framework in order to select an operating body for existing toll roads in the US. The framework 
involves: 1) alternative identification, 2) NPV assessment considering monetary factor for each 
alternative, 3) weight analysis considering quantitative and qualitative variables for each 
decision maker, and 4) comparison of results from 2) and 3). 
However, as Akintoye et al. (2003) pointed out, the VFM assessment is practically the most 
common PPP decision methodology on whether to use a PPP alternative or not for a project 
because through this assessment the PPP scheme can be justified to achieve more economic 
efficiency than conventional procurement, even though it could be inappropriate to find one 
unique VFM test meeting all conditions and situations (Grout, 2005). 
Using the VFM assessment methodology, Shin (2006) claimed that from the viewpoint of the 
public sector cost, the BTL approach is more favourable than the BTO approach for the Incheon 
International Airport Railway project connecting Seoul and Incheon International Airport in 
Korea. Park (2007) claimed that the BTL option is more favourable than the BTO option in 
sewage treatment facilities in Korea. In addition, Gil (2011) suggested how to share traffic 
volume risk between the public and the private sector and the optimal PPP model between BTO 
and BTL for road and railway sector in Korea. Other than that, Bain (2010) demonstrated that JI HONG PARK    Ch.1 Introduction 
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the generally assumed relationship between the discount rate and the procurement option 
selection, that any reduction in the discount rate makes the conventional procurement 
favourable, could be changed by the size and shape of the cost profile. 
 
Research on risk 
Research on risk in the context of PPP is largely concerned with risk identification and risk 
analysis in order to help establish how to allocate risks between the public and the private sector. 
Seemingly the reason for active research on risk is that risk is a key issue in PPP contract 
making, and the success of a PPP contract primarily depends on risk allocation between the two 
parties (Marques and Berg, 2011).  
With respect to risk identification, many researchers, such as Zayed and Chang (2002), Lam and 
Chow (1999), Xenidis and Angelides (2005) and Schaufelberger and Wipadapisut (2003), have 
tried to classify risks or to determine critical risk factors in a certain risk in PPPs as an initial 
step towards risk identification.  
Risk allocation between the public and the private sector in PPPs has also been actively 
researched by many researchers. With respect to Private Finance Initiative (PFI) in the UK, 
based on a questionnaire survey, Li et al. (2005) argued that the public sector should take the 
land acquisition risk and political risk, while the project risk should be taken by the private 
sector; legal risk needs to be shared by the both sectors. In other research (Roumboutsos and 
Anagnostopoulos, 2008, Ke et al., 2010) using Li et al.’s questionnaire on China/Hong Kong 
and Greece, the results were very similar to the earlier research though there were some regional 
distinguishing differences.  
In addition, regarding risk analysis or risk quantification in PPPs, researchers have also 
developed risk assessment models based on various methodologies. Tah and Car (2000) 
developed a risk assessment model using fuzzy logic and hierarchical risk breakdown structure, 
and Thomas et al. (2006) suggested a risk probability and impact assessment framework based 
on a fuzzy-fault tree
4 and the Delphi method
5. In addition, Zhang and Zou (2007) proposed a 
fuzzy analytical hierarchy process (AHP) model to support decision-making of the stakeholders 
in joint venture projects. 
                                         
4 A fuzzy-fault tree method is a graphical risk analysis using a deductive approach to determine the risks, 
quantified by the fuzzy logic, contributing to a designated impact. The fuzzy logic is useful in quantifying 
linguistic variables.  
5 The Delphi method is one of qualitative future forecast methods: it collects experts’ opinions on a 
subject over and over again, exchanges and develops them in order to forecast the subject’s future. JI HONG PARK    Ch.1 Introduction 
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However, in the practical aspects, it seems that Monte Carlo Simulation (see Section 3.5.3) is 
almost the only risk quantification methodology recommended by the guidelines of various 
countries, such as Australia (2008b), Hong Kong (2008b) and Canada (2011), because this 
method is able to give powerful solutions for decision-making (Shim et al., 2005b). Since 
Pouliquen (1972) used this method in feasibility studies of the port and highway projects 
supported by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), many 
researchers have adopted this decision-making method regarding risks (Lam and Tam, 1998, 
Malini, 1999, Lee et al., 1999, Jung et al., 2001, Grimsey and Lewis, 2002, Lee, 2003, Molenaar, 
2005, Salling and Leleur, 2011) and in developing a risk analysis model (Sadeghi et al., 2010). 
However, despite various studies, most research uses assumed probability distribution, not from 
historical observations, because of data availability. In this case, there is always possibility that 
subjectivity can affect the simulation results (Lee, 2003) because the experience and knowledge 
of an individual or a group, utilised for the assumption of the probability distribution, can be 
biased.  
 
As suggested above, no quantitative PPP decision methodology considering the completion 
delay of the conventional delivery seems to have ever developed to date and research on risk 
quantification using historical observations is very rare. Therefore, in order to determine the 
impact of transferable risks, such as completion delay, construction cost risk and traffic volume 
risk, on PPP decisions from the viewpoint of a quantitative evaluation, this research will 
develop a new PPP decision methodology, taking into account completion delay in the 
conventional delivery; quantified risks from historical observations are included for the purpose 
of the exclusion of subjectivity. JI HONG PARK    Ch.1 Introduction 
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1.4 Research Procedure 
 
 
The research procedure, shown in Figure 1-1, is largely made up of five steps, set out across 
nine chapters, in order to achieve the research objectives.  
To begin with, the first step deals with the research background, research objectives and 
previous studies, which provide a robust basis to this research in Chapter 1.  
The next step is a literature review (Chapter 2) and methodology (Chapter 3). Chapter 2, 
covering the research objectives 1-1, deals with the generality of PPPs, the characteristics of the 
transport and PPP systems of Korea, and PPP decision-making, examining why completion 
delay needs to be considered in a quantitative VFM, which PPP types and transport programmes 
should be considered, and what the key factor is in the PPP decision-making.  
In addition, Chapter 3, covering research objective 1-2, deals with research methodologies, 
including the development of a new PPP decision methodology (a  modified VFM), risk 
quantification, impact analysis (such as single-value estimation, sensitivity analysis and the 
Monte Carlo Simulation), the selection of case studies, and meta-analysis.  
The third step, provided in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 in order to cover research objectives 2-1, 2-2 and 
2-3, is to find out the impact of transferable risks on the PPP decisions in three transport 
programmes (the National Highway, the National Expressway and the National Railway), using 
two case studies per programme. Therefore, each chapter is largely composed of risk 
quantification through historical observations and a literature review, alongside case studies. 
The fourth step, provided in Chapters 7 and 8 in order to cover research objectives 2-2, 2-3 and 
3-1, is to synthesise the impact of transferable risks, such as completion delay, construction cost 
risk and traffic volume risk, on PPP decisions from the three transport programmes and to 
determine the most appropriate procurement option for each transport programme. In particular, 
in Chapter 8, in order to draw a more generalised and transferable conclusion, which is usually 
hard to find, on the land transport programme, including roads and railways, meta-regression 
analysis is conducted. 
 
In the final step, main conclusions on the main research objectives are provided in Chapter 9. As 
well as this, the contribution and limitations of this research will also be discussed in this 
chapter.  
   JI HONG PARK    Ch.1 Introduction 





Figure 1-1: Research procedure
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Exploring the generalities on PPPs, the transport and PPP system of Korea and the PPP decision 
methodology through literature reviews, this chapter examines why completion delay needs to 
be considered in a quantitative VFM, which PPP types and transport programmes should be 
considered, what the key factor is in the PPP decision-making, and why quantitative VFM is 
important in the PPP decisions in Korea, covering the research objective 1-1 through literature 
review. This chapter is composed of four sections: 1) the generalities on PPPs, 2) transport and 
PPP system of Korea, 3) PPP decision-making, and 4) the VFM assessment.  
In the first section (2.2), the generalities on PPPs are explained, exploring the meaning of PPPs, 
why governments want to use PPPs, the classification of PPPs, the advantages and 
disadvantages of PPPs, and PPP status and prospect in transport. In doing so, in particular, it 
scrutinises quantitative assessment factors for PPP decisions, considering the reasons for using 
PPPs and why this research considers BTL and BTO as PPP options. 
In addition, in the next section (2.3), the main features of the Korean PPP system are probed for 
the purpose of providing background to the Korean PPP system. To this end, this section deals 
with the characteristics of transport of Korea and the Korean PPP system, explaining the 
importance of land transport (roads/railways), the difference between BTO and BTL, the issues 
on PPPs of Korea and the PPP implementation procedures.  
In the third section (2.4), similarities and differences in PPP decision-making are reviewed, 
using information from countries including Korea and the UK. In doing so, what the key factor 
in PPP decision is will also be revealed.  
Finally, the last section (2.5) focuses on the limitations of current Korean VFM assessment 
practice and why systematic completion delay in the conventional delivery in Korea should be 
added to a quantitative VFM, exploring the generalities of VFM assessment as well as VFM 
assessment comparison among countries.  JI HONG PARK    Ch.2 PPPs in Transport 




2.2.1 The meaning of PPPs 
 
The concept of PPPs 
PPPs, generally speaking, mean the participation of the private sector through a contract 
between a public agency and a special purpose vehicle (SPV
6) in public projects or services 
which, in the past, used to be delivered by the public sector (Papajohn et al., 2011). This means 
that through PPPs the public sector and the private sector need to cooperate to achieve a 
common objective, the provision of public infrastructure services. 
According to Burger (2008) and the OECD (2008), PPPs are procurement methods that fill the 
gap between complete government delivery and privatisation by mixing government risks and 
private risks properly, as seen in Figure 2-1. Therefore, it is very difficult to find a single 
definition of PPPs which can be used universally (Grimsey and Lewis, 2005); sometimes it is 
said that it may be clearer to find delivery systems that are not included in PPPs (Grimsey and 
Lewis, 2004b). This is because PPPs may have a number of types which consist of various 
combinations of the public and the private sectors. Nevertheless, many researchers and 
institutions have tried to define a PPP.  
 
 
Source: Burger (2008) and OECD (2008)  
Figure 2-1: The spectrum of combinations of public and private participation for PPPs 
 
Though there is a little difference in defining the PPP, as shown in Table 2-1, the characteristic 
common to all definitions seems to be “a public service delivery by the private sector through 
contractual arrangement/relationship and risk sharing between the public and the private sector”.  
                                         
6 The SPV means a legal entity that undertakes a PPP project. On behalf of the private sector, the SPV 
negotiates the contract agreements with the public sector (UNESCAP, 2011). JI HONG PARK    Ch.2 PPPs in Transport 
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Table 2-1: Definition of PPPs
7 from various researchers and institutions 
 
Source: Grimsey and Lewis (2004b), Kwak et al. (2009), IMF (2006), EC (2004), EIB (2005) and OECD 
(2008) 
 
Why governments want to use PPPs 
In order to understand PPPs more clearly, it is essential to know why governments use PPPs as 
one of their procurement alternatives. Marty (2008) argued that the determinants of government 
commitment in PPPs are budgetary constraints, fiscal opportunism and economic efficiency 
across the whole life of a project. In addition, according to EIB (2005), the main reason for 
using PPPs is that governments are able to provide infrastructure services within a reasonable 
time, which would be impossible considering the limitations of the public sector budget. EC 
(2003) and ADB (2008) also pointed out that, due to financial shortages in the public sector, 
                                         
7 In Korea, a PPP is simply defined as “a public service delivery by the private funds” according to the 
Act on Promotion of Private Capital into Social Overhead Capital Investment (the PPP Act), so it seems 
that the importance of risk sharing between two parties is underestimated in a PPP. However, in other 
PPP advanced country like the UK, the definition of PPP (or PFI) includes the concept of risk sharing. 
Sources Definitions
Grimsey and Lewis (2004) 
“A risk-sharing relationship based on a shared aspiration between the public sector and one or 
more partners from the private and/or voluntary sectors to deliver a publicly agreed outcome 
and/or public service”.
Kwak et al. (2009)
“A cooperative arrangement between the public and private sectors that involves the sharing of 
resources, risks, responsibilities, and rewards with others for the achievement of joint objectives”
IMF (2006) 
“Arrangements under which the private sector supplies infrastructure assets and infrastructure-
based services that traditionally have been provided by the government.  In addition to private 
execution and financing of public investment, PPPs have two other important characteristics: 
there is an emphasis on service provision, as well as investment, by the private sector; and 
significant risk is transferred from the government to the private sector. PPPs are involved in a 
wide range of social and economic infrastructure projects, but they are mainly used to build and 
operate hospitals, schools, prisons, roads, bridges and tunnels, light rail networks, air traffic 
control systems, and water and sanitation plants”
EC (2004) 
“The term public-private partnership ("PPP") is not defined at Community level. In general, the 
term refers to forms of cooperation between public authorities and the world of business which 
aim to ensure the funding, construction, renovation, management or maintenance of an 
infrastructure or the provision of a service”
EIB (2005) 
“A PPP should  - have been initiated by the public sector - involve a clearly defined project - 
involve the sharing of risks with the private sector - be based on a contractual relationship which 
is limited in time - have a clear separation between the public sector and the Borrower.”
OECD (2008) 
“An agreement between the government and one or more private partners (which may include the 
operators and the financiers) according to which the private partners deliver the service in such 
a manner that the service delivery objectives of the government are aligned with the profit 
objectives of the private partners and where the effectiveness of the alignment depends on a 
sufficient transfer of risk to the private partners”JI HONG PARK    Ch.2 PPPs in Transport 
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PPPs have prospered and with PPPs governments are expected to gain operating efficiencies as 
well as additional financial resources.  
With respect to significant incentives to use PFIs in the UK, The House of Commons (2011) 
point out that so far the majority of PFIs do not seem to increase government debt or the deficit; 
with PFIs, government departments can afford new investment without using their assigned 
budget. In Korea, there are three main reasons
8 to resort to PPPs: 1) supplementing lack of 
public funds, 2) bringing forward benefit occurring time and 3) utilising creativity and 
efficiency in infrastructure provision (MOSF, 2009b, MOSF, 2009c). Accordingly, though there 
are some differences across institutions and countries, the main reason for using PPPs in the 
public sector seems the shortages in public funds and the resulting delayed infrastructure 
provision when using public procurement.  
Consequently, from the viewpoint of the public sector, a PPP seems to mean “a public service 
delivery by the private sector through a contractual arrangement/relationship and risk sharing 
between the public and the private sector, with a view to overcoming shortages in public funds 
and the resulting delayed infrastructure provision”.  
 
 
2.2.2 Classification of PPPs 
 
Several institutions have suggested somewhat broad categories with respect to PPP 
classification. According to the European Commission (EC, 2003), PPPs can be largely divided 
into three categories: 1) opportunities for private involvement in traditionally procured projects 
(e.g. service contracts, operation and management, contracts, leasing), 2) integrated project 
development and operation opportunities (e.g. BOT and Design-Build-Finance-Operate 
(DBFO)), 3) partnership project development and investment opportunities (e.g. concessions 
and private divestiture).  
The World Bank (2011) has also suggested four sub-types of PPPs: management and lease 
contract, concessions (e.g. Rehabilitate-Operate-Transfer (ROT)), greenfield project (e.g. Build-
Lease-Transfer (BLT), BOT) and divestitures.
9  
                                         
8 From a viewpoint of international comparisons, the reason to use PPPs in Korea is more detailed and 
explicit than international organisations (such as EC and ADB) suggest though the main reason is quite 
similar. 
9 Divestitures mean the cases that a private company buys full or part of the equity in the state-owned 
company through an asset sale, public offering, or mass privatisation programme (World Bank, 2011). JI HONG PARK    Ch.2 PPPs in Transport 
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Other than that, the ADB (2008) has grouped PPPs into six basic forms: service contracts, 
management contracts, affermage or lease contracts, BOT and similar arrangements, 
concessions and joint ventures. 
Additionally, the probably more widely accepted classification of PPPs is related to how much 
risk is transferred from the public to the private sector or the extent to which the private sector is 
involved in PPPs (OECD, 2008, Tvarno, 2011, Kwak et al., 2009).  
Accordingly, considering the broad categories from international institutions and the extent of 
both risk transfer to the private sector and private participation, the United Nations Economic 
and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP, 2011) has suggested the 
classification of PPP models shown in Table 2-2. As seen in Table 2-2, there can be diverse 
types of PPPs in terms of ownership of capital assets, responsibility of investment and who 
takes on the risk.  
 
Table 2-2: Classification of PPP models 
Source: UNESCAP (2011) 
However, despite various classifications, there is apparently no single PPP model meeting all 
conditions with respect to a project’s local, technical and financial features, and therefore the 
most appropriate PPP model should be designated given the country’s socio-economic 








Outsourcing Public Public Public 1 - 3
Maintenance 
management
Public Public/Private Private/Public 3 - 5
Operational 
management
Public Public Public 3 - 5
Turnkey Public Public Private/Public 1 - 3
Affermage Public Public Private/Public 5 - 20
Lease
* Public Public Private/Public 5 - 20
Franchise Public/Private Public/Private Private/Public 3 - 10
BOT
** Public/Private Public/Private Private/Public 15 - 30
BOO/DBFO Private Private Private Indefinite
PFI
*** Private/Public Private Private/Public 10 - 20







of assets and PFI 
type
*       Build-Lease-Transfer (BLT) is a variant.
**     Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) has many other variants such as Build-Transfer-Operate (BTO), 
         Build-Own-Operate-Transfer (BOOT) and Build-Rehabilitate-Operate-Transfer (BROT).
***  The Private Finance Initiative (PFI) has many other names. In some cases, asset owener may be transferred to, 
         or retained by the prubic sector.JI HONG PARK    Ch.2 PPPs in Transport 
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circumstances, the maturity of its PPP market and the financial and technical characteristics of 
the projects and sectors concerned (UNESCAP, 2011). For example, in the UK, PPPs usually 
mean PFIs of three types: 1) free-standing projects, where the private sector is assumed to 
recover entire costs from the end user tariff, 2) joint ventures, where the private sector takes the 
initiative despite the contribution of the public sector and 3) services sold to the public sector 
(e.g. DBFO) (Allen, 2001). Among them the most popular type seems to be DBFO in the UK, 
reflecting the UK’s PPP system and socio-economic environment. One the other hand, 
according to MOSF (2009b) types of PPPs in Korea are largely categorised into “profit-oriented 
PPP” (i.e. BTO) and “lease-oriented PPP” (i.e. BTL) considering Korea’s institutions and 
market
10. 
Consequently, it seems that PPP research on specific region or country needs to consider how 
PPPs are classified and what type is mostly used in order to reflect the characteristic of each 
region or country. Therefore, this research will consider the most popular PPP types in Korea, 
BTO and BTL, in deciding which procurement option is the most favourable, including 
conventional delivery.  
 
 
2.2.3 Advantages and disadvantages of PPPs 
 
There are many advantages and disadvantages, which are shown in Table 2-3, when using PPPs 
for infrastructure provision. Although types of PPPs can vary from country to country, it is no 
exaggeration to say that all countries try to obtain all these advantages in using PPPs.  
 
Advantages 
Looking at the major advantages, first of all, PPPs make it possible to do better whole-of-life 
evaluation and to obtain better VFM by eliminating the so-called “optimism bias” which makes  
conventional delivery seem better than it really is (Katz, 2006, Kwak et al., 2009, Harris, 2005).  
The next advantage is that through the PPP system the private sector has a tendency to minimise 
whole-of-life costs by optimising design and operation in order to be selected as a 
concessionaire (Katz, 2006, Grimsey and Lewis, 2004b, Kwak et al., 2009, Harris, 2005). From 
                                         
10 In Korea, no PPP projects has been launched without governmental subsidy which consists of 
compensation cost and construction support.  Considering the revenue stream of transport projects, the 
Korean government supports approximately 30 to 50 percent of the total project cost, which is the sum of 
compensation cost and construction cost. Therefore, strictly speaking, “profit-oriented PPPs (i.e. BTO)” 
in Korea are different from free-standing projects in the UK. JI HONG PARK    Ch.2 PPPs in Transport 
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the viewpoint of the government sector, other than government budget, the government sector 
can access additional capital sources without causing a budget deficiency through off-balance 
sheet financing (Katz, 2006, Grimsey and Lewis, 2004b, Kwak et al., 2009).
11  
 
Table 2-3: Advantages and disadvantages from various researchers 
 
Source: Katz (2006), Kwak et al. (2009), Harris (2005), Grimsey and Lewis (2004b), Papajohn et al. 
(2011) and Regan et al. (2009) 
 
Most importantly, with PPPs the government sector can transfer the risks and responsibilities 
which are provided in the contract to the private sector (Grimsey and Lewis, 2004b, Katz, 2006, 
Kwak et al., 2009). The innovation and creativity from the private sector to develop transport 
infrastructure could also represent an advantage when using PPPs (Kwak et al., 2009, Harris, 
2005).  
 
With respect to the innovation and creativity, in fact, it is difficult to find the results of the 
innovation and creativity independently or separately in PPP practices because they are usually 
shown as a lumped form of whole life cost saving, early completion or enhanced service quality, 
                                         
11 PPP projects are sometime delivered on-balance sheet financing and sometimes off-balance sheet. 
When PPP projects are delivered by a project company acting as the government’s private sector 
counterparty, the government’s balance sheets will be affected by whether the company itself is classified 
as a public or a private entity (OECD, 2012).  
Advantages Disadvantages
Quantitative
j better whole-of-life evaluation without an 
optimism bias and value for money 
k optimisation of design and operation in order to 
minimise whole-of-life costs 
l completion of project at the lowest cost and in 
the shortest time period 
m transferring risks from the government sector to 
the private sector 
n allowing the public sector to avoid up-front 
capital costs and reduce public sector 
administration costs 
j high tendering and negotiation costs 
k either bankruptcy or very large profits of the 
private sector due to long term project could create 
political problems for the government, causing it to 
intervene
l limited competition in PPP projects or PPPs 
monopoly could cause higher costs 
m likelihood of high cost since the private sector 
cannot borrow capital to finance projects as 
cheaply as the public sector
Qualitative
o access to additional capital without causing 
budget deficiency 
p off-balance sheet financing 
q assurance of good maintenance and service 
quality 
r facilitating innovation in infrastructure 
development 
s promotion of local economic growth and 
employment opportunities, and development of 
new business sector
n relatively new concepts that are not well 
understood in some countries 
o difficulties of ensuring good performance 
p lack of appropriate knowledge and skills to 
implement such long-term projects in both the 
public and private sector 
q likelihood of project delay due to political 
debates, public opposition, and complex 
negotiation processes JI HONG PARK    Ch.2 PPPs in Transport 
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mixed with other advantages. Government officials in Korea, therefore, tend to consider PPPs as 
merely financial alternatives to public delivery, emphasising the role of off-balance sheet 
financing and ignoring the effectiveness resulting from the engineering innovation and 
creativity, because standard design guidelines which most PPPs are subject to prevent them 
from achieving cost reductions with respect to the innovation and creativity (Perkins, 2013).  
Also, recent research (Blanc-Brude et al., 2009) showed that there were little differences in 
construction cost between PPPs and conventional delivery and this research seems to support 
their viewpoint. Accordingly, they tend to think that a project implemented by a PPP alternative 
is almost identical to one by conventional option except where project funds come from.  
 
However, their viewpoints on PPPs seem to be problematic because it has already been shown 
that, when a project is planned considering whole life cost concept, combing project stages such 
as design, construction and operation like PPPs, whole life cost effectiveness can be achieved in 
procurement practices. Theoretically, there is high possibility of saving more whole life cost  
when a project is reviewed at the earlier stages such as planning and design (Smith, 2002, TRB, 
2010, Miller et al., 2009) because more innovative and creative measures can be reflected well 
at the earlier stages, through the selections of procurement, route,  location, material and 
construction method.  
 
In particular, regarding procurement choice, PPPs that bundle project stages can always allow 
some reductions in whole life cost (Nisar, 2007, Burger and Hawkesworthsworth, 2011). For 
example, some PPP road projects, such as E18 (Muurla-Lohja) in Finland (Vehviläinen, 2007),  
M25 in the UK (NAO, 2010), the Peninsular Link Project in Australia and  Port Man Project in 
Canada (FHWA, 2011), show the competitiveness in terms of whole life cost, compared with 
conventional delivery. In addition, according to Ugrate et al. (2012), through innovation in 
design under PPP contracts, the LBJ Expressway (IH-635 managed lanes, Dallas, Texas, USA) 
reduced “construction costs by USD 970 million from an initial estimate of USD 2.875 billion”. 
As well as this, the comparison engineering materials and building methods at design stage can 
also reduce whole life cost including initial cost and maintenance cost (Wimsatt et al., 2009). 
Talking broadly, it may be said that these types of whole life cost savings were achieved by the 
innovation and creativity due to the adoption of PPPs that bundle project stages.  
 
Additionally, PPPs can have high possibility of obtaining more revenue through more creative 
methods (such as sales promotions and subsidiary enterprises) than conventional delivery. It is 
because the revenue increase using sales promotions or subsidiary enterprises (e.g. such as 
service stations on the National Expressway) is directly connected to the profit increase for the 
private sector in PPPs. For example, in order to promote usage, some PPP expressway projects JI HONG PARK    Ch.2 PPPs in Transport 
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(Cheonan-Nonsan, Daegu-Pusan and Seoul-Chuncheon) in Korea use TV commercials that 
emphasize user benefits like the reduction of travel time and fuel expenses.   
Therefore, it is more reasonable to consider the innovation and creativity factors in the private 
sector in whole life perspective as well as the advantages of off-balance sheet financing in 
deciding whether to use PPP options or not. 
   
 
Disadvantages 
However, several disadvantages also exist when implementing PPPs for public services. To 
begin with, unlike with conventional delivery, PPPs can cause high transaction costs in the 
tendering and negotiation process, which can be criticised for not being efficient compared with 
conventional delivery (Katz, 2006, Dudkin and Välilä, 2005, NAO, 2004).  
Next, although when launching a PPP, a good performance is expected, in reality it is very 
difficult to ensure how good the performance from the private sector is (Katz, 2006) seemingly 
because of poor regulation.  
In addition, limited competition in PPP projects could cause unexpected higher costs. According 
to Kim et al. (2008a), about 60 per cent of PPP projects were implemented without competition 
in Korea between 2000 and 2007
12, and as a result the PPP system has been suspected of 
wasting available public funds (CCEJ, 2009).  
Another important disadvantage is that high financial cost
13 could be an obstacle in using PPPs. 
The financial cost of the private sector is usually higher than that of the public sector for two 
reasons. Firstly, commercial banks tend to think that lending money to the private sector is more 
risky than lending to the public sector, so the private sector needs to pay an extra premium to 
borrow money compared with the public sector, which can do that at a risk-free rate (Palmer, 
                                         
12 It seems that collusion still exists in construction market in Korea notwithstanding eradication efforts of 
the Korean government. In the past (before 2010), when construction company led PPP projects, the 
collusion practice in construction market seems to have spread out to PPP market though it is abnormal 
from a viewpoint of international PPP market. However, nowadays financial firms usually leads PPP 
projects and PPP market seems to be free from collusion practice. 
13 Theoretically, the financial cost of the private sector is not always more expensive than that of the 
public sector. However, the equity risk that taxpayers take on is usually ignored in PPP decisions, so the 
financial cost of the public sector becomes cheaper (Jenkinson, 2003, Grout, 1997). In addition, in reality 
the efforts of the public sector to transfer risks to the private sector as much as they can also make the 
financial cost of the private sector increase (Meaney and Hope, 2012). JI HONG PARK    Ch.2 PPPs in Transport 
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2000, Broadbent et al., 2003, Ball et al., 2007).
14 In addition, project financing for the private 
sector requires extra costs and fees such as funding fees (Palmer, 2000). For example, in the UK, 
to borrow senior debt
15 for PFI project, the private sector needs to pay typically 2 or 4 
percentage points higher than the government sector does (Spackman, 2002, Accounts 
Commission, 2002). According to the PPP pre-qualification report on the Osan-Gwangju BTO 
project conducted in 2009 in Korea, the financial cost to the public sector was 5.42 per cent 
(five-year exchequer bond), while that of the private sector was from 7.0 per cent (senior debt) 
to 12.0 per cent (subordinated debt) (Yeo and Yu, 2009).  
 
Considerations for better PPP decisions 
When deciding whether to use PPPs or not, each country has to consider these advantages and 
disadvantages. As shown in Table 2-3, the advantages and disadvantages of PPPs can be 
classified into quantitative and qualitative. Most quantitative factors are related to whether the 
public sector cost goes up or down and how early a project can be completed by PPPs. 
Accordingly, a quantitative PPP decision methodology seems to need to take completion time as 
well as the public sector cost into account, considering that the impact of the completion time as 
well as the public sector cost can be quantified for a reasonable PPP decision.  
In addition, when PPP schemes and conventional delivery provide clearly different completion 
times, namely different effectiveness, from each other, as in Korea, it seems somewhat 
problematic to compare only the public sector cost for the selection of procurement option in 
terms of quantitative assessment.  
Consequently, for a better PPP decision, it is reasonable to take not only the public sector cost 
but also the completion time into account in the quantitative PPP decision methodology.  
 
 
                                         
14 Superficially it seems to be reasonable to use cheap public funds by issuing additional exchequer bonds 
instead of expensive private funds. However, it is practically impossible to replace private funds with 
public funds by issuing additional exchequer bonds because issuing additional exchequer bonds for 
infrastructure provision can cause the following problems around: 1) fairness among budget-consuming 
fields, 2) fiscal sustainability (balanced fiscal finance), 3) sovereign credit rating, and 4) fund delivery for 
a specific, urgent project (MOSF, 2009c).  
15 Debt in finance is largely divided into senior debt and subordinate debt in terms of priority. Senior debt 
takes priority over subordinate debt (or “junior debt”) owed by the debtor, so when the debtor goes 
bankrupt the senior debt must be repaid prior to any debt held by other creditors. JI HONG PARK    Ch.2 PPPs in Transport 
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2.2.4 PPP status and prospects in transport 
 
Status of world PPP market 
According to the World Bank Private Participation in Infrastructure Database
16 (World Bank 
and PPAIF, 2013), from 1990 to 2011, globally 5,240 projects in the fields of energy, telecom, 
transport and water and sewage sectors, started using PPPs amounting to 1,826.9 billion USD. 
From the viewpoint of total investment, the telecom sector is the biggest, occupying 44.9 per 
cent of the total PPP market, followed by the energy sector (34.5 per cent) and the transport 
sector (17.0 per cent).  
With respect to the transport sector, during the same period, 1,373 projects amounting to 310.7 
billion USD were implemented to construct or operate airports, railroads, roads and seaports. 
Among the transport sector, roads make up the largest area of investment, occupying 51.7 per 
cent of the total transport PPP market, followed by seaports (19.5 per cent). 
 
Table 2-4: The status of PPP projects from 1990 to 2011 
 
                                                                                                      Source: World Bank and PPAIF (2013) 
 
Prospect of transport PPP market 
The OECD (2006) estimated annual world infrastructure expenditure between 2000 and 2030  
for selected sectors (road, rail, telecom, energy and water), as shown in Table 2-5. With respect 
to road and rail, according to the OECD (2006), during the same period, the annual expenditure 
requirements were calculated to approximately from 269 to 350 billion USD, with a range of ± 
20 per cent fluctuation, using a model having the current existing stock of road or rail and GDP 
growth as key drivers. In addition, the difference between this amount and available public 
                                         
16 http://PPI.worldbank.org 
Number % Billion USD %
2,283 43.6 630.41 34.5
822 15.7 820.62 44.9
1,373 26.5 310.65 17.0
Airports (145) (10.6) (33.96) (10.9)
Railroads (116) (8.4) (55.71) (17.9)
Roads (731) (53.2) (160.49) (51.7)
Seaports (381) (27.7) (60.49) (19.5)
762 14.5 65.16 3.6
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funds is recommended to be added using PPPs (OECD, 2007), so the transport PPP market in 
the future seems likely to experience growth. 
 
Table 2-5: Annual world infrastructure expenditure as a percentage of World GDP 
Source: OECD (2006) 
 














Road 220 0.38 245 0.32 292 0.29
Rail 49 0.09 54 0.07 58 0.06
Telecom 654 1.14 646 0.85 171 0.17
Electricity 127 0.22 180 0.24 241 0.24
Water 576 1.01 772 1.01 1037 1.03
1. Estimates apply to the years 2005, 2015 and 2025
2. Transmission and distribution only
3. Only OECD countries, Russia, China, India and Brazil are considered hereJI HONG PARK    Ch.2 PPPs in Transport 
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2.3 Transport and PPP system of Korea 
 
 
2.3.1 Transport in Korea 
 
Transport share and investment 
With respect to the transport demand share among transport modes in Korea, roads and railways 
are the major transport modes from the viewpoint of passenger numbers as well as freight. For 
example, according to the Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs (MLTM) (2011c), 
roads occupied 81.4 per cent of the total passenger transport demand in passenger-
kilometres/year, followed by railways with 15.9 per cent as of 2008. In addition, regarding 
freight transport, roads and railways occupied 71.1 and 8.1 per cent of the total freight transport 
in tonne-kilometres/year respectively as of 2008.  
 
Table 2-6: The investment in transport from the Korean Government budget 
(Unit: ten million KRW, %) 
 
Source: MLTM (2011c) 
 
As a result, transport investment in Korea has focused on roads and railways. According to 
MLTM (2011c), as shown in Table 2-6, the Korean government has invested approximately 15 
to 17 trillion KRW
17 in the transport infrastructure annually between 2004 and 2010, and in 
doing so it has concentrated on roads and railways (including urban rail), which have occupied 
about 46 to 54 per cent and 28 to 32 per cent of the total investment respectively. Consequently, 
this research will concentrate on road and railway among the transport modes in Korea, given 
the transport demand share and the transport investment in Korea.  
 
 
                                         
17 1million KRW = 541.3 GBP (as of 27 May 2012) 


























































Note: 1. The bracketed values are percentages of each sector to total investment. 
          2. Others include logistic facilities and relating infrastructures like access roadJI HONG PARK    Ch.2 PPPs in Transport 
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Roads 
In terms of modern paved roads, roads in Korea started to be built between the 1970s and 1980s 
with the help of the IBRD and the ADB. After the 1980s, following the rapid growth of the 
Korean economy and the expansion on car ownership
18, the road network was expanded to 
support increasing transport demands. By December of 2012, the total length of the roads was 
105,930 km and car registration exceeded 18 million. In Korea, road authority and responsibility 
of construction and operation differ depending on the classification of roads.  
 
Table 2-7: Classification of Roads in Korea 
(As of 2012)  
 
Source: MLTM (2012a)  
 
Note: a) The Korea Expressway Corporation (KEC) constructs and operates the National Expressways as a proxy of 
the Minster of the MLTM. b) As of 2012, about 10 per cent of the National Expressway network is constructed or 
operated by BTO companies according to the contract awarded from the Korean government. c) The planned length 
of the National Expressway is 4,468km and its length in use is 3,912 km as of 2012 
 
As seen in Table 2-7, the Minister of the MLTM is responsible for the construction and 
operation of the National Expressway and the National Highway (excluding the National 
Highway in city areas), while with respect to other roads the responsibility of construction and 
operation lies with local governments.  
                                         
18 The changes of the gross net income (GNI) per capita and car ownership are as follows: 
  1970  1980  1990  2000  2010  2011  2012 
GNI per capita (USD)  254  1,645  6,147  11,292  20,562  22,451  22,708 
Car ownership (vehicles)  126,600  571,754  3,394,803  12,059,276  17,941,356  18,437,313  18,870,533 





National Expressway Minister of the MLTM





















Governor of province 
(Mayor of city)






City Road Mayor of city Mayor of city Mayor of city 27,086
County Road Governor of county Governor of county Governor of count 23,865
Classification Road Authority
Responsibility
Length in use 
(km)
National Highway
Minister of the MLTM
(Mayor of City)
Minister of the MLTM
(Mayor of city)
Minister of the MLTM
(Mayor of city)
13,797 
(2,232)JI HONG PARK    Ch.2 PPPs in Transport 
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With respect to the National Expressway, the first of these was the Seoul-Pusan Expressway, 
which was planned to support the development of the national economy and to manage freight 
transport in the 1970s. As of 2012, Korea has a plan by 2020 to have in total 5,470km long 
National Expressways (35 routes) which have been designated by Road Act, and nearly 87 per 
cent of them (3,912 km) has already been constructed and been operated by the Korea 
Expressway Corporation (KEC) or PPP companies. In addition, the fund for the construction of 
National Expressway consists of governmental budget, funds from issuing KEC bonds and toll 
revenue. Usually, government supports the full expenses of feasibility study, design and land 
acquisition, and half of the construction cost.  
When it comes to the National Highway, this is defined as an arterial road, being designated by 
a presidential decree; it connects major cities, ports, airports and industrial facilities. The total 
length of the National Highways in 2012 was 13,797 km. The Minister of the MLTM is 
responsible for approximately 90 per cent of the National Highways, and the mayor of each city 
constructs and maintains about 10 per cent of them, which run through the city area (MLTM, 
2009). To construct and maintain a National Highway, the MLTM has respectively five regional 
offices and 18 Highway management offices in Korea. The funds for construction and 
maintenance of the National Highways are delivered by the governmental budget. 
With respect to the application of PPP scheme in road sector, since 1997 only the BTO scheme 
has been used for some profitable National Expressway projects and no PPP scheme has been 
applied to the National Highway projects to date. 
 
Railways 
The history of railways in Korea began in 1899 with the completion of the Seoul-Incheon 
National Railway. At that time, railways in Korea were constructed by Japan and the US with 
the purpose of colonial exploitation for natural resources like iron and coal. As a result, the 
modern railway networks, such as the Seoul-Pusan and the Seoul-Mokpo, were formed in the 
early 20
th century (MLTM, 2010a). In the middle of the 1990s, the Korean government planned 
to construct the High Speed Railway using high speed trains (Korea Train eXpress, KTX) to 
prevent serious road congestion. The Seoul-Taegu High Speed Railway was opened in 2004, 
and the Taegu-Pusan section was completed in 2010.  
As shown in Table 2-8, railways in Korea are largely classified into three categories: the High 
Speed Railway, the National Railway and the Urban Railway. In Korea, the Korea Railway 
Network Authority (KRNA), on behalf of the MLTM, is in charge of the construction and 
maintenance of the High Speed Railway and the National Railway, and Korea Railroad 
Corporation (KRC) is responsible for the operation of railways and trains. The funds for rail JI HONG PARK    Ch.2 PPPs in Transport 
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construction come from the national budget, the funds by issuing the KRNA bonds and rail use 
fee from the KRC.  
With respect to the Urban Railway, which means underground metros or light/heavy railways in 
a metropolitan city, the metropolitan city usually establishes a public sector authority to build, 
operate and maintain urban railways. However, in some cases, local governments seem to prefer 
PPP companies instead of public sector authorities because the initial construction cost can be a 
great economic burden.  
In contrast to the road sector, not only the BTO scheme but also the BTL scheme has been 
applied to the National Railway and the Urban Railway. The first PPP project in rail sector was 
the Incheon International Airport Railway project (which used BTO). However, after the BTL 
scheme was introduced in 2005, the BTL scheme has been predominant in the railway sector. 
 
Table 2-8: The length of railways in Korea 
(Unit: km) 
 
Source: MLTM (2010a) 
 
Future investment plan 
In order to support sustainable economic growth and balanced national development, the 
transport network in Korea is expected to expand in the future, as shown in Fig 2-2. According 
to MLTM (2011c), by the year 2020, over the period between 2011 and 2020 the total 
investment on arterial roads and railways, including 70 road and 72 rail projects, is expected to 
be approximately 142 trillion KRW. From the viewpoint of total length, the Korean government 
has a blueprint that by 2020 the National Expressway network will be expanded to 5,470 km, 
from 3,776 km in 2009, and the National Railway, including the High Speed Railway, will be 
expanded to 4, 995km, from 3,378 km in 2009. In addition, the Korean government expect that 
transport shares of railways in terms of passenger-kilo metres/year and tonne-kilo metres/year 
will increase to 27.3 per cent and 18.5 per cent respectively (MLTM, 2011c).  
 
Given the various road and railway programmes in Korea, this research will address the 
National Highway, the National Expressway and the National Railway, considering the 
availability of historical observations.  
Classification 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Total 3,515 3,526 3,540 3,551 3,797 3,862 3,874 3,899 3,885 3,912
High Speed Railway 
(KTX)
- - - - 240 240 240 240 240 240
Urban Railway 394 401 410 410 422 470 482 500 504 534
3,135 National Railway 3,123 3,125 3,129 3,140 3,152 3,152 3,159 3,140 3,138JI HONG PARK    Ch.2 PPPs in Transport 
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Source: MLTM (2011c) 
Figure 2-2: The National Transport Network Master Plan 
19(2001-2020) of Korea 
 
                                         
19  According to the Transport System Efficiency Act in Korea, the National Transport Network Master 
Plan is established every twenty year and this can be amended considering the changes in economic or 
political environments. The most recent amendment was made in 2012. JI HONG PARK    Ch.2 PPPs in Transport 
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2.3.2 The PPP system of Korea 
 
History 
The Korean government implemented 93 PPP projects on the basis of individual laws such as 
the Toll Road Act and the Harbour Act from 1968 to 1994 before the legislation of the Act on 
Promotion of Private Capital into Social Overhead Capital Investment (the PPP Act) which 
introduced PPPs into Korea. However, considering these projects were intended only to remedy  
temporary shortfalls in the government budget, though they could be one of various PPP types, 
they differ from the current popular PPP types (BTO/BTL), where autonomy was granted from 
the government sector not only in financing but also in construction and operation (Park, 1999).  
The first legal framework of PPP system was introduced when the PPP Act was made in August 
1994 and enacted from 1 January 1995. After that, in December 1998 the PPP Act was wholly 
amended. The two main contents that were amended were the introduction of diverse PPP 
implementation schemes including solicited and unsolicited schemes, and the adoption of risk 
sharing mechanisms such as the MRG and the buyout right (Kim, 2008). The second 
amendment of the PPP Act was made in January 2005 to expand eligible facilities for PPPs, 
which were centred on transport infrastructures by then, to social infrastructures that are closely 
related to people’s everyday lives, such as schools, healthcare facilities, culture and sport 
centres, and public rental housing. At the same time, the PPP Act introduced BTL schemes to 
enable private investment in social infrastructure as well as transport infrastructure (MOSF and 
KDI, 2011). 
 
Representative PPP types of Korea: BTO and BTL 
Basically, the Korean PPP system has no limitation on what types of PPP should be used, so all 
types of contractual schemes, including BTO, BOT, Build-Own-Operate (BOO) and BTL, are 
possible in Korea (MOSF, 2009b). Regardless of the PPP types, PPPs seem to be favourable to 
the public sector in terms of tax revenue because the project company in a PPP project pays 
taxes such as corporate tax in Korea and this implies that PPPs could generate more benefits 
(great public sector cost savings), compared with conventional delivery.  
Among these schemes, BTO and BTL are most popular. They are considered the standard PPP 
types, for the reasons that the private sector cannot own social infrastructure according to the 
Urban Planning Act and even without this act the private sector needs to pay several taxes such 
as asset acquisition and registration tax
20 to own assets (Wang, 2005). In fact, BTO and BTL are 
                                         
20 Asset acquisition tax: 1-3% of the standard value based on the current prices; registration tax: 1.6-4% 
of the standard value based on the current prices. JI HONG PARK    Ch.2 PPPs in Transport 
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a variant of BOT and BLT respectively (UNESCAP, 2011). Though it seems that there are little 
differences excepting when ownership is transferred to public sector, the time of ownership 
transfer can make a difference between BTO (or BTL) and BOT (or BLT) due to the different 
taxation scheme
21 in Korea between BTO (or BTL) and BOT (or BLT). According to Wang 
(2005), BTO scheme is more favourable to the private sector than BOT scheme in Korea, 
because the private sector does not have to pay property tax, local education tax and business 
place tax due to the difference in the ownership transfer time.  
However, these differences do not seem to affect the choice of BTO or BOT because the tax 
difference in regard to ownership is not included in VFM calculation in the name of competitive 
neutrality (Grimsey and Lewis, 2005). Other than that, for the private sector, the advantage in 
taxation in BTO can be a disadvantage to BOT in terms of subsidy; the reduction in private 
sector cost due to tax exemption in BTO can also mean the reduction in governmental subsidy 
in Korea. Accordingly, the impact of the difference in tax in deciding whether to use BOT or 
BTO can be diluted from the viewpoint of public sector or private sector in Korea. In addition, 
although many countries suggest various incentives like tax exemption or deduction to 
encourage private sector participation in PPPs, with a view to easing the infrastructure budget 
constraint (UNESCAP, 2011, Posautz, 2012, Lehman and Tregoning, 2004),  these incentives 
could cause distortion of competition in the end (Posautz, 2012).         
Figure 2-3 shows the structure of the BTO and the BTL schemes in Korea. In the BTO scheme, 
as soon as a facility is built the ownership is transferred to the government sector, and the right 
to operate this facility is granted to the project company (or the SPV), and it collects a user fee 
from end users by providing public services, so that it can gain a return on its investment for a 
specified period of time according to the contract.  
                                         
21 The taxation differences between BOT and BTO in Korea are shown in the table below. 
Source: Wang (2005) 
BOT BTO
- Construction period Refund of purchase tax amount Refund of purchase tax amount
- Operation period Taxation (10%) Taxation (10%)
Tax-free Tax-free




Annually 0.3 % of the standard value based
on the current prices
Tax-free
Annually 20% of property tax Tax-free
Annually 250 KRW per 1 m
2 of building area Tax-free Business place tax
(Note) According to the Local Tax Act (Article 106 and Article 126), acqution tax and registration tax can be exempt under the
condition that the real estate is transferred to the central or local government. The original table was modified by inserting some
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Source: MOSF and KDI (2011) 
Figure 2-3: Structure of the BTO and the BTL in Korea 
 
 
However, in the BTL scheme, though the general structure is not significantly different from the 
BTO scheme, the project company of a BTL project receives a lease fee from the government to 
gain a return on its investment, instead of collecting use fees from end users. Therefore, the 
BTL scheme is usually recognised to be appropriate to urgent social projects that find it hard to 
obtain funds from the private sector because of the low return, or that are expected to take a 
long time to provide services because of the limited access to government budget, such as 
schools, military accommodation, public housing, child-care facilities, senior citizen housing, 
welfare facilities, and cultural facilities (Kim, 2008).  
 
Table 2-9: Differences between the BTO and the BTL scheme in Korea 
Source: Kim (2010a) and Shim et al. (2005a) 
 
BTO BTL
Investment recovery User fee + construction subsidy + MRG Lease fee (fixed revenue)
Project risk Demand risk on concessionaire Little demand risk on concessionaire
Return High risk, high return Low risk, low return
Eligibility Both solicited and unsolicited projects Solicited project only
Facility types
Facilities that investment recovery is 
possible with user fee 
(e.g., roads, railways, ports etc.)
Facilities that invest recovery is impossible 
with end user fee 
(e.g., schools, military accommodations, public 
housing, cultural facilities etc.)
Note: 1. MRG = minimum revenue guarantee,  2. The MRG system for the unsolicited method and the solicited method 
was abolished respectively in 2006 and in 2009.JI HONG PARK    Ch.2 PPPs in Transport 
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The differences in the BTO and the BTL scheme are summarised in Table 2-9. Given these 
differences, the BTO and the BTL scheme are usually called “a profit-oriented PPP” and “a 
lease-oriented PPP” respectively.  
 
Issues of PPPs of Korea 
Although the PPP system of Korea has contributed to the infrastructure provision, many 
criticisms have been made and issues regarding PPPs have been raised from the National 
Assembly of Korea and the media.  
  BTO 
In particular, most criticisms have been concentrated on BTO projects. According to Lee (2005), 
the major issues in BTO projects can be summarised as follows: the excessive MRG, the low 
competition in selecting concessionaire and expensive construction cost, and the high charge to 
the end user. Among these issues, the excessive MRG seems to be the most important issue. 
Regarding the MRG cost burden of the public sector, reporters like Jung (2011) and Kang (2012) 
have pointed out that the excessive MRG is due to the inaccurate traffic volume forecasts in PPP 
projects. Although the MRG was completely abolished in 2009, regarding the contracts awarded 
with the MRG condition before 2009, the government needs to pay the MRG cost every year. 
According to the Board of Audit and Inspect of Korea (BAI, 2012), as an MRG cost, 2.1 trillion 
KRW was already paid to the private sector, and the public sector is expected to pay 
approximately18.8 trillion KRW to the private sector in the future.  
The construction cost is also problematic in BTO projects. Son (2012) claimed that the 
construction subsidy in BTO projects is excessive, so that it is difficult to determine the merits 
of PPP projects. In addition, Lee (2008) argued that unit construction cost per kilometre in BTO 
road projects is more expensive than in conventionally delivered projects, which is due to the 
low competition in BTO projects. According to Kim et al. (2008a), the number of 
concessionaire bidders in PPP projects is just 1.88 on average, while in the conventionally 
delivered projects the number of bidders was between 57 and 180 from 2002 to 2007.   
Other than that, the public express strong dissatisfaction about the much higher tariff level in the 
BTO projects than in the public sector projects. For example, according to a document 
submitted to National Assembly of Korea from the MLTM in 2011 (Table 2-10), the tariff level 
of five National Expressways, completed over the last five years, was on average 1.06-2.89 
times higher than conventionally delivered projects. As a result, some members of the National 
Assembly of Korea, such as Sungsoon Kim and Ilpyo Hong, claimed that the Korean 
government needs to take necessary actions to reduce higher tariff in BTO road projects (Shim 
and Shin, 2010, Jeon, 2011).  JI HONG PARK    Ch.2 PPPs in Transport 
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Table 2-10: Tariff level of the BTO National Expressways 
Source: MLTM 
 
  BTL 
The BTL scheme is relatively free from criticisms compared with the BTO scheme because it 
was introduced in 2005 with a view to solving the problems created by the BTO scheme. 
However, it seems that payment mechanisms not relating to performance in the BTL scheme 
could be a critical issue in the future.  
Generally speaking, the payment mechanism depends on the PPP procurement method, which in 
turn is related to the nature of output procured. For example, BTO or BOT systems use a real-
toll usage payment reflecting project demand over the specified time lengths, while DBFO 
systems in the UK provide a shadow-toll usage payment and the performance-based DBFO 
provides payment on the basis of service availability (Aziz and Ahmed, 2007). In addition, the 
recent payment mechanism reflects not only service availability but also service management, 
safety performance (measured by the number of accidents) and even congestion management 
(measured by mean journey times, variability of journey times or delay times) (Mackie and 
Smith, 2005). In the UK, the Highways Agency provides payment based on the traffic demand 
with adjustments considering lane closure and safety performance, based on so-called shadow 
tolls (Highway Agency, 2011).  
In Korea, the government could reduce payments reflecting the level of service such as 
infrastructure safety, durability and user satisfaction, and payment mechanism should be 
provided in a PPP contract considering the infrastructure characteristics (MOSF, 2009a, MLTM 
and Gaya railway corp., 2007). However, to date, no payment reduction in BTL project has been 
reported in Korea, which could be an issue for the BTL scheme in the future. Although BTO 
payments reflect demand side outputs and BTL payments reflect supply side outputs, it seems 
that payments without the evaluation of the level of service are unlikely to meet with public 
approval. In addition, it seems that the performance-based DBFO will be a good alternative to 
the BTL if the payment mechanisms do not work well in the BTL scheme in Korea. 
Seoul Outer Ring 01/12/2007 36km 4,300 2,600 1.65
Busan-Ulsan 01/12/2008 47km 3,500 3,100 1.13
Seoul-Chuncheon 01/07/2009 61km 5,900 3,500 1.69
Yongin-Seoul 01/07/2009 23km 1,800 1,900 1.06
Incheon Grand bridge 01/10/2009 21km 5,500 1,900 2.89
Suwon-Pyungtaek 01/10/2009 39km 2,800 2,000 1.40
Note: Conventionally delivered means when each project is assumed to be delivered by the Korea Expressway 
Corporation (KEC).
National Expressway Completion Length
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PPP implementation procedure 
In Korea, there are two ways to initiate PPPs, according to the PPP Act and relating guidelines: 
the solicited route and the unsolicited route. The BTO scheme, as seen in Figure 2-4 (a), can be 
implemented by the above two methods, whilst the BTL scheme can be carried out only by the 




(a)  Implementation procedure for BTO projects 
 
                      
(b) Implementation procedure for BTL projects 
Source: MOSF and KDI (2011) 
Figure 2-4: Implementation procedures for BTO and BTL projects JI HONG PARK    Ch.2 PPPs in Transport 
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As shown in Figure 2-4 (a), in the solicited project route, the government asks the private sector 
to join a certain project by announcing a request for a proposal, including a project plan, and 
implementation terms and conditions. Before selecting a PPP project, project evaluation using 
diverse analysis, such as economic appraisal and VFM assessment, is performed in the name of 
the PPP pre-qualification test at preliminary feasibility stage, which will be explained in detail 
later (see 2.4.2). The PPP pre-qualification test is usually performed by the Public Private 
Investment Management Centre (PIMAC) on the behalf of the Ministry of Strategy and Finance, 
which is affiliated to the KDI. If the PPP pre-qualification test shows a positive result, the 
government designates the project as a PPP project. Through a bidding and negotiation process, 
the contract between the government and the private sector is awarded. 
However, in the unsolicited project route (Figure 2-4 (a) and (b)), a PPP project is initiated from 
the private sector. The private sector can propose a PPP project to the government, considering 
the government policy direction and public needs if it is sure that it can gain sufficient 
profitability. If the private sector proposes a PPP project, the government sector reviews 
whether the project accords with the governmental infrastructure provision plan and policy or 
not, and if so, the government performs the PPP pre-qualification test through the PIMAC. The 
subsequent procedure is the same as with the solicited project route.  
 
Status and prospect of PPPs of Korea 
According to the MOSF and the MLTM (SOC work group, 2012), between 2004 and 2011, the 
total infrastructure investment amounted to between 23.6 and 37.7 trillion KRW, or between 2.8 
and 3.3 per cent of GDP, as seen in Table 2-11. In addition, during the same period, the private 
capital investment from the BTO and the BTL projects occupied between 6.2 and 13.2 per cent 
of the total infrastructure investment.  
 
Table 2-11: Investment status on infrastructure 
(Unit: trillion KRW) 
 
Source: MOSF and MLTM, quoted from SOC work group (2012) 
2004 2006 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
21.9 22.6 24.9 31.3 35 33.1 29.4
Government budget 17.4 18.4 20.5 25.5 25.1 24.4 23.1
Others































Note: 1. Others mean the investment of the public corporations in Korea which construct or operate infrastructures such as National 
Highways, National Railways, International Airports, Seaports, Containers Wharfs and Water facilities.  2.  Private investment means 
the private capital investment from the BTO and the BTL projects awarded by the Korean government.  3. The bracketed percentage 
values in the private investment row mean the proportion of private investment to total investment.  4. The bracketed percentage 
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As shown in Table 2-12, with respect to the PPP projects, according to the MOSF and KDI 
(2011), there are 461 PPP projects in progress in Korea as of September 2009, among which 
there are 169 BTO projects and 292 BTL projects. All in all, about 54 per cent (251 projects) are 
in operation, 34 per cent (156 projects) are under construction and 11 per cent (54 projects) are 
in a preparatory phase following the awarding of the contract. 
 
Table 2-12: Status of PPP projects in progress 
(As of September 2009, unit: number of projects) 
 
Source: MOSF and KDI (2011) 
 
Looking into the composition of BTO projects shown in Figure 2-5 (a), with respect to the total 
investment cost, transport infrastructure such as roads, railways and seaports occupies 87 per 
cent, in other words 47.0 trillion KRW among 53.8 trillion KRW, while in the light of number 
of projects environmental facilities item occupies primarily with 36 per cent, or 60 projects.  
 
 
(a) BTO projects 
 
(b) BTL projects 
Source: MOSF and KDI (2011) 
Figure 2-5: Composition of BTO and BTL projects 
National Local Sub  total
Under Operation 24 82 108 145 251
Under Construction 15 31 46 110 156
Contract Awarded 8 9 17 37 54
Total 47 122 169 292 461
BTO projects
BTL projects TotalJI HONG PARK    Ch.2 PPPs in Transport 
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In BTL projects shown in Figure 2-5 (b), schools and dormitories item occupy 48 per cent with 
7.1 trillion KRW, followed by sewage pipes with 27 per cent, or 3.92 trillion KRW from the 
viewpoint of total cost. With respect to the number of projects, the schools and dormitories item 
is also the primary element. It occupies 59 per cent with 173 projects, followed by sewage pipes 
with 20 per cent, or 58 projects. 
With respect to the prospect of the PPPs of Korea, as shown in Figure 2-6, Kim (2008) 
estimated that, based on the Five-year National Fiscal Management Plan (2007-2011) of Korea, 
the total investment of the BTO project from the public sector and the private sector will grow 
to 46.6 trillion KRW on average and that of BTL projects will be 69.9 trillion KRW between 
2007 and 2016.  
 
 
Source: Kim (2008) 
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2.4 PPP decision-making 
 
 
2.4.1 Examples from other countries 
 
Deciding on an appropriate procurement method for infrastructure services is critical in the 
project procurement process. Globally, decisions on whether to use PPP schemes or which PPP 
scheme is appropriate for a project are usually made through a procurement option assessment, 
where the government selects an appropriate procurement method producing the best VFM as 
well as the highest suitability for project objectives and outcomes.  
 
UK 
In the UK, after an investment decision is made for a project, delivery authorities contemplate 
the most appropriate procurement method and deliberate on how to compose and manage 
procurement procedure (HM Treasury, 2008). According to the Department of Finance and 
Personnel of Northern Island (DFP, 2010), in the procurement option assessment, delivery 
authorities evaluate the suitability of the various PPP schemes and traditional delivery in terms 
of the VFM assessment by the HM Treasury, through which it is essential to compare various 
options in order to offer the best VFM. In addition, the VFM assessment is conducted at 
programme level, project level and procurement level (HM Treasury, 2006) and through this 
process an appropriate procurement option is clearly determined.  
With respect to the procurement options, there could be a series of choices considering the 
characteristics of the infrastructure service. For example, a PPP guidance for local authorities 
(4PS, 2004) suggests six procurement options for highway services: in-house provision, 




Australia has a procurement option analysis procedure for PPP decisions that is similar to the 
UK’s. The key issue in the procurement option analysis is which type of delivery system 
produces the best VFM, in terms of meeting the project objectives and outcomes (Australian 
Government, 2008a). In determining a procurement option, various delivery models are 
considered. These include: PPPs; construct-only (lump sum or fixed price contract); design and 
construct; design, construct and maintain; construction management; alliance contracting; or 
managing contractor model. The VFM evaluation is used as the background for the procurement 
option analysis, and consideration factors for this analysis include determining core versus non-JI HONG PARK    Ch.2 PPPs in Transport 
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core services, VFM, analysis of market capability and appetite and public interest. The VFM 
drivers are used as the basis for this assessment (Australian Government, 2008d). 
 
Hong Kong 
In Hong Kong, when the strategic need for infrastructure services has been determined, a 
procurement option analysis, including PPP options, is implemented in a feasibility or business 
case study. The procurement option analysis is usually implemented twice (stage 1 and stage 2). 
At stage 1 usually high level cost estimates are gathered from a market-testing exercise and, 
using these data, different options are compared, and at stage 2 a detailed public sector 
comparator for the VFM analysis is required (Efficient Unit, 2008a). 
 
British Columbia, Canada 
When it comes to British Columbia, Canada, the evaluation of procurement options is mainly 
composed of two steps. The first step is to identify the main project objectives and to assess a 
variety of procurement options, including both conventional and PPP schemes, in terms of the 
qualitative context. The second step provides a more detailed quantitative analysis: this uses risk 
analysis with the Monte Carlo Simulation and financial analysis with a public sector comparator 
(Partnerships British Columbia, 2011). It seems that this quantitative analysis means, in practice, 






According to the Construction Technology and Management Act and the National Finance Act, 
the procedure for public works in Korea mainly consists of seven phases: 1) a preliminary 
feasibility study, 2) a feasibility study, 3) a basic design, 4) a final design, 5) a tender/bid, 6) 
construction, and 7) operation and maintenance. In terms of whether to use PPP schemes or not 
for a project, PPP decisions are usually made through the pre-qualification test for PPPs by the 
Public PIMAC under the Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MOSF) after the preliminary 
feasibility study, where a project is scrutinised for compliance with economy and governmental 
policy.  
In the PPP pre-qualification test shown in Figure 2-7, the VFM assessment is largely divided 
into three steps: quantitative VFM test, qualitative VFM test and comprehensive decision. The 
first step is the quantitative VFM test, where the whole-life cost is compared between the PPP 
and the public sector option in terms of the reduction in public sector expenditure. As a PPP JI HONG PARK    Ch.2 PPPs in Transport 
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option, the BTO option is usually used in the National Expressways, while in the National 
Railway both BTL and BTO are used though the BTL has predominated recently. After 
conducting the quantitative VFM test, if the result shows that the PPP scheme is cheaper than 
the conventional delivery in terms of whole-of-life public cost, the project will proceed to the 
second step. 
The second step is the qualitative VFM test. The qualitative VFM test considers the 
improvement of service quality, various secondary effects like flexible fiscal management, and 
the distinctiveness of the project. At the final stage, the comprehensive decision stage, even if 
the project proceeds to the qualitative VFM test, if the comprehensive decision stage gives a 
negative result, the project cannot be carried out by PPP schemes. After passing the preliminary 
feasibility study and the PPP pre-qualification test, the project can be designated a PPP project 




Source: MOSF, quoted from NABO (2007) 
Figure 2-7: PPP pre-qualification test process JI HONG PARK    Ch.2 PPPs in Transport 




As mentioned above, many countries have a procurement option assessment process before the 
procurement stage and after the investment decision stage. In selecting an appropriate option, 
including various traditional delivery options and PPP options, the VFM assessment seems to be 
used as a key factor in many countries. In Korea, the PPP pre-qualification test
22 seems to be 
similar to the procurement option assessment process that many other countries have. In 
addition, the VFM assessment seems to be a key factor in PPP decisions, as in other countries.  
   
                                         
22 Strictly speaking, the PPP pre-qualification test in Korea is different from procurement option 
assessment in other countries in that it considers only what to choose between public delivery and PPP 
delivery (BTL/BTO), without deliberating various alternative options like in-house provision, service 
outsourcing and partnering contract.  JI HONG PARK    Ch.2 PPPs in Transport 
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The VFM assessment was introduced and institutionalised first in the UK. In November 1994, 
HM Treasury announced that they would not approve a public sector procurement for capital 
project if it had not prepared a private participation plan or if its private participation plan had 
not been found to be uneconomic (Grout, 1997). As the HM Treasury used private funds more 
and more, they were under an obligation to explain why they try to use private funds instead of 
public ones. That is, they had to prove that their PFI system was better than public sector 
procurement from the viewpoint of VFM (Park, 2007).  
 
According to the HM Treasury (2006) VFM is defined as “the optimum combination of whole-
of-life costs and quality (or fitness for purpose) of the good or service to meet the user’s 
requirement”. A more detailed definition of VFM is found in Improvement Network sponsored 
by the Audit Commission and Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy. 
According to Improvement Network (2009), VFM is defined as follows:  
 
… Value for money is about obtaining the maximum benefit with the resource available. 
VFM is about achieving the right local balance between economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness, the 3ES – spending less, spending well and spending wisely. 
(Improvement Network, 2009) 
 
 
Source: Improvement Network (2009) 
Figure 2-8: Schematic diagram for VFM 
 
Figure 2-8 explains the relationship between VFM and the three elements, economy, efficiency 
and effectiveness. Firstly, economy is related to the costs and inputs which are needed to 
provide a public service; from an economic viewpoint, how low the cost is to provide a public JI HONG PARK    Ch.2 PPPs in Transport 
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service is very important. Second, efficiency is the relationship between inputs and outputs, 
namely productivity, which means how much the government receives from its inputs. It seems 
that these two elements of VFM can be measured quantitatively. Lastly, effectiveness is about 
secondary effects such as quality, and sustainability due to outputs, so it can be measured 
quantitatively and qualitatively depending on effects. Therefore, a high VFM can be achieved 
when a balance among these three elements is optimised, namely, when, from a specified 
delivery method, successful outcomes with relatively low costs and high productivity are 
expected (Improvement Network, 2009).  
 
All in all, VFM is a qualitative and quantitative approach to estimate outcomes, productivity and 
the whole-life costs of a project, and can also be a useful tool to decide how the government 
could achieve maximum benefits from constrained resources.  
 
 
2.5.2 The VFM assessment: quantitative and qualitative approach 
 
A complete VFM requires not only the quantitative assessment but also consideration of 
qualitative factors. In order to identify the best outcome, qualitative factors that have not been 
explicitly valued should be considered (Australian Government, 2008b). 
 
Quantitative VFM 
Quantitative VFM can be simply calculated by comparing the public sector costs from a so-
called public sector comparator (PSC) and a PPP alternative, as shown in Figure 2-9 (a). 
Explaining the quantitative VFM in detail, from the viewpoint of the NPV, the whole-of-life 
public costs of a PSC and a PPP are compared; the VFM means the NPV difference between 
PSC whole-of-life public costs and PPP whole-of life public costs, assuming that there is no 
completion delay (MOSF, 2009a).  
The components of PSC can be different between countries. For example, as shown in Figure 2-
9 (b) the PSC in the UK consists of tax, optimism bias, risks, operation cost and capital cost, 
while in Australia it is made up of transferable risk, competitive neutrality, raw PSC and 
retained risk, which are the same as in Korea. However, the raw PSC in Australia means capital 
cost and operation cost in the UK, and transferable risk and retained risk in Australia correspond 
to risk and optimism bias in the UK. In addition, competitive neutrality in Australia corresponds 
to tax in the UK (Shim et al., 2006). This means that the components of PSC between two 
countries are not quite different. Therefore, from now on, referencing the components of PSC in 
Australia and Korea, the following five major components will be examined. JI HONG PARK    Ch.2 PPPs in Transport 
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  Reference project 
When constructing a PSC, the first step is to identify the reference project. According to 
Partnerships Victoria (2001), the reference project is “the most likely and efficient form of 
public sector delivery that could be employed to satisfy all elements of the output specification, 
as outlined in the project brief, based on current best practice. Therefore, the reference project 
should reflect the most likely and achievable procurement approach by the relevant department 
to satisfy all elements of the output specification if the project were to proceed on a traditionally 
funded basis”. In addition, generally, the PSC and the PPP are assumed to provide “the same 
level of service” when analysing VFM, and the reference project means the project providing 
“the same level of service” (MOSF, 2009a).  
 
  Raw PSC 
Raw PSC means the base costs of the reference project, which includes construction costs, 
operation costs (including maintenance costs) and revenues, when the reference project is 
implemented by conventional public procurement and owned by the public sector (Partnerships 
Victoria, 2001, MOSF, 2009a). 
 
  Transferable risks 
Transferable risks means those risks that are transferred to the private sector when the public 
sector uses a PPP option (Australian Government, 2008b, MOSF, 2009a). As VFM can be 
realised by risk transfer from the public sector to the private sector under PPP arrangement, 
transferable risks are at the heart of VFM assessment. In order to determine the value of 
transferable risks, the availability of historical observations on cost items that are interested in is 
essential; however, the possibility of collecting these data differs by country. With respect to 
risk transfer, in Australia saved cost by PPP arrangement was reported at 9 per cent compared 
with the net present risk-adjusted cost of PSC (Fitzgerald, 2004). 
 
  Retained risks 
Retained risk means those risks that are not transferred to the private sector under the PPP 
arrangement because retained risks are located outside of the project (Australian Government, 
2008b, MOSF, 2009a). For an example, even if a National Expressway project is delivered 
using private funds, the Korean government retains the responsibility for raising user fees, 
which is a kind of retained risk. 
 
  Competitive Neutrality JI HONG PARK    Ch.2 PPPs in Transport 
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To compare a PSC with a PPP fairly, unfair items such as tax should be adjusted for, to ensure 
that there is competitive neutrality in the PSC calculation. Competitive neutrality means that the 
public sector and the private sector compete with each other on a level playing ground to 
conduct a certain project. Therefore, in light of competitive neutrality, unfair cost items needs to 
be adjusted in the VFM calculation (Sun et al., 2010, MOSF, 2009a).  
 
 
Source: Grimsey and Lewis (2005) 
(a) Comparison of a PSC and a PPP alternative 
 
 
Source: Shim et al. (2006) 
(b) Comparison of a PSC between Australia and the UK 
 
Figure 2-9: Comparison of a PSC and a PPP alternative JI HONG PARK    Ch.2 PPPs in Transport 
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Qualitative VFM 
It seems that qualitative VFM has become more important in the VFM assessment. With respect 
to qualitative VFM, HM Treasury revised the VFM assessment guidelines in 2004 with a view 
to transferring the focus of VFM from quantitative to qualitative (Shim et al., 2006). In Korea, 
qualitative VFM was simultaneously institutionalised when quantitative VFM was introduced in 
2005. 
What is to be assessed in qualitative VFM can be different depending on the country. For 
example, according to HM Treasury (2006), assessment items in the UK are largely categorised 
into three groups: 1) viability (objectives and outputs, operational flexibility, equity, efficiency 
and accountability), 2) desirability (risk management, innovation, contract duration, residual 
values, incentive and monitoring, and life-cycle cost), 3) achievability (market interest and other 
issues). In Korea, however, assessment items are composed of the improvement of service 
quality, the ease of contract management, risk transfer, secondary effect and project specialty 
(MOSF, 2009b).  
In addition, in terms of how to assess the qualitative items, though the methodologies are not 
explicitly suggested in the PPP or VFM guidelines of the UK and Korea, generally speaking 
there are many qualitative assessment methods available, such as observation, interviews and 
documentary analysis (Berg, 2001). For instance, Gil (2012) conducted qualitative VFM 
assessment on transport projects in Korea using interview technique in order to find an optimum 
PPP procurement option and Yang et al. (2007) tried the quantitative estimation of qualitative 
decision factors using an analytic hierarchy process (AHP) technique. 
 
Limitations of current Korean VFM assessment practice 
There are two limitations in the current Korean VFM assessment practice.  
The first is that, although qualitative VFM has already been introduced into the Korean PPP 
system, qualitative VFM does not seem to play a role in PPP decisions in the Korean PPP 
practice. With respect to qualitative VFM, reviewing the PPP pre-qualification test reports on 
several projects
23 by the PIMAC or the Korea Transport Institute (KOTI), all reports made 
almost the same judgement that the project needs to be implemented by a PPP option, 
considering the following (which are not related to the project and seem to be vague): 1) the 
                                         
23 Examples of projects include the Bongdam-Songsan National Expressway project, the Osan-Gwangju 
National Expressway project, the Bujeon-Masan National Railway project and the Sosa-Wonsi National 
Railway project. JI HONG PARK    Ch.2 PPPs in Transport 
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improvement of service quality due to the innovation and creativity of the private sector, 2) the 
efficiency of contract management utilising private sector experts, 3) the effectiveness of risk 
transfer, and 4) the management efficiency of the private sector. In addition, according to KDI 
(2012), the qualitative VFM result should be used as a mere reference in the PPP decisions.  
Accordingly, the qualitative VFM test does not seem to be practically implemented yet in Korea 
though there is systematic research on qualitative VFM using interview techniques (Gil, 2012) 
and AHP techniques (Yang et al., 2007). This implies that quantitative VFM can also be critical 
in PPP decisions in Korea, which is very similar to the argument of Grimsey and Lewis (2005) 
that most governments recognise the importance of qualitative VFM, suggesting qualitative 
factors in VFM calculation; however, in reality the quantitative VFM usually takes precedence 
in the VFM evaluation.  
The second is that the assumption that there is no completion delay between PPP options and 
conventional option does not seem to be appropriate in Korea, where systematic completion 
delay is expected in the conventional delivery due to the unusual national budget system, the 
LEC system (Kim et al., 2008b). In order to estimate the quantitative VFM, not only the effects 
but also timing (construction duration and completion) of a PSC and a PPP are assumed to be 
the same (MOSF, 2009a, Grimsey and Lewis, 2005, Hoose, 2011). However, it seems 
problematic if the completion delay between a PSC and a PPP option is ignored in the 
quantitative VFM calculation though it clearly occurs in Korea. In addition, although the 
qualitative VFM assessment could deal with the completion time difference and the resulting 
social benefit difference between a PSC and a PPP, it is more reasonable to deal with these 
differences in the quantitative VFM, partly because they could be assessed in a quantitative 
context and partly because qualitative VFM does not seem to play a role in PPP decision-
making in Korea.  
 
Consequently, the social benefit difference due to the completion delay needs to be included in 
the quantitative VFM (Morallos and Amekudzi, 2008) and a new quantitative VFM reflecting 
the completion time difference needs to be developed considering the Korean PPP system and 
its real world use. 
 
 
2.5.3 VFM assessment comparison among countries 
 
Although the VFM assessment method is used widely in the procurement option analysis, 
including in PPP decision and procurement process, the shapes are different with countries. 
Based on PPP or VFM guidelines of five countries (the UK, Australia, Korea, Hong Kong and JI HONG PARK    Ch.2 PPPs in Transport 
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Canada (British Columbia)), as seen in Table 2-13, several factors are explored: definition, 
composition, application level, PSC components, discount rate and qualitative appraisal factor. 
First, with respect to definition, the UK, Hong Kong and Canada (British Columbia) have their 
own definitions, while Australia and Korea do not. The definitions in the first three countries, 
though there are differences in terminology, are similar in focusing on the best outcomes 
(economy, efficiency and effectiveness) for the public need.  
Second, the VFM assessment is usually composed of a quantitative and a qualitative assessment. 
However, in Hong Kong it is not clear whether qualitative assessment is considered or not. In 
addition, as mentioned above, qualitative VFM is used as a formality in PPP decisions in Korea.   
Third, the application level also seems to be similar in these countries, in that each country uses 
the VFM assessment in the selection of procurement option and procurement bid process. 
However, the details in the application are different. For example, the VFM guideline of the UK 
(HM Treasury, 2006) provides for the use of the VFM assessment three times for the selection 
of procurement option (programme level, project level and procurement level), while other 
countries’ guidelines do not provides such a detailed description.  
Fourth, when it comes to PSC components, they differ by country. A PSC consists of a raw PSC, 
competitive neutrality, transferable risk and retained risk in Australia, Korea and Hong Kong, 
while in Canada (British Columbia) it is composed of capital costs, operating costs, life-cycle 
costs, transferred risk, insurance and taxation. Recently the UK even uses Outline Business Case 
(OBC), composed of asset cost, operation cost, optimism bias, risk and tax, instead of PSC.  
Fifth, the discount rates used in the VFM assessment are completely different for the different 
countries, given their socio-economic status. In addition, the basis of discount rate also differs 
by country. For example, the UK uses a social time preference rate based discount rate, while 
Australia and Canada (British Columbia) use a capital asset pricing model (CAPM) and 
weighted average cost of capital (WACC) model based discount rate respectively.   
Finally, regarding qualitative assessment, the UK has very detailed and clear factors for 
qualitative assessment. However, other countries just suggest qualitative factors as an example 
(e.g. Australia and Korea) or do not have explicit qualitative factors (e.g. Hong Kong and 
Canada (British Columbia)).  
 
In summary, reviewing the VFM assessment in several countries, although definition, 
composition and application level are similar, PSC components, discount rate and qualitative 
factors are quite different with countries. Therefore, considering this research is regarding 
quantitative PPP decisions in Korea, it seems reasonable that PSC components and discount rate JI HONG PARK    Ch.2 PPPs in Transport 
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in the VFM assessment should be related to the Korean context reflecting the socio-economic 
status and regulation of Korea.  
Table 2-13: Comparison of VFM assessment in several countries 
 
Source: HM Treasury (2006), Australian Government (2008b), MOSF (2009a), MOSF (2009b), Efficient 
Unit (2008a), Partnerships British Columbia (2011) and Morallos and Amekudzi (2008) 
 
Definition
‘The optimum combination of whole-of-life costs and quality (or fitness for purpose) of the good or 
service to meet the user’s requirement’
Composition Quantitative + qualitative appraisal
Application level Programme level (stage 1), project level (stage 2), procurement level (stage 3)
Components of PSC Outline Business Case (OBC), Full Business Case (FBC) 
Asset cost, operation cost, optimism bias, risk, tax
Discount rate 3.5% (real term) based on the social time preference rate
Qualitative appraisal factors
1) viability;  project level outputs, operational, flexibility, equity, efficiency, and accountability, 2) 
desirability; risk management, innovation, contract duration and residual value, incentives and 
monitoring, lifecycle costs, 3) achievability;  market interest, time scale, transaction cost
Remark
Overall judgement made based on qualitative and quantitative assessments. Balance between 
quantitative and qualitative test is emphasized.
Definition Not explicit
Composition Quantitative + qualitative appraisal
Application level Procurement option analysis, procurement
Components of PSC Raw PSC, competitive neutrality, transferable risk, retained risk
Discount rate 3 risk bands (very low, low, medium) based on the capital asset pricing model (CAPM)
Qualitative appraisal factors
(Examples) service delivery, operational requirements, interface/relationship, project management 
and a range of design considerations
Remark
In Australia, delivery method whether to use PPP or not is determined by procurement option 
analysis, where VFM assessment is used.
Definition Not explicit
Composition Quantitative + qualitative appraisal
Application level Preliminary feasibility study level, procurement level
Components of PSC Raw PSC, competitive neutrality, transferable risk, retained risk
Discount rate Discount rate provided by KDI (e.g. 6% (real term) for BTO, 6% (nominal term) for BTL )
Qualitative appraisal factors (Examples) the improvement of service quality, the easiness of contract management, risk transfer, 
secondary effects and project specialty
Remark Qualitative appraisal is not practically implemented. 
Definition
‘Value for money refers to the best available outcome taking account of all benefits, cost, and risks 
over the whole life of the procurement, combining economy, efficiency and effectiveness’.
Composition Quantitative (it is not clear whether qualitative analysis is used or not)
Application level PPP feasibility study stage, procurement stage
Components of PSC Raw PSC, competitive neutrality, transferable risk, retained risk
Discount rate The Economic Analysis and Business Facilitation Unit (EABFU) provides advice on discount rates 
to be used in calculating the net present value and internal rate of return.
Qualitative appraisal factors Not explicit
Remark PPP feasibility study is implemented at Business Case development stage.
Definition
‘Also commonly referred to as value for taxpayer dollars, VFM describes the benefits to the public 
expected to be realized through a particular procurement method, and can be quantitative and/or 
qualitative in nature’. 
Composition Quantitative + qualitative appraisal
Application level Procurement option analysis, procurement stage
Components of PSC Capital costs, operating costs, life-cycle costs, transferred risk, insurance and taxation
Discount rate
Discount rate based on the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) of the private sector, reflecting 
minimum rate of return, which investors would require in deciding to invest in a project.
Qualitative appraisal factors Not explicit
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This chapter has reviewed the generalities on PPPs, transport status and PPP system of Korea, 
and PPP decision methodology through a literature review. Based on the literature review, the 
following conclusions are drawn.  
The first conclusion concerns the necessity of a new quantitative PPP decision methodology 
reflecting systematic completion delay in the conventional delivery in Korea.  
Considering the common characteristics to various definitions and why governments want to 
use PPPs, a PPP seems to mean a public service delivery by the private sector through a 
contractual arrangement/relationship and risk sharing between the public and the private sector, 
with a view to overcoming the shortages in public funds and the resulting delays in 
infrastructure provision. In addition, the advantages that the public sector wants to achieve by 
using PPP schemes are mainly related to public sector cost savings and early completion 
compared with the conventional delivery, which can be quantified. Besides, though most 
governments recognise the importance of qualitative VFM, suggesting the inclusion of 
qualitative factors in VFM calculation, in reality the quantitative VFM usually takes precedence 
in the VFM evaluation (Grimsey and Lewis, 2005).  
Accordingly, for better PPP decisions, it is reasonable to take not only the public sector cost but 
also completion time into account in a quantitative PPP decision methodology. With respect to 
Korea, in particular, it seems necessary to develop a new quantitative PPP decision 
methodology considering the completion delay between the conventional and the PPP scheme, 
partly because systematic completion delay in the conventional delivery exists due to the 
unusual national budget system, the LEC system, and partly because qualitative VFM is 
practically conducted as a formality.  
The next conclusion concerns PPP types and transport programmes that should be considered in 
this research. It seems that PPP research on a specific country needs to consider how PPPs are 
classified and what type is mostly used in order to reflect the characteristic of each country. 
Additionally, considering the transport demand and the transport investment in Korea, roads and 
railways are the most important transport modes in Korea. Therefore, summing up, this research 
will consider Korea’s most popular PPP types, BTO and BTL, focusing on roads and railways, 
in deciding which procurement option is most favourable of the three considered (this includes 
conventional delivery).  
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Another important conclusion is that VFM assessment is worldwide used as a key factor in PPP 
decisions. Reviewing PPP decision-making in several countries, they all have a procurement 
option assessment process (or a similar stage) before the procurement stage and after the 
investment decision stage. In selecting an appropriate option, including the conventional and the 
PPP schemes, the VFM assessment seems to be the key factor used worldwide.  
 
Finally, reviewing the VFM assessment in several countries, definition, composition and 
application levels are quite similar, whereas PSC components, discount rate and qualitative 
factors are quite different among countries. Therefore, considering that this research concerns 
quantitative PPP decisions in Korea, it seems reasonable that PSC components and discount rate 
in the VFM assessment should be related to the Korean context and reflect the socio-economic 
status and regulation of Korea.  
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One of the main objectives of this research is to find out the impact of transferable risks on the 
PPP decision at a project level as well as at a programme level, and this is naturally related to 
which procurement option is the most favourable for each transport programme (the National 
Highway, the National Expressway and the National Railway). In addition, with respect to the 
land transport programme including roads and railways, the causes and the effects of PPP 
decisions are also examined in this research. To this end, various methodologies are employed 
in this research. Regarding the employed methodology, this chapter consists of six sections 
covering research objective 1-2: 1) the VFM analysis; 2) the Modified VFM; 3) risk 
quantification; 4) impact analysis; 5) case studies; and 6) meta-analysis.  
Firstly, as the most common PPP decision methodology, the VFM analysis is reviewed in terms 
of quantitative assessment (3.2). In this section, a quantitative formulation taking into account 
the Korean context is discussed, and the problems related to completion delay are also 
addressed in the later part. In order to consider the completion delay in the VFM analysis, a 
Modified VFM assessment is developed by adapting the NPV technique to the VFM in the next 
section (3.3). Along with the development of the Modified VFM, the question of how to select a 
proper discount rate for the Modified VFM is also dealt with here.  
Another important section in this chapter concerns risk quantification (3.4). In this section, the 
risks that need to be transferred from the public sector to the private sector are identified and 
how to quantify these is scrutinised as well. In addition, other risk factors considered in this 
research are also reviewed. When it comes to the impact analysis section (3.5), some impact 
analysis methodologies, including single-value estimation, sensitivity analysis and Monte Carlo 
Simulation, are considered. In this research, six case studies from three transport programmes 
(two for each) are also employed to determine the impact of transferable risks on the Modified 
VFM and PPP decisions. These will be discussed in section (3.6). 
Finally, the causes and the effects of PPP decisions in the land transport programme (roads and 
railways) are addressed in this study, with meta-analysis used as a methodology in section (3.7).  JI HONG PARK    Ch.3 Research Methodology 
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3.2 The VFM analysis 
 
 
The most common PPP decision methodology 
Many countries have used PPPs as a delivery method with a view to overcoming shortages in 
public funds and the resulting delays in infrastructure provision (EIB, 2005). However, to date, 
from the viewpoint of public sector costs, doubts about PPPs have also been raised by various 
researchers, for example Shaoul et al. (2012), and institutions, for example UNISON (2010). As 
a PPP decision methodology, the VFM assessment, assuming that timing (construction duration 
and completion) is the same for the conventional and PPP alternatives (Grimsey and Lewis, 
2005, MOSF, 2009a), is the most commonly used in deciding whether to use a PPP alternative 
or not for a project. Through this assessment, a PPP scheme can be justified if it is better than 
conventional procurement (Akintoye et al., 2003) in terms of economics (spending less), 
efficiency (higher productivity) and effectiveness (better outcome) (HMSO, 1999), even though 
it could be impossible to find one unique VFM test meeting all conditions and situations (Grout, 
2005).  
 
Quantitative VFM in the Korean context 
Generally, in the light of quantitative assessment, the current VFM approach assumes that 
efficiency and effectiveness from a PSC and a PPP are the same (MOSF, 2009a, Grimsey and 
Lewis, 2005, Hoose, 2011), so the only thing to be compared is the public sector cost. The 
public sector cost in a PSC includes construction cost, including design cost, operation cost, and 
other costs which the public sector should pay, while that of a PPP covers construction support 
from the public sector, MRG cost in BOT and lease fee in BTL. Therefore, the current VFM 
concept can be expressed as follows from the viewpoint of present value: 
 
      =  	
    
(  +  ) 
 
   
−  
    
(  +  ) 	
 
   
  (3-1) 
 
where C is public sector cost, d is a discount rate, and n (= construction period (tC) + operation 
period (tO)) is an analysis period. From equation (3-1), if VFM is positive, then the PPP project 
can be launched. Conversely, if VFM is negative, then the PPP system adoption will be 
discarded.  
 
As illustrated in the schematic drawing of the current VFM test of a PPP (a BTL scheme is 
considered) project in Korea (Figure 3-1), an ideal PSC (b) and a PPP (c) have the same benefit JI HONG PARK    Ch.3 Research Methodology 
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(effectiveness) but a different public sector cost from each other. For a simple discussion, Figure 
3-1 (a), explaining an ideal conventional public work, assumes that the public sector cost of a 
PSC includes the construction cost and the operation cost. Moreover, in Figure 3-1 (c), lease fee 
and operation costs are considered as a PPP cost. In the Korean context, the construction cost of 
an ideal PSC is assumed to be delivered by the issuing of a five-year exchequer bond, as 
stipulated in Korea’s BTL guidelines (MOSF, 2009a). Therefore, as a result of issuing a five-
year exchequer bond, during the construction period (tC) the public sector pays only the interest 
on the principal, after which it pays the interest and principal. Figure 3-1 (b) describes an ideal 
PSC scheme. This is actually the same as Figure 3-1 (a) except for investment cost delivery. 
According to the current VFM test, if the discounted PPP cost (e.g. lease fee and operation cost) 
is cheaper than the discounted PSC cost (e.g. construction cost and operation cost), the PPP 




(a) An ideal conventional public works scheme 
 
 
(b) An ideal PSC  (c) A PPP 
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According to the BTL guidelines (MOSF, 2009a) and the general guidelines for a feasibility 
study (KDI, 2008b) of Korea, capital expenditure between a PSC and a PPP can be summarised 
as in Table 3-1. As seen in Table 3-1, the cost items that need to be included in the VFM 
calculation is largely composed of the government base cost items and the risk adjustment cost 
items.  However, with respect to the risk adjustment cost, the guidelines do not provide how to 
estimate them. Accordingly, the VFM calculation in Korea is conducted without the inclusion of 
the risk adjustment cost.  
 
Table 3-1: Summary of capital expenditure between a PSC and a PPP 
 
Note: If compensation cost is given to the concessionaire from the central or local government for free, 
this should be excluded in the asset cost estimation and lease fee calculation.  
Source: MOSF (2009a) and KDI (2008b)  
 
Therefore, considering the government base cost in Table 3-1, from the viewpoint of BTO and 
BTL schemes, equation 3-1 can be expressed as follows (Park and Preston, 2013b): 
BTO BTL
Building cost Building cost Building cost
- Investigation - Investigation - Investigation
- Design - Design - Design
- Construction - Construction - Construction
Compensation cost Compensation cost
* Compensation cost
*
Additional cost Additional cost Additional cost
- Traffic impact  - Traffic impact  - Traffic impact 
   assessment    assessment    assessment
- Environmental impact - Environmental impact - Environmental impact
   assessment    assessment    assessment
- Inspection - Inspection - Inspection
- Insurance  - Insurance  - Insurance 
Operation facility cost Operation facility cost Operation facility cost
- Business reserve  Business reserve 
Tax and public utilities’ charge Tax and public utilities’ charge Tax and public utilities’ charge
Financial cost Financial cost Financial cost
Management cost Management cost Management cost
Maintenance cost Maintenance cost Maintenance cost
Government Monitoring cost Government Monitoring cost Government Monitoring cost
Other cost - Subsidy, MRG cost  Lease fee
(BTO) 
Asset cost +  Operation Cost – 
Revenue
(BTL) 





Cost overrun + Time overrun - -
①+②






Subsidy + MRG cost Lease fee + Operation costJI HONG PARK    Ch.3 Research Methodology 
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where       = asset cost in the PSC,       =	operation cost in the PSC,            = 
government subsidy including compensation cost and construction subsidy in the BTO, Revenue 
= the government’s revenue income when the government uses conventional delivery  that can 
be obtained,        = MRG cost from the government in the BTO,      	   	    = the lease 
fee that the government pays to the private sector in the BTL and       = operation cost in the 
BTL.  
 
Questions for the current quantitative VFM  
However, in cases where there are systematic completion delays between conventional delivery 
and PPP alternatives, as in Korea, the current PPP decision methodology seems to have a 
limitation in terms of quantitative assessment as a result of this assumption. In addition, current 
quantitative VFM methodology seems to represent the finance authority which does not want to 
spend money, if possible, on the fiscal management aspect. However, for the transport decision 
makers or transport service consumers, the time when the transport service is available seems to 
be also as important as spending less. The transport service provision timing is related to the 
completion time of the transport project. 
With respect to the systematic completion delays in Korea, according to Ahn (2006), among 197 
road projects completed between 2001 and 2005, 155 projects (86.5 per cent) were delayed, and 
among the delayed projects, 134 projects (79 per cent) were delayed due to lack of funds. This 
is the main cause of completion delay due to the unusual national budget system in Korea, i.e. 
the LEC system (Kim et al., 2008b). According to the LEC system, an infrastructure project 
starts by reflecting its first-year expenditure in the Budget Book, as settled by the National 
Assembly, even if the total expenditure of the project is not secured in the Budget Book. This 
means that, with the LEC system, infrastructure construction can start even though its yearly 
expenditure has not been determined by the National Assembly. Using this system, too many 
infrastructure projects, compared with the size of the budget, tend to be implemented by reason 
of political necessity, such as balanced regional development policy. As a result, each project 
under construction experiences budget constraints and a systematic completion delay occurs.  JI HONG PARK    Ch.3 Research Methodology 
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In addition, many developing or under-developed countries seem to want PPPs not because a 
PPP is cheaper than a PSC but because without PPPs it is very difficult for them to provide 
infrastructure services to the public at all, given their insufficient public funds. With insufficient 
public funds, completion time delay or a delay in the time when an infrastructure service starts 
to be provided seems to be inevitable in these countries, if they try to provide infrastructure 
services using a conventional delivery system. In this case, as Leigland and Shugart (2006) have 
pointed out, the current VFM assessment using a PSC could be meaningless for these countries 
because, in practice, they cannot make an investment on infrastructure like the public sector 
comparator option due to lack of public funds and the public sector comparator is an impossible 
alternative. For this reason, it is necessary to develop a new PPP decision-making methodology 
reflecting systematic completion delay in the conventional delivery in Korea. 
   JI HONG PARK    Ch.3 Research Methodology 
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3.3 The Modified VFM 
 
 
3.3.1 The development of the Modified VFM analysis 
 
Adoption of the NPV technique  
In order to reflect a completion delay in the conventional delivery for a new PPP decision 
methodology, the construction investment difference, as well as the social benefit difference due 
to delay in time when an infrastructure service starts to be provided between a PSC and a PPP, 
needs to be reflected.  
As depicted in Figure 3-2 (a), a real conventional public work with completion delay (tD) due to 
a lack of budget has two points of difference in relation to an ideal one. The first is completion 
time, which is delayed from point A (tC) to point B (tC + tD). Due to this construction completion 
time difference (B-A = tD), a PPP option seems to bring the benefit occurring forward by an 
early infrastructure service provision, compared with a conventional option. Another is the 
construction period and construction investment intensity. A real conventional public work 
seems to have a longer construction period (tC + tD) – and a weaker investment intensity of 
construction cost – than an ideal conventional public work without budget constraints.  
In this case with a construction completion time difference (tD), instead of the current VFM test, 
it seems that some different approach is needed for decision-making on whether to use PPP 
system or not. To consider public sector cost (excluding private sector cost) and effectiveness 
(benefit) at the same time for procurement option selection, the NPV technique can be adopted. 
This has been widely used in addressing infrastructure decision-making by many researchers, 
such as Quinet and Vickerman (2004), Layard and Glaister (1994) and Pearce and Nash (1981).  
 
Development of the Modified VFM 
In order to identify which option is better between a PSC and a PPP, the difference in NPV 
between a PPP and a PSC can be considered as follows (Park and Preston, 2013b): 
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(a) An real conventional public work 
(b) An ideal PSC  (c) A PPP 
 
Figure 3-2: Schematic drawing of an ideal PSC and a PPP for a Modified VFM test 
 
From equation (3-4), the first bracketed part is the difference in the discounted public sector cost 
between a PSC and a PPP, which means the difference between the discounted sum of interest 
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operation cost in Figure 3-2 (c) (a BTL option is considered as an example). The second 
bracketed part is the difference in the social benefits between a PSC and a PPP, which means 
the discounted area C in Figure 3-2 (b). Finally, the NPV difference can be reduced as follows: 
 
       =       +     (3-5) 
 
where       is the difference in the discounted public sector cost between a PSC and a PPP with 
a different investment cost input time, and ΔB is the difference in the benefit between a PSC and 
a PPP due to the construction completion time difference.  
 
If there is no construction completion difference,       will become VFM, and then ΔB will be 
zero because the size of the benefit is the same between a PSC and a PPP. In this case, equation 
(3-5) can be expressed simply as follows: 
 
       =      (3-6) 
 
Therefore, the NPV difference (ΔNPV) between a PPP and a PSC can be considered as an 
extended form of the current VFM analysis, and it could be used when a certain project 
implemented by the public sector has a construction completion time difference, as compared 
with a PPP system. If the NPV difference (ΔNPV) between a PPP and a PSC is defined as a 
Modified VFM, it can be considered a more generalised form, explaining not only the 
construction cost input difference but also the infrastructure provision time difference between a 
PSC and a PPP (Park and Preston, 2013b). As an indicator showing which procurement option 
between a PSC and a PPP is viable, if the Modified VFM (ΔNPV) of a certain project is positive 
then a PPP option can be adopted for the project.  
 
The Modified VFM in the Korean context 
In addition, considering the BTO and the BTL scheme in Korea, equation (3-5) can be 
decomposed based on main cost items as follows (Park and Preston, 2013b): 
 
   .      	=      	    	        −      	    	        +    
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          = (      +      ) − (     	   	    +      )+ 	    (3-8) 
 
where  .   	= Modified VFM,       = the asset cost in the PSC,       =	the operation cost 
in the PSC, Revenue = the government’s revenue income when the government uses 
conventional delivery,            = the government subsidy in the BTO,        = the MRG 
cost in the BTO,      	   	    = the lease fee that the government pays to the private sector in 
the BTL in the BTL and       = the operation cost in the BTL.  
 
Therefore, when deciding which model between a BTO and a BTL is favourable when factoring 
in a completion delay, the following equation will be used: 
 
   .   	    	    =  .   	    −	 .   	    
 





Using equation (3-9), if  .   	    	    is positive for a certain project, it is better to use the 
BTL scheme for the project; in other cases, the BTO is better. 
 
The application of the Modified VFM 
The Modified VFM (the NPV difference, ΔNPV) can be applied to any projects with a 
construction completion time difference between the conventional public works system and the 
PPP system, especially in developing or under-developed countries suffering from lack of 
public funds. However, before using this methodology, the construction completion time 




3.3.2 The selection of the discount rate for the Modified VFM 
 
 
3.3.2.1 General considerations for the selection of the discount rate 
To calculate the present value in the Modified VFM, it is important to select an appropriate 
discount rate. When selecting a discount rate, there are three general questions to be answered: 1) 
which kind of discount rate needs to be used, a financial one or an economic one, 2) whether to 
use the same or different discount rate for alternatives, 3) the theory based on the discount rate. JI HONG PARK    Ch.3 Research Methodology 
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A financial or economic discount rate 
The first question to be considered is whether to adopt a financial discount rate or an economic 
discount rate. With respect to the VFM calculation, the guidelines of many countries, including 
Ireland, Australia and Korea (but not the UK), suggest that a financial discount rate considering 
the public sector’s borrowing costs should be used because the VFM calculation considers 
financial cash flows between the PSC and the PPP alternative, differing from the decision on 
whether to invest using a cost-benefit analysis with an economic discount rate (Australian 
Government, 2008c, Irish Government, 2006, PIMAC, 2005). However, the Green Book (HM 
Treasury, 2003) in the UK does not seem to use a financial discount rate in the VFM calculation; 
instead using a pure time preference-based discount rate. Other than that, there is another view 
that an economic discount rate is more appropriate than a financial one in the VFM calculation, 
as government officials tend to have a standpoint of considering social benefits arising from 
infrastructure provision more than borrowing costs when selecting a procurement option 
(Shugart, 2009, Charko, 2011).  
 
Same or different for alternatives 
The next consideration is whether the same discount rate should be applied to the PSC and PPP 
alternatives or not. In the UK and Korea, regardless of whether a PSC or a PPP is involved, the 
same discount rate should be applied according to the guidelines. In contrast to these countries, 
however, the PPP guidelines of Australia provide that a different discount rate between a PSC 
and a PPP may be used in bidding, even though the same discount rate should be used when 
deciding which alternative to invest in at the initial stage (Australian Government, 2008c, New 
South Wales Government, 2007).  
There are two different views on this point. One is that cash flow in the PSC (if the public sector 
pays for the facility) is a cost for the public sector, while the cash flow in the PPP is the revenue 
of the private sector, which is riskier. Therefore, a higher discount rate should be used in a PPP 
than a PSC (Grout, 2003). Another is that cash flow from a PPP contract is guaranteed by the 
public sector, and that therefore a SPV can also have risk-free cash flow by public sector, so it is 
reasonable that a risk-free discount rate, the same as is used in a PSC, should be used for a PPP 
(Davis, 2005). 
 
Based theory  
The last question concerns theories about where discount rate comes from and how to deal with 
systematic risk. The discount rate in the UK is calculated on the basis of the social time JI HONG PARK    Ch.3 Research Methodology 
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preference rate
24, and a single discount rate is used for a PSC and a PPP, so this approach 
ignores the impact of the systematic risk being transferred to the private sector on cash flows 
(Gray et al., 2010, Shugart, 2009). However, the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)
25-based 
discount rate used in Australia is able to consider systematic risk by adding risk premiums to the 
risk-free discount rate, so various discount rates are provided for projects with different risk 
bands,
26 which is one of the important merits of the CAPM process (Grimsey and Lewis, 2005). 
   
                                         
24 Like individuals, as a whole, society also prefers to enjoy goods (or services) sooner rather than later 
and to delay costs to next generations, which is known as ‘social time preference’. The social time 
preference rate (STPR) is “the rate at which society values the present compared to the future”  (HM 
Treasury, 2003). 
25 In Australia, a discount rate is estimated by the CAPM, which considers the risk-free rate of return and 
the risk premium of the market (Partnerships Victoria, 2010). A discount rate is calculated by the CAPM 
as follows: 
   =	   +	      −	    
where    = discount rate,    = risk-free rate of interest,    = rate of return of market,    = the asset beta, 
the sensitivity of the expected excess asset returns to the expected excess market returns, and    −	   = 
risk premium of market.  
26 The Department of Treasury and Finance of Australia recommends a 4.95 per cent risk-free rate of 
interest (in nominal terms) and a 6 per cent risk premium (in real terms), and suggests that the asset betas 
for different project sectors (Partnerships Victoria, 2010). The discount rate in real terms for different 
project sectors is as follows: 
 < Discount rates in Australia > 
 
Source: Partnerships Victoria (2010) 
Risk free rate Asset beta
Market risk 
premium
Risk premium Discount rate
R f βa R m - R f βa (Rm  - R f)
R a = R f  + βa 



































1. The data in italic are provided from the Victorian government's PPP Guidelines (2010).  
2. 3% Inflation rate is assumed to calculate discount rate. 
3. Risk-free rate in real terms is calculated in the following way: (1+0.0495)/(1+0.03) -1 = 0.0189,
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3.3.2.2 The discount rate for Modified VFM 
 
 
Characteristics of the research considered 
Although there are many viewpoints regarding selecting discount rates in the VFM calculation, 
no consensus seems to have been reached (Grimsey and Lewis, 2004a) regarding the above 
three considerations. Moreover, countries have somewhat different guidelines for the VFM 
calculation, which take into account their socio-economic environments. Consequently, the 
discount rate for this research will be adopted considering the characteristics of the decision-
making methodology, the socio-economic environment, the decision-making stage and factors 
that are necessary in the decision-making process.  
To begin with, it seems reasonable to assume that the economic discount rate and not the 
financial rate in real terms should be used for the Modified VFM: this is because the Modified 
VFM considers the social benefit difference between a PSC and a PPP due to completion delay, 
whereas the VFM is considered as a special case of the Modified VFM with no completion 
delay.  
In addition, the same discount rate will be applied to the PSC and the PPP in the Modified VFM 
on the grounds that this research considers PPP decisions at the initial stage, such as the 
feasibility or pre-feasibility study. At this stage, decision-making refers to the delivery method 
not to selecting which corporate body will deliver in the bidding process.  
When it comes to the size of the discount rate, the same discount rate as the Korean government 
officially uses will be applied to the Modified VFM, which considers the socio-economic 
environment in Korea. According to KDI (PIMAC, 2005) and MOSF (2009a), a financial 
discount rate of 6 per cent in nominal terms is recommended for a BTL scheme. However, 
considering other countries, such as Australia and the UK, this rate seems too small when 
inflation is excluded. For example, 4.9 per cent in real terms is used for transport infrastructure 
in Australia (Partnerships Victoria, 2010), which is much higher than the 6 per cent in nominal 
terms considering inflation. In the UK, although 3.5 per cent in real terms is considered in the 
PFI, this has been criticised for being too low (Coulson, 2008).  
Before 2004 an economic discount rate of 7.5 per cent in real terms was used in Korea at the 
project assessment stage (KDI, 2001), although after revisions to the general preliminary 
feasibility study guidelines the economic discount rate was reduced to 6.5 per cent in real terms 
(KDI, 2004b). Additionally, according to some studies on the discount rates published in 2008 JI HONG PARK    Ch.3 Research Methodology 
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(KDI, 2008a, KDI, 2008b), 5.5 per cent in real terms was suggested for the economic discount 
rate, reflecting discount rates calculated by the social time preference rate and CAPM.  
 
Discount rate for the Modified VFM  
All in all, as stated above, in this research, depending on the decision-making time of a case 
study, an economic discount rate of 7.5, 6.5 and 5.5 per cent in real terms will be used, 
irrespective of whether it is a PSC or a PPP in the Modified VFM. 
 
    Decision-making time  Economic discount rate 
Before 2004         7.5  per cent 
From 2004 to 2008         6.5 per cent 
After 2009         5.5 per cent 
 
Discussion 
As already reviewed, there are some disagreements on the selection of discount rate among 
researchers and PPP guidelines in deciding whether to use PPP options or not, because there are 
many arguments regarding risk premium and the relevant theory (Grimsey and Lewis, 2004a, 
Harrison, 2010). In addition, with respect to the discount rate for public projects, the debate on 
what rate should be used to discount future costs and benefits has been existing since the early 
20
th century and four alternative approaches have been developed: 1) social rate of time 
preference, 2) social opportunity cost, 3) weighted average method, and 4) shadow price of 
capital method (Boardman et al., 2001). The essence of these approaches is that each has a 
different viewpoint on how public projects affect domestic consumption, private business 
investment, and international borrowing costs (Zhuang et al., 2007). Stiglitz (1994) argued that 
the market rate of interest for private consumption goods is not appropriate for the social 
discount rate when evaluating projects because of market imperfections such as taxes, risks, 
information asymmetry and externalities, and pointed out that, in general, neither the social rate 
of time preference nor the marginal rate of transformation in the private sector is appropriate for 
discount rate. It is said, however, that social discount rate is somewhere in between social time 
preference rates (which is related to the earning rate on personal savings) and social opportunity 
cost of capital (which is related to the marginal earning rate of private business investment), 
though not always (Pearce and Nash, 1981).  
 
As seen in Table 3-2, the discount rates in real term used in some countries show a range 
between 3and 15 per cent. The variety in the discount rate seems to come from the degree of 
economic development and how it is produced (Harrison, 2010). The highest rates (12-15 per JI HONG PARK    Ch.3 Research Methodology 
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cent) are considered in developing countries like Philippines and India, while the lowest rates 
(3-3.5 per cent) are used in developed countries like Germany and Norway. As previously 
reviewed, the theoretical basis for producing the discount rate is dependent on each country. The 
UK uses the social time preference rate for the discount rate. Australia and Canada (British 
Columbia) use the CAPM-based discount rate and the WACC-based discount rate respectively. 
In addition, Korea uses the rate determined from a specialised agency (KDI) by considering 
existing theories (social time preference rate and CAPM) and socio-economic environments. 
 
Table 3-2: Discount rates in real term in selected countries 
 
Source: Harrison (2010), Partnerships Victoria (2010) and KDI (2008a) 
 
However, more important thing is the size of the discount rate selected. In calculating the 
Modified VFM, the net present value of a project with future public sector cost and social 
benefit difference between delivery options is essentially dependent on the discount rate 
selected, especially when public sector costs have a different time frame with social benefit 
differences (Harrison, 2010). Generally, considering initial costs like construction cost are spent 
first, with the social benefits difference occurring later in the benefit cost analysis in a transport 
project, it seems that the higher the discount rate is, the less attractive the project is as a result of 




World Bank 10-12 (2007)




African Development Bank 10-12 (2007)
New Zealand Treasury and Finance Ministry 8 (2008)
Canada Treasury Board 8 (2007)
China 8 (2007)
South Africa 8 (2004)
United States Office of Management and Budget 7 (2007)
South Korea Korea Development Institute 5.5
A (2008)





Australia Partnership Victoria 4.9
B (2010)
The Netherlands Ministry of Finance 4 (2003)
France  Commissariat General du Plan 4 (2003)
United Kingdom HM Treasury 3.5 (2007)
Norway 3.5 (2007)
Germany Federal Finance Ministry 3 (2007)
International Multi-lateral
Development Banks
(Note) 1. A is from KDI (2008 a), B is calculated considering transport project using Partnerships Victoria (2010) and others are
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its lower net present value. However, it is not easy to predict the impact of the discount rate in 
PPP decisions because even when the discount rate change is infinitesimally small, the PPP 
decision can be different (Grimsey and Lewis, 2005) and the change of size and shape of the 
cost profile of a project also make an impact on PPP decision in forecasting the effect of the 
discount rate on PPP decisions (Bain, 2010).  
 
As the structure of public sector cost and social benefit difference in the Modified VFM is 
different from the VFM, it seems more difficult to know the possibility of the change of PPP 
decision according to the discount rate selected. Consequently, a sensitivity analysis will be 
adopted in the thesis, along with single value estimation, in order to find out the impact on the 
discount rate change on the Modified VFM or PPP decision.  
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3.4 Risk quantification 
 
 
3.4.1 Risk identification and allocation 
 
Risk is usually said to exist where the odds of various future output can be known on the basis 
of mathematics (probability) or the experience from similar situation (Smith et al., 2009, Mun, 
2006). With respect to risk in PPP decisions, it is important to find out how to identify major 
risk and how to quantify them. Generally speaking, risk identification and risk quantification are 
a part of risk management framework, composed of various different processes; risk 
identification and allocation, risk assessment and analysis, risk mitigation, risk monitoring and 
control (Institute of Civil Engineers, 1998, Molenaar, 2005, Park, 2007). The first step to reflect 
risks in PPP decision is to identify risks and allocate them. It is known that some advanced 
countries such as the UK and Australia use risk matrices or risk registers for risk identification 
and allocation in project planning phase and feasibility assessment stage. Unlike these countries, 
in Korea, there is no guideline for risk identification and allocation until now, and the discussion 
on risks starts from contract negotiation stage between public sector and private sector. 
Therefore, it seems that if it is possible to identify and allocate risks in early stage it is very 
helpful to reduce risks in a real situation (Park, 2007).  
 
However, through more than fifteen year experiences Korea have developed standard contract 
forms for BTO and BTL projects with respect to risk identification and allocation. Therefore, in 
this thesis, risks in PPPs in construction and operation periods are mainly identified and 
allocated based on Table 3-3, the typical risk identification and allocation table (Shim et al., 
2005a) considering conventional public sector procurement, road BTO project (BTO 1), rail 
BTO project (BTO 2) and BTL project by analysing previous contracts. As seen in Table 3-3, 
there are little differences between BTO and BTL contract in terms of risks in construction and 
operation periods except revenue risk. Regarding revenue risk, in principle, government takes 
demand risk in BTL project, while in BTO project private sector takes it all because minimum 
revenue guarantee (MRG) system of BTO project in Korea was abolished in 2006 and 2009. 
Very importantly, as shown in Table 3-3, government can transfer risks about making assets and 
providing services, which is in shaded cells, to private sector, so that government usually takes 
risks regarding project environments. In addition, this risk allocation in PPP of Korea 
corresponds with the basic risk allocation principle which a party that can manage a certain risk 
well should takes that risk, and  also coincides with the generality which cause contributor of a 
certain risk should take the risk (Park, 2007).     JI HONG PARK    Ch.3 Research Methodology 
  70   
Table 3-3: Risk identification and allocation in PPP projects in Korea 
 
(Note) 1. Conventional means public conventional procurement, and BTO 1, BTO 2 and BTL means Suwon-
Pyungtaek Expressway projects (contract 2005), New Bundang rail project (contract 2005) and BTL standard 
contract respectively. 2. ‘G’, ‘P’ and ‘G&P’ mean ‘government’, ‘private sector’ and ‘government and private sector’ 
respectively. 3. The original table was modified by adding risks from road project, eliminating unnecessary data, 
correcting data and shading cells.  
Risks Conventional BTO 1 BTO 2 BTL Remark
Land acquisition G G G G
Civil complaint (not regarding construction) G G G G Political force majeure
Civil complaint regarding construction G P P P
Sponsor problem (Equity investment delay etc.) G P P P
Lender problem (Loan delay etc.) G P P P
Delivery difficulties and inflation of labour force and material G P (G) P(G) P
Government takes inflation risk to
negotiated  level
Builder problem (bankruptcy, lack of ability) G P P P
Improper design G P P P
Use of improper construction technologies G P P P
Change of law & regulation during construction G G G G
Change of total project cost by government G G G G
Approval responsibility during construction G P (G) P (G) P (G)
Government gives administration
support for approval
Amendment of laws causing significant impact to PPP G G G & P (90% /10%) G Political force majeure
National moratorium or payment delay G - G & P (90%/10%) - Political force majeure
War or rebellion during construction G G & P (90%/10%) G & P (90%/10%) G & P Political force majeure
Cultural assets excavation G G & P (80%/20%) G G & P
Dangerous material treatment, site contamination due to nuclear
disposal or radioactivity
G G & P (80%/20%) G & P (80%/20%) G & P Non-political force majeure
Natural disaster during construction G G & P (80%/20%) G & P (80%/20%) G & P Non-political force majeure
Strike over the nation G G & P (80%/20%) G & P (80%/20%) G & P Non-political force majeure
Restriction of the right to decide usage fee G G G -
Excessive operation and management cost beyond expectation G P P P
Change of government policy, governmental request, change of total
project cost and amendment of Tax Law
G G G G
Service quality lower than minimum requirement and loss due to this
problem
G P P P
Operation and maintenance of subsidiary enterprise G P - P
Unexpected decrease in market demand G
G&P (G: 60~80% for
first 25 year, P: lower
than 50%,)
G&P (G: 50~80%, P:
lower than 50%,)
G
Confiscation by government - G G G
Changes of the institution of taxation and finance G G G - Amendment of Corporate Tax Law
Confiscation by government - G G G
Changes of the institution of taxation and finance G G G - Amendment of Corporate Tax Law
Difficulties in loan and decrease in profitability due to economic crisis
(including interest rate and exchange rate fluctuation)
G G&P (80%/20%) G&P (80%/20%) G&P Non-political force majeure
Improper or not having insurance G P P P






G & P (80% /20%) Restriction of currency exchange and overseas remittance G G & P (90% /10%) G & PJI HONG PARK    Ch.3 Research Methodology 
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Besides, from Korean’s BTL guideline (MOSF, 2009a), several risk factors can also be 
identified in the calculation of the Modified VFM; construction deflator, consumer price index, 
five-year exchequer bond interest rate and three-year non-guaranteed corporate bond interest 
rate. However, they do not seem to be transferable because there are related to project 
environments. According to the guidelines, construction deflator is used to calculate the yearly 
lease fee and consumer price index is used to convert nominal terms to real terms. In addition, 
five-year exchequer bond interest rate is used to estimate BTL lease profitability for private 
sector and three-year non-guaranteed corporate interest rate is used to calculate BTL finance 
interest rate for private sector.  
 
 
3.4.2 Risks transferable to the private sector 
 
Optimum risk transfer 
Risk transfer is at the heart of PPPs and the essence is how to reflect risk cost when building a 
PSC for the Modified VEM. According to Cooper et al. (2005), the body best able to manage 
risks at the lowest cost should take responsibility for risk management in PPPs. Therefore, 
optimum risk transfer is essential to achieve the best VFM in using PPPs (Arthur Andersen and 
Enterprise LSE, 2000, Sun et al., 2010). With respect to optimum risk transfer, when it comes to 
the PPP decisions at the initial stage (the stage that this research is concerned with), selecting 
transferable risks and their quantification is the most important element because the cost of 
transferable risks needs to be included in the Modified VFM. 
 
Transferable risks in this research 
Regarding which risks should be transferred to the private sector in PPPs, Li et al. (2005) argued 
that the public sector should take land acquisition risk and political risk, while project risk and 
revenue risk should be taken by the private sector; legal risk needs to be shared by both sectors. 
In other research (Roumboutsos and Anagnostopoulos, 2008, Ke et al., 2010) using Li et al.’s 
questionnaire on China/Hong Kong and Greece, the results were largely similar to the former 
research in the way that project risk and revenue risk, which is directly related to traffic volume 
risk, should be transferred to the private sector.  
According to Korea’s BTL guidelines (MOSF, 2009a), transferable risks means a construction 
cost risk and a completion delay in conventional delivery, which can be considered in building a 
PSC. When it comes to the BTO option, traffic volume risk is designed to be transferred fully to 
the private sector because of the abolition of a MRG system. In addition, as seen in Table 3-3, 
the risks transferable to private sector are almost related to construction costs, completion time, JI HONG PARK    Ch.3 Research Methodology 
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operation costs and revenue stream, which is directly related to traffic volume risk. However, in 
the case of operation costs
27, it is difficult to find their reference costs in Korea so it is 
impossible to consider operation cost overruns for the Modified VFM assessment.   
Consequently, this research will consider construction cost risk, completion delay risk and 
traffic volume risk as risks transferable to the private sector, given the literature reviewed and 
the availability of historical observations.  
 
 
3.4.3 How to quantify transferable risks 
 
 
3.4.3.1 Construction cost risk 
 
Construction cost for the Modified VFM calculation 
Along with the question of which risks are considered as transferable risks, how to quantify 
these risks also must be included in the calculation of the Modified VFM. With respect to 
construction cost risk, in the Korean context, the construction cost used in the Modified VFM 
calculation can be conceptually expressed using estimated price, winning bid ratio and 
construction cost overrun, as follows (Park and Preston, 2013b): 
CHAPTER 4    =             =	           + ∆  	                    
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where    = construction cost used in the Modified VFM assessment,   	           = 
construction cost at completion,            = construction cost at construction start, 
∆  	                    = the construction cost increase between completion and construction 
start, EP = estimated price,
28 WBR = winning bid ratio and   = construction cost overrun ratio 
 
∆  	                   
          
 .  
                                         
27 Though operation costs are not considered as transferable risks, some of them are quantified to be used 
in the Monte Carlo Simulation. 
28 Estimated price means the construction price that the delivery authority uses for the bidding process 
after reviewing the designed price. Therefore, the estimated price could be slightly different from the 
designed price, usually by ± 2 per cent (Kim et al., 2008a). Nonetheless, the designed price will be used JI HONG PARK    Ch.3 Research Methodology 
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Public works in Korea are delivered using turn-key bid, alternative bid or design-bid-build. In 
turn-key or alternative bids, the designer who is selected through a bidding process becomes the 
contractor for the project, whereas in design-bid-build bid the designer and the contractor are 
different each other. The difference between turn-key and alternative bids is a design scope. In 
turn-key bid the design scope is all the parts of the project, whereas in alternative bid it is 
restricted to main part of the project which a delivery authority determines.   
With respect to equation (3-10), according to Korea’s BTL guidelines (MOSF, 2009a), the 
construction cost of a PSC in the Modified VFM is calculated using the designed price for 
construction and an average winning bid ratio of turn-key/alternative bids
29 in similar projects 
without considering construction cost overrun. This means that an average winning bid ratio of 
turn-key/alternative bids can be used instead of WBR × (1 + α)	in equation (3-10). This is 
because a construction cost increase is usually not allowed in turn-key/alternative bids except in 
regard to inflation or cases in which the delivery authority is responsible for it. As a result, the 
public sector does not have to consider construction cost overrun when estimating a PSC.  
However, although it is true that some projects use the turn-key/alternative bid system, the 
typical bid system in conventional delivery is in fact design-bid-build. Additionally, it still 
remains unknown how much construction cost rises from start of construction to completion 
when the three bid systems (turn-key, alternative and design-bid-build) are considered in each 
transport programme in Korea.  
                                                                                                                         
instead of the estimated price to calculate the construction cost of a PSC under the assumption that the 
estimated price is the same as the designed price (because the estimated price is usually not open to the 
public). The designed price is mainly calculated using the Standard Estimation book, which is published 
annually by the Korea Institute of Construction Technology on behalf of the MLTM. In order to calculate 
the designed price, the quantities of cost items, such as materials, labour and equipment for construction, 
are estimated using this book at the design stage, and then the designed price is calculated by multiplying 
these quantities by unit costs from the market (Kim et al., 2005). However, there are some difficulties in 
instantly considering new construction technology or project market price with this method, so since 1997 
the Korean Government has been accumulating detailed historical work costs for later use. 
29 Strictly speaking, winning bid ratio does not exist in turn-key/alternative bid because these bid systems 
use not only the price part but also the technology part to select a bid winner. Therefore, the exact 
expression is not “winning bid ratio” but the “ratio of bid winner” price to estimate the price in turn-
key/alternative bid. However, “winning bid ratio” is usually used instead of this exact expression, so this 
term is used in this study. JI HONG PARK    Ch.3 Research Methodology 
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For this reason, in this study a substitute for an average winning bid ratio of turn-key/alternative 
bids, named as an application ratio in equation (3-10), is developed using historical observations, 
and accordingly the application ratio risk means the construction cost risk. An application ratio 
is composed of the winning bid ratio risk and the construction cost overrun risk, as quantified 
from historical observations.  
 
 
Construction cost overrun risk (α) 
Construction cost on completion is usually composed of contract construction cost, inflation and 
cost increment by construction quantity increase due to design changes.
30  
From the historical observations obtained, it is impossible to know how much of the cost 
increment was incurred in a certain project, so some assumptions are needed. According to KDI 
(2004a), among construction cost increments approved by the finance authority between start 
and completion, design change accounts for 53.7, 50.7 and 62.4 per cent in the National 
Highways, the National Expressways and the National Railways, respectively. Using this 
information, cost increment by design changes can be calculated, and adding an assumption that 
design changes occur equally throughout the construction period, the construction cost on 
completion can be calculated in real terms. With respect to the inflation rate, according to the 
general guidelines for preliminary feasibility studies (KDI, 2008b) and Korea’s BTL guidelines 
(MOSF, 2009a), the construction deflator
31 provided by the Bank of Korea is recommended for 
construction cost, so this inflation index will be used for the calculation of construction cost 
overrun risk in real terms.  
Regarding the measurement of the construction cost overrun, the inflation effect should firstly 
be eliminated from the construction cost on completion to find out how much the construction 
cost changes are due to design changes. Then, the construction cost overrun (α) in real terms 
adjusted for design changes can be defined as follows (Park and Preston, 2013b): 
 
   	 =	
            	               −             	            
            	            
×    	%  (3-11) 
                                         
30 There are many factors that can cause a design to change. Unexpected geological conditions, 
construction plan changes, traffic demand changes and unit price changes could be significant causes of 
design change. In this research, design changes mean all the changes occurring in the construction period 
which mean the construction price changes (excluding inflation), irrespective of the factor responsible for 
these changes. 
31 Construction deflator means the construction investment deflator referred to in Expenditure on Gross 
Domestic Product on National Accounts. JI HONG PARK    Ch.3 Research Methodology 
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where             	               means construction cost on completion in real terms 
adjusted for design changes, and             	             means construction cost in real 
terms when the construction contract was awarded. 
 
Winning bid ratio risk 
Winning bid ratio means the proportion of contract construction cost to estimated construction 
cost. In the absence of a calculation, this is directly available from the historical observations in 
each transport programme.  
 
 
3.4.3.2 Completion delay 
 
Definition 
Completion delay in construction refers to the time overrun beyond what was initially planned, 
such as the completion date speciﬁed in a contract (Assaf and Al-Hejji, 2006), and it can occur 
due to various unanticipated changes in circumstances: 1) contract management; 2) site 
conditions; 3) changes in requirements or design; 4) weather; 5) unavailability of labour, 
material, or equipment; 6) defective plans and specifications; and 7) the owner’s interference 
(Bramble and Callahan, 2011).  
 
Systematic completion delay in Korea 
However, in Korea, completion delays are expected to occur more systematically due to the 
unusual national budget system, i.e. the LEC system. With respect to systematic completion 
delays in Korea, according to Ahn (2006), among 197 road projects completed between 2001 
and 2005, 155 projects (86.5 per cent) were delayed, and among the delayed projects 134 
projects (79 per cent) were delayed due to a lack of funds.  
According to the LEC system,
32 an infrastructure project starts by reflecting its first-year 
expenditure in the Budget Book, as settled by the National Assembly, even if the total 
expenditure of the project is not secured in the Budget Book. Using this system, too many 
infrastructure projects compared with the size of the budget tend to be implemented by reason 
                                         
32 The LEC is outlined in Article 21 of the Act on Contracts, to which the State is a party. The 
inefficiency of the LEC is criticised by NGOs like the Citizen’s Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ). 
CCEJ (2010) criticised it for inducing too many projects to start without considering the available budget.  JI HONG PARK    Ch.3 Research Methodology 
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of political necessity, such as a balanced regional development policy. As a result, each project 
under construction experiences budget constraints and a systematic completion delay occurs.  
 
How to estimate completion delay 
With the LEC system, although a construction contract is awarded based on the total 
construction cost and construction duration in the first-year, the contract is renewed every year 
considering the yearly budget allocated to the project and resulting in a completion delay. 
Accordingly, for a government official who is in charge of contract, it is impossible to know 
how long it will take to complete a project under the LEC system. However, when awarding a 
contract, the contract usually takes five years to be the construction duration, considering a 
standard construction duration suggested by KDI (2008a) and MLTM (2010c), based on the 
project delivery practice
33 of Korea.  
Usually real construction duration can be shortened or lengthened depending on project size and 
construction difficulty, so it is more reasonable for a government official to adjust construction 
duration considering project characteristics when awarding contracts. However, it is not easy for 
him/her to do so, because they are usually so conservative that they cannot feel the need to use 
different construction duration in a situation that standard construction duration (5 years) was 
already provided by KDI. In addition, it seems that sometimes they can feel so risky to do so 
considering the annual inspection from the Board of Audit and Inspection (therefore, it seems 
that KDI needs to provide more detailed standard construction duration reflecting project size 
and construction difficulty).    
As practical evidence, according to the contract details of 24 National Highway projects (Lee, 
2007), awarded by Wonju Regional Construction Management Office, a five-year construction 
duration was applied to all the contracts regardless of project size. Then, considering the yearly 
budget for each project, completion duration was lengthened in each contract. 
Considering the LEC system and a standard construction duration used in Korea, it is assumed 
in this research that the normal construction duration is five years in the conventional delivery 
as well as in the PPP options if there is no confinement in the construction funds.  
In addition, although, in light of the Korean context, the budget constraint is the main reason for 
completion delay in conventional delivery (CERIK, 2011, Kim et al., 2008b, Ahn, 2006), there 
could be a variance in completion delay related to project characteristics: size, geological or 
                                         
33 In order to complete a project earlier, a large project is usually delivered by several small projects of a 
proper size; by doing so the Korean government can also widen the effects of public investment to more 
contractors and more people. JI HONG PARK    Ch.3 Research Methodology 
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topographical conditions and main work types (e.g. tunnel and bridge). With respect to project 
size, a smaller project could have shorter construction duration than a larger project. However, 
as there is practically no detailed standard construction duration considering project size, it is 
difficult to estimate construction delay from historical construction duration observations. When 
it comes to the other characteristics, the historical observations do not have sufficient 
information on them. Accordingly, for a simple consideration, a completion delay in the 




 3.4.3.3 Traffic volume risk 
 
Why traffic volume risk occurs in Korea 
Traffic volume risk in Korea can be explained in various ways. According to Cho (2011), the 
reasons why forecast traffic volume differs so greatly from actual traffic volume can be 
summarised as follows: 1) uncertainty of surrounding related development plans; 2) uncertainty 
of surrounding future socio-economic indices; 3) low reliability of origin-destination (O-D) trip 
data; 4) limitation of the forecasting model itself; and 5) absence of standardised guidelines for 
traffic volume forecasting.  
In order to enhance the accuracy of traffic volume forecasting, the Korean government has been 
developing the National Transportation Database since 2001, which includes the following 
elements: 1) regional passenger and freight O-D (purpose, mode, item etc.); 2) trip generation 
characteristics of major transport facilities; 3) traffic counting data on main points; 4) transport 
thematic map; 5) transport indices; and 6) bibliographic data (Cho, 2011). 
 
Traffic volume risk 
Traffic volume risk in this research is defined as the proportion of actual traffic volume to 
forecast traffic volume, as shown in equation (3-12): 
 
         	      	     =	
       	      	      
       	      	        
  (3-12) 
 
where Traf ic	volume	       = actual traffic volume in operation and Traf ic	volume	         = 
forecast traffic volume at the design stage. 
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As appropriate traffic volume observations for the National Highways and the National 
Expressways are not available, the road traffic volume inaccuracy in Korea by Kim (2007) will 
inevitably be utilised. According to Kim (2007), the traffic volume inaccuracy (I) is defined as 
follows: 
 
    =	
   	  
  
	×     (%)  (3-13) 
 
where I = traffic volume inaccuracy,    = actual traffic volume and     = forecast traffic volume. 
 
Using this information, equation (3-12) can be expressed as follows (Park and Preston, 2013b): 
 
         	      	     = 	  +   =	
       	      	      
       	      	        
  (3-14) 
 
As the traffic volume inaccuracy from 171 road projects by Kim (2007) is not provided by raw 
data but by frequency bar graph, shown in Figure 3-3, traffic volume risk is calculated by 
digitising the graph. 
 
 
Source: Kim (2007) 
Figure 3-3: Traffic volume inaccuracy in roads 
 
With respect to railways, the changes of railway traffic volume in Korea are gathered from 
various literatures as a form of raw data (the details are given in Table 6-3).  
 
 
3.4.4 Other risk factors considered 
 
Apart from the transferable risks used in this research, some other risk factors that identified in 
section 3.4.1 are also quantified for the Monte Carlo Simulation of the Modified VFM. These 
risk factors include operation costs (See 4.2.1.1, 5.2.2.1 and 6.2.2.1), construction deflator and JI HONG PARK    Ch.3 Research Methodology 
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consumer price index (See 4.2.2.2), five-year exchequer bond interest rate and three-year non-
guaranteed corporate bond interest rate (See 4.2.2.3). Though operation costs can be transferable 
risks according to Table 3-3, they are not considered as transferable risks in this thesis because 
it is difficult to find their reference costs in Korea and it is impossible to consider operation cost 
overruns for the Modified VFM. Therefore, operation costs are considered separately here. In 
addition, though construction deflator, consumer price index, five-year exchequer bond interest 
rate and three-year non-guaranteed corporate bond interest rate are important in the Modified 
VFM calculation, it is difficult to consider them as transferable risks because they are related to 
project environments not a specific project. Accordingly, they are considered separately here.
   
 
 
3.4.5 Probability distribution functions 
 
In order to use risk factors in the Monte Carlo Simulation, each risk factor is quantified, if 
possible, as a form of probability distribution function (PDF). To determine the best PDF for a 
risk factor, a goodness of fit (GOF) test with a Chi squared test
34 (  ) was implemented at the 
significance level 0.05 using @Risk 5.7.
35 
If the Chi squared test statistic is smaller than the critical value of the statistical hypothesis test 
at the significance level 0.05   . .   <   
 .    or the p value is larger than 0.05, then the null 
hypothesis (  ), stating that the sample data come from the stated distribution, is accepted 
within the significance level 0.05. When a risk factor has a PDF passing the Chi squared test, 
the PDF will be used for the Monte Carlo Simulation. Otherwise, the distribution histogram will 
be used. 
   
                                         
34 The  Chi  squared  (  ) statistics  estimate  the  extent  to  which  the  expected  frequency  of  the  fitted 
distribution compares with that of a histogram of observed data (Vose, 1996). The following formula 
shows the Chi squared statistics: 
   =	 
{ ( ) −  ( )} 
 ( )
 
   
 
where	  is number of bins,  ( ) is the observed frequency of the  th histogram class or bar and  ( ) is the 
expected frequency from the fitted distribution of  -values falling within the  -range of the  th histogram 
bar. 
35 @Risk 5.7 is risk analysis and simulation add-in for Microsoft Excel by Palisade Corporation. This 
software makes it possible to use the Monte Carlo Simulation as well as probability distribution fitting. JI HONG PARK    Ch.3 Research Methodology 
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3.5 Impact analysis 
 
 
In order to establish the impact of transferable risks on the PPP decisions in the transport 
infrastructure of Korea, this research compares the Modified VFM results, including 
transferable risks, with those based on the BTL guidelines (MOSF, 2009a). To estimate the 
Modified VFM with quantified risks, there are largely two kinds of approaches: 1) deterministic 
approaches like single-value estimation and sensitivity analysis; and 2) probabilistic approaches 
like Monte Carlo Simulation (Tanaka et al., 2005, Park, 2007). In this research, which uses 
single-value estimation, sensitivity analysis and Monte Carlo Simulation, the impact of the 
transferable risks on the Modified VFM and PPP decisions will be examined in order to assess 
the changes of the most appropriate procurement option depending on reflecting each 
transferable risk.  
 
 
3.5.1 Single-value estimation 
 
The impact of transferable risks on the PPP decision will be mainly assessed using the single-
value estimation method, reflecting the mean value (expected value) of the probability 
distribution of each transferable risk on the Modified VFM calculation. By doing so, how much 
each transferable risk influences PPP decisions will be examined, comparing the Modified VFM 
results with each risk and those without each risk. 
 
 
3.5.2 Sensitivity analysis 
 
Why a sensitivity analysis? 
A sensitivity analysis is probably the most representative approach among the deterministic 
techniques. A sensitivity analysis usually considers the effects of risk variables, considered to be 
critical to a decision-making, on decision-making. Therefore, future uncertainty from risk 
variables, the vulnerability of a procurement option decision or a determinant value regarding 
decision-making can be examined (HM Treasury, 2003, MLTM, 2010c). In other words, a 
sensitivity analysis is conducted with a view to finding how a determinant for a transport 
decision-making can be changed, depending on the variation of risk variables, such as discount 
rate and construction cost.  JI HONG PARK    Ch.3 Research Methodology 
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A sensitivity analysis can be developed into a scenario analysis, which is a complicated 
sensitivity analysis. A scenario analysis can reveal the changes of a determinant for a decision-
making by using scenarios, which are combinations of simultaneous changes of risk variables 
(Van Groenendaal and Kleijnen, 1997).  
However, there are some shortcomings to a sensitivity analysis, as follows: 1) equal probability 
of occurrence is assumed in all cases even if some scenarios have an extremely low probability 
of occurrence; 2) correlations between the variables are not considered; and 3) too many 
scenarios in projects are needed, considering the number of items and activities and their 
combination (Tanaka et al., 2005). 
 
Use in this research 
In this research, a sensitivity analysis is used to find out how the Modified VFM ( .      , 
 .      	and  .          ) results can vary depending on the changes (fluctuation from -
20 to +20 per cent) of calculation factors, such as discount rate and construction deflator, which 
are estimated based on Korea’s BTL guidelines (MOSF, 2009a). In addition, in terms of the 
impact of the transferable risks on the Modified VFM, a sensitivity analysis is not used because 
the analysis can be done more comprehensively using the Monte Carlo Simulation.  
 
 
3.5.3 The Monte Carlo Simulation 
 
Why Monte Carlo Simulation is preferred 
Although there could be various risk assessment methodologies, such as fuzzy set theory and 
decision tree analysis, it seems that Monte Carlo Simulation is almost the only risk 
quantification methodology recommended in the guidelines of various countries such as 
Australia (2008b), Hong Kong (2008b) and Canada (2011) because this method is able to give 
powerful solutions for decision-making (Shim et al., 2005b).  
To use Monte Carlo Simulation, the probabilistic distribution of the cost items or activities 
being analysed should firstly be defined. Random numbers are then generated over and over to 
calculate the resulting value, as with the Modified VFM, until the iteration meets the confidence 
level. Finally, the repeated simulation results are displayed by histograms or accumulated 
frequency distribution curves. In addition, the correlations
36 between variables can also be 
                                         
36 In this research, the following correlations are considered using @Risk 5.7: 1) between winning bid 
ratio and construction cost overrun; 2) between construction deflator and consumer price index; 3) five-
year exchequer bond rate and three-year non-guaranteed corporate bond interest rate.  JI HONG PARK    Ch.3 Research Methodology 
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considered in Monte Carlo Simulation because this simulation considers the probabilistic 
distribution of main variables at the same time (Palisade Corporation, 2010).  
 
 
Monte Carlo Simulation using historical observations  
With Monte Carlo Simulation, defining the probabilistic distribution of risk factors is very 
important in simulating results. If there are proper historical observations, the probabilistic 
distribution can be defined from these data, while if these are absent then this distribution can be 
assumed by personal or organisational intuitions and decisions (Park, 2007). However, when the 
probability distribution is assumed, there is always the possibility that subjectivity can affect the 
simulation results, which can be one of the faults of this method (Lee, 2003).  
 
Table 3-4: Research using Monte Carlo Simulation in transport 
 
Note: Research with (*) used probabilistic density function from historical observations 
 
From a review of the literature on the use of Monte Carlo Simulation in the transport area, it 
appears that since Pouliquen (1972) used this method in feasibility studies of the port and 
highway projects supported by IBRD, previous research adopting this method has primarily 
focused on financial or economic analysis (Lam and Tam, 1998, Malini, 1999, Lee et al., 1999, 
Jung et al., 2001, Grimsey and Lewis, 2002, Lee, 2003, Molenaar, 2005, Salling and Leleur, 
Researchers Purpose of research Project
Pouliquen (1972)
Feasibility analysis to supplement sensitivity analysis for IBRD 
projects to support underdeveloped countries
Lighterage port project (Somalia), 
Tanzan highway project (Zambia)
Lam and Tam (1998)




Malini (1999) Development of probabilistic simulation model for BOT project Municipal bridge (India)
Lee et al. (1999)
Development of risk analysis framework for PPP Expressway 
project
Seoul Beltway, Daejeon-Dangjin 
Expressway (South Korea)
Ye and Tiong (2000)
Development of NPV-at-risk model for the investment of BOT 
project  
Power plant project (hypothetical)
Jung et al. (2001)
Establishment of financial risk assessment model for BOT light rail 
project
Light rail project (South Korea)
Grimsey and Lewis (2002)
Establishment of risk assessment model for PPP project from the 
viewpoint of procurer, sponsor and lender
Almond Valley and Seafield 
Sewage Project (Scotland)
Lee (2003) Development of evaluation model for ITS project Daejeon ITS project (South Korea)
Molenaar (2005)* Development cost estimation validation process Highway Megaprojects (US)
Girmscheid (2009) Analysis of economic efficiency of PPP
Municipal street maintenance 
(Swiss)
Sadeghi et al. (2010)
Development of fuzzy Monte Carlo framework to consider 
uncertainty
Highway overpass project
Salling and Leleur (2011)
Development of CBA-DK software model for transport decision-
making
Transport appraisal (Denmark)JI HONG PARK    Ch.3 Research Methodology 
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2011). Other than that, this method has been used for developing a risk analysis model (Sadeghi 
et al., 2010).  
 
As seen in Table 3-4, research using probabilistic distribution from historical observations is 
very  rare  and  this  research  is  also  differentiated  from  other  research  in  using  historical 
observations that reflect project realities in Korea.  
 
Use in this research 
In this research, Monte Carlo Simulation is used to find out the changes of the Modified VFM 
and the selection of procurement options for case studies by using PDFs for risk variables 
(transferable risks and other risks), compared with the results from a single-value estimation 
method.  
   JI HONG PARK    Ch.3 Research Methodology 
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3.6 Case studies 
 
One of the main objectives of this research is to determine the impact of the transferable risks 
(completion delay, construction cost risk and traffic volume risk) on PPP decisions with respect 
to the National Highways, the National Expressways and the National Railways in Korea.  
To this end, six different projects (two projects for each transport mode) in two project groups 
have been considered: Group 1) involves three projects where a PPP decision has already been 
made, so these projects are under construction or are in operation; Group 2) involves three 
projects where a PPP decision has not already been made or that are awaiting commencement 
after procurement option decision-making. Candidate projects are shown in Table 3-5 and in 
Figure 3-3. 
 
Table 3-5: Candidate projects for case study 
 
 
For the case studies in Group 1, whether the PPP decision made in the past was appropriate will 
be scrutinised through the Modified VFM assessment with quantified risks. In addition, Group 2 
case studies will provide some new information on PPP decisions for these projects before  
commencement, so they could be helpful to justify the procurement option already selected by 
providing a more robust basis – or indeed to change the existing procurement option by pointing 
to a more reasonable alternative.  
National Highway National Expressway National Railway
Todang-Gwansan Suwon-Pyungtaek Sosa-Wonsi
Stage Construction Operation Construction
Delivery option Conventional BTO BTL
Completion 2012 2006 2016
Tariff - ⃝ ⃝
MRG - ⃝ -
Subsidy/lease fee - ⃝ -
PPP type BTL BTO, BTL BTO, BTL
MRG - ⃝ ⃝
Dongup-Hanlim Songsan-Bongdam Bujeon-Masan
Stage Waiting for construction PPP decision completed Feasibility stage
Delivery option Conventional BTO BTL
Construction Uncertain Uncertain Uncertain
Tariff - ⃝ ⃝
MRG - - -
Subsidy/lease fee - ⃝ ⃝
PPP type BTL BTO, BTL BTL
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With respect to the National Highway programme, as the National Highways do not have any 
experience in PPP procurement to date, many options for case study projects are available. 
Among many projects, the Todang-Gwansan project (Gyeonggi Province) and the Dongeup-
Hanlim project (Gyungnam Province) are selected for Group 1 and Group 2 respectively. The 
Todang-Gwansan case is selected as a Group 1 project because it is a recent project with a high 
benefit-cost ratio (more than 2.0) in the National Highway programme. Similarly, the Dongup-
Hanlim case is selected as a Group 2 project because it is one of the projects waiting to start in 
the very near future with a moderate benefit-cost ratio (about 1.2). The case studies for the 
National Highways will consider only BTL schemes because they are toll-free roads, which are 
different from other transport programmes, i.e. the National Expressway and the National 
Railway.  
Being different from the National Highway programme, the National Expressway programme 
has many PPP experiences with BTO schemes. As a Group 1 project, the Suwon-Pyungtaek 
project is chosen because it is the most recently completed project in this programme with a 
BTO scheme. In addition, the Songsan-Bongdam is selected as a Group 2 project because this 
project is waiting to start the PPP procedure in the near future (the PPP decision to use the BTO 
option was made in 2012).  
When it comes to the National Railway programme, projects using PPP schemes are relatively 
rare. Although there has been one BTO project (the Incheon International Airport Railway), 
since 2005 the BTL option has been predominant in the National Railways. Therefore, case 
study projects are selected from among BTL projects. Firstly, the Sosa-Wonsi case is considered 
as a Group 1 project because it is the biggest BTL project ever undertaken in Korea. Along with 
this, the Bujeon-Masan project is considered for Group 2 because it has already undergone a 
PPP pre-qualification test and it is easy to obtain project details from the PPP pre-qualification 
report.  
As shown in Figure 3-4, the case studies are located either in Gyeonggi Province (surrounding 
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Figure 3-4: Location of case study projects 
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Meta-analysis and previous research 
Since the beginning of the 20th century, many efforts have been made to draw a powerful 
conclusion, which is objective as well as trustworthy, by synthesising available findings from 
various pieces of literature or case studies under the name of “systematic review” (Oh, 2002, 
Higgins and Green, 2011) in various research fields, especially in medical treatment (Simpson 
and Pearson, 1904, Cochran, 1937) and agriculture (Fisher et al., 1932).  
Although in some regions, such as North America, the term “systematic review” is 
interchangeable with “meta-analysis”, “systematic review” in fact refers to the whole process of 
identifying, appraising, selecting, synthesising and presenting all available evidence, whereas 
“meta-analysis” refers only to the statistical techniques used in mixing and extracting studies to 
produce results (Cochrane Collaboration, 2002, Higgins and Green, 2011). 
Usually a meta-analysis means using a statistical method for summarising available specific or 
subjective findings from the literature or case studies into a more general or objective 
conclusion (Crombie and Davies, 2009). The term was first used by Glass in 1976. According to 
Glass (1976), meta-analysis simply refers to “the statistical analysis of large collections of 
analysis results from individual studies” in order to integrate findings, and it is also called as 
“analysis of analyses”. The meta-analysis is widely used, including in psychology, education 
and economics, to say nothing of medical research and agriculture (Button, 1995). 
As well as other research fields, many pieces of research have been conducted using meta-
analysis in transport research fields, with the main topics including the following: 1) valuing 
travel time saving (Wardman, 2004, Zamparini and Reggiani, 2007, Shires and de Jong, 2009); 
2) property value in relation to transport infrastructure (Nelson, 2004, Debrezion et al., 2007); 3) 
elasticity of transport demand (Goodwin et al., 2004, Brons et al., 2002); and 4) transport safety 
(Elvik, 2001, Bunn et al., 2003, de Blaeij et al., 2003).  
 
The objective of meta-analysis 
The typical objective of meta-analysis is to analyse comprehensively the relationship between 
outcome estimates and their related variables from the pool of findings from the literature or 
case studies, by producing systematic explanation of differences in the outcomes (Debrezion et 
al., 2007, Smith and Huang, 1995). In other words, using a meta-analysis, the impact of the 
variables on the outcome estimates, such as direction and magnitude, can be examined (Jang JI HONG PARK    Ch.3 Research Methodology 
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and Shin, 2011). Through this process, outcome estimates from various studies can be 
scrutinised in regard to whether they are statistically more or less than a base value, and some 
general or transferable conclusions can be drawn (Brons et al., 2002). In order to achieve the 
objective of meta-analysis, the procedure, though not sequential, is usually separated into five 
fundamental phases: 1) formulation of research problem; 2) collection of studies; 3) 
identification of relevant variables and model composition; 4) statistical analysis; and 5) 
description of findings (Zamparini and Reggiani, 2007).  
 
Meta-regression  
Generally speaking, when analysing heterogeneous research work, the ranges of research fields 
and statistical issues which need to be addressed, are so wide that the statistical methods 
employed in meta-analysis can be diverse (Button, 1995). Among various meta-analysis 
techniques, meta-regression is powerful when examining the relationship between one or more 
quantitative variables and outcome results. Though meta-regression was adopted for the purpose 
of handling heterogeneity problems between prior studies in meta-analysis, it is nowadays 
recommended for use in almost all meta-analysis sectors because it provides greater knowledge 
and a clearer explanation about the relationship between causes and effects as well (Chang, 
2012, Higgins and Green, 2011). Meta-regression is seen to be different from simple multiple 
regression in two respects, although these are superficially similar. First, more influence on the 
relationship is expected in larger studies than in smaller studies because studies are weighted by 
the standard errors of their respective effect value. Second, meta-regression considers the 
residual heterogeneity among case studies (Higgins and Green, 2011, Chang, 2012). 
With respect to meta-regression, from the viewpoint of the relationship between causes and 
effects, the general functional form can be expressed as follows (Button, 1995, Florax et al., 
2002): 
 
    =  ( , , , , ) +    (3-14) 
 
where Y = the variable under study, P = the set of causes of the outcome Y, X = the 
characteristics of the set of objects under examination affected by P in order to determine the 
outcome Y, R = the characteristics of research method, T = the time period covered by the study, 
L = the location of each study conducted,   = the error term  
 
Fixed-effects model and random-effects model 
Meta-regression basically attempts to explore variation in effects (the Modified VFM in this 
research) through the independent variables composing the regression model. According to JI HONG PARK    Ch.3 Research Methodology 
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Morton et al. (2004), although a meta-regression could take various forms, among them the 
fixed-effects model and random-effects model are the most popular in the literature.  
The fixed-effects model assumes that the effects are random samples selected from one true 
value. In other words, the effect sizes are assumed to have only within-study variance without 
between-study variance. As a result, the variance in the meta-regression means the within-study 
variance (  
 ) comes only from the sampling error. Additionally, the weight (  ) of each effect 
size is expressed as the reciprocal of the variance (  = 1/  
 ). Assuming a single true effect size 
( ), the effects (  )	can be statistically expressed as follows (Harbord and Higgins, 2008, 
Debrezion et al., 2007): 
    	~	 ( ,  
 )  (3-15) 
or equivalently: 
     =   +	  				where	  	~	 (0,  
 )		  (3-16) 
 
by replacing the mean (  ) with a linear predictor,   β:  
     =   β +	  				where	  	~	 (0,  
 )  (3-17) 
 
where β is a k × 1 vector of coefficients, including a constant, and    is a 1 × k vector of 
covariate values in study i.  
A random-effects model, on the other hand, assumes that the variance is composed of two 
different parts: the within-study variance (  
 ), and the between-study variance (  ). Thus, the 
weight of each effect size can be expressed as the reciprocal of each total variance (  = 
1/(  
  +   ). Statistically, assuming that the true effects (  ), which vary between studies, 
follow a normal distribution around a mean effect ( ) with between-study variance (  ), the 
effects (  ) can be expressed as follows (Harbord and Higgins, 2008, Debrezion et al., 2007): 
 
    |  	~	    ,  
  ,			where			  ~ ( ,  )	  (3-18) 
so: 
    ~ ( ,  
  +   )		  (3-19) 
or equivalently: 
     =   +    +   		where	  	~	 (0,	  )	and	  	~	  0,  
  		  (3-20) 
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by replacing the mean (  ) with a linear predictor,   β:  
     =   β +	   +   		where	  	~	 (0,	  )	and	  	~	  0,  
  		  (3-21) 
 
In the event that the between-study variance does not exist, the result of the random-effects 
model is the same as the fixed-effects model, so the random-effects model can be regarded as an 
extension of a fixed-effects model allowing for residual heterogeneity. Therefore, the fixed-
effects model is not usually recommended because it does not consider residual heterogeneity 
(Harbord and Higgins, 2008) though this can be picked up by case specific dummy variables.  
 
Use of meta-regression in this research 
In this research, based on the Modified VFM values with various conditions from six cases, the 
impact of some quantitative and qualitative variables on the Modified VFM in the land transport 
programme (roads and railways) of Korea is also examined, including the direction and 
magnitude of the impact.  
In order to verify the direction and size of causes on the Modified VFM values from the six case 
studies in the land transport programme, the STATA-based meta-regression algorithm 
(metareg
37) using the random-effects meta-regression model will be employed.  
   
                                         
37 Metareg is STATA command requiring STATA 8.0 or above, performing random-effects meta-
regression on study-level summary data. This programme was originally written by Stephen Sharp in 
1998 and then significantly rewritten by Roger M. Harbord and Julian P. T. Higgins in 2008. In this study, 
STATA Special Edition 12.1 was used for meta-regression analysis.  JI HONG PARK    Ch.3 Research Methodology 
  91   
 
3.8 Methodological framework 
 
The methodologies mentioned in this chapter are shown in Figure 3-5. By employing these 
methodologies, the impact of the transferable risks on the PPP decisions in each transport mode 
will be scrutinised and the most appropriate procurement options for the transport mode will be 
reviewed. As well as this, in the light of the land transport programme (roads and railways) of 




Figure 3-5: The methodological framework JI HONG PARK    Ch.3 Research Methodology 





As described above, this chapter deals with the research methodologies employed in order to 
achieve the objectives of this research. The essence of the chapter relates to the following: 1) the 
development of the Modified VFM; 2) the impact of transferable risks on the PPP decision 
through case studies; and 3) the use of meta-analysis to scrutinise the causes and effects on the 
PPP decision in the land transport programme.  
Firstly, as the most common PPP decision-making methodology, the VFM is popular in many 
countries using PPPs. Despite its popularity, however, it seems difficult to find a unique VFM 
test meeting all the socio-economic conditions. For example, in some countries where the public 
sector cannot deliver sufficient (or any) funds without the help of the private sector, it is 
difficult to provide infrastructure services properly (i.e. on time and on budget). When using the 
VFM approach for PPP decisions, these countries have to pretend that a PSC could be a possible 
alternative (despite this being impossible). In this case, the VFM assessment using a PSC could 
be meaningless (because a PSC is a nearly impossible alternative). Therefore, from the 
viewpoint of the Korean context, considering completion delay in the conventional delivery, the 
Modified VFM was developed to overcome the limitation of the VFM analysis, not including 
completion delay in terms of a quantitative assessment.  
Next is the impact of transferable risks on the PPP decision through case studies. To begin with, 
the transferable risks identified were completion delay, construction cost risk and traffic volume 
risk, and how to quantify them was also described in this chapter. In addition, in order to verify 
the impact of transferable risks on the PPP decision, the single-value estimation method will be 
mainly used, also subordinately adopting a sensitivity analysis and the Monte Carlo Simulation. 
With respect to the selection of case studies, six cases were selected taking into account 
transport programmes and project stages: 1) the National Highway programme, and the Todang-
Gwansan and the Dongup-Hanlim; 2) the National Expressway, and the Suwon-Pyungtaek and 
the Bongdam-Songsan; and 3) the National Railway, and the Sosa-Wonsi and the Bujeon-
Masan. 
Lastly, in order to induce some general or transferable conclusion in the land transport 
programme from specific results in roads and railways, a meta-regression analysis, using the 
Modified VFM result data with various conditions, is employed in this research. Through meta-
regression analysis, factors and their influences on the Modified VFM in the land transport 










The objective of this chapter is to determine the impact of transferable risks on the Modified 
VFM and the PPP decisions in the National Highway programme, using two case studies. The 
Todang-Gwansan National Highway case and the Dongup-Hanlim National Highway case are 
considered in this chapter, as explained in Chapter 3. Therefore, this chapter is largely made up 
of three sections covering the research objectives 2-1, 2-2 and 2-3: 1) quantified risks for the 
National Highways; 2) case study 1: the Todang-Gwansan case; and 3) case study 2: the 
Dongup-Hanlim case. 
To begin with, risk quantification is conducted in section 4.2; this applies not only to 
transferable risks but also to other risks like operation costs and inflations, based on historical 
observation and the literature. Three transferable risks are considered in this section: 
construction cost risk (winning bid ratio risk and construction cost overrun), traffic volume risk 
and completion delay in conventional delivery. Other than that, eight risk variables are also 
quantified: operation costs (general maintenance cost/VKT, re-pavement cost/VKT and road 
structure maintenance cost/VKT), construction deflator, consumer price index, five-year 
exchequer bond interest rate, and three-year non-guaranteed corporate bond (AA-) interest rate. 
The risk quantification is performed using the @ Risk 5.7 software package.  
In the Todang-Gwansan case (4.3) and in the Dongup-Hanlim case (4.4), the impacts of 
transferable risks on the Modified VFM and the PPP decisions are explored, using impact 
analyses such as single-value estimation, sensitivity analysis and the Monte Carlo Simulation, 
which are explained in Chapter 3 (3.5).  
In short, for the calculation of the Modified VFM using single-value estimation and sensitivity 
analysis, analysis input data are estimated by following Korea’s BTL guidelines (MOSF, 2009a) 
because the guidelines provide reference points for all the factors. When it comes to the 
Modified VFM using the Monte Carlo Simulation, analysis factors are used as a form of the 
probability distribution, quantified from historical observations. By doing so, the question of 
how the PPP or procurement decisions could be changed will be scrutinised, when they are 
reflected simultaneously in the Modified VFM. JI HONG PARK    Ch.4 The National Highway Case Studies 
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4.2.1 Transferable risks 
 
4.2.1.1 Construction cost risk 
 
Construction cost risk in the National Highway programme is estimated using the historical 
observations collected from 140 National Highway projects completed from 2006 to 2010. 
From equation (3-10), construction cost risk is composed of estimated price (EP), winning bid 
ratio (WBR) and construction cost overrun (α). Among these, EP (designed price in this 
research) is a constant for a project, so WBR and construction cost overrun are considered the 
risk factors.  
  
Construction cost overrun 
Construction cost overrun risk in real terms for the National Highways can be estimated from 
equation (3-11); the quantified PDF is shown in Figure 4-1. The mean value (expected value) is 
9.98 (per cent), which means that the construction cost of a National Highway project is 




Figure 4-1: The PDF for construction cost overrun risk in the National Highways 
 
WBR 
WBR means the proportion of the bid winner’s price (contract price) to the EP for a project. The 
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overrun risk, there are no PDFs passing the Chi square test (  ), so WBR risk is expressed as a 
form of frequency distribution, shown in Figure 4-2. From Figure 4-2, the mean value of WBR 




Figure 4-2: Frequency distribution for WBR in the National Highways 
 
Application ratio 
Based on construction cost risk and WBR estimated above, the application ratio in equation (3-
10), meaning construction cost risk, can be calculated. Therefore, the mean value of the 
application ratio becomes 84.58 (per cent)
38, which will be used in order to estimate the 
Modified VFM using single-value estimation and sensitivity analysis. For the Monte Carlo 
Simulations (MCS) of the Modified VFM, the PDF of construction cost overrun and the 
frequency distribution of WBR will be used, shown in Figure 4-1 and Figure 4-2 respectively.  
 
 
4.2.1.2 Completion delay 
 
From the historical observations, the probability distribution of the completion delays in the 
National Highways is shown in Figure 4-3. As this makes clear, completion delay in 
conventional delivery is, on average, 7.74 years. Considering five years to be the standard 
construction duration (KDI, 2008a, MLTM, 2010c), as discussed in Chapter 3, 2.74 years of 
completion delay is expected to occur when using conventional delivery for a National Highway 
                                         
38 84.58 (%) = 0.769 × (1+ 0.0998) 
5.0% 90.0% 5.0%
54.4 93.7
40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110
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project. Though a PDF for completion delay can be obtained, it is not used for the MCS because 
the MCS requires too many calculation sheets in order to use the PDF of completion delay. 
 
 
Figure 4-3: Construction duration in the National Highways 
 
 
4.2.1.3 Traffic volume risk 
 
As stated in Chapter 3 (3.4.3.3), from the bar graph of traffic volume inaccuracy in road sector, 
traffic volume risk, shown in Figure 4-4, can be generated according to equation (3-14). As seen 
in Figure 4-4, traffic volume risk is, on average, 0.686 in the road sector. 
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4.2.2 Other risk variables 
 
4.2.2.1 Operation cost 
 
In this study, the historical observations of the operation cost in the National Highway sector 
come from 18 regional National Highway Management Offices (NHMOs), not from individual 
projects. Therefore, the historical observation data concerns the executed budget in the 
respective NHMO from 2006 to 2010. Taking into account the availability of historical 
observations, operation cost is composed of four elements
39: management cost, general 
maintenance cost, re-pavement cost and road structure maintenance cost.  
In order to use operation cost items as risk factors for the calculation of the Modified VFM, 
operation cost items need to be transformed by a scale factor because conditions such as length 
and traffic volume differ between a case study and the National Highways operated by NHMOs. 
As a scale factor, although length or traffic volume could be used, it is more reasonable to 
consider vehicle kilometre travelled
40 (VKT) in each regional NHMO each year because this 
measure reflects the concept of length and traffic volume simultaneously. However, 
management cost/VKT is excluded from the risk variables because management cost seems to 
be close to a fixed cost and not a variable (as it is according to VKT).  
Accordingly, the following three risk variables relating to operation cost are considered: 1) 
general maintenance cost/VKT, 2) re-pavement cost/VKT, and 3) road structure maintenance 
cost/VKT. Using the historical observations regarding operation cost and VKT in each NHMO 
                                         
39 Management cost includes the expenses for National Highway Office management and overloaded 
vehicle enforcement, but doses not includes personnel cost. So, it is considered additionally when 
estimating the Modified VFM. General maintenance cost means total expenses for road maintenance, 
such as pavement repair and road sweeping. In addition, re-pavement cost means additional pavement 
cost needed when initial pavement is damaged after starting operation, and road structure maintenance 
cost is to maintain road structures such as bridges, tunnels, culverts and drainage. 
40 In this study, VKT is calculated as VKT = total length weighted annual average daily traffic (AADT, 
passenger car nit) × total length× 365days. In addition, in order to consider passenger car unit, the same 
passenger car equivalent (PCE), assuming flat land as used in Statistical Yearbook of Traffic Volume 
(2011), is applied in this study, which is as follows.  
 
                                                                                                                            Source:MLTM (2011d) 
Classification Small size Medium size Large size
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from 2006 to 2010, three risk variables (at the 2005 price) can be estimated, shown in Figure 4-
5. 
 
(a) General maintenance cost/VKT 
 
(b) Re-pavement cost/VKT 
 
(c) Road structure maintenance cost/VKT 






































In the calculation of the Modified VFM, factors relating to cost and benefits need to be 
estimated in real terms. Most of the calculation factors are already prepared without taking into 
account the effect of inflation; however, some factors, such as lease fee, newly estimated in 
nominal terms, need to be transformed into real terms by removing inflation. According to 
Korea’s BTL guidelines (MOSF, 2009a), the yearly lease fee in nominal terms is calculated by 
reflecting the construction deflator to yearly private investment, and this needs to be converted 
to real terms by the consumer price index. Construction deflator and consumer price index, 
shown in Figure 4-6, can be quantified using quarterly observations from 2000 to 2012, 
provided by the Bank of Korea. 
 
 (a) Construction deflator 
  
(b) Consumer price index 
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4.2.2.3 Factors relating BTL viability 
 
According to Korea’s BTL guidelines (MOSF, 2009a), BTL lease profitability is expressed as a 
“five-year exchequer bond interest rate + a mark-up”, where a mark-up is composed of a  
premium for long term investment and a risk premium for construction and operation. In a 
similar way, the BTL finance interest rate for the private sector is estimated by applying an 
additional rate to the three-year non-guaranteed corporate bond (AA-) interest rate, which is the 
base rate. As a result, for the Monte Carlo Simulation, the five-year exchequer bond interest rate 
and three-year non-guaranteed corporate bond (AA-) interest rates need to be quantified. Based 
on the historical fluctuations from 2000 to 2012, provided by the Korea Bond Information 
Service, they can be quantified as shown in Figure 4-7.  
 
 
 (a) five-year exchequer bond interest rate 
  
(b) three-year non-guaranteed corporate bond (AA-) interest rate 


























4.3 Case 1: The Todang-Gwansan case 
 
 
4.3.1 Project overview 
 
Todang-Gwansan, a part of National Highway number 39 (Figure 4-8), has been under 
construction since 2005 for the purposes of creating a new detour around the city centre of 
Goyang City near Seoul. According to the Statistical Yearly Book of Traffic Volume (MLTM, 
2011d), in 2010 the existing road had 42,094 vehicles using it daily, on average, which is 
beyond the marginal transport ability
41 (41,300) of a four-lane Nation Highway (MLTM, 2010b). 
In particular, the existing road runs though the city centre of Goyang City, so its function as a 
trunk road has been severely weakened. Therefore, in order to maintain the arterial function of 
the National Highway, the Korean government planned to build a detour around Goyang city in 
2000: they expected that the traffic congestion in the local area would be improved and 




Figure 4-8: The location map of the Todang-Gwansan case 
                                         
41 According to MLTM (2010b), as a rule of thumb, the Korean government uses the concept of the 
marginal transport ability of a road. The marginal transport ability (41,300) of a four-lane National 
Highway is estimated by considering level of service (D).   JI HONG PARK    Ch.4 The National Highway Case Studies 
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The key features of the Todang-Gwansan case are as follows: 
  Title: The Todang-Gwansan National Highway (39) Project  
  Location: Todang-dong ~ Gwansan-dong, Goyang City, Gyeonggi Province 
  Length: 9.24km (four lanes) 
  Construction cost: 198.2 (estimated, billion KRW, 2002 price) 
  Benefit cost (B/C) ratio: 2.14 
 
 
4.3.2 Analysis factors and assumptions for the Modified VFM 
 
Analysis factors 
The National Highway programme has not experienced any PPP system so far, so a hypothetical 
PPP project reflecting the decision-making time needs to be considered for use in the Modified 
VFM. In terms of PPP options, only the BTL option is considered in this case because the 
National Highways are all toll-free roads and so without a revenue stream a stand-alone type of 
PPP such as a BTO, cannot be adopted. In addition, in terms of the design stage, the PPP 
decision is assumed to be taken in 2002, three years (a two years’ final design and a one year’s 
administration such as presentations for residents) earlier than the start of construction. Other 
factors are estimated by following Korea’s BTL guidelines (MOSF, 2009a). 
Basic factors for the Modified VFM are as follows: 
  PPP model: Build-Transfer-Lease 
  Discount rate: 7.5 per cent (real) 
  Decision-making time: 2002 
  Price base year: 2002 
  Five-year exchequer bond interest rate
42: 6.9 per cent (nominal)  
  Construction deflator
43: 3.51 per cent (nominal, on average from 1999 to 2002) 
                                         
42 The five-year exchequer bond interest rate is calculated by a weighted average method, which applies 
0.1, 0.2, 0.3 and 0.4 to the first, second, third and fourth quarter value (MOSF, 2009a). The quarterly five-
year exchequer bond interest rate is provided by the Korea Bond Information Service 
(http://www.kofiabond.or.kr).  
43 Construction deflator means the construction investment deflator in Expenditure on Gross Domestic 
Product on National Accounts, which is provided by the Bank of Korea (http://ecos.bok.or.kr). According 
to the BTL guidelines of Korea (MOSF, 2009a), it is used in the calculation of the private sector JI HONG PARK    Ch.4 The National Highway Case Studies 
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  Consumer price index
44: 3.50 per cent (nominal, on average from 1999 to 2002) 
  BTL lease profitability
45: 8.9 per cent (nominal) 
  BTL finance interest rate
46: 8.51per cent (nominal) 
                   (Three-year non-guaranteed corporate bond (AA-) interest rate (7.01 per cent)
47 + 
1.5 per cent)  
  BTL finance terms: level debt service
48 during operation period 
  BTL finance structure: equity 15 per cent, debt 85 per cent 
  Operation period: 30 years, construction duration: five years 
 
Assumptions 
The case study was analysed under four assumptions: 1) the normal construction duration is five 
years in the conventional case as well as in the PPP delivery if there is no restriction on 
construction funds; 2) a completion delay in the conventional delivery occurs only due to lack 
of a budget; 3) when using a PPP delivery, a completion delay does not occur; and 4) without 
completion delay, all deliveries produce the same social benefit. 
 
 
                                                                                                                         
investment for the lease fee calculation. For a more accurate private sector investment calculation, it is 
used instead of the consumer price index.  
44 The consumer price index is also provided by the Bank of Korea (http://www.bok.or.kr).  
45 BTL lease profitability is expressed as “five-year exchequer bond interest rate + mark-up rate” and 
mark-up is composed of a premium for long term investment and risk premium for construction and 
operation (MOSF, 2009a). According to research (Jung et al., 2006) and newspaper reports (Jung, 2005, 
Lee, 2009), the mark-up rate is distributed from 0.5 per cent to 2.25 per cent. Given that there is no 
advanced BTL projects for road programme and road projects usually takes 35 years for construction and 
operation, 2.0 per cent of mark-up rate is considered for the National Highways in this research. 
46 BTL finance interest rate is expressed as a “three-year non-guaranteed corporate bond interest rate + 
mark-up rate” (MOSF, 2009a) and, according to Kim et al. (2005), the mark-up rate is distributed from 
0.66 per cent to 2.00 per cent. Considering there is no advanced BTL projects for roads and road projects 
usually takes 35 years for construction and operation, 1.5 per cent of mark-up rate is used for the National 
Highways.  
47 Three-year non-guaranteed corporate bond interest rate is also provided by the Korea Bond Information 
Service (http://www.kofiabond.or.kr). It is estimated in the same way as the five-year exchequer bond 
interest rate, following the BTL guidelines of Korea (MOSF, 2009a) 
48 Level debt service means principal and interest payment scheme that a debtor pays back a creditor 
annually an equal amount of money including principal and interests. JI HONG PARK    Ch.4 The National Highway Case Studies 
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4.3.3 Main calculation items for the Modified VFM analysis 
 
From equation (3-8), the main calculation items for the Modified VFM are the asset cost of a 
PSC (     ), the operation cost of a PSC (     ) and a BTL (     ), the lease fee of a BTL 
(     	   	   ) and the benefit difference (ΔB).  
 
Asset cost of the PSC (     ) 
The basic asset cost of this project is shown in Table 4-1. Building cost and compensation cost 
in brackets are collected from feasibility review report on the Goyang City detour (MLTM, 
2011a); other costs for which historical observations are not available are estimated using the 
governmental cost estimate standard.
49  
 
Table 4-1: Basic asset cost for the PSC and the BTL 
(Unit: billion KRW, real term, 2002 price) 
 
                                         
49 The cost items using the governmental cost estimate standard are as follows: 1) design inspection cost, 
2) construction inspection cost, 3) environmental impact study cost, 4) traffic impact assessment cost, 5) 
























                         10.6
Design inspection 1.0
Construction inspection 5.9
Environmental impact assessment 1.3
Traffic impact assessment 0.1
Disaster impact assessment 0.2
Cultural asset survey 1.1
Insurance 1.0 
                         11.0
Design inspection 1.0
Construction inspection 5.9
Environmental impact assessment 1.3
Traffic impact assessment  0.1
Disaster impact assessment  0.2




                           5.7
Business commence cost 5.4




Note: 1. Compensation cost is provided by the Korean government so it is not included in the Modified VFM 
assessment.  2. The bracketed values are from the feasibility review report on the Goyang City detour project (MLTM, 
2011a).  3. Insurance cost for a PSC is contractor’s all risk insurance(1.0), while insurance cost for a BTL is composed 
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In addition, operation facility cost, business reserve and insurance cost refer to the PPP pre-
qualification report on the Bongdam-Songsan National Expressway project (PIMAC, 2009b). In 
particular, insurance cost is estimated by considering insurance premium rates used in the report. 
According to Korea’s BTL guidelines (MOSF, 2009a), the building cost items of the PSC are 
calculated by multiplying the historical observations by 88.55 (per cent),
50 the average WBR of 
turn-key/alternative bid in National Highway projects between 2002 and 2011 (MLTM, 2012b).  
In order to calculate the public sector cost of the PSC, total building costs (including 
investigation, design, and construction) can be distributed annually over the construction period 
according to the yearly distribution ratios from the preliminary feasibility study guidelines (KDI, 
2008a). For additional costs, however, there are no yearly cost distribution ratios in the 
preliminary feasibility guideline, so the yearly distribution ratios, used in the PPP pre-
qualification report on the Bongdam-Songsan National Expressway (PIMAC, 2009b), are used 
for the Modified VFM calculation. In addition, operation facility cost is assumed to be invested 
in the fifth year of construction. In summary, Table 4-2 shows the yearly cost distribution ratios 
for the asset cost of the PSC. 
In addition, in order to consider completion delay, new yearly distribution ratios developed by 
interpolation, based on yearly distribution ratios in five-year constructions, are applied to the 
VFM and the Modified VFM analysis.  
 
Table 4-2: Standard yearly cost distribution ratios for asset cost of the PSC 
 
Source: KDI (2008a), PIMAC (2009a) 
 
Operation cost for the PSC and the BTL (     ,     ) 
With respect to the PSC (     ), yearly base operation costs are estimated by multiplying the 
mean values of the operation costs
51 (KRW/VKT) from the historical observations and the 
                                         
50 The details are shown in Appendix A. 
51 Management cost/VKT = 1.68 KRW/VKT, general maintenance cost/VKT = 11.85 KRW/VKT, re-










1 1 1 0.05 0.336 0.336
2 0 0 0.15 0.135 0.135
3 0 0 0.25 0.26 0.26
4 0 0 0.35 0.202 0.202
5 0 0 0.2 0.067 0.067
Total 1 1 1 1 1JI HONG PARK    Ch.4 The National Highway Case Studies 
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yearly VKT of this case from the feasibility review report of the Goyang City detour project 
(MLTM, 2011a). In addition, personnel cost
52 is considered in addition to operation cost 
because the historical observations do not include a cost entry to cover this. 
However, in general, the maintenance costs (among the operation cost items) tend to gradually 
increase over time because of the facility’s increasing decrepitude. In order to consider 
decrepitude, the preliminary feasibility guidelines (KDI, 2008b) suggest relative yearly 
maintenance cost ratios for 30 years. However, the historical observations for maintenance costs 
per VKT are estimated, unfortunately, from the executed budget in 18 NHMOs, not from an 
individual National Highway section, so it would appear that they include diverse decrepitude 
ranges for National Highways maintained by 18 NHMOs. Inevitably, for a simple calculation, 
the historical observations are assumed to be collected from the National Highways with 15 
years of decrepitude in this research.  
Accordingly, yearly maintenance costs are finally calculated by reflecting the yearly normalised 
maintenance cost ratios, shown in Table 4-3, on the yearly base maintenance costs. The yearly 
ratios are estimated by calculating the proportions of yearly maintenance cost in the National 
Expressways, provided by KDI (2004b), to the maintenance cost of the 15
th year. 
 
Table 4-3: Yearly cost distribution ratios for maintenance costs of the PSC 
 
Source: KDI (2004b) 
 
According to KDI (2004b), Table 4-3 was created based on historical observations from the 
Joongbu Expressway in Korea and the yearly maintenance costs were estimated by logistic 
regression based on historical observation for 10 years from the start of operations. According 
                                         
52 Considering yearly salary/person and its inflation, total personnel of 18 National Highway Management 
Offices and length in terms of four-lane kilometres, the personnel cost of 3,490,881 (KRW/four-lane 
kilometre; the 2005 price) will be used in this research.  
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Maintenance cost 
(KRW/4 lane km)
0.93 1.11 1.31 1.55 1.82 2.13 2.49 2.88 3.32 3.8
Normalised ratio 0.14 0.17 0.2 0.23 0.27 0.32 0.38 0.43 0.5 0.57
Year 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Maintenance cost 
(KRW/4 lane km)
4.32 4.87 5.45 6.04 6.63 7.23 7.81 8.36 8.89 9.37
Normalised ratio 0.65 0.73 0.82 0.91 1 1.09 1.18 1.26 1.34 1.41
Year 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
Maintenance cost 
(KRW/4 lane km)
9.82 10.22 10.58 10.9 11.18 11.43 11.64 11.82 11.97 12
Normalised ratio 1.48 1.54 1.6 1.64 1.69 1.72 1.76 1.78 1.81 1.81JI HONG PARK    Ch.4 The National Highway Case Studies 
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to theoretical approach in road maintenance, whole life pavement performance curve (shown as 
roughness in Figure 4-9) looks spiky when optimal maintenance is provided (Rouse and Chiu, 
2009, Tsunokawa and Schofer, 1994, Harvey, 2012). Therefore, whole life maintenance cost 
can also be spiky, similar to whole life pavement performance curve when optimum 
maintenance is provided, which is quite different from Table 4-3.  
There could be three reasons that make this difference. Firstly, due to lack of budget, optimum 
maintenance could not be achieved in Korean practice. When roads are not maintained 
appropriately because maintenance funds are not available, the maintenance cost graph can be 
different from the spike graph like Figure 4-9, where roughness is improved when timely 
maintenance is provided as time passes. Secondly, the condition of road sections can be 
different even though they were constructed by the same project. Road authorities in Korea 
invest maintenance funds considering the condition of sections and fund availability, so 
historical maintenance cost observations considering the whole road length can be different 
from the spike graph considering a small (or ideal) size road section. Thirdly, there are various 
maintenance cost items with different maintenance periods and when they are overlapped total 
maintenance cost graph can be different from being spiky like Figure 4-9.  
Therefore, though Table 4-3 seems to be oversimplified from the theoretical perspective, it 
seems that it can be carefully utilised in the calculation of maintenance costs, considering the 
impact of lack of maintenance funds, the superimposition of various maintenance cost items 
with different maintenance periods and its being from historical observations. 
 
 
Source: ATC (2006), quoted from Harvey (2006) 
Figure 4-9: Illustrative whole life pavement curve with rehabilitations and reconstructions 
 
 When it comes to operation cost of the BTL (     ), because there are no cases in which BTL 
scheme is applied in the National Highway, the same operation cost as was used in the PSC is 




Lease fee for the BTL (     	   	   ) 
 
According to Korea’s BTL guidelines (MOSF, 2009a), the lease fee in nominal term is paid 




















   
(4-1) 
 
where N = operation period, k = rate of return, P = the private sector investment principal and 
the interest which is converted to the present value at construction completion time (if the BTL 
project includes subsidiary enterprises, the investment principal and interest should be reduced 
as much as the profit of them), and PVIFA = Present value Interest Factor of an Annuity, which 
is equivalent to the reciprocal of the capital recovery factor (Rogers and Duffy, 2012).
53  
The private sector investment principal and interest (P) is calculated reflecting the BTL finance 
structure (debt ratio), the finance terms and the interest rate. From Table 4-1, the asset cost 
delivered in total by the private sector amounts to 200.2 (billion KRW, 2002 price) in real terms. 
Using the BTL finance structure, 15 per cent (30.0) is delivered as equity, and 85 per cent 
(170.2) as debt. The asset cost in nominal terms delivered annually can be calculated by 
applying construction deflator to real prices. Therefore the principal of the private sector 
investment is 240.6 (billion KRW, nominal term), which is the sum of (a) and (b) in Table 4-4. 
In addition, according to the finance terms (the level debt service during the operation period), 
during the construction period only interest is paid, and during the operation period an even 
amount (including both principal and interest) in nominal terms is paid annually by borrowing 
debt in nominal terms during the construction period. Therefore, the interest during construction 
period by borrowing debt amounts to 28.7 (billion KRW, nominal terms), (c) in Table 4-4. 
Summing the principal and interest, the private sector investment (P) is in total 269.3 (billion 
KRW, in nominal terms) at the construction completion time. Consequently, in this case study, 
the lease fee in nominal terms for the BTL is calculated as follows: 
 
                                         
53 PVIFA can be expressed by the reciprocal of the capital recovery factor	 ∑
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269.3	






Considering consumer price index and economic discount rate, the lease fee in nominal terms in 
each year will be transformed into real terms to be applied to the Modified VFM.  
 
Table 4-4: Calculation of the private sector investment 




Social benefit difference (  )  
Social benefits for the Modified VFM analysis for this case study are collected from the 
feasibility review report on the Goyang City detour project (MLTM, 2011a). The social benefit 
difference (ΔB) beween the PSC and the BTL alternative, considering the completion delay on 
conventional delivery, can be calculated using these data. 
According to the preliminary feasibility study guideline for roads and railway in Korea (KDI, 
2008a), the social benefits of roads and railways in Korea mainly consist of the valuation of 
vehicle operating cost (VOC) saving, the valuation of travel time (VOT) saving, the valuation of 
accident costs (VAC) saving and the valuation of environment cost (VEC) saving.  
With respect to the relationship of traffic volume and social benefit, it seems that social benefits 
can vary when actual traffic volume is different from the forecast because traffic volume can 
have an influence on the benefit factors above directly or indirectly. In order to establish this 
relationship, it appears necessary to conduct a new traffic demand analysis for the case. 
However, if this is difficult in practical terms, this relationship could be estimated roughly using 
an empirical method.  
Real (2002 price) Nominal Real (2002 price) Nominal
2005 3.8 4.2 21.5 23.8
2006 4.2 4.8 23.6 27.1 2.0
2007 7.0 8.3 39.7 47.2 4.3
2008 9.5 11.7 54.1 66.5 8.4
2009 5.5 7.0 31.2 39.7 14.0
Total 30.0 36.1 (a) 170.2 204.5 (b) 28.7 (c)
Year
Equity (15%) Debt (85%) Interest 
(nominal)
Private sector investment (P = a + b + c) 269.3JI HONG PARK    Ch.4 The National Highway Case Studies 
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With respect to this, Kim et al. (2011) researched the relationship between benefit cost ratio
54 
(BCR) and volume-capacity ratio (V/C) based on the preliminary feasibility study on 91 
National Highway projects in order to estimate the approximate economic feasibility of the 
National Highway projects. According to Kim et al. (2011), as shown in Figure 4-10, the 
relationship between BCR and V/C is as follows: 
 
      =  .    ×
 
 




Source: Kim et al. (2011) 
Figure 4-10: Relationship between BCR and volume/capacity in the National Highway 
 
Although this relationship seems to show roughly that BCR is 0.439 when V/C is zero, the 
relationship is used for this research for a simple calculation. If roads in Korea are assumed to 
                                         
54 According to the feasibility study guidelines of Korea (KDI, 2008b), in order to measure the economic 
feasibility of a project, three methodologies regarding benefit and cost can be used in Korea: 1) benefit 
cost ratio (BCR), 2) net present value (NPV), and 3) internal rate of return (IRR). Among them, BCR is 
mainly used in the feasibility study of a project because it is easy to understand and also makes it easy to 
consider project size. Usually when the BCR of a project is greater than or equal to 1, the project is 
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(1 +  ) 
 
   
   
 
Where,    = benefit at t,    = cost at t,   = discount rate, and   = project duration (construction and 
operation) JI HONG PARK    Ch.4 The National Highway Case Studies 
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follow the above relationship, as traffic volume becomes k times, social benefit changes to b
55 
times as follows: 
 
    =	
  + ∆ 
 
=   +	
 .   	(  −  )




Where, B = the social benefit with current traffic volume, B = the social benefit change when 
traffic volume changes to k times, BCR = the benefit cost ratio. 
In this case study (BCR = 2.14), from equation (4-3), when the traffic volume drops to 68.6 per 
cent of the forecast one, the social benefits also drop to 75.0 per cent of the forecast one. 
 
   
                                         







4.3.4.1 The Modified VFM (with no completion delay) 
 
To verify the impact of the inclusion of construction cost risk and traffic volume risk on the 
Modified VFM when there is no completion delay in the conventional delivery, four different 
Modified VFM (M.VFMBTL) using the mean value of each risk are conducted: 1) M.VFMBTL 
without risks; 2) M.VFMBTL with construction cost risk; 3) M.VFMBTL with traffic volume risk; 
and 4) M.VFMBTL with both risks (construction cost risk and traffic volume risk). The results of 
M.VFMBTL are shown in Table 4-5. 
 
Table 4-5: The Modified VFM results according to risk inclusion 




M.VFMBTL with no risk inclusion 
Considering an average WBR of turn-key/alternative bids (88.55 per cent) in National Highway 
projects between 2002 and 2011 (MLTM, 2012b) in calculating the asset cost of the PSC, 
M.VFMBTL (Table 4-5, the first row) shows that it is feasible to implement this project with the 
BTL, indicating the value of 4.8 (billion KRW) in the BTL.  
 
M.VFMBTL with construction cost risk 
From equation (3-10), an application ratio, indicating construction cost risk, consists of WBR 











1) M.VFM BTL 
(+no risks)
109.6 16.8 104.8 16.8 0.0 4.8
2) M.VFM BTL
(+const. risk)
105.0 16.8 104.8 16.8 0.0 0.2
3) M.VFM BTL
(+volume risk)
109.6 12.2 104.8 16.8 0.0 0.2
4) M.VFM BTL
(+both risks)
105.0 12.2 104.8 16.8 0.0 -4.4
Note: 1.  M.VFM BTL (+no risks) = the Modified VFM value without considering risks based on the BTL guidelines of Korea, M.VFM BTL 
(+const. risk) = the Modified VFM value considering the mean values of winning bid ratio risk and construction cost overrun risk, 
M.VFM BTL (+volume risk) = the Modified VFM value considering the mean value of traffic volume risk, and M.VFM BTL (+both risks) = 
the Modified VFM value considering the mean values of winning bid ratio risk, cost overrun risk and traffic volume risk. 
2. AC PSC = Asset cost in the PSC, OC PSC = Operation cost in the PSC, Lease fee  BTL = Lease fee in the BTL, OC BTL = Operation cost 
in the BTL and DB = social benefit difference between the PSC and the BTL.
PSC BTL
D B
(f)JI HONG PARK    Ch.4 The National Highway Case Studies 
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Figure 4-2) and construction cost overrun risk (9.98 per cent, Figure 4-1), the asset cost of the 
PSC can be freshly calculated. 
The result (Table 4-5, the second row) shows that M.VFMBTL, taking in account the construction 
cost risk, is 0.2 (billion KRW), which is 4.6 (billion KRW) lower than M.VFMBTL with no risk 
inclusion. This is because the mean values of WBR and construction cost overrun make an 
application ratio of 84.58 per cent (0.769 × (1+0.0998)), which is 3.97 per cent lower than the  
average winning bid ratio of turn-key/alternative bids (84.58 per cent) used.  
This means that M.VFMBTL with no risk inclusion based on Korea’s BTL guidelines (MOSF, 
2009a) could be exaggerated by as much as the difference of 3.97 per cent more than the 
situation in reality. 
 
M.VFMBTL with traffic volume risk 
To verify the impact of traffic demand risk on M.VFMBTL, the mean value of traffic volume risk 
(68.6 per cent, Figure 4-4) is applied. The result (Table 4-5, the third row) shows that the 
M.VFMBTL decreases by 4.6 (billion KRW). The decrease in M.VFMBTL is due to the decrease in 
the operation cost in the PSC by the VKT decrease in the project from traffic volume reduction 
(from 100 to 68.6 per cent).  
 
M.VFMBTL with both risks 
Table 4-5 (the last row) shows that the BTL scheme is not the best option for this project with 
M.VFMBTL value of -4.4 (billion KRW) when construction cost risk and traffic volume risk are 
included. Compared with M.VFMBTL with no risk inclusion, the value decreases by 9.2 (billion 
KRW), among which the impact of construction risk and traffic volume risk occupies, 
respectively, 4.6 and 4.6 (billion KRW).  
All in all, from the viewpoint of the M.VFMBTL with no completion delay, it seems that the 
conventional delivery is more favourable than the BTL scheme when construction cost and 
traffic volume risks are included. 
 
 
4.3.4.2 The Modified VFM (with completion delay) 
 
Impact of a completion delay in the conventional delivery 
To verify the impact of a completion delay in the conventional delivery on the PPP decision-
making, M.VFMBTL with completion delay (0 to 4 years) is conducted. M.VFMBTL is calculated JI HONG PARK    Ch.4 The National Highway Case Studies 
114 
 
by considering a completion delay of conventional delivery, which affects not only the yearly 
asset cost input but also the social benefit difference between the PSC and the BTL. 
M.VFMBTL results are shown in Table 4-6. In the no risk inclusion case, M.VFMBTL soars from 
4.8 to 76.9 (billion KRW) as completion is delayed from 0 to 4 years. Similarly, in the risk 
(construction cost risk and traffic volume risk) inclusion case, it rises from -4.4 to 46.6 (billion 
KRW) according to completion delay. This is because the increase in the social benefit 
difference between the PSC and the BTL due to a completion delay is bigger than the decrease 
in the public sector cost in the PSC due to discounting.  
Additionally, taking into account the mean value of the completion delay (2.74 years, Figure 4-3) 
in the National Highway projects, the BTL scheme is better than the conventional option for this 
project.  
 
Table 4-6: The Modified VFM result with completion delay 




Critical completion delay 
In order to find out a critical completion delay in the conventional delivery, which makes the 
M.VFMBTL zero, a linear regression analysis was conducted using Table 4-6. As seen in Figure 
4-11, depending on whether construction cost risk and traffic volume risk are included or not, 
the regression line of M.VFMBTL differs. 
In the no risk inclusion case, when the linear regression line is extended, it meets the horizontal 











0 109.6 16.8 104.8 16.8 0.0 4.8
1 105.5 15.6 104.8 16.8 25.5 25.0
2 101.6 14.5 104.8 16.8 49.2 43.7
2.74 98.7 13.8 104.8 16.8 65.8 56.6
3 97.8 13.5 104.8 16.8 71.3 61.0
4 94.1 12.6 104.8 16.8 91.9 76.9
0 105.0 12.2 104.8 16.8 0.0 -4.4
1 101.1 11.4 104.8 16.8 19.2 10.0
2 97.3 10.6 104.8 16.8 37.0 23.2
2.74 94.5 10.0 104.8 16.8 49.4 32.3
3 93.6 9.8 104.8 16.8 53.5 35.4
4 90.1 9.2 104.8 16.8 69.0 46.6
Risk 
inclusion
Note: 1. AC PSC = Asset cost in the PSC, OCPSC = Operation cost in the PSC, Lease fee BTL= Lease fee in the BTL, OCBTL = 
Operation cost in the BTL and ∆B= the social benefit difference between the PSC and the BTL. 2. Risk inclusion = construction 
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this project earlier than the BTL by up to 0.35 years (4.2 months), the BTL is better than the 
conventional delivery. In other words, even if the construction in the BTL starts up to 0.35 years 
(4.2 months) later (as the result of a negotiation delay or a financial problem) than the 
conventional delivery, the BTL is more favourable than the conventional delivery. 
In the same way, regarding M.VFMBTL with risk inclusion, the intercept of the horizontal axis 
(the critical completion delay) becomes 0.26 years (3.12 months). This means that if the 
completion in the conventional delivery is delayed more than 0.26 years (3.12 months), the BTL 
becomes better than the conventional delivery. In other words, when more than 0.26 years (3.12 
months) of completion delay is expected in the conventional delivery, the BTL is a more 
appropriate delivery option even if M.VFMBTL is negative without completion delay. 
 
 
Figure 4-11: The Modified VFM result according to completion delay 
 
In addition, considering that critical completion delay in this project is less than the mean value 
(2.74 years, Figure 4-3) of completion delay in National Highway projects, the BTL option 
seems to be more favourable for this project case. 
 
 
4.3.4.3 Sensitivity analysis 
 
M.VFMBTL results can be different depending on how large values are used as analysis factors. 
In order to examine the behaviour of M.VFMBTL, according to the change of analysis factors, a 
sensitivity analysis is conducted. For a sensitivity analysis, the following eight analysis factors 
are considered: 1) BTL construction cost; 2) BTL operation cost; 3) BTL finance interest rate; 4) 
discount rate; 5) BTL lease profitability; 6) construction deflator; 7) consumer price index; and 
8) the size of social benefits.  JI HONG PARK    Ch.4 The National Highway Case Studies 
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The changes of M.VFMBTL with risk inclusion and 2.74 year delay are shown in Figure 4-12, 
when the analysis factors vary by from -20 to 20 per cent on each factor’s given value. The 
summary of sensitivity analysis is shown in Table 4-7.  
 
 
Figure 4-12: Sensitivity analysis of analysis factors (risk inclusion, 2.74 year delay) 
 







1. BTL construction cost Decrease -0.96
The increase of BTL construction cost makes private 
investment and lease fee rise, so M.VFM BTL decreases.
2. BTL operation cost Decrease -0.19
The increase of BTL operation cost naturally makes 
M.VFM BTL decrease.
3. BTL finance interest rate Decrease -0.14
The increase of BTL finance interest rate makes lease fee rise, 
so M.VFM BTL decreases
4. Discount rate Increase 0.29
The increase of discount rate makes cost items fall.  Among 
them, lease fee has a largest drop, so M.VFM BTL decreases.  
5. Lease profitability Decrease -0.83
The rise of lease profitability makes lease fee rise, so 
M.VFM BTL decreases
6. Construction deflator Decrease -0.19
The rise of construction deflator makes private investment 
and lease fee increase, so M.VFM BTL decreases.
7. Consumer price index 
   (CPI)
Increase 0.39
Nominal lease fee is converted to real term by consumer price 
index.  The rise of CPI makes lease fee in real term drop, so 
M.VFM BTL increases.
8. Social benefits Increase 0.49
The rise of social benefits makes the social benefit difference 
grow, so M.VFM BTL increases.
Analysis factors
M.VFM BTL changes due to the increase of analysis factors
Note; Unit change means the change of M.VFM BTL when an analysis factor rises by 1 per cent on its given value.JI HONG PARK    Ch.4 The National Highway Case Studies 
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Sensitivity analysis results, given in Figure 4-12, show that M.VFMBTL values with risk inclusion 
and 2.74 year delay are always positive, which means the BTL option is better than the 
conventional option.  
Among the eight analysis factors, as seen in Table 4-7, as discount rate, consumer price index or 
social benefits go up, M.VFMBTL rises with a positive slope; this is mainly because these factors 
make the lease fee drop. However, when other factors go up, M.VFMBTL falls with a negative 
slope because these make the lease fee rise or lead directly to an increase in the public sector 
cost (BTL operation cost) in the BTL.  
Other than that, the sensitivity results show that, among the factors, BTL construction cost and 
lease profitability are most influential for the Modified VFM with the steepest slopes when they 
rise by from -20 to 20 per cent point based on each factor’s given value. Accordingly, an 
individual appraiser who feels pressure to show the viability of the BTL may be vulnerable to 
adjusting BTL construction cost and lease profitability. For this reason, in reality, according to 
Kim (2011), BTL construction cost applied to a VFM analysis is less (93.8 per cent on average) 
than PSC construction cost without reason. 
  
 
4.3.4.4 The Monte Carlo Simulations 
 
The MCS is conducted to identify the impact of the 11 risk variables shown in Figure 4-
1~Figure 4-7, which are from historical observations: WBR, construction cost overrun, traffic 
volume, three operation costs (general maintenance cost/VKT, re-pavement cost/VKT and road 
structure maintenance cost/VKT), construction deflator, consumer price index, five-year 
exchequer bond interest rate, and three-year non-guaranteed corporate bond interest rate. 
Figure 4-12 shows the MCS results with no completion delay and with a 2.74-year completion 
delay. In the case of no completion delay (Figure 4-13 (a)), M.VFMBTL is distributed between -
41.4 and 27.8 (billion KRW) with 90 per cent probability and the mean value is -5.4 (billion 
KRW). Additionally, the probability that M.VFMBTL is positive is 37.9 per cent, which shows 
that the BTL scheme is not the best option for this project.  
In addition, in the case of a 2.74-year completion delay (Figure 4-13 (b)), M.VFMBTL is 
distributed between -16.8 and 89.1(billion KRW) with 90 per cent probability and the mean 
value is 32.1(billion KRW). The probability that M.VFMBTL is positive is 84.9 per cent, which 
shows that the BTL scheme is feasible for this project.   JI HONG PARK    Ch.4 The National Highway Case Studies 
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From the MCS results, as the completion delay goes up, the mean value M.VFMBTL and the 
probability that the BTL is better also go up. In addition, when considering the average 
completion delay of the National Highway projects (2.74 years), the BTL scheme seems to be 
better than the conventional delivery for this project, which is the same result as single-value 
estimations.  
 
(a) No delay 
 
(b) 2.74 year completion delay 
Figure 4-13: Probability distribution of the Modified VFM 
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4.4 Case 2: The Dongup-Hanlim case 
 
 
4.4.1 Project overview 
 
Along with the National Expressway 10 (Soonchun-Busan), the National Highway 14 is a main 
east and west corridor in Changwon and Gimhae region (Figure 4-14). There was serious traffic 
congestion in urban areas like Dongup and Jinyoungup, so the Korean government planned to 
build two small detours in this local region in 2000.  
According to the Statistical Yearly Book of Traffic Volume (MLTM, 2011d), the National 
Highway 14 near Dongup and Jinyoungup had an annual average daily traffic volume of 38,621 
vehicles in 2010. Although this is not beyond the marginal transport ability
56 (41,300) of a four-
lane National Highway (MLTM, 2010b), there was serious traffic congestion in this section 




Figure 4-14: The Dongup-Hanlim case location map 
                                         
56 According to MLTM (2010b), as a rule of thumb, the Korean government uses the concept of the 
marginal transport ability of a road. The marginal transport ability (41,300) of four-lane National 




As seen in Figure 4-14, the first detour, the Dongup Detour, started to be constructed from 2003 
and is expected to be completed at the end of 2013. The Dongup-Hanlim project is the second 
detour constructed in order to ease traffic congestion in Jinyoungup area; work is expected to 
start on it after 2013.  
The overview of the Dongup-Hanlim National Highway project is as follows: 
  Title: The Dongup-Hanlim National Highway (14) project  
  Location: Jinyoungup ~ Hanlim, Gimhae, Gyungnam Province 
  Length: 7.29 km (four lanes) 
  Construction cost: 159.8 (estimated, billion KRW, 2007 price) 
  BCR: 1.23 
 
 
4.4.2 Analysis factors assumptions for the Modified VFM 
 
As with the Todang-Gwansan case, only a BTL option is considered as a PPP alternative (and 
for the same reason). In addition, this case study assumes that the PPP decision is made in 2011 
and construction starts in 2013, considering that the final design was completed in 2011. Other 
factors are estimated by following Korea’s BTL guidelines (MOSF, 2009a). The basic analysis 
factors for the Modified VFM are as follows: 
  PPP model considered: Build-Transfer-Lease 
  Decision-making time: 2011 
  Price base year: 2011 
  Discount rate: 5.5 per cent (real) 
  Construction deflator:
57 5.56 per cent (average between 2007 and 2011) 
  Consumer price index:
58 3.38 per cent (average between 2007 and 2011) 
  Five-year exchequer bond interest rate:
59 3.77 per cent (2001) 
                                         
57 Construction deflator means construction investment deflator in Expenditure on Gross Domestic 
Product on National Accounts, which is provided by the Bank of Korea (http://ecos.bok.or.kr). 
58 Consumer price index, which is used as inflation in operation period, is provided by the Bank of Korea 
(http://ecos.bok.or.kr).  
59 The five-year exchequer bond interest rate is calculated by a weighted average method, which applies 
0.1, 0.2, 0.3 and 0.4 to the first, second, third and fourth quarter value (MOSF, 2009a). The quarterly five-
year exchequer bond interest rate is provided by the Korea Bond Information Service 
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  BTL Lease profitability:
60 5.77 per cent (five-year exchequer bond interest rate + 2.0 
per cent) 
  BTL finance interest rate:
61 5.85 per cent (three-year non-guaranteed corporate bond 
62(AA-), 4.35 per cent + 1.5 per cent) 
  BTL finance structure: equity 15 per cent, debt 85 per cent 
  BTL finance terms: level debt service during operation period 
  Operation period: 30 years 
  Standard construction duration: five years 
 




4.4.3 Main calculation items for the Modified VFM analysis 
 
From equation (3-8), the main calculation items for the Modified VFM are the asset cost of a 
PSC (     ), the operation cost of a PSC (     ) and a BTL (     ), the lease fee of a BTL 
(     	   	   ) and the benefit difference (ΔB).  
 
Asset cost of the PSC (     ) 
Table 4-8 shows the basic asset cost of this project. At the time of making the decision, 2011, 
the final design stage was already finished, so the expenditure on investigation and design was 
neglected in both the PSC and the BTL. The bracketed construction cost figure is collected from 
                                         
60 BTL lease profitability is expressed as “five-year exchequer bond interest rate + mark-up rate” and 
mark-up is composed of a premium for long term investment and risk premium for construction and 
operation (MOSF, 2009a). According research (Jung et al., 2006) and newspaper reports (Jung, 2005, Lee, 
2009), the mark-up rate is distributed from 0.5 per cent to 2.25 per cent. Considering that there is no 
advanced BTL projects for road programme and road projects usually takes 35 years for construction and 
operation, 2.0 per cent of the mark-up rate is considered for the National Highways in this research.  
61 BTL finance interest rate is expressed as a “three-year non-guaranteed corporate bond interest rate + 
mark-up rate” (MOSF, 2009a) and, according to Kim et al. (2005), the mark-up rate seems to be 
distributed from 0.66 per cent to 2.00 per cent. Considering that there are no advanced BTL projects for 
roads and that road projects usually take 35 years for construction and operation, 1.5 per cent of mark-up 
rate is used for the National Highways.  
62 Three-year non-guaranteed corporate bond interest rate is also provided by the Korea Bond Information 
Service (http://www.kofiabond.or.kr). It is estimated in the same way as the five-year exchequer bond 
interest rate, following the BTL guidelines of Korea (MOSF, 2009a). JI HONG PARK    Ch.4 The National Highway Case Studies 
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the final design report for the Dongup-Hanlim National Highway (MLTM, 2011b), and, using 
the governmental cost estimation standards,
63 most of the additional costs are estimated. 
Operation facility cost, business reserve and insurance cost refer to the pre-qualification report 
on Bongdam-Songsan National Expressway project (PIMAC, 2009b).  
According to Korea’s BTL guidelines (MOSF, 2009a), the construction cost is obtained by 
multiplying bracketed construction value by 88.55 per cent, a WBR of turn-key/alternative bids 
in the National Highway projects between 2002 and 2011(MLTM, 2012b). 
 
Table 4-8: Basic asset cost for the PSC and the BTL 








                                         
63 The cost items using the governmental cost estimate standards are as following: 1) construction 
inspection cost; 2) environmental impact assessment cost; 3) traffic impact assessment cost; 4) disaster 
















                          9.7
Construction inspection 6.6
Environmental impact assessment 1.0
Traffic impact assessment 0.1
Disaster impact assessment 0.2
Cultural asset survey 0.9
Insurance 0.9 
                         10.2
Construction inspection 6.6
Environmental impact assessment 1.0
Traffic impact assessment  0.1
Disaster impact assessment  0.2




                           6.4
Business commence cost 6.0
Stock issue cost 0.4
167.4 174.2 Total
Note: 1. Compensation cost is provided by the Korean government, so it is not included in the Modified VFM 
assessment.  2. The bracketed values are from the final design report for the Dongup-Hanlim project (MLTM, 2011b).  
3. Insurance cost for a PSC is contractor’s all risk insurance(0.9), while insurance cost for a BTL is composed of 










Operation cost for the PSC and the BTL (     ,     ) 
In the same way as the Todang-Gwansan case, the yearly base operation costs for the PSC 
(     ) is calculated by multiplying the mean values of the operation costs (KRW/VKT) from 
the historical observations and the VKT of this project from the final design report for Dongup-
Hanlim National Highway (MLTM, 2011b). Yearly maintenance costs are estimated by 
considering the decrepitude of road (Table 4-3).  
When it comes to the operation costs of the BTL (     ), because there are no cases in which 
the BTL scheme is applied in the National Highways, the same operation cost as used in the 
PSC is applied as the operation cost of the BTL. 
 
Lease fee for the BTL (     	      ) 
According to Korea’s BTL guidelines (MOSF, 2009a), the yearly lease fee in nominal terms is 
calculated as equation (4-1). The asset cost of the BTL in real terms in Table 4-8 is delivered as 
a form of equity (15 per cent) and debt (85 per cent), according to the BTL finance structure. 
Considering construction deflator, the principal of the private sector investment becomes 221.1 
(billion KRW, nominal term), which is the sum of (a) and (b) in Table 4-9. In addition, 
according to the finance terms, the interest amounts to 17.2 (billion KRW, nominal terms), (c) 
in Table 4-9. Summing the principal and interest, the private sector investment (P) at 
construction completion time is a total of 238.2 (billion KRW, nominal terms) in Table 4-9.  
 
Table 4-9: Calculation of the private sector investment 




Consequently, in this case study, the yearly lease fee in nominal terms for the BTL is calculated 
as follows: 
     (  , .    ) =  
1




Real (2011 price) Nominal Real (2011 price) Nominal
2013 2.6 3.0 15.0 16.7
2014 3.7 4.4 21.1 24.9 1.0
2015 6.3 7.8 35.6 44.1 2.5
2016 8.5 11.1 48.4 63.4 5.0
2017 5.0 6.9 28.0 38.8 8.7
Total 26.1 33.2 (a) 148.1 187.9 (b) 17.2 (c)
Year
Equity (15%) Debt (85%) Interest 
(nominal)




     	    =
238.20	






Considering the consumer price index and economic discount rate, the yearly lease fee in 
nominal terms will be transformed into real terms to be applied to the Modified VFM.  
 
Social benefit difference (  ) 
Social benefits for the Modified VFM analysis are collected from the final design report for 
Dongup-Hanlim National Highway project (MLTM, 2011b). As with the Todang-Wondang 
case, using equation (4-3) and social benefit data, the social benefit difference (ΔB) beween the 
PSC and the BTL alternative, considering the completion delay of conventional delivery, can be 
calculated.  
Considering equation (4-3) and the BCR (=1.23) of this case, when the traffic volume drops to 
68.6 per cent of the forecast one, the social benefits also drop to 79.8 per cent of the forecast one. 
 







4.4.4.1 The Modified VFM (with no completion delay) 
In the same way as the Todang-Gwansan case, to verify the impact of the inclusion of 
construction cost risk and traffic volume risk on the Modified VFM when there is no completion 
delay in the conventional delivery, four different Modified VFMs (M.VFMBTL) using the mean 
value of each risk are conducted: 1) M.VFMBTL without risks; 2) M.VFMBTL with construction 
cost risk; 3) M.VFMBTL with traffic volume risk; and 4) M.VFMBTL with both risks (construction 
cost risk and traffic volume risk). The results of M.VFMBTL are shown in Table 4-10. 
 
Table 4-10: The Modified VFM results according to risk inclusion 
(Discounted value, billion KRW, 2011 price) 
 
 
M.VFMBTL with no risk inclusion 
Considering an average WBR of turn-key/alternative bids (88.55 per cent) in the National 
Highway projects between 2002 and 2011 (MLTM, 2012b) in calculating the asset cost of the 
PSC, M.VFMBTL (Table 4-10, the first row) shows that it is feasible to implement this project 
with the BTL, indicating the value of 0.8 (billion KRW) in the BTL.  
 
M.VFMBTL with construction cost risk 
From equation (3-10), using the mean values of WBR risk (76.90 per cent, Fig 4-2) and 
construction cost overrun risk (9.98 per cent, Figure 4-1), construction cost risk can be freshly 











1) M.VFM BTL 
(+no risks)
103.2 13.7 102.4 13.7 0.0 0.8
2) M.VFM BTL
(+const. risk)
98.9 13.7 102.4 13.7 0.0 -3.5
3) M.VFM BTL
(+volume risk)
103.2 9.9 102.4 13.7 0.0 -2.9
4) M.VFM BTL
(+both risks)




Note: 1.  M.VFM BTL (+no risks) = the Modified VFM value without considering risks based on the BTL guidelines of Korea, M.VFM BTL 
(+const. risk) = the Modified VFM value considering the mean values of winning bid ratio risk and construction cost overrun risk, 
M.VFM BTL (+volume risk) = the Modified VFM value considering the mean value of traffic volume risk, and M.VFM BTL (+both risks) = 
the Modified VFM value considering the mean values of winning bid ratio risk, cost overrun risk and traffic volume risk. 
2. AC PSC = Asset cost in the PSC, OC PSC = Operation cost in the PSC, Lease fee  BTL = Lease fee in the BTL, OC BTL = Operation cost 
in the BTL and DB = social benefit difference between the PSC and the BTL.JI HONG PARK    Ch.4 The National Highway Case Studies 
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shows that M.VFMBTL considering the construction cost risk is -3.5 (billion KRW), which is 4.3 
(billion KRW) lower than the figure with no risk inclusion. This is because the mean value of 
construction cost risk is 3.97 per cent lower than an average WBR of turn-key/alternative bids 
(84.58 per cent).  
This means that M.VFMBTL with no risk inclusion based on Korea’s BTL guidelines (MOSF, 
2009a) could be exaggerated by as much as the difference of 3.97 per cent more than the 
situation in reality. 
 
M.VFMBTL with traffic volume risk 
To verify the impact of traffic demand risk on M.VFMBTL, the mean value of traffic volume risk 
(68.6 per cent, Figure 4-4) is applied. The result (Table 4-10, the third row) shows that the 
M.VFMBTL decreases to -2.9 (billion KRW). The decrease in M.VFMBTL is due to the decrease in 
the operation cost in the PSC by the VKT decrease in the project from traffic volume reduction 
(from 100 to 68.6 per cent).  
 
M.VFMBTL with both risks 
Table 4-10 (the last row) shows that the BTL scheme is not the best option for this project with 
M.VFMBTL value of -7.3 (billion KRW), when construction cost risk and traffic volume risk are 
included. Compared with M.VFMBTL with no risk inclusion, the value decreases by 8.1 (billion 
KRW), among which the impact of construction risk and traffic volume risk occupies, 
respectively, 4.4 and 3.7 (billion KRW).  
All in all, from a viewpoint of the M.VFMBTL with no completion delay, it seems that the 
conventional delivery is more favourable than the BTL scheme when construction and traffic 




4.4.4.2 The Modified VFM (with completion delay) 
 
Impact of a completion delay in the conventional delivery 
As with the Todang-Gwansan case, to verify the impact of a completion delay in the 
conventional delivery on the PPP decision-making, M.VFMBTL with completion delay (0 to 4 
years) is calculated. M.VFMBTL is calculated by considering a completion delay of conventional 
delivery, which affects not only yearly asset cost input but also the social benefit difference 
between the PSC and the BTL. JI HONG PARK    Ch.4 The National Highway Case Studies 
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M.VFMBTL results are shown in Table 4-11. In the no risk inclusion case, M.VFMBTL soars from 
0.8 to 30.0 (billion KRW) as a completion is delayed from 0 to 4 years. Similarly, in the risk 
(construction cost risk and traffic volume risk) inclusion case, it rises from -7.3 to 11.1 (billion 
KRW) according to the completion delay. This is because the increase in the social benefit 
difference between the PSC and the BTL due to a completion delay is bigger than the decrease 
in the public sector cost in the PSC due to discounting.  
Additionally, considering the mean value of the completion delay (2.74 years, Figure 4-3) in the 
National Highway projects, the BTL scheme is better than the conventional option for this 
project, which is the same result as in the Todang-Gwansan case. 
 
Table 4-11: The Modified VFM result with completion delay 




Critical completion delay 
In order to determine a critical completion delay in the conventional delivery, which makes the 
M.VFMBTL zero, a linear regression analysis was conducted using Table 4-11. As seen in Figure 
4-15, depending on whether construction cost risk and traffic volume risk are included or not, 
the regression line of M.VFMBTL differs. 
In the no risk inclusion case, when the linear regression line is extended, it meets the horizontal 
axis at -0.17 year (-2.04 months). This means that even if the conventional delivery completes 
this project earlier than the BTL by up to 0.17 years (2.04 months), the BTL is better than the 











0 103.2 13.7 102.4 13.7 0.0 0.8
1 100.2 12.9 102.4 13.7 11.8 8.8
2 97.2 12.3 102.4 13.7 23.0 16.4
2.74 95.0 11.8 102.4 13.7 30.9 21.6
3 94.3 11.6 102.4 13.7 33.5 23.4
4 91.5 11.0 102.4 13.7 43.6 30.0
0 98.9 9.9 102.4 13.7 0.0 -7.3
1 96.0 9.4 102.4 13.7 8.5 -2.2
2 93.2 8.9 102.4 13.7 16.6 2.6
2.74 91.0 8.6 102.4 13.7 22.3 5.8
3 90.4 8.5 102.4 13.7 24.2 7.0
4 87.7 8.0 102.4 13.7 31.5 11.1
Risk 
inclusion
Note: 1. AC PSC = Asset cost in the PSC, OC PSC = Operation cost in the PSC, Lease fee BTL= Lease fee in the BTL, OC BTL = 
Operation cost in the BTL and ∆B= the social benefit difference between the PSC and the BTL. 2. Risk inclusion = construction 
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(2.04 months) later (for reasons including a negotiation delays or a financial problem) than the 
conventional delivery, the BTL is more favourable than the conventional delivery. 
In the same way, regarding M.VFMBTL with risk inclusion (construction cost risk and traffic 
volume risk), the intercept of the horizontal axis (the critical completion delay) becomes 1.51 
years (18.12 months). This means that if the completion in the conventional delivery is delayed 
by more than 1.51 years (18.12 months), the BTL becomes better than the conventional delivery. 
In other words, when more than 1.51 years (18.12 months) of completion delay is expected in 
the conventional delivery, the BTL can be a more appropriate delivery option even if M.VFMBTL 
is negative without completion delay. 
 
 
Figure 4-15: The Modified VFM result according to completion delay 
 
 
 4.4.4.3 Sensitivity analysis 
M.VFMBTL results can be different depending on how large values are used as analysis factors. 
As in the Todang-Gwansan case, in order to examine the behaviour of M.VFMBTL, according to 
the change of analysis factors, a sensitivity analysis is conducted. For this analysis, the 
following eight analysis factors are considered: 1) BTL construction cost; 2) BTL operation cost; 
3) BTL finance interest rate; 4) discount rate; 5) BTL lease profitability; 6) construction deflator; 
7) consumer price index; and 8) the size of social benefits.  
The changes of M.VFMBTL with risk inclusion and a 2.74 year delay are shown in Figure 4-16, 
when the analysis factors vary by from -20 to 20 per cent on each factor’s given value. A 
summary of the sensitivity analysis is shown in Table 4-12.  
The sensitivity analysis results, shown in Figure 4-16, show that M.VFMBTL values with risk 
inclusion and a 2.74 year delay can be negative, which means the conventional delivery can be JI HONG PARK    Ch.4 The National Highway Case Studies 
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better than the BTL, when lease profitability goes up by about 9 per cent, the discount rate drops 
by about 14 per cent or the consumer price index drops by about 15 per cent. In the case of BTL 
construction cost, when it goes up by about 6 per cent, the Modified VFM becomes negative.  
 
 
Figure 4-16: Sensitivity analysis of analysis factors (risk inclusion, 2.74 year delay) 
 
Among the eight analysis factors, as seen in Table 4-12 and Figure 4-16, as discount rate, 
consumer price index or social benefits go up, M.VFMBTL rises with a positive slope, mainly 
because these factors make the lease fee drop. However, in the case of other factors, when they 
go up, M.VFMBTL falls with a negative slope because they make the lease fee rise or mean 
directly an increase in the public sector cost in the BTL (BTL operation cost).  
In addition, the sensitivity results show that among the factors, BTL construction cost and lease 
profitability are most influential on the Modified VFM with the steepest slopes when they rise 
by from -20 to 20 per cent points based on each factor’s given value, which is the same result as 
found in the Todang-Gwansan case. 
Accordingly, when the viability of the BTL is needed in terms of the government policy, it 
could be achieved by reducing BTL construction cost or lease profitability. For this reason, in 
reality, according to Kim (2011), when conducting the VFM analysis, many BTL projects adopt 
a lower BTL construction cost (93.8 per cent on average) than the PSC construction cost 
without sufficient support for this decision. 
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Table 4-12: Sensitivity of analysis factors on the Modified VFM 
 
 
4.4.4.4 The Monte Carlo Simulations 
 
The MCS is conducted to identify the impact of the following 11 risk variables, shown in Figure 
4-1~Figure 4-7, from historical observations: WBR, construction cost overrun, traffic volume, 
three operation costs, construction deflator, consumer price index, five-year exchequer bond 
interest rate, and three-year non-guaranteed corporate bond interest rate.  Figure 4-17 shows the 
MSC results with no completion delay and with a 2.74-year completion delay. In the case of no 
completion delay (Figure 4-17 (a)), M.VFMBTL is distributed between -57.5 and 17.3 (billion 
KRW) with a 90 per cent probability and the mean value is -17.7 (billion KRW). Additionally, 
the probability that M.VFMBTL is positive is 20.2 per cent, which shows that the BTL scheme 
would not be feasible for this project.  In addition, in the case of a 2.74-year completion delay 
(Figure 4-17 (b)), M.VFMBTL is distributed between -48.1 and 37.3 (billion KRW) with a 90 per 
cent probability and the mean value is -5.3 (billion KRW). The probability that M.VFMBTL is 
positive is 41.0 per cent, meaning that the BTL scheme is not the best option for this project, 
even considering the average completion delay of the National Highways.  
From the MCS results, as a completion delay goes up, the mean value M.VFMBTL and the 
probability that the BTL is better also go up. In addition, even when considering the average 






1. BTL construction cost Decrease -0.92
The increase of BTL construction cost makes private 
investment and lease fee rise, so M.VFM BTL decreases.
2. BTL operation cost Decrease -0.13
The increase of BTL operation cost naturally makes 
M.VFM BTL decrease.
3. BTL finance interest rate Decrease -0.07
The increase of BTL finance interest rate makes lease fee rise, 
so M.VFM BTL decreases
4. Discount rate Increase 0.36
The increase of discount rate makes cost items fall.  Among 
them, lease fee has a largest drop, so M.VFM BTL decreases.  
5. Lease profitability Decrease -0.64
The rise of lease profitability makes lease fee rise, so 
M.VFM BTL decreases
6. Construction deflator Decrease -0.24
The rise of construction deflator makes private investment 
and lease fee increase, so M.VFM BTL decreases.
7. Consumer price index 
   (CPI)
Increase 0.36
Nominal lease fee is converted to real term by consumer price 
index.  The rise of CPI makes lease fee in real term drop, so 
M.VFM BTL increases.
8. Social benefits Increase 0.22
The rise of social benefits makes the social benefit difference 
grow, so M.VFM BTL increases.
Analysis factors
M.VFM BTL changes due to the increase of analysis factors
Note; Unit change means the change of M.VFM BTL when an analysis factor rises by 1 per cent on its given value.JI HONG PARK    Ch.4 The National Highway Case Studies 
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more favourable for this project than the BTL scheme, which is a quite different result from 
single-value estimations.   
 
(a) No delay 
 
(b) 2.74 year completion delay 
Figure 4-17: Probability distribution of the Modified VFM 
 
This difference between single-value estimation and the MCS seems to occur because some 
analysis factors estimated by following Korea’s BTL guidelines (MOSF, 2009a) are 
considerably different from the expected values (mean value) from historical observations. For 
examples, the five-year exchequer bond interest rate in the single-value estimation method is 
3.77 per cent, while the historical observations produce 5.10 per cent as an expected value. As 
the five-year exchequer bond interest rate is closely related to BTL profitability, considering the 
sensitivity of BTL profitability shown in Figure 4-16, it can cause the MCS result of M.VFMBTL 
to drop considerably, compared with the use of the single-value estimation method.  
Consequently, it seems reasonable that the MCS technique using historical observations should 
be used in PPP decisions because this can produce some different results to single-value 
estimation method by considering the potential for change of various analysis factors at the 







In order to determine the impact of transferable risks on the PPP decisions and which delivery 
option is the most appropriate in the National Highway programme, the Modified VFM analysis 
was applied to the Todang-Gwansan case and the Dongup-Hanlim case. Through two case 
studies, the application of the analysis revealed several common features. 
 
1) Regarding construction cost risk, M.VFMBTL with an average WBR of turn-key/alternative bid 
based on Korea’s BTL guidelines (MOSF, 2009a) can be exaggerated compared with that with 
the use of construction cost risk (winning bid ratio risk and construction cost overrun risk). This 
is because the average WBR of turn-key/alternative bids in the National Highway projects was 
88.55 per cent between 2002 and 2011 (MLTM, 2012b), while the historical observations  
suggests an application ratio of 84.58 per cent, meaning construction cost risk.  
Although it is true that some National Highway projects use turn-key/alternative bid, a typical 
bid system in the conventional delivery
64 in the National Highways seems to be design-bid-build, 
not a turn-key/alternative. Particularly, non-governmental organisations like CCEJ (2012), and 
the media, have criticised the turn-key/alternative bid for being inefficient and for wasting 
public funds. Considering that a PSC needs to be backed by a plausible and practical case 
(Grimsey and Lewis, 2005), it does not appear reasonable to use an average turn-key/alternative 
bid for the public sector cost calculation of a PSC.  
As a result, for more accurate quantitative PPP decision-making in the National Highway 
projects, the Modified VFM considering historical observations reflecting all bid systems is 
recommended for the estimation of asset cost, instead of an average WBR of turn-
key/alternative projects.  
 
2) Traffic volume risk seems to affect PPP decisions in the National Highways. When including 
traffic volume risk (68.6 per cent), M.VFMBTL values decrease by 4.6 and 3.7 (billion KRW) in 
the Todang-Gwansan case and in the Dongup-Hanlim case, respectively, compared with those 
without traffic volume risk. This is due to the decrease of operation cost in the PSC by the VKT 
decrease in the projects from traffic volume reduction (from 100 to 68.6 per cent). In addition, 
                                         
64 According to (MLTM, 2012b), between 2002 and 2011, 33 National Highway projects were started by 
turnkey/alternative bidding. Considering that 20 to 40 projects are started every year, it seems that 
approximately 10–15 per cent of the National Highway projects start by turnkey/alternative bidding.  JI HONG PARK    Ch.4 The National Highway Case Studies 
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when considering traffic volume risk solely, the most favourable procurement option with no 
completion delay changes from conventional to BTL in the Dongup-Hanlim case. 
 
3) A completion delay in the conventional delivery can make a critical impact on the PPP 
decisions. When including a completion delay (2.74 years) in the conventional delivery, 
M.VFMBTL values, with risk (construction cost risk and traffic volume risk) inclusion, soar by 
36.7 and 13.1 (billion KRW) in the Todang-Gwansan case and in the Dongup-Hanlim case, 
respectively. As a result, the most favourable procurement option in two cases with risk 
(construction cost risk and traffic volume risk) inclusion changes from the conventional to the 
BTL option. 
 
4) Case studies show that each project has its own critical completion delay, making M.VFMBTL 
zero. In no risk inclusion cases, critical completion delay is -0.35 and -0.17 years in the Todang-
Gwansan case and in the Dongup-Hanlim case respectively. This means that, with no risk 
inclusion, even if the construction in the BTL starts up to 0.35 and 0.17 years, later, respectively, 
than the conventional delivery because of, for example, a negotiation delay or a financial 
problem, the BTL is more favourable than the conventional delivery.  
Similarly, in the case of risk inclusion (construction cost risk and traffic volume risk), the 
critical completion delay is respectively 0.26 and 1.51 years in the Todang-Gwansan case and in 
the Dongup-Hanlim case. This means that, when more than 0.26 and 1.51 years of completion 
delay are respectively expected in the conventional delivery, the BTL can be a more appropriate 
delivery option even when the Modified VFM is negative without completion delay. 
 
5) Sensitivity analysis shows that BTL construction cost and BTL lease profitability are the 
most influential among eight analysis factors in the calculation of M.VFMBTL. In the Todang-
Gwansan case, even when each analysis factor fluctuates from -20 to + 20 on its given value, 
the procurement decision does not change. However, in the Dongup-Hanlim case, the 
procurement decision could change in accordance with the fluctuation of some analysis factor, 
such as BTL construction cost, BTL lease profitability, discount rate and consumer price index. 
 
6) The MCS results, with 11 risk variables from historical observations, show that as 
completion delay increases, the mean value of M.VFMBTL and the probability that the BTL is 
better increase. Considering a completion delay (2.74 years), the most favourable procurement 
option is the BTL scheme for the Todang-Gwansan case, which is the same as the result from 
the single-value method. However, in the Dongup-Hanlim case, the result is different from that 
obtained by single-value method. This appears to be the case because some analysis factors, JI HONG PARK    Ch.4 The National Highway Case Studies 
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estimated by following Korea’s BTL guidelines (MOSF, 2009a), differ considerably from the 
expected values (mean value) derived from historical observations.  
 
Summing up the results, considering all risk variables from historical observations, the BTL 
option is more favourable for the Todang-Gwansan case, while conventional delivery is more 
favourable for the Dongup-Hanlim case. In addition, it seems reasonable to say that the MCS 
technique should be used in PPP decisions because it might produce some different results by 
considering the potential for change of various analysis factors at the same time.  
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The objective of this chapter is to find out the impact of transferable risks on the Modified VFM 
and the PPP decisions in the National Expressway programme, using two case studies, covering 
the research objectives (2-1, 2-2 and 2-3). As case studies, the Suwon-Pyungtaek National 
Expressway case and the Bongdam-Songsan National Expressway case are considered in this 
chapter (as explained in Chapter 3 (see 3.6)). Therefore, this chapter is largely made up of three 
sections: 1) quantified risks for the National Expressways; 2) case study 1: the Suwon-
Pyungtaek case; and 3) case study 2: the Bongdam-Songsan case. 
To begin with, as in Chapter 4 (the National Highway case studies), risk quantification is 
conducted (in section 5.2) regarding not only transferable risks but also other risks like 
operation costs and inflation, based on historical observation and the literature. In terms of 
transferable risks, as with the National Highway programme, three risks are considered in this 
chapter: construction cost risk (consists of WBR risk and construction cost overrun), traffic 
volume risk and completion delay in the conventional delivery. Besides, three operation cost 
items are also quantified: general maintenance cost/VKT, re-pavement cost/VKT and road 
structure maintenance cost/VKT. The risk quantification is performed using the @ Risk 5.7 
software package.  
In the section of the Suwon–Pyungtaek case (5.3) and the Bongdam-Songsan case (5.4), the 
impacts of transferable risks on the Modified VFM and the PPP decisions are verified using 
impact analyses, such as single-value estimation, sensitivity analysis and the Monte Carlo 
Simulation, as explained in Chapter 3 (see 3.5).  
As with the National Highway programme, for the calculation of the Modified VFM using 
single-value estimation and sensitivity analysis, analysis input data are estimated by following 
Korea’s BTL guidelines (MOSF, 2009a) because these can provide the reference points for 
various analysis factors. When it comes to the Modified VFM using Monte Carlo Simulation, 
analysis factors are used as a form of the probability distribution, quantified from historical 
observations. By doing so, how the PPP or procurement decisions could be changed will be 
scrutinised, when they are reflected simultaneously in the Modified VFM. JI HONG PARK    Ch.5 The National Expressway Cases 
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5.2 Quantified risks for the National Expressways 
 
 
5.2.1 Transferable risks 
 
5.2.1.1 Construction cost risk 
 
Construction cost risk in the National Expressways is estimated using historical observations 
collected from 66 National Expressway projects completed between 2006 and 2010. From 
equation (3-10), construction cost risk is composed of EP, WBR and construction cost overrun 
(α). Among these, estimated price (designed price in this research) is a constant for a project, so 
WBR and construction cost overrun are considered as risk factors.  
 
Construction cost overrun 
Construction cost overrun risk in real terms for the National Expressways can be estimated from 
equation (3-11) and the quantified PDF is shown in Figure 5-1. The mean value (expected value) 
is 10.21 per cent, which means that the construction cost of a National Expressway project is 
expected to increase on average by 10.21 per cent on the contract construction cost in real terms.  
 
 
Figure 5-1: The PDF for construction cost overrun risk in the National Expressways 
 
WBR 
WBR means the proportion of bid winner’s price (contract price) to EP for a project. WBR is 
directly obtained from the historical observations. In contrast to construction cost overrun risk, 
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frequency distribution, shown in Figure 5-2. From Figure 5-2, the mean value of winning bid 
ratio is 71.5 per cent, which means the expected value of winning bid ratio of a National 
Expressway project.  
  
 
Figure 5-2: Frequency distribution for WBR in the National Expressway 
 
Application ratio 
Based on construction cost risk and WBR estimated above, the application ratio from equation 
(3-10), meaning construction cost risk, can be calculated. Therefore, the mean value of the 
application ratio becomes 78.80 (per cent),
65 which will be used in order to estimate the 
Modified VFM using single-value estimation and sensitivity analysis. For the MCS of the 
Modified VFM, the PDF of construction cost overrun and the frequency distribution of the 
WBR will be used, shown in Fig 5-1 and Figure 5-2 respectively.  
 
 
5.2.1.2 Completion delay 
 
From the historical observations, the probability distribution of the completion delays in the 
National Expressways is shown in Fig 5-3. As seen in Figure 5-3, completion delay in the 
conventional delivery is, on average, 6.30 years. Taking five years as the standard construction 
duration (KDI, 2008a, MLTM, 2010c), as discussed in Chapter 3, 1.30 years of completion 




                                         
65 78.80 (%) = 0.715 × (1+ 0.1021) 
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Figure 5-3: Construction duration probability distribution in the National Expressways 
 
 
5.2.1.3 Traffic volume risk 
 
Along with the National Highways, traffic volume risk in the road sector, shown in Figure 4-4, 




5.2.2 Other risk variables 
 
5.2.2.1 Operation cost 
 
In this research, the historical observations on operation cost in the National Expressways come 
from 44 regional National Expressway Management Offices (NEMOs) under the KEC, not from 
individual projects. Therefore, the historical observation data concern the budget executed in the 
appropriate NEMO from 2006 to 2010. In the same way as for the National Highway, using 
VKT as a scale factor, three risk variables are considered for operation cost: 1) general 
maintenance cost/VKT; 2) re-pavement cost/VKT; and 3) road structure maintenance cost/VKT, 
which are shown in Figure 5-5. The risk variables are calculated based on the 2005 price. 
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(a) General maintenance cost/VKT 
 
(b) Re-pavement cost/VKT 
 
(c) Road structure maintenance cost/VKT 
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With respect to inflation, according to Korea’s BTL guidelines (MOSF, 2009a), a construction 
deflator, shown in Figure 4-6 (a), is used for the calculation of the BTL lease fee. In addition, 
the yearly BTL lease fee in nominal terms is converted to real terms by the consumer price 
index, shown in Figure 4-6 (b). 
 
5.2.2.3 Factors relating BTL viability 
 
According to Korea’s BTL guidelines (MOSF, 2009a), BTL lease profitability is expressed 
through “five-year exchequer bond interest rate + mark-up” and the mark-up is composed of a 
premium for long term investment and risk premium for construction and operation. In the same 
way, BTL finance interest rate for private sector is estimated by applying additional rate to a 
“three-year non-guaranteed corporate bond (AA-) interest rate”, which is the base rate. These 
are shown in Figure 4-7.  
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5.3 Case 1: The Suwon-Pyungtaek case 
 
 
5.3.1 Project overview 
 
In 1998, the Suwon-Pyungtaek National Expressway was planned by the Korean government to 
supplement the main north-south transport corridors, which were experiencing daily 
congestion,
66 in the southern part of Gyeonggi Province, such as Expressway 1 (Seoul-Busan) 
and Expressway 15 (Seoul-Mokpo). New capacity would be provided by building a new main 
transport axis connecting several east-west transport axes, such as Expressway 40 (Pyungtaek-
Jaechun) and Expressway 400 (the 2
nd Seoul metropolitan orbital), as shown in Figure 5-5. 
However, The Suwon-Pyungtaek National Expressway was suggested to the Korean 
government from the private sector, specifically construction companies and finance firms, as a 
BTO project in 2000. As a result, it was decided to implement this project using BTO scheme in 
2002 after the deliberation of the PPP board. After final design and negotiation, construction on 
this project started in 2005; the project was completed in 2009. 
The overview of this project (as shown in the contract awarded in 2005) is as follows: 
  Title: the Suwon-Pyungtaek National Expressway (171 & 400) Project  
  Length and location: : 38.5km (4~6 lanes) 
                   (North-south) Anyung-ri, Hwasung ~ Suksung-ri, Pyungtaek, Gyeonggi province  
                   (East-west) Dongwha-ri, Hwasung ~ Bangkyo-ri, Hwasung, Gyeonggi Province 
  PPP type: BTO 
  Construction duration: 52 months 
  Operation duration: 30 years 
  Project cost:
67 856.9 (billion KRW, 2002 price) 
(Private fund: 608.4, construction subsidy: 248.5) 
  Inflation rate: 4 per cent 
  Internal rate of return (IRR): 7.40 per cent in real terms 
  MRG and redemption 
                                         
66 As of 2010, the neighbouring National Expressway 1 (ten lanes) had a traffic volume of 150,242 (level 
of service: E) and National Expressway 15 (six lanes) has 109,507 traffic volume, according to MLTM 
(2011d). 
67 The project cost in this project means asset cost excluding compensation cost (567.8 billion KRW) 
provided by the Korean Government. JI HONG PARK    Ch.5 The National Expressway Cases 
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- The Korean government guarantees up to 80 per cent, 70 per cent and 60 per cent 
of contract revenue every five years for 15 years after start of operation.  
- The Korean government does not provide a guarantee when actual revenue is 
smaller than a half of contract revenue. 
- The Korean government redeems revenue exceeding 120 per cent, 130 per cent 
and 140 per cent of contract revenue in first five years, second five years and 
third five years, respectively, after the start of operation. 
  Concessionaire: Gyeonggi Expressway Corp. 
- Construction investor (90 per cent): Doosan heavy industry (25 per cent), 
Keumho corp. (25 per cent), Daelim corp. (16 per cent), Dongbu construction 
(13.33 per cent), Hanwha construction (10.67 per cent),  
- Financial investor (10 per cent): Shinhan bank (10 per cent). 
 
                                                                                                                            Source: MLTM 
Figure 5-5: The Suwon-Pyungtaek National Expressway project map JI HONG PARK    Ch.5 The National Expressway Cases 
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5.3.2 Analysis factors and assumptions for the Modified VFM 
 
Although this project has already been implemented under the BTO scheme, in order to verify 
the impact of transferable risks on the PPP decisions and the appropriateness of PPP decision, 
this case study considers three alternative delivery procurement options: conventional, BTL and 
BTO.  
Basic analysis factors for Modified VFM are as follows: 
  PPP model: BTO and BTL 
  Discount rate: 7.5 per cent (real) 
  Decision-making time: 2002 
  Price base year: 2002 
  Five-year exchequer bond interest rate:
68 6.9 per cent (nominal)  
  Three-year non-guaranteed corporate bond (AA-) interest rate:
69 7.01 per cent 
(nominal)  
  Construction deflator:
70 3.51 per cent (nominal, on average from 1999 to 2002) 
  Consumer price index:
71 3.50 per cent (nominal, on average from 1999 to 2002) 
  BTL Lease profitability:
72 8.9 per cent (nominal) 
                   (Five-year exchequer bond interest rate + 2 per cent) 
  BTL finance interest rate:
73 8.51 per cent (nominal) 
                                         
68 The five-year exchequer bond interest rate is calculated by a weighted average method, which applies 
0.1, 0.2, 0.3 and 0.4 to the first, second, third and fourth quarter value (MOSF, 2009a). The quarterly five-
year exchequer bond interest rate is provided by the Korea Bond Information Service 
(http://www.kofiabond.or.kr).  
69 The three-year non-guaranteed corporate bond interest rate is also provided by the Korea Bond 
Information Service (http://www.kofiabond.or.kr). It is estimated in the same way as the five-year 
exchequer bond interest rate, following Korea’s BTL guidelines (MOSF, 2009a). 
70 Construction deflator means the construction investment deflator in Expenditure on Gross Domestic 
Product on National Accounts and it is provided by the Bank of Korea (http://www.bok.or.kr).  
71 Consumer price index is also provided by the Bank of Korea (http://www.bok.or.kr).  
72 BTL lease profitability is expressed as a “five-year exchequer bond interest rate + mark-up rate” and 
the mark-up is composed of a premium for long-term investment and risk premium for construction and 
operation (MOSF, 2009a). According to research (Jung et al., 2006) and newspaper reports (Jung, 2005, 
Lee, 2009), the mark-up rate is distributed from 0.5 per cent to 2.25 per cent. Considering that there is no 
advanced BTL projects for road programme and road projects usually takes 35 years for construction and 
operation, a mark-up rate of 2.0 per cent is considered for the National Expressways in this research. JI HONG PARK    Ch.5 The National Expressway Cases 
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                   (Three-year non-guaranteed corporate bond (AA-) interest rate + 1.5 per cent)  
  BTL Finance terms: level debt service during operation period 
  BTL finance structure: equity 15 per cent, debt 85 per cent 
  Operation period: 30 years, construction duration: five years 
 
In addition, the same assumptions (see 4.3.2) for the Modified VFM used in the National 
Highway cases are also used in the National Expressway cases. 
 
 
5.3.3 Main calculation items for the Modified VFM 
 
From equation (3-7), (3-8) and (3-9), the main calculation items for the Modified VFM are the 
asset cost of a PSC (     ), the operation cost of a PSC (     ) and a BTL (     ), the lease 
fee of a BTL (     	   	   ), the revenue (       ) and subsidy (          ) from the 
Korean government, the minimum revenue guarantee cost (      ) and the benefit difference 
(ΔB).  
 
Asset cost of the PSC	(     ) 
The basic asset cost data for this project is shown in Table 5-1. With respect to      , the cost 
items are collected from the negotiation result report on the Suwon-Pyungtaek National 
Expressway (MLTM, 2005). The bracketed cost values mean the designed price, not including 
WBR. Therefore, design cost and construction cost in the PSC based on Korea’s BTL guidelines 
(MOSF, 2009a) are calculated by multiplying each bracketed cost and 82.14  per cent, an 
average WBR
74 of turn-key/alternative bids in the National Expressways between 2002 and 
2011 (MLTM, 2012b). The asset cost items of the PPP are collected from the agreement on the 
Suwon-Pyungtaek National Expressway (MLTM and Gyeonggi Expressway Corp., 2005).  
In addition, in order to estimate the Modified VFM, according to Table 4-2, the yearly asset 
costs of the PSC are distributed. With respect to longer construction durations, considering 
                                                                                                                         
73 BTL finance interest rate is expressed as “three- year non-guaranteed corporate bond interest rate + 
mark-up rate” (MOSF, 2009a) and, according to Kim et al. (2005), a mark-up rate seems to be distributed 
from 0.66 per cent to 2.00 per cent. Considering that there is no advanced BTL projects for roads and 
road projects usually takes 35 years for construction and operation, a mark-up rate of 1.5 per cent is used 
for the National Expressways.  
74 The details are given in Appendix D. JI HONG PARK    Ch.5 The National Expressway Cases 
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completion delay, new yearly distribution ratios based on interpolation methods and Table 4-2 
will be applied to the calculation of the Modified VFM. 
 
Table 5-1: Basic asset cost for the PSC and the PPP 





Operation cost for the PSC and the BTL (     ,     ) 
As for the National Highway cases, yearly base operation costs for the PSC (     ) are 
calculated by multiplying the mean values of the operation costs
75 (KRW/VKT) from the 
historical observations and yearly VKT data of this project from the contract (MLTM and 
Gyeonggi Expressway Corp., 2005). In order to consider the variation of maintenance cost 
                                         
75 From the historical observations, the mean values of operation cost items are as follows: 1) 
management cost (personnel cost included)/VKT = 16.51 KRW/VKT; 2) general maintenance cost/VKT 
= 3.84 KRW/VKT; 3) re-pavement cost/VKT = 1.28 KRW/VKT; and 4) road structure maintenance 














Sub total 731.1 787.7
0 0
                          27.0
Construction inspection 17.0
Environmental/traffic  impact 
assessment 1.4
Cultural asset survey 4.6
Insurance  4.0




Cultural asset survey 4.6
Insurance  5.0
Financial cost 9.3
                          21.1
Toll collection 14.0
Traffic monitoring and control 5.7
Traffic safety 0.6
Facility maintenance 0.8
                          21.1
Toll collection 14.0




                          9.7
Business commence cost 8.6
Stock issue cost 1.1
779.1 855.8 Total
Note: 1. Compensation cost is provided by the Korean government, so it is not included in the Modified VFM 
assessment.  2. The bracketed values are from the negotiation result report on the Suwon-Pyungtaek National 
Expressway (MLTM, 2005).  3. Insurance cost for a PSC is contractor’s all risk insurance(4.0), while insurance cost for 
a PPP is composed of contractor’s all risk (4.0), advanced loss of profits (0.3), employer's liability (0.01) and 
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according to aging, yearly maintenance costs are estimated by considering the decrepitude of 
road with Table 4-3.  
When it comes to the operation cost of the BTL (     ), since yearly operation costs are 
provided in the contract awarded in 2005, these values are used for the Modified VFM 
calculation. 
 
Lease fee for the BTL (     	      ) 
According to Korea’s BTL guidelines (MOSF, 2009a), the yearly lease fee in nominal terms is 
calculated as in equation (4-1). The asset cost of the PPP (BTL) in real terms in Table 5-1 is 
delivered as a form of equity (15 per cent) and debt (85 per cent) according to the BTL finance 
structure. Considering construction deflator and BTL finance interest rate, the total investment 
of private sector, including principal and interest, becomes 1,150.1 (billion KRW, nominal 
term), which is the sum of (a), (b) and (C) in Table 5-2.  
 
Table 5-2: Calculation of the private sector investment 
                                                                                     (Unit: billion KRW) 
 
 
Consequently, in this case study, the yearly lease fee in nominal terms for the BTL is calculated 
as follows: 
     (  , .   ) =  
1
(1 + 0.089) 
  
   
= 10.3654 
     	    =
1150.1	






Considering the consumer price index and economic discount rate, the yearly lease fee in 
nominal terms will be transformed into real terms to be applied to the Modified VFM.  
 
Revenue, subsidy and MRG for the BTO (       ,          ,      ) 
Real (2002 price) Nominal Real (2002 price) Nominal
2005 6.9 7.7 39.4 43.8
2006 17.7 20.5 101.0 116.1 3.7
2007 41.8 49.8 237.5 282.3 13.6
2008 41.7 51.4 236.8 291.4 37.6
2009 19.9 25.4 113.1 144.1 62.4
Total 128.0 154.9 (a) 727.8 877.8 (b) 117.4 (c)
Year
Equity (15%) Debt (85%) Interest 
(nominal)
Private sector investment (P = a + b + c) 1150.1JI HONG PARK    Ch.5 The National Expressway Cases 
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As shown in equation (3-7), revenue, subsidy and MRG costs reduce the Modified VFM in the 
BTO scheme. Revenue and subsidy are collected from the contract awarded in 2005.  
With respect to MRG, the MRG condition of this project is weaker than in previous projects, 
such as the Incheon International Airport Expressway and the Chunan-Nonsan Expressway, 
where up to 90 per cent of contract revenue is guaranteed for 20 years. In this project, the 
Korean government guarantees up to 80 per cent, 70 per cent and 60 per cent of the contract 
revenue every five years for 15 years after the project is opened. In addition, when actual 
revenue is less than half of contract revenue, the MRG condition is not applied.  
Although the MRG cost is zero when forecast traffic volume is realised, in reality there is some 
discrepancy between forecast and actual traffic volumes. Using the traffic volume risk and the 
MRG condition, the MRG cost will be calculated in Modified VFM analysis.  
 
Social benefit difference (   ) 
The social benefits for the Modified VFM analysis are collected from the negotiation report on 
the Suwon-Pyungtaek National Expressway project (MLTM, 2005). For a simple calculation, 
the relationship between benefit cost ratio and volume/capacity in the National Expressway is 
assumed to follow equation (4-2) because of the unavailability of appropriate historical 
observations. Using equation (4-2) and social benefit data, the social benefit difference (ΔB) 
beween the PSC and the PPP (BTL and BTO) can be calculated.  
Considering equation (4-3) and the BCR (=2.72) of this case, when the traffic volume drops to 
68.6 per cent of the forecast one, the social benefits also drop to 74.0 per cent of the forecast one. 
   JI HONG PARK    Ch.5 The National Expressway Cases 





5.3.4.1 The Modified VFM (with no completion delay) 
 
In order to verify the impact of the inclusion of construction cost risk and traffic volume risk on 
the Modified VFM when there is no completion delay in the conventional delivery, four 
different Modified VFM (M.VFM) using the mean value of each risk are conducted: 1) M.VFM 
without risks; 2) M.VFM with construction cost risk; 3) M.VFM with traffic volume risk; and 4) 
M.VFM with both risks (construction cost risk and traffic volume risk). The results of M.VFM 
are shown in Table 5-3. 
 
Table 5-3: The Modified VFM results according to risk inclusion 
(Discounted value, billion KRW, price of 2002)
 
 
M.VFM with no risk inclusion 
According to Korea’s BTL guidelines (MOSF, 2009a), an average WBR of turn-key/alternative 
bids (82.14 per cent) in the National Expressway projects between 2002 and 2011 (MLTM, 
2012b) is considered in calculating the asset cost of the PSC, as shown in the first row of Table 
5-3.  
The results of M.VFM with no risk inclusion show that the BTL is more favourable than the 
conventional delivery, indicating M.VFMBTL of 33.8 (billion KRW), while the BTO is not the 
best option indicating M.VFMBTO of -87.9 (billion KRW). Accordingly, the BTL option is much 
better than the BTO, indicating M.VFMBTL-BTO of 121.8 (billion KRW).  
 




















437.5 129.6 519.5 447.7 85.5 135.5 0.0 0.0 33.8 -87.9 121.8
2) M.VFM
(+const. risk)
420.8 129.6 519.5 447.7 85.5 135.5 0.0 0.0 17.2 -104.6 121.8
3) M.VFM
(+volume risk)
437.5 120.6 356.6 447.7 85.5 135.5 15.9 0.0 24.8 50.1 -25.3
4) M.VFM
(+both risks)
420.8 120.6 356.6 447.7 85.5 135.5 15.9 0.0 8.2 33.5 -25.3
DB
(f)
Note: 1.  M.VFM (+no risks) = the Modified VFM without considering risks, based on the BTL guidelines of Korea, M.VFM (+const. risk) = the 
Modified VFM considering the mean values of winning bid ratio risk and construction cost overrun risk, M.VFM (+volume risk) = the Modified 
VFM value considering the mean value of traffic volume risk, and M.VFM (+both risks) = the Modified VFM value considering the mean values of 
winning bid ratio risk, cost overrun risk and traffic volume risk. 
2. AC PSC = Asset cost in the PSC, OC PSC = Operation cost in the PSC, Revenue = Revenue, Lease fee  BTL = Lease fee in the BTL, OC BTL = 
Operation cost in the BTL Subsidy BTO  = Subsidy from the Korean government, MRG BTO = MRG cost and DB = social benefit difference 
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M.VFM with construction cost risk 
From equation (3-10), an application ratio, indicating construction cost risk, consists of WBR 
risk and construction cost overrun risk. Using the mean values of the WBR risk (71.50 per cent, 
Fig 5-2) and construction cost overrun risk (10.21 per cent, Figure 5-1), the asset cost of the 
PSC can be freshly calculated. 
The results (Table 5-3, the second row) show that M.VFMBTL and M.VFMBTO considering the 
construction cost risk are respectively 17.2 and -104.6 (billion KRW), which are 16.6 (billion 
KRW) lower than those with no risk inclusion. This is because the mean values of WBR and 
construction cost overrun make an application ratio of 78.80 per cent (0.715 × (1+0.1021)), 
which is 3.34 per cent lower than an average winning bid ratio (82.14 per cent) of turn-
key/alternative bids used. This means that M.VFMBTL and M.VFMBTO with no risk inclusion 
based on Korea’s BTL guidelines (MOSF, 2009a) could be exaggerated by as much as the 
difference of 3.34 per cent more than the situation in reality. 
However, M.VFMBTL-BTO (the Modified VFM difference between the BTL and the BTO) is not 
changed because this is not related to the asset cost of the PSC, though affected by WBR and 
construction cost overrun, according to equation (3-10). 
 
M.VFM with traffic volume risk 
To verify the effect of traffic demand risk on M.VFM, the mean value of traffic volume risk 
(68.6 per cent) shown in Figure 4-4 is applied to the analysis. The result (Table 5-3, third row) 
shows that M.VFMBTL decreases by 9.0 (billion KRW), whereas M.VFMBTO increases by 138.0 
(billion KRW), compared with those with no risk inclusion.  
The decrease of M.VFMBTL is due to the decrease in operation cost in the PSC by VKT reduction 
following the traffic volume decrease. In addition, the main reason for the M.VFMBTO increase is 
that with the traffic volume decreasing, the decrease in revenue is much more than the MRG 
increase. 
As a result, M.VFMBTL-BTO is changed to a negative value (-25.3) from a positive value (121.8). 
In other words, the BTO option becomes more favourable than the BTL for this project, when 
actual traffic volume drops to 68.6 per cent of forecast traffic volume.  
 
M.VFM with both risks 
When both construction cost risk and traffic volume risk are included in the analysis, Table 5-3 
(the last row) shows that that M.VFMBTL and M.VFMBTO become respectively 8.2 and 33.5 JI HONG PARK    Ch.5 The National Expressway Cases 
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(billion KRW), which means that the BTL and the BTO option are more favourable than the 
conventional delivery for this project. In addition, among PPP alternatives the BTO option is 
better than the BTL because M.VFMBTL-BTO shows a negative value (-25.3 billion KRW). 
 
 
5.3.4.2 The Modified VFM (with completion delay) 
 
Impact of a completion delay in the conventional delivery 
To verify the impact of a completion delay in the conventional delivery on the PPP decision-
making, the Modified VFM analyses (M.VFMBTL, M.VFMBTO, and M.VFMBTL-BTO) with 
completion delay (zero to four years) are conducted. The Modified VFM values are calculated 
by considering a completion delay of conventional delivery, which affects not only yearly asset 
cost input but also the social benefit difference between the PSC and the PPP alternatives. 
The results are shown in Table 5-4. In the no risk inclusion case, as completion is delayed from 
zero to four years, M.VFMBTL soars from 33.6 to 620.7 (billion KRW) and M.VFMBTO also 
jumps from -88.1 to 629.5 (billion KRW). Similarly, in the risk (construction cost risk and 
traffic volume risk) inclusion case, M.VFMBTL and M.VFMBTO respectively rise from 8.0 and 
33.3 (billion KRW) to 420.0 and 534.9 (billion KRW) according to completion delay. This 
increasing trend is mainly because of the increase in the social benefit difference between the 
PSC and the PPP alternatives (BTL/BTO): a completion delay is much bigger than the decrease 
of the public sector cost in the PSC due to discounting. In consequence, as completion is 
delayed, the PPP alternatives seem to become more favourable than the conventional delivery. 
 
Table 5-4: The Modified VFM result with completion delay 
 (Discounted value, 100 million KRW, price of 2002)
 


















0 437.3 129.6 519.5 447.7 85.5 135.4 0.0 0.0 33.6 -88.1 121.7
1 420.3 120.6 483.3 447.7 85.5 135.4 0.0 189.9 197.5 112.1 85.5
1.30 415.0 118.0 473.0 447.7 85.5 135.4 0.0 243.6 243.3 168.1 75.2
2 404.0 112.2 449.6 447.7 85.5 135.4 0.0 366.6 349.5 297.7 51.7
3 388.3 104.3 418.2 447.7 85.5 135.4 0.0 531.0 490.3 469.9 20.4
4 373.1 97.0 389.0 447.7 85.5 135.4 0.0 683.8 620.7 629.5 -8.8
0 420.6 120.6 356.6 447.7 85.5 135.4 15.9 0.0 8.0 33.3 -25.3
1 404.3 112.2 331.7 447.7 85.5 135.4 15.9 140.0 123.2 173.4 -50.2
1.30 399.2 109.8 324.7 447.7 85.5 135.4 15.9 179.5 155.2 212.5 -57.2
2 388.6 104.3 308.6 447.7 85.5 135.4 15.9 270.2 229.9 303.3 -73.4
3 373.5 97.1 287.0 447.7 85.5 135.4 15.9 391.3 328.6 423.5 -94.9
4 358.9 90.3 267.0 447.7 85.5 135.4 15.9 504.0 420.0 534.9 -114.9
Note: 1.  No risk inclusion = the Modified VFM without considering risks, based on the BTL guidelines of Korea, Risk inclusion = the Modified VFM  
considering construction cost risk and traffic volume risk. 
2. AC PSC = Asset cost in the PSC, OC PSC = Operation cost in the PSC, Revenue = Revenue, Lease fee  BTL = Lease fee in the BTL, OC BTL = Operation 
cost in the BTL Subsidy BTO  = Subsidy from the Korean government, MRG BTO  = MRG cost and DB = social benefit difference between the PSC and 
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On the other hand, M.VFMBTL-BTO decreases as completion is delayed from zero to four years 
regardless of risk inclusion mainly because the revenue stream is increasingly reduced due to 
the discounting effect. This implies that as completion is delayed, the BTO option becomes 
more favourable than the BTL option. 
Additionally, as shown in Table 5-4, considering construction cost risk, traffic volume risk and 
completion delay (the mean value: 1.30 years, Figure 5-3) in the National Expressway projects, 
the BTO is better than any other procurement option. 
 
Critical completion delay 
In order to determine the critical completion delay in the conventional delivery which makes the 
M.VFM zero, linear regression analyses were conducted, using Table 5.4. As seen in Figure 5-6, 
depending on whether construction cost risk and traffic volume risk are included or not, the 
regression lines of M.VFM differ. 
 
 
(a) No risk inclusion 
 
(b) Risk inclusion 
Figure 5-6: The Modified VFM result according to completion delay 
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In the case of no risk inclusion (Figure 5-6 (a)), with respect to M.VFMBTL, when the linear 
regression line is extended, it meets the horizontal axis at -0.31 year (-3.72 months). This means 
that even when the conventional delivery is competed earlier than the BTL by up to 0.31 years 
(3.72 months), the BTL is more favourable than the conventional delivery. In other words, even 
if the construction in the BTL starts up to 0.31 years (3.72 months) later than the conventional 
delivery, perhaps because of negotiation delays or financial problems, the BTL is more 
favourable. Regarding M.VFMBTO, when the conventional delivery is delayed more than 0.41 
years (4.92 months), the BTO option becomes feasible. In addition, when a completion delay is 
longer than 3.66 years (43.92 months) the BTO option is the most appropriate procurement 
option. 
In the same way, completion delays in the risk inclusion case are shown in Figure 5-6 (b). With 
respect to M.VFMBTL, the intercept of the horizontal axis (the critical completion delay) becomes 
-0.16 years (1.92 months). This means that even when the conventional delivery is completed 
earlier than the BTL by up to 0.16 years (1.92 months), the BTL is more feasible than the 
conventional delivery. In other words, even if the construction in the BTL starts up to 0.16 years 
(1.92 months) later than the conventional delivery, perhaps because of negotiation delays or 
financial problems, the BTL is more favourable. Regarding M.VFMBTO, even if the construction 
in the BTO starts 0.34 years (4.08 months) later than the conventional delivery, the BTO is 
more favourable than the conventional delivery. In addition, when a completion delay is 
expected in conventional delivery the BTO is better than the BTL. Besides, even if the 
conventional delivery completes this project 1.21 years (14.52 months) earlier than the PPP 
alternatives (BTO/BTL), the BTO option is more favourable than the BTL.  
Furthermore, considering that critical completion delay in this project is less than the mean 
value (1.30 years, Figure 5-3) of the completion delay in the National Expressway projects, the 
BTO option seems to be more favourable for this project.  
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5.3.4.3 Sensitivity analysis 
 
M.VFM results can differ depending on how large values are used as analysis factors. In order to 
examine the behaviour of M.VFM depending on the change of analysis factors, sensitivity 
analysis is conducted. To conduct a sensitivity analysis, the following seven analysis factors are 
considered: 1) BTL finance interest rate; 2) discount rate; 3) BTL lease profitability, 3-1) five-
year exchequer bond interest rate; 4) construction deflator; and 5) consumer price index; and 6) 
the size of social benefits. BTL lease profitability is composed of a five-year exchequer bond 
interest rate and mark-up rate, so the five-year exchequer bond interest rate does not seem to be 
included as an analysis factor in M.VFMBTL. However, in the calculation of M.VFMBTO and 
M.VFMBTL-BTO, it needs to be considered, so inevitably both BTL lease profitability and the five-
year exchequer bond interest rate are considered in the sensitivity analysis. In addition, this case 
study is analysed using fixed PPP construction cost and operation cost from the contract 
awarded in 2005, so these cost items are excluded in the sensitivity analysis factors. 
The changes of M.VFM with risk inclusion and a 1.30-year delay are shown in Figure 5-7, 
where the analysis factors vary by from -20 to +20 per cent on each factor’s given value. The 
summary of sensitivity analysis is shown in Table 5-5.  
In the case of M.VFMBTL (Figure 5-7 (a), Table 5-5), the result is similar to those in the National 
Highway cases. Among the seven analysis factors, the BTL lease profitability is most influential. 
In addition, regardless of the change of the factors, the BTL is more favourable than the 
conventional delivery.  
With respect to M.VFMBTO (Figure 5-7 (b), Table 5-5), social benefit size is the most influential 
among the four factors but the impact is not large compared with the BTL lease profitability in 
M.VFMBTL. The BTO is more favourable than the conventional delivery regardless of the change 
of the factors.  
When it comes to M.VFMBTL-BTO (Figure 5-7 (c), Table 5-5), though it shows a negative value in 
most cases, meaning that the BTO is better than the BTL, it can show a positive value when 
BTL lease profitability drops more than approximately 17 per cent on the given value. In 
addition, BTL lease profitability is the most influential factor among the seven analysis factors 
in the calculation of M.VFMBTL-BTO.  
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5.3.4.4 The Monte Carlo Simulations 
 
The MCS is conducted to identify the impact of the following 11 risk variables (shown in 
Figure 5-1~Figure 5-4, Figure 4-4 and Figure 4-6~Figure 4-7) from historical observations: 
WBR, construction cost overrun, traffic volume, three operation costs, construction deflator, 
consumer price index, five-year exchequer bond interest rate, and three-year non-guaranteed 






1. BTL finance 
    interest rate
Decrease -0.45
The increase of BTL finance interest rate makes lease fee rise, 
so M.VFM BTL decreases
2. Discount rate Increase 0.49
The increase of discount rate makes cost items fall.  Among 
them, lease fee has largest drop, so M.VFM BTL decreases.  
3. Lease 
   profitability
Decrease -3.55
The rise of lease profitability makes lease fee rise, so 
M.VFM BTL decreases
3-1. Exchequer
   bond interest rate
Decrease -1.45
The rise of 5 year exchequer bond rate means the rise of lease 
profitability, making lease fee rise, so M.VFM BTL decreases.
4. Construction 
    deflator
Decrease -0.81
The rise of construction deflator makes private investment and 
lease fee increase, so M.VFM BTL decreases.
5. Consumer price 
    index 
Increase 1.69
Nominal lease fee is converted to real by CPI. The rise of CPI, 
making real lease fee drop, means M.VFM BTL increases.
6. Social benefits Increase 1.80 The rise of social benefits makes M.VFM BTL increase.
2. Discount rate Increase 0.32
The increase of discount rate makes cost items fall.  Among 
them, revenue has a largest drop, so M.VFM BTO decreases.  
3-1. Exchequer   
   bond interest rate
Increase 0.86
The rise of 5 year exchequer bond rate means the rise of the 
asset cost in the PSC, so M.VFM BTO increases.
5. Consumer price 
    index
Decrease -0.45
The rise of CPI makes the borrowing cost of the public sector in 
real term drop, so M.VFM BTO decreases.
6. Social benefits Increase 1.80 The rise of social benefits makes M.VFM BTO increases.
1. BTL finance   
    interest rate
Decrease -0.45
The increase of BTL finance interest rate makes lease fee rise, 
so M.VFM BTL-BTO decreases
2. Discount rate Increase 0.17
The lease fee reduction due to the discount rate increase is 
bigger than the revenue decrease, so M.VFM BTL-BTO increases.
3. Lease 
    profitability
Decrease -3.55
The rise of lease profitability makes lease fee rise, so 
M.VFM BTL-BTO decreases
3-1. Exchequer  
   bond interest rate
Decrease -2.31
The 5 year exchequer bond rate rise (the lease profitability rise) 
makes lease fee rise, so M.VFM BTL-BTO decreases.
4. Construction 
    deflator
Decrease -0.81
The rise of construction deflator makes private investment and 
lease fee increase, so M.VFM BTL-BTO decreases.
5. Consumer price
    index
Increase 2.14
The lease fee drop and the borrowing cost drop in the PSC 
make M.VFM BTL-BTO increase.
6. Social benefits - 0
The rise of social benefits does not make any changes in 
M.VFM BTL-BTO.





M.VFM changes due to the increase of analysis factors
M.VFM BTL
M.VFM BTO 
M.VFM BTL-BTOJI HONG PARK    Ch.5 The National Expressway Cases 
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with a 1.30-year completion delay, which is an average completion delay in the National 
Expressways from historical observations, as shown in Fig 5-3.  
In the case of no completion delay (Figure 5-8 (a)), the mean value of M.VFMBTL is 5.1 (billion 
KRW) and the probability that M.VFMBTL is positive is 52.3 per cent. This implies that the BTL 
option is better than the conventional option. With respect to M.VFMBTO, its mean value is 33.0 
(billion KRW) and the probability that it is positive is 56.7 per cent, which implies the BTO 
option is more favourable than the conventional option. Additionally, M.VFMBTL-BTO has a mean 
value of -27.9 (billion KRW) and the probability that it is positive is 44.7 per cent, which 
implies the BTO option is better than the BTL option. Accordingly, assuming that there is no 
completion delay in the conventional delivery, the most appropriate delivery option for this 
project is the BTO, followed by the conventional and the BTL option. 
Similarly, in the case of a 1.30-year completion delay (Figure 5-8 (b)), the mean value of 
M.VFMBTL is 153.8 (billion KRW) and the probability that it is positive is 90.3 per cent. This 
implies that the BTL option is better than the conventional delivery. With respect to M.VFMBTO, 
its mean value is 213.6 (billion KRW) and the probability that it is positive is 99.6 per cent, 
which implies the BTO option is more favourable than the conventional option. Besides, 
M.VFMBTL-BTO has a mean value of -59.8 (billion KRW) and the probability that it is positive is 
37.8 per cent, which implies that the BTO option is better than the BTL option. Accordingly, 
considering an average completion delay in the conventional delivery (1.30 years), the most 
appropriate delivery option is the BTO, followed by the BTL and the conventional option. 
Consequently, as the completion delay increases, the mean values of M.VFM and the 
probabilities that the PPP options are better increase. The PPP decision for the Suwon-
Pyungtaek National Expressway made in 2002 seems to be appropriate, considering 
construction cost risk, traffic volume risk and an average completion delay (1.30 years) in the 
conventional delivery. 
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i) M.VFMBTL  i) M.VFMBTL 
ii) M.VFMBTO  ii) M.VFMBTO 
iii) M.VFMBTL-BTO  iii) M.VFMBTL-BTO 
(a) No delay  (b) 1.30 year completion delay 
Figure 5-8: Probability distribution of the Modified VFM with a 1.30-year completion 
delay    JI HONG PARK    Ch.5 The National Expressway Cases 
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5.4 Case 2: The Bongdam-Songsan case 
 
 
5.4.1 Project overview 
 
In order to solve daily traffic congestion in the Seoul metropolitan region, the Korean 
government established the Seoul metropolitan National Expressway Network Plan, including 
the second Seoul metropolitan orbital, in 2008. As part of this plan, the second Seoul 
metropolitan orbital is composed of 12 National Expressway sections, shown in Figure 5-9. Its 
total length is 259.2 km and the total project cost is approximately 10.1 trillion KRW (at 2007 
prices). Among the 12 sections, the Bongdam-Dongtan is already in operation, the Gimpo-
Incheon is under construction and the Pocheon-Hwado is under PPP negotiation with the private 
sector. In addition, another eight sections are also planned to be completed by 2020 using public 
or private funds. 
The Bongdam-Songsan National Expressway project, a part of the second Seoul metropolitan 
orbital, is connected to the Bondam-Dongtan section, the Ansan-Songsan section and the 
National Expressway 15 (Seoul-Mokpo). This project was proposed as a BTO project from the 
private sector in 2007, so PPP pre-qualification test was conducted in 2009. Though the PPP 
pre-qualification result was affirmative, owing to the difficulty of financial agreement in private 
sector from the financial market crisis from 2008 (Song, 2011), the PPP decision-making was 
delayed to 2012 and construction has still not yet started.   
The overview of the Bongdam-Songsan National Expressway project, proposed in 2007, is as 
follows: 
 
  Title: Bongdam-Songsan National Expressway project  
  PPP type: BTO 
  Location: Mado ~ Bongdam, Hwasung city, Gyeonggi Province 
  Length: 18.46 km (four lanes) 
  Project cost:
76 326.5 (billion KRW, 2006 price) 
- Private fund: 264.8, construction subsidy: 61.7 
  Inflation: 4 per cent 
                                         
76 The project cost in this project means asset cost excluding compensation cost (259.9 billion KRW) 
provided by the Korean Government, so it is composed of construction subsidies and other cost needed 
for the duration of the construction, which is delivered by the private sector.  JI HONG PARK    Ch.5 The National Expressway Cases 
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  IRR: 5.03 per cent (real) 
  Construction period: 54 months 
  Operation period: 30 years 
  Support request  
- Construction subsidy 61.7 (billion KRW, at 2006 prices)  
- Compensation cost 259.9 (billion KRW, at 2006 prices) 
       (No minimum revenue guarantee was requested in this project) 
  Proposer: Gyeonggi Dongseo Expressway corp. 
- Construction investors (10 per cent): eight companies including Hanhwa 
construction (1.967 per cent)  
- Financial investors (80 per cent): Emerging infrastructure investment (20 per cent), 
Hankook infra2 (20 per cent), Daehan life insurance (12 per cent), Kyobo life 
insurance (12 per cent), Shinhan bank (8 per cent), IBK bank (8 per cent) 




Source: MLTM, maps.google.com 
Figure 5-9: The Bongdam-Songsan National Expressway project map JI HONG PARK    Ch.5 The National Expressway Cases 
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5.4.2 Analysis factors and assumptions for the Modified VFM 
 
Although this project was proposed as a BTO scheme, in order to verify the impact of 
transferable risks on the PPP decisions and the Modified VFM, this research considers three 
alternative options: the conventional delivery, the BTL and the BTO option.  
Basic analysis factors for the Modified VFM are as follows: 
  PPP model considered: BTO and BTL 
  Decision-making time:
77 2009 (with construction to start in 2012) 
  Discount rate: 5.5 per cent (real); price base year: 2006 
  Construction deflator:
78 4.82 per cent (average between 2005 and 2009) 
  Consumer price index:
79 2.99 per cent (average between 2005 and 2009) 
  Five-year exchequer bond interest rate:
80 4.72 per cent (2009) 
  BTL Lease profitability:
81 6.72 per cent  
     (Five-year exchequer bond interest rate + 2.0 per cent, nominal) 
                                         
77 Following the financial market crisis triggered by the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008, the 
financial agreement in private sector became difficult (Song, 2011), so the PPP decision on this project 
was delayed to 2012 though PPP pre-qualification result in 2009 was affirmative. In this case study, the 
decision making time is assumed to be 2009, considering the time when PPP pre-qualification was 
conducted.  
78 Construction deflator means construction investment deflator in expenditure on Gross Domestic 
Product on National Accounts, which is provided by the Bank of Korea (http://ecos.bok.or.kr), and 
according to Korea’s BTL guidelines (MOSF, 2009a), it is used in the calculation of the private sector 
investment for the lease fee calculation. For a more accurate private sector investment calculation, it is 
used instead of consumer price index.  
79 Consumer price index, which is used as inflation in operation period, is provided by the Bank of Korea 
(http://ecos.bok.or.kr). 
80 The five-year exchequer bond interest rate is calculated by a weighted average method, which applies 
0.1, 0.2, 0.3 and 0.4 to the first, second, third and fourth quarter value (MOSF, 2009a). The quarterly five-
year exchequer bond interest rate is provided by the Korea Bond Information Service 
(http://www.kofiabond.or.kr). 
81 BTL lease profitability is expressed as “five-year exchequer bond interest rate + mark-up” and mark-up 
rate is composed of a premium for long term investment and risk premium for construction and operation 
(MOSF, 2009a). According to research (Jung et al., 2006) and newspaper reports (Jung, 2005, Lee, 2009), 
the mark-up rate is distributed from 0.5 per cent to 2.25 per cent. Considering that there is no advanced 
BTL projects for road programme and road projects usually takes 35 years for construction and operation, 
a mark-up rate of 2.0 per cent is considered for the National Highways in this research.  JI HONG PARK    Ch.5 The National Expressway Cases 
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  BTL finance interest rate:
82 7.12 per cent  
    (Three-year non-guaranteed corporate bond (AA-),
83 5.62 per cent + 1.5 per cent, 
nominal) 
  BTL finance structure: equity 15 per cent, debt 85 per cent 
  BTL finance terms: level debt service during operation period 
  Operation period: 30 years; standard construction duration: five years 
  MRG condition: not included 
 
In addition, the same assumptions (see 4.3.2) for the Modified VFM used in the National 
Highway cases are also used in the National Expressway cases. 
 
 
5.4.3 Main calculation items for the Modified VFM 
 
From equations (3-7), (3-8) and (3-9), it is clear that the main calculation items for the Modified 
VFM are the asset cost of a PSC (     ), the operation cost of a PSC (     ) and a BTL 
(     ), the lease fee of a BTL (     	   	   ), revenue (       ), the subsidy 
(          ) from the Korean government, the minimum revenue guarantee cost (      ) 
and the benefit difference (ΔB).  
 
Asset cost of the PSC (     ) 
Table 5-6 shows the basic asset cost of this project. With respect to the PSC column in Table 5-
6, the cost data are collected from the PPP pre-qualification report on the Bongdam-Songsan 
National Expressway project (PIMAC, 2009b). Among cost data, the building costs of the PSC 
are calculated by multiplying designed prices (values not including winning bid ratio in the 
report) and an average turn-key/alternative WBR (82.14 per cent) in the National Expressway 
projects between 2002 and 2011(MLTM, 2012b). Other PSC cost items are collected from the 
                                         
82 BTL finance interest rate is expressed as a “three-year non-guaranteed corporate bond interest rate + 
mark-up” (MOSF, 2009a) and, according to Kim et al. (2005), the mark-up rate seems to be distributed 
from 0.66 per cent to 2.00 per cent. Considering that there is no advanced BTL projects for road 
programme and road projects usually takes 35 years for construction and operation, this research uses 1.5 
per cent for the mark-up rate.  
83 The three-year non-guaranteed corporate bond (AA-) interest rate is calculated by a weighted average 
method, which applies 0.1, 0.2, 0.3 and 0.4 to the first, second, third and fourth quarter value (MOSF, 
2009a). The quarterly three-year non-guaranteed bond (AA-) interest rate is provided by the Korea Bond 
Information Service (http://www.kofiabond.or.kr). JI HONG PARK    Ch.5 The National Expressway Cases 
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PPP pre-qualification report on the Bongdam-Songsan National Expressway project (PIMAC, 
2009b). 
With respect to basic asset costs for the PPP, proposed asset costs are utilised in this case; these 
are also collected from the PPP pre-qualification report on the Bongdam-Songsan National 
Expressway project (PIMAC, 2009b).  
In addition, in order to estimate the Modified VFM, according to Table 4-2 the yearly asset 
costs of the PSC are distributed. With respect to longer construction duration considering 
completion delay, new yearly distribution ratios using interpolation methods and Table 4-2 will 
be applied to the calculation of the Modified VFM. 
 
Table 5-6: Basic asset cost for the PSC and the PPP 






















Sub total 357.8 288.0
0 0
                          16.6 
Design inspection 1.4 
Construction inspection 9.1 
Environmental impact assessment 1.9
Traffic impact assessment  0.2
Disaster impact assessment 0.3 
Cultural asset survey 1.8 
Insurance  1.9
                          18.4
Design inspection 0.2 
Construction inspection 7.6
Environmental impact assessment 1.7
Traffic impact assessment  0.2 
Disaster impact assessment 0.2 
Cultural asset survey 1.8 
Insurance  1.9 
Financial cost 4.8
                             16.5 
Toll collection 9.8
Traffic monitoring and control 5.0
Traffic safety 0.6 
Facility maintenance 1.3
                           14.3
Toll collection 9.1
Traffic monitoring and control 3.7 
Traffic safety 0.6 
Facility maintenance 0.9
0
                            5.8
Business commence cost 5.5 
Stock issue cost 0.3
390.9 326.5 Total
Note: 1. Compensation cost is provided by the Korean government, so it is not included in the Modified VFM 
assessment.  2. All values in the Table comes from the PPP pre-qualification report on the Bongdam-Songsan National 
Expressway projects (PIMAC, 2009) and the bracketed values are designed prices not including winning bid ratios.  3. 
Insurance cost for a PSC is contractor’s all risk insurance (1.9), while insurance cost for a PPP is composed of 
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Operation cost for the PSC and the BTL (     ,     ) 
As with the National Highway cases, yearly base operation costs for the PSC (     ) are 
calculated by multiplying the mean values of the operation costs
84 (KRW/VKT) from the 
historical observations and yearly VKT data of this project from the PPP pre-qualification report 
on the Bongdam-Songsan National Expressway (PIMAC, 2009b). In order to consider the 
variation of maintenance cost according to aging, yearly maintenance costs are estimated by 
considering decrepitude of road by Table 4-3.  
When it comes to the operation cost of the BTL (     ), proposed operation costs from private 
sector, collected from the PPP pre-qualification report on Bongdam-Songsan National 
Expressway (PIMAC, 2009b), are used for the Modified VFM calculation. 
 
Lease fee for the BTL (     	      ) 
According to Korea’s BTL guidelines (MOSF, 2009a), the yearly lease fee in nominal terms is 
calculated as equation (4-1). The asset cost of the PPP (BTL) in real terms in Table 5-6 is 
delivered as a form of equity (15 per cent) and debt (85 per cent) according to the BTL finance 
structure. Considering construction deflator and BTL finance interest rate, the total investment 
from the private sector, including principal and interest, becomes 460.9 (billion KRW, nominal 
term) at completion time, which is the sum of (a), (b) and (C) in Table 5-7.  
 
Table 5-7: Calculation of private sector investment 
(Unit: billion KRW) 
 
 
Consequently, in this case study, the yearly lease fee in nominal terms for the BTL is calculated 
as follows: 
                                         
84 From the historical observations, the mean values of operation cost items are as follows: 1) 
management cost (personnel cost included)/VKT = 16.51 KRW/VKT; 2) general maintenance cost/VKT 
= 3.84 KRW/VKT; 3) re-pavement cost/VKT = 1.28 KRW/VKT; and 4) road structure maintenance 
cost/VKT = 1.58 KRW/VKT.  
Real (2006 price) Nominal Real (2006 price) Nominal
2012 3.5 4.1 19.9 22.9
2013 7.1 8.5 40.0 48.2 1.6
2014 13.6 17.2 77.2 97.7 5.1
2015 16.4 21.8 92.9 123.2 12.0
2016 8.4 11.7 47.5 66.1 20.8
Total 49.0 63.3 (a) 277.5 358.1 (b) 39.5 (c)
Year
Equity (15%) Debt (85%) Interest 
(nominal)
Private sector investment (P = a + b + c) 460.9JI HONG PARK    Ch.5 The National Expressway Cases 
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     (  , .    ) =  
1
(1 + 0.0672) 
  
   
= 12.7662 
     	    =
460.9	






Considering the consumer price index and the economic discount rate, the lease fee in nominal 
terms in each year will be transformed into real terms to be applied to the Modified VFM.  
 
Revenue, subsidy and MRG for the BTO (       ,          ,      ) 
As shown in equation (3-7), revenue, subsidy and MRG cost reduce the Modified VFM in the 
BTO scheme. Along with other items, revenue and subsidy are collected from the PPP pre-
qualification report on the Bongdam-Songsan National Expressway (PIMAC, 2009b).  
With respect to MRG, the MRG system for an unsolicited project was abolished in 2006 
because public opinion had it that the MRG system created an enormous economic burden to 
the public sector, so the private sector did not require an MRG condition. Accordingly, this case 
study does not include the MRG cost. 
 
Social benefit difference (  ) 
Information on social benefits for the Modified VFM analysis is collected from the PPP pre-
qualification report on the Bongdam-Songsan National Expressway. As with the Suwon-
Pyungtaek case, for a simple calculation, the relationship between benefit cost ratio and 
volume/capacity in the National Expressway is assumed to follow equation (4-2), because of the 
unavailability of appropriate historical observations. Using equation (4-2) and social benefit 
data, the social benefit difference (ΔB) beween the PSC and the PPP (BTL and BTO) can be 
calculated.  
Considering equation (4-3) and the BCR of this case (= 1.17), when the traffic volume drops to 
68.6 per cent of the forecast one, the social benefits also drop to 80.4 per cent of the forecast one. 
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5.4.4.1 The Modified VFM (with no completion delay) 
 
To verify the impact of risk inclusion (construction cost risk and traffic volume risk) on the 
Modified VFM analysis when there is no completion delay in the conventional delivery, four 
different types of Modified VFM (M.VFM) using the mean value of each risk are conducted: 1) 
M.VFM without risks; 2) M.VFM with construction cost risk; 3) M.VFM with traffic volume risk; 
and 4) M.VFM with both risks (construction cost risk and traffic volume risk). The results of 
M.VFM are shown in Table 5-8. 
 
Table 5-8: The Modified VFM results according to risk inclusion 




M.VFM with no risk inclusion 
According to Korea’s BTL guidelines (MOSF, 2009a), an average WBR of turn-key/alternative 
bids (82.14 per cent) in the National Expressway projects between 2002 and 2011 (MLTM, 
2012b) is considered in the calculating the asset cost of the PSC, as shown in the first row of 
Table 5-8.  
The results of M.VFM with no risk inclusion show that the BTL is more favourable than the 
conventional delivery, indicating M.VFMBTL of 12.7 (billion KRW), while the BTO is not the 
best option, indicating M.VFMBTO of -47.5 (billion KRW). Accordingly, the BTL option is 
preferable by far to the BTO, indicating M.VFMBTL-BTO of 60.3 (billion KRW).  
 
 




















245.3 67.7 322.4 214.0 86.3 38.1 0.0 0.0 12.7 -47.5 60.3
2) M.VFM
(+const. risk)
236.2 67.7 322.4 214.0 86.3 38.1 0.0 0.0 3.6 -56.6 60.3
3) M.VFM
(+volume risk)
245.3 62.6 221.3 214.0 86.3 38.1 0.0 0.0 7.7 48.6 -40.9
4) M.VFM
(+both risks)
236.2 62.6 221.3 214.0 86.3 38.1 0.0 0.0 -1.4 39.4 -40.9
Note: 1.  M.VFM (+no risks) = the Modified VFM without considering risks, based on the BTL guidelines of Korea, M.VFM (+const. risk) = the 
Modified VFM considering the mean values of winning bid ratio risk and construction cost overrun risk, M.VFM (+volume risk) = the Modified 
VFM value considering the mean value of traffic volume risk, and M.VFM (+both risks) = the Modified VFM value considering the mean values of 
winning bid ratio risk, cost overrun risk and traffic volume risk. 
2. AC PSC = Asset cost in the PSC, OC PSC = Operation cost in the PSC, Revenue = Revenue, Lease fee  BTL = Lease fee in the BTL, OC BTL = 
Operation cost in the BTL Subsidy BTO  = Subsidy from the Korean government, MRG BTO = MRG cost and B = social benefit difference 
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M.VFM with construction cost risk 
From equation (3-10), an application ratio, indicating construction cost risk, consists of WBR 
risk and construction cost overrun risk. Using the mean values of the WBR risk (71.50 per cent, 
Fig 5-2) and construction cost overrun risk (10.21 per cent, Figure 5-1), the asset cost of the 
PSC can be freshly calculated. 
The results (Table 5-8, the second row) show that M.VFMBTL and M.VFMBTO considering the 
construction cost risk are respectively 3.6 and -56.6 (billion KRW), which are 9.1 (billion KRW) 
lower than those with no risk inclusion. This is because the mean values of the WBR and 
construction cost overrun make an application ratio of 78.80 per cent (0.715 × (1+0.1021)), 
which is 3.34 per cent lower than an average winning bid ratio (82.14 per cent) of turn-
key/alternative bids used. This means that M.VFMBTL and M.VFMBTO with no risk inclusion 
based on Korea’s BTL guidelines (MOSF, 2009a) could be exaggerated by as much as the 
difference of 3.34 per cent more than the situation in reality. 
However, M.VFMBTL-BTO (the Modified VFM difference between the BTL and the BTO) is not 
changed because this is not related to the asset cost of the PSC, affected by the WBR and 
construction cost overrun, according to equation (3-10). 
 
M.VFM with traffic volume risk 
To verify the effect of traffic demand risk on M.VFM, the mean value of traffic volume risk 
(68.6 per cent) shown in Figure 4-4 is applied to the analysis. The result (Table 5-8, third row) 
shows that M.VFMBTL decreases by 5.0 (billion KRW) whereas M.VFMBTO increases by 96.1 
(billion KRW), compared with those with no risk inclusion.  
The decrease of M.VFMBTL is due to the decrease in the operation cost by VKT reduction as 
traffic volume decreases. In addition, the main reason for M.VFMBTO increase is the decrease of 
revenue due to the reduction of traffic volume, which causes M.VFMBTO to rise according to 
equation (3-7). 
As a result, M.VFMBTL-BTO is changed to a negative value (-40.9) from a positive value (60.3). In 
other words, the BTO option becomes more favourable than the BTL for this project when 
actual traffic volume is expected to reach 68.6 per cent of forecast traffic volume.  
 
M.VFM with both risks 
Table 5-8 (the last row) shows that that M.VFMBTL and M.VFMBTO show respectively -1.4 and 
39.4 (billion KRW), which means that the most appropriate procurement option for this case is JI HONG PARK    Ch.5 The National Expressway Cases 
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the BTO option, followed by the conventional and the BTL options, when construction cost risk 
and traffic volume risk are taken into account. 
 
 
5.4.4.2 The Modified VFM (with completion delay) 
 
Impact of a completion delay in the conventional delivery 
To verify the impact of a completion delay in the conventional delivery on the PPP decision-
making, Modified VFM analyses (M.VFMBTL, M.VFMBTO, and M.VFMBTL-BTO) with completion 
delay (zero to four years) are conducted. The Modified VFM values are calculated by 
considering a completion delay of conventional delivery, which affects not only yearly asset 
cost input but also the social benefit difference between the PSC and the PPP alternatives. 
The results are shown in Table 5-9. In the no risk inclusion case, as completion is delayed from 
zero to four years, M.VFMBTL soars from 12.7 to 103.0 (billion KRW) and M.VFMBTO also 
jumps from -47.5 to 104.9 (billion KRW). Similarly, in the risk (construction cost risk and 
traffic volume risk) inclusion case, M.VFMBTL and M.VFMBTO respectively rise from -1.4 and 
39.4 (billion KRW) to 65.2 and 148.7 (billion KRW), according to completion delay. This 
increasing trend is mainly because of the increase of the social benefit difference between the 
PSC and the PPP alternatives (BTL/BTO) since the completion delay is much bigger than the 
decrease of the public sector cost in the PSC due to discounting. In consequence, as a 
completion is delayed, the PPP alternatives seem to become more favourable than the 
conventional delivery. 
 
Table 5-9: The Modified VFM result with completion delay 
 (Discounted value, billion KRW, 2006 price) 
 


















0 245.3 67.7 322.4 214.0 86.3 38.1 0.0 0.0 12.7 -47.5 60.3
1 238.3 64.1 305.6 214.0 86.3 38.1 0.0 35.3 37.4 -6.0 43.4
1.30 236.0 63.1 300.8 214.0 86.3 38.1 0.0 45.4 44.3 5.7 38.6
2 231.4 60.8 289.6 214.0 86.3 38.1 0.0 68.8 60.7 33.2 27.5
3 224.7 57.6 274.5 214.0 86.3 38.1 0.0 100.5 82.5 70.1 12.4
4 218.1 54.6 260.2 214.0 86.3 38.1 0.0 130.5 103.0 104.9 -1.9
0 236.2 62.6 221.3 214.0 86.3 38.1 0.0 0.0 -1.4 39.4 -40.9
1 229.4 59.4 209.7 214.0 86.3 38.1 0.0 28.4 16.9 69.3 -52.4
1.30 227.2 58.4 206.4 214.0 86.3 38.1 0.0 36.5 21.9 77.6 -55.7
2 222.7 56.3 198.8 214.0 86.3 38.1 0.0 55.3 34.0 97.4 -63.3
3 216.3 53.3 188.4 214.0 86.3 38.1 0.0 80.8 50.1 123.8 -73.7







Note: 1.  No risk inclusion = the Modified VFM without considering risks, based on the BTL guidelines of Korea, Risk inclusion = the Modified VFM  
considering construction cost risk and traffic volume risk. 
2. AC PSC = Asset cost in the PSC, OC PSC = Operation cost in the PSC, Revenue = Revenue, Lease fee  BTL = Lease fee in the BTL, OC BTL = Operation 
cost in the BTL Subsidy BTO  = Subsidy from the Korean government, MRG BTO  = MRG cost and DB = social benefit difference between the PSC and 
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On the other hand, M.VFMBTL-BTO decreases as completion is delayed from zero to four years 
regardless of risk inclusion mainly because the revenue stream is reduced due to the discounting 
effect. This implies that as completion is delayed the BTO option become more and more 
preferable to the BTL option. 
Additionally, as shown in Table 5-9, considering construction cost risk, traffic volume risk and 
completion delay (the mean value: 1.30 years; Figure 5-3) in the National Expressway projects, 
the BTO is better than any other procurement option. 
 
Critical completion delay 
In order to determine a critical completion delay in the conventional delivery, which makes the 
M.VFM zero, linear regression analyses were conducted, using Table 5-9. As seen in Figure 5-
10, depending on whether construction cost risk and traffic volume risk are included or not, the 
regression lines of M.VFM differ. 
 
 
(a) No risk inclusion 
 
(b) Risk inclusion 
Figure 5-10: The Modified VFM result according to completion delay JI HONG PARK    Ch.5 The National Expressway Cases 
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In the case of no risk inclusion (Figure 5-10 (a)), with respect to M.VFMBTL, when the linear 
regression line is extended, it meets the horizontal axis at -0.63 years (-7.56 months). This 
means that even if the conventional delivery completes this project earlier than up to 0.63 years 
(7.56 months) than the BTL, the BTL option is better than the conventional option for this 
project. In other words, even if the construction in the BTL starts 0.63 years (7.56 months) later 
for a reason such as a negotiation delay or financial problem than the conventional delivery, the 
BTL is more favourable than the conventional delivery. In a similar way, regarding M.VFMBTO, 
when a completion is delayed more than 1.19 years (14.28 months) in the conventional delivery, 
the BTO scheme becomes feasible. In addition, the completion delay of M.VFMBTL-BTO shows 
that, when a completion delay in the conventional delivery is expected to be longer than 3.82 
years (45.84 months), the BTO becomes the most appropriate option. 
However, when construction risk and traffic volume risk are included, the critical completion 
delay is changed, as shown in Figure 5-10 (b). With respect to M.VFMBTL, the intercept of the 
horizontal axis (the critical completion delay) becomes 0.02 years (0.24 month). This means that 
when a completion in the conventional delivery is delayed more than 0.02 years (0.24 month), 
the BTL is better than the conventional delivery. With respect to M.VFMBTO, the critical 
completion delay becomes -1.50 years (-18.00 months) when the linear regression line is 
extended. This means that even if the conventional delivery completes this project earlier by up 
to 1.50 years (18.00 months) than the BTO, the BTO is better than the conventional delivery for 
this project. In other words, even if the construction in the BTO starts 1.50 years (18.00 months) 
later for a reason such as a negotiation delay or financial problem than the conventional delivery, 
the BTO is preferable to the conventional delivery. In addition, the critical completion delay of 
M.VFMBTL-BTO becomes -3.89 years (-46.68 months) when the linear regression line is extended. 
This means that even if the conventional delivery completes this project within 3.89 years 
(46.68 months) earlier than the PPP (BTO/BTL), the BTO is better than the BTL for this project.  
As stated above, owing to the problems surrounding financial agreements in the private sector 
caused by the financial crisis beginning in 2008 (Song, 2011), this project has been delayed in 
terms of PPP decision-making and construction start date. If it was decided that this project was 
to be implemented by the BTO scheme in 2009, as in this case study, it would have started in 
2012. Considering the critical completion delay (-1.5 years) of M.VFMBTO, this project needs to 
start construction at the latest by June 2013
85 in order that the PPP decision to use the BTO 
option is valid. Accordingly, if the Korean government made a PPP decision for the Bongdam-
                                         
85 According to the Korean government, the Bongdam-Songsan project is going to start construction in 
2015. JI HONG PARK    Ch.5 The National Expressway Cases 
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Songsan case and also knew this information (the critical completion delay), it would be 
possible that the BTO option for the project could be changed to other procurement option like 
the conventional delivery. 
 
 
5.4.4.3 Sensitivity analysis 
 
M.VFM results can differ depending on how large values are used as analysis factors. In order to 
examine the behaviour of M.VFM depending on the change of analysis factors, a sensitivity 
analysis is conducted. For this analysis, the following seven analysis factors are considered: 1) 
BTL finance interest rate; 2) discount rate; 3) BTL lease profitability; 3-1) five-year exchequer 
bond interest rate; 4) construction deflator; 5) consumer price index; and 6) the size of the social 
benefits. The BTL lease profitability is composed of a five-year exchequer bond interest rate 
and mark-up rate, so it does not seem necessary to include a five-year exchequer bond interest 
rate as an analysis factor in M.VFMBTL. However, in the calculation of M.VFMBTO and 
M.VFMBTL-BTO, this rate does need to be considered, so inevitably both BTL lease profitability 
and the five-year exchequer bond interest rate are considered in the sensitivity analysis. In 
addition, this case study is analysed using fixed PPP construction cost and operation cost, 
proposed by private sector in 2007, so these cost items are excluded from the sensitivity analysis 
factors. 
The changes in M.VFM with risk inclusion and a 1.30-year delay are shown in Figure 5-11 
when the analysis factors vary by from -20 to +20 per cent on each factor’s given value. The 
summary of sensitivity analysis is shown in Table 5-10.  
In case of M.VFMBTL (Figure 5-11 (a), Table 5-10), the result is similar to those in the National 
Highway cases and in the Suwon-Pyungtaek case. Among the seven analysis factors, the BTL 
lease profitability is most influential, being the largest unit change value (-1.47) in terms of 
absolute value. When the BTL lease profitability grows by more than about 14 per cent, 
M.VFMBTL is changed from a positive value to a negative one. This means that in such a case the 
delivery option can be changed from the BTL to the conventional option. 
With respect to M.VFMBTO (Figure 5-11 (b), Table 5-10), the discount rate and a five-year 
exchequer bond interest rate are relatively influential but the impact is not big, compared with 
the BTL lease profitability in M.VFMBTL. Besides, the BTO is more favourable than the 
conventional delivery regardless of the change of the factors with positive M.VFMBTO values.  JI HONG PARK    Ch.5 The National Expressway Cases 







Figure 5-11: Sensitivity analysis on the Modified VFM (risk inclusion, 1.30-year delay) JI HONG PARK    Ch.5 The National Expressway Cases 
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When it comes to M.VFMBTL-BTO (Figure 5-11 (c), Table 5-10), a negative value in all cases 
regardless of the fluctuation of analysis factors is shown, implying that the BTO is better than 
the BTL. In addition, BTL lease profitability is the most influential factor among seven analysis 
factors in the calculation of M.VFMBTL-BTO, being the largest unit change value (-1.47) in terms 
of absolute value, as shown in Table 5-10.  
 
Table 5-10: Sensitivity of analysis factors on the Modified VFM 
 






1. BTL finance 
    interest rate
Decrease -0.18
The increase of BTL finance interest rate makes lease fee rise, 
so M.VFM BTL decreases
2. Discount rate Increase 0.83
The increase of discount rate makes cost items fall.  Among 
them, lease fee has largest drop, so M.VFM BTL decreases.  
3. Lease 
   profitability
Decrease -1.47
The rise of lease profitability makes lease fee rise, so 
M.VFM BTL decreases
3-1. Exchequer
   bond interest rate
Decrease -0.50
The rise of 5 year exchequer bond rate means the rise of lease 
profitability, making lease fee rise, so M.VFM BTL decreases.
4. Construction 
    deflator
Decrease -0.53
The rise of construction deflator makes private investment and 
lease fee increase, so M.VFM BTL decreases.
5. Consumer price 
    index 
Increase 0.71
Nominal lease fee is converted to real by CPI. The rise of CPI, 
making real lease fee drop, means M.VFM BTL increases.
6. Social benefits Increase 0.37 The rise of social benefits makes M.VFM BTL increase.
2. Discount rate Increase 0.46
The increase of discount rate makes cost items fall.  Among 
them, revenue has a largest drop, so M.VFM BTO decreases.  
3-1. Exchequer   
   bond interest rate
Increase 0.44
The rise of 5 year exchequer bond rate means the rise of the 
asset cost in the PSC, so M.VFM BTO increases.
5. Consumer price 
    index
Decrease -0.29
The rise of CPI makes the borrowing cost of the public sector in 
real term drop, so M.VFM BTO decreases.
6. Social benefits Increase 0.37 The rise of social benefits makes M.VFM BTO increases.
1. BTL finance   
    interest rate
Decrease -0.18
The increase of BTL finance interest rate makes lease fee rise, 
so M.VFM BTL-BTO decreases
2. Discount rate Increase 0.37
The lease fee reduction due to the discount rate increase is 
bigger than the revenue decrease, so M.VFM BTL-BTO increases.
3. Lease 
    profitability
Decrease -1.47
The rise of lease profitability makes lease fee rise, so 
M.VFM BTL-BTO decreases
3-1. Exchequer  
   bond interest rate
Decrease -0.94
The 5 year exchequer bond rate rise (the lease profitability rise) 
makes lease fee rise, so M.VFM BTL-BTO decreases.
4. Construction 
    deflator
Decrease -0.53
The rise of construction deflator makes private investment and 
lease fee increase, so M.VFM BTL-BTO decreases.
5. Consumer price
    index
Increase 0.99
The lease fee drop and the borrowing cost drop in the PSC 
make M.VFM BTL-BTO increase.
6. Social benefits - 0
The rise of social benefits does not make any changes in 
M.VFM BTL-BTO.





M.VFM changes due to the increase of analysis factors
M.VFM BTL
M.VFM BTO 
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5.4.4.4 The Monte Carlo Simulations 
 
The MCS is conducted to identify the impact of the following 11 risk variables (shown in 
Figure 5-1~Figure 5-4, Figure 4-4 and Figure 4-6~Figure 4-7) from historical observations: 
WBR, construction cost overrun, traffic volume, three operation costs, construction deflator, 
consumer price index, five-year exchequer bond interest rate, and three-year non-guaranteed 
corporate bond interest rate. 
Figure 5-12 shows the MSC results with no completion delay and with a 1.30-year completion 
delay, which is an average completion delay in the National Expressways from the historical 
observations, as shown in Figure 5-3.  
In the case of no completion delay (Figure 5-12 (a)), the mean value of M.VFMBTL is -3.3 
(billion KRW) and the probability that M.VFMBTL is positive is 45.6 per cent. This implies that 
the conventional option is better than the BTL. With respect to M.VFMBTO, its mean value is 
41.5 (billion KRW) and the probability that it is positive is 66.5 per cent, which implies the 
BTO option is more favourable than the conventional option. Additionally, M.VFMBTL-BTO has a 
mean value of -44.8 (billion KRW) and the probability that it is positive is 33.6 per cent, which 
implies the BTO option is better than the BTL option. Accordingly, assuming that there is no 
completion delay in the conventional delivery, the most appropriate delivery option for this 
project is the BTO, followed by the conventional and the BTL option. 
Similarly, in the case of a 1.30-year completion delay (Figure 5-12 (b)), the mean value of 
M.VFMBTL is 19.9 (billion KRW) and the probability that it is positive is 65.3 per cent. This 
implies that the BTL option is better than the conventional delivery. With respect to M.VFMBTO, 
its mean value is 79.6 (billion KRW) and the probability that it is positive is 76.7 per cent, 
which implies the BTO option is more favourable than the conventional option. In addition, 
M.VFMBTL-BTO has a mean value of -59.7 (billion KRW) and the probability that it is positive is 
29.4 per cent, which implies the BTO option is better than the BTL option. Accordingly, taking 
in account an average completion delay in the conventional delivery (1.30 years), the most 
appropriate delivery option is the BTO, followed by the BTL and the conventional option. 
Consequently, as completion delay increases, the mean values of M.VFM and the probabilities 
that the PPP options are better also increase. Furthermore, considering all the risk factors, 
including the 1.30-year delay, it is reasonable to implement the Bongdam-Songsan section 
among the second Seoul metropolitan orbital using the BTO option. 
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i) M.VFMBTL  i) M.VFMBTL 
ii) M.VFMBTO  ii) M.VFMBTO 
iii) M.VFMBTL-BTO  iii) M.VFMBTL-BTO 
(a) No delay  (b) 1.30 year completion delay 
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In order to find out the impact of transferable risks on the PPP decisions and which delivery 
option is the most appropriate in the National Expressway programme, the Modified VFM 
analysis on the Suwon-Pyungtaek case and the Bongdam-Songsan case were conducted. By 
examining two case studies, several characteristics are revealed. 
 
1) Regarding construction cost risk, M.VFMBTL and M.VFMBTO using an average WBR of turn-
key/alternative bids based on Korea’s BTL guidelines (MOSF, 2009a) can be exaggerated, 
compared with those using construction cost risk (WBR risk and construction cost overrun risk) 
from the historical observations. This is because an average WBR of turn-key/alternative bids in 
the National Expressway projects was 82.14 per cent between 2002 and 2011 (MLTM, 2012b), 
while the historical observations from 66 National Expressway projects completed between 
2006 and 2010 suggests an application ratio of 78.80 per cent, meaning construction cost risk.  
It also appears, as with the National Highway programme, that this difference comes from the 
fact that the National Expressway projects are mainly delivered by design-bid-build in terms of 
conventional delivery.
86 In particular, non-governmental organisations like CCEJ (2012) and 
media (Lee, 2012, Sun, 2009) have criticised the turn-key/alternative bid for being inefficient 
and for wasting public funds from. Considering that a PSC needs to be built by a plausible and 
practical case (Grimsey and Lewis, 2005), it does not appear reasonable to use an average turn-
key/alternative bid for the public sector cost calculation of a PSC.  
As a result, for a more accurate quantitative PPP decision-making in the National Expressway 
projects, the Modified VFM considering historical observations and reflecting all bid systems is 
recommended to estimate the asset cost of the PSC instead of an average WBR of turn-
key/alternative projects.  
 
2) Traffic volume risk seems to affect PPP decisions in the National Expressway. When 
including traffic volume risk (68.6 per cent), M.VFMBTL values decrease respectively by 9.0 and 
5.0 (billion KRW) in the Suwon-Pyungtaek case and in the Bongdam-Songsan case, comparing 
these without traffic volume risk. This is due to the decrease in the operation cost in the PSC by 
the VKT decrease in the projects from traffic volume reduction (from 100 to 68.6 per cent). On 
                                         
86 Only three projects used turn-key/alternative bid system among 66 National Expressway projects 
completed between 2006 and 2010. JI HONG PARK    Ch.5 The National Expressway Cases 
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the other hand, when including traffic volume risk (68.6 per cent), M.VFMBTO values increase 
respectively by 138.0 and 96.1 (billion KRW) in the Suwon-Pyungtaek case and in the 
Bongdam-Songsan case, compared to those without traffic volume risk. This is mainly because 
the decrease in revenue due to the traffic volume risk inclusion makes M.VFMBTO increase 
sharply. In addition, when considering traffic volume risk in the case of no completion delay, 
the most favourable procurement option changes to the BTO option from the BTL option in the 
two case studies.  
 
3) A completion delay in the conventional delivery can make a critical impact on the PPP 
decisions. From the two case studies, according to the completion delay in the conventional 
delivery, the values of M.VFMBTL and M.VFMBTO increase mainly because the increase of the 
social benefit difference between the PSC and the PPP alternatives is much bigger than the 
decrease of the public sector cost in the PSC due to discounting. On the other hand, M.VFMBTL-
BTO decreases as completion is delayed from zero to four years mainly because revenue stream 
drops due to the discounting effect. This implies that as completion is delayed, the BTO option 
become more and more preferable to the BTL option. 
 
4) Considering risk inclusion (construction cost risk and traffic volume risk), the critical 
completion delays of M.VFMBTL, M.VFMBTO and M.VFMBTL-BTO are respectively -0.16, -0.34 and 
-1.21 years in the Suwon-Pyungtaek case. This implies that even if the BTL or the BTO 
respectively start up to 0.16 or 0.34 year later than the conventional delivery, the BTL or the 
BTO is more favourable than the conventional delivery. Besides, even if the conventional 
delivery completes the project 1.21 years (14.52 months) earlier than the PPP alternatives 
(BTO/BTL), the BTO option is preferable to the BTL.  
With respect to the Bongdam-Songsan case, the critical completion delays of M.VFMBTL, 
M.VFMBTO and M.VFMBTL-BTO are respectively 0.02, -1.50 and -3.89 years. This means that when 
a completion in the conventional delivery is delayed more than 0.02 years (0.24 month), the 
BTL is better than the conventional delivery. Regarding M.VFMBTO, even if the construction in 
the BTO starts 1.50 years (18.00 months) later for some reasons like a negotiation delay or 
financial problem than the conventional delivery, the BTO is preferable to the conventional 
delivery. In addition, regarding M.VFMBTL-BTO, even if the conventional delivery completes this 
project within 3.89 years (46.68 months) earlier than the PPP (BTO/BTL), the BTO is better 
than the BTL for this project.  
In addition, considering risk inclusion and an average completion delay (1.30 years) in the 
National Expressway projects, the BTO is the most favourable option in the two cases. 
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5) The sensitivity analysis results show that, when considering risk inclusion (construction and 
traffic volume risk) and an average completion delay (1.30 years) in the National Expressway 
projects, the procurement option selection could change depending on project and concerning 
procurement option. Among seven analysis factors, the BTL lease profitability is the most 
influential in the calculation M.VFMBTL and M.VFMBTL-BTO in the two cases. With respect to 
M.VFMBTO, social benefit size is the most influential factor is the Suwon-Pyungtaek case, while 
discount rate is the most influential in the Bongdam-Songsan case. However, their impacts are 
very small, compared with that of BTL lease profitability in M.VFMBTL and M.VFMBTL-BTO in the 
two cases. 
  
6) The MCS result, using 11 risk variables from historical observations, shows that as a 
completion delay rises, the probabilities that the PPP alternatives are better than the 
conventional delivery also increase. Considering an average completion delay of the National 
Expressway projects (1.30 years), the BTO scheme is the most appropriate option for the two 
projects.  
 
Summing up all the results, considering the transferable risks (construction cost risk, traffic 
volume risk and completion delay), the BTO option is the most appropriate option for the 
Suwon-Pyungtaek case and the Bongdam-Songsan case. Therefore, the PPP decision made for 
the two projects seems to be appropriate. In addition, regarding the Bongdam-Songsan case, this 
project was delayed in terms of PPP decision-making and construction start due to the financial 
crisis beginning in 2008. If it has been decided to implement this project using the BTO scheme 
in 2009, as in this case study, it would have started in 2012. Considering the critical completion 
delay (-1.5 years), this project needs to start construction at the latest in June 2013 in order that 
the PPP decision to use the BTO option is valid. Accordingly, if the Korean government made a 
PPP decision for the Bongdam-Songsan case and also knew this information (the critical 
completion delay), it would be possible that the BTO option for the project could be changed to 
other procurement option like the conventional delivery. 
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The objective of this chapter is to determine the impact of transferable risks on the Modified 
VFM and the PPP decisions in the National Railway programme, using two case studies 
covering the research objectives 2-1, 2-2 and 2-3. As case studies, the Sosa-Wonsi National 
Railway project and the Bujeon-Masan National Railway project are considered in this chapter, 
as explained in Chapter 3. Therefore, this chapter is largely made up of three sections: 1) 
quantified risks for the National Railways; 2) case 1: the Sosa-Wonsi case; and 3) case 2: the 
Bujeon-Masan case. 
To begin with, as in Chapter 4, risk quantification is conducted in section 6.2 in terms of not 
only transferable risks but also maintenance, based on historical observation and the literature. 
As with the road programmes, three risks are considered in this chapter as transferable risks: 
construction cost risk, traffic volume risk and completion delay. The difference from road 
programmes is that construction cost risk in railways consists of six WBR risks and six 
construction cost overruns regarding six major work elements. In addition, maintenance cost is 
quantified, reflecting railway usage. The risk quantification is performed using the @ Risk 5.7 
software package.  
In the Sosa-Wonsi case (6.3) and in the Bujeon-Masan case (6.4), the impacts of transferable 
risks on the Modified VFM and the PPP decisions are verified, using impact analyses, such as 
single-value estimation, sensitivity analysis and the Monte Carlo Simulation, which are 
explained in Chapter 3.  
Like the National Highway and the National Expressway programmes, for the calculation of the 
Modified VFM using single-value estimation and sensitivity analysis, analysis factors are 
estimated by following Korea’s BTL guidelines (MOSF, 2009a) because these can provide 
reference points for various analysis factors. When it comes to the Modified VFM using the 
Monte Carlo Simulation, analysis factors are used as a form of probability distribution, 
quantified from historical observations. By doing so, how the PPP or procurement decisions 
could be changed will be scrutinised when they are reflected simultaneously in the Modified 
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6.2 Quantified risks for the National Railways 
 
 
The risk variables used for the National Railway cases are largely divided into transferable risks 
and other risks. Transferable risks, as mentioned in Chapter 3, are construction cost risk, 
completion delay and traffic volume risk, which are the main risk variables in this research. 
Other risks include operation cost, construction deflator, consumer price index, the five-year 
exchequer bond interest rate and the three-year non-guaranteed corporate bond interest rate.  
 
 
6.2.1 Transferable risks 
 
6.2.1.1 Construction cost risk 
 
In contrast to road projects, when it comes to the National Railway programme, a project is 
usually procured through six different major element work contracts: earth works/structures, 
track, buildings/equipment, electricity, communications and signalling due to relating laws.
87 
For the National Railway programme, construction data sources include not only the National 
Railway but also the High Speed Railways and the Metropolitan Railways because there are a 
low number of railway projects in Korea. The total number of individual contracts, providing 
historical observations, is 339.
88 These come from 32 railways completed after 2000, including 
26 National Railways, one High Speed Railway and five Metropolitan Railways. 
From equation (3-10), construction cost risk is composed of EP, WBR and construction cost 
overrun (α). Among them, estimated price (designed price in this research) is a constant for a 
project, so winning bid ratio and construction cost overrun are considered as risk factors.  
 
Construction cost overrun 
Among the contracts of the six elements, usually earth works/structures is the largest, followed 
by buildings/equipment and electricity. Regarding the six major work elements, the probability 
                                         
87 Relating laws mean the Electricity Construction Business Act and the Information and 
Communications Construction Business Act. For example, according to the Electricity Construction 
Business Act (Article 1, Paragraph 11), the electricity construction work is to be contracted separately 
from other construction work. 
88 The total contract number is 339 (earth works/structures 55, buildings/equipment 67, track 21, 
electricity 80, communications 51, and signalling 65). JI HONG PARK    Ch.6 The National Railway Cases 
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distributions of construction cost overrun risks (2005 price) in real terms from the historical 
observations are shown in Figure 6-1.  
 
 









(e) Communications  (f) Signalling 
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From Figure 6-1, the construction cost of earth work/structure, buildings/equipment and track is 
respectively expected to increase on average 18.65, 17.94 and 24.02 (per cent) in real terms on 
its contract cost. In addition, the construction cost of electricity, communications and signalling 
is respectively expected to increase on average 36.24, 15.35 and 41.32 (per cent) in real terms 
on its contract cost.  
 
WBR 
WBR means the proportion of bid winner’s price (the contract price) to the EP for a project. The 
WBR is directly obtained from the historical observations. In contrast to construction cost 
overrun risk, there is no PDFs passing the Chi square test (  ), so WBR risk is expressed as a 
form of frequency distribution. Regarding the six major work elements, the frequency 
distribution graphs of WBRs are shown in Figure 6-2.  
From Figure 6-2, the WBR of earth works/structures, buildings/equipment and track is 
respectively expected to be 74.45, 82.69 and 83.36 (per cent) on average. In addition, the WBR 
of electricity, communications and signalling is respectively expected to be 83.65, 85.67 and 
86.03 (per cent) on average.  
 
Application ratio 
Based on construction cost risks (Figure 6-1) and WBRs (Figure 6-2) in the six major element 
works, each element’s application ratio in equation (3-10), meaning construction cost risk, can 
be calculated. As seen in Table 6-1, the application ratio of earth works/structures, 
buildings/equipment and track is respectively 88.33, 97.52 and 103.38 (per cent) in real terms. 
In addition, the application ratio of electricity, communications and signalling is respectively 
113.96, 102.63 and 121.58 (per cent) in real terms. The application ratio over 100 (per cent) 
means that construction cost at completion exceeds the estimated construction price in real 
terms. 
 
Table 6-1: The application ratios of six major work elements 
 






Earth work/Structure 74.45 18.65 88.33
Building/Equipment 82.69 17.94 97.52
Track 83.36 24.02 103.38
Electricity 83.65 36.24 113.96
Communication 85.67 15.35 98.82
Signalling 86.03 41.32 121.58
Note: Application ratio (%) = Winning bid ratio (%) × (1 + Construction cost overrun (%))JI HONG PARK    Ch.6 The National Railway Cases 


















Figure 6-2: Frequency distribution for WBR in the National Expressway 
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6.2.1.2 Completion delay 
 
Regarding completion delay for the National Railway, historical observations are currently not 
available. However, it is appropriate to attempt to establish how long the National Railway 
projects can be expected to be delayed due to lack of budget.  
According to a press release from Jingoo Lee, a member of the National Assembly, the KRNA 
expected that due to a lack of budget, railway projects under construction will be delayed by 
between two and seven years, with respect to the inspection of the KRNA conducted by the 
National Assembly in 2006 (Kwon, 2006). As seen in Table 5, a lack of budget means a delay 
of 3.36 years on average on the expected completion time.  
 
Table 6-2: Completion delay expected in the National Railways 
 




6.2.1.3 Traffic volume risk 
 
Railway traffic volume changes in Korea, shown in Table 4, are gathered from a literature 
review. Using equation (3-12) and this table, the probability distribution histogram of railway 









Suwon-Incheon (electrified double track rail) 2008 2015 7 years
Yongsan-Moonsan (electrified double track rail) 2008 2010 2 years
Ori-Suwon (electrified double track rail) 2008 2015 7 years
Wangsimri-Sunrung (electrified double track rail) 2008 2010 2 years
Busan-Ulsan (electrified double track rail) 2010 2015 5 years
Seoul-Choonchun (electrified double track rail) 2009 2013 4 years
Dukso-Wonju (electrified double track rail) 2008 2010 2 years
Youngdong line (relocation) 2007 2009 2 years
Dongsoonchun-kwangyang (double track rail) 2006 2009 3 years
Soonchun-Yeosu (improvement) 2008 2010 2 years
Jaechun-Dodam (electrified double track rail) 2007 2011 4 years
Junla line (double track rail) 2008 2010 2 years
Jaechun-Ssangyong (electrified double track rail) 2008 2011 3 years
Samrangjin-Jinju (electrified double track rail) 2011 2013 2 years
Average 3.36 yearsJI HONG PARK    Ch.6 The National Railway Cases 
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Table 6-3: The traffic volume changes in railways of Korea 
 
Note: Data source is as follows; (a) Kim (2010b), (b) MLTM, recited from Gil (2012), (c) Park (2012) 
 
 
Figure 6-3: Probability distribution of railway traffic volume risk 
   
Forecast (A) Actual (B)
Seoul metro line 1(Seoul station-Chungryangri) 7.8 1974 395,255 87,060 0.22 (a)
Seoul metro line 2 (Circulation) 60.2 1980 156,499 58,750 0.38 (a)
Seoul metro line 5 (Bangwha-Sangil, Macheon) 52.3 1995 1,725,000 524,714 0.3 (a)
Seoul metro line 6 (Ungam-Bongwhasan) 35.1 2000 1,319,276 246,803 0.19 (a)
Seoul metro line 7 (Jangam-Onsoo) 46.9 1996 897,220 380,464 0.42 (a)
Seoul metro line 8 (Amsa-Moran) 17.7 1996 241,229 150,963 0.63 (a)
Seoul metro line 9 (Gaewha-Nonhyun) 27 2009 312,438 260,452 0.83 (b)
Incheon metro 1 (Gyulhyun-Dongmak) 21.9 2000 1,890,000 218,551 0.12 (b)
Incheon metro 1 (Dongmak-Business Centre) 6.5 2009 81,783 11,376 0.14 (b)
Ilsan line (Daewha-Jichuk) 19.2 1996 110,266 44,104 0.4 (a)
Busan metro 2 (Jangsan-Yangsan) 45.2 1999 1,462,448 213,521 0.15 (a)
Busan metro 3 (Daejeo-Sooyoung) 18.1 2005 395,014 55,852 0.14 (a)
Busan metro line 4 12.7 2011 86,000 26,000 0.3 (c)
Busan-Kimhae light rail 23.9 2011 176,358 31,000 0.18 (c)
Daegu metro line 1 (Daegok-Anshim) 25.9 1997 1,128,055 137,705 0.12 (a)
Daegu metro line 2 (Moonyang-Sawol) 28 2005 912,468 124,595 0.14 (a)
Kwangjoo metro line 1 (Nokdong-Pyungdong) 20.5 2004 257,100 30,573 0.12 (a)
Daejeon metro line 1 (Panam-Banseok) 20.5 2006 420,096 93,483 0.22 (a)
Suseo line (Suseo-Ogum) 3 2009 16,610 16,813 1.01 (b)
Uijeongbu-Dongdoocheon line  23 2007 191,984 139,513 0.73 (b)
Suwon-cheonan line 55.6 2007 114,165 240,006 2.1 (b)
Janhhang line (renovation, 1st stage) 75.6 2009 39,234 19,693 0.5 (b)
Incheon airport railway 61.7 2010 421,592 47,791 0.11 (b)
Ori-Suwon line  19.5 2007 108,518 28,041 0.26 (b)
Cheongryangli-Deokso line  18 2010 96,916 155,921 1.61 (b)
Deokso-Wonju line 90.4 2009 55,511 38,326 0.69 (b)
Cheonan-Onyangoncheon line  16.5 2009 33,056 43,152 1.31 (b)
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6.2.2 Other risk variables 
 
 
6.2.2.1 Operation cost 
 
In this research, the historical observations on operation cost in the National Railways come 
from 18 National Railways between 2000 and 2010. The operation cost from the historical 
observations is largely composed of personnel cost, management cost and maintenance cost. In 
order to use the historical observations in the calculation of the Modified VFM on a specific  
project, these cost items need to be transformed by a scale factor because conditions such as 
length and traffic volume are different between a case studies and the projects providing the 
historical observations. As with road programmes, as a scale factor, passenger car kilometre 
travelled (PCKT) data from 18 National Railways between 2000 and 2010 are used because this 
measure can reflect the concept of length and traffic volume at the same time. However, 
personnel cost and management cost seems to be close to fixed cost, not varying according to 
project size or traffic volume. Therefore, only maintenance cost/PCKT is used as an operation 
cost risk variable in the National Railway programme. The PDF of maintenance cost/PCKT 
(2005 price) from the historical observations is shown in Figure 6-4.  
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6.2.2.2 Inflation 
 
With respect to inflation, according to Korea’s BTL guidelines (MOSF, 2009a), a construction 
deflator is used for the calculation of the yearly BTL lease fee in nominal terms and it is 
converted to real terms by consumer price index. The construction deflator and consumer price 
index are shown in Figure 4-6.  
 
 
6.2.2.3 Factors relating BTL viability 
 
According to Korea’s BTL guidelines (MOSF, 2009a), BTL lease profitability is expressed as a 
“five-year exchequer bond interest rate + mark-up” and the mark-up is composed of a premium 
for long term investment and risk premium for construction and operation. In a same way, the 
BTL finance interest rate for private sector is estimated by applying an additional rate to a 
“three-year non-guaranteed corporate bond (AA-) interest rate”, which is the base rate. They are 
shown in Figure 4-7.  
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6.3 Case 1: The Sosa-Wonsi case 
 
 
6.3.1 Project overview 
 
The Sosa-Wonsi National Railway was planned with the aim of relieving traffic congestion due 
to large-scale housing and industrial development in the south-west of Gyeonggi Province, in 
particular in Ansan city and Sihung city. Connecting the Seoul-Incheon line and the Suwon-
Incheon line, this project will provide not only a skeleton of urban circulation rail network in 
south-west Gyeonggi Province but also a new north-south rail corridor (Figure 6-5). In addition, 
this project is expected to support the balanced regional development and multi-centralisation
89 
of Gyeonggi Province.  
At first, this project was reviewed as a traditionally delivered project through a preliminary 
feasibility study in 2002. However, according to the introduction of the BTL system in 2005, 
this project was designated as a BTL project following PPP board deliberation in 2007 in order 
to activate the BTL system. After final design and negotiation, construction started in 2010 and 
is expected to be completed in 2015.  
The overview of this project shown in the contract awarded in 2010 is as follows: 
  Title: Sosa-Wonsi National Railway PPP Project  
  Location: Sosa-dong, Bucheon city ~ Wonsi-dong, Ansan city, Gyeonggi Province 
  Length: 23.3km (electrified double track) 
  PPP type: BTL 
  Construction duration:
90 60 months, operation duration: 20 years 
  Project cost:
91 1,098 (billion KRW, 2006 price) 
                                         
89 For the sustainable development of Seoul metropolitan area including Seoul and Gyeonggi Province, 
Seoul metropolitan area readjustment plan was established in 2006, which includes the development of 10 
growth centres in Gyeonggi Province in order to change the space structure of Seoul metropolitan area 
focused on Seoul in terms of population and functions. 
90 For the VFM and the Modified VFM analysis, the five-year construction duration will be used because 
these analyses are implemented at a decision-making stage (preliminary feasibility stage) earlier than the 
award of the contract. 
91 Project cost means asset cost excluding compensation cost (238.6 billion KRW) provided by the 
Korean government, so it is composed of all the costs that are necessary during the construction stage 
which are delivered by the private sector.  JI HONG PARK    Ch.6 The National Railway Cases 
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  Inflation rate: 3 per cent 
  Lease profit rate: 5.7 per cent (nominal) 
  BTL finance interest rate: 7.42 per cent (nominal)  
  BTL finance structure: equity 10 per cent, debt 90 per cent 
  Special project vehicle: E rail corp. 
- KB Sosa-Wonsi railway project investment trust (90 per cent), Daewoo 
construction (3.425 per cent), Hyundai construction (3.175 per cent), Hanwha 
construction (1.125 per cent), Taeyoung construction (0.6 per cent), Hanla 
construction (0.5 per cent), KCC construction (0.275 per cent), Bando construction 
(0.250 per cent), Wonha construction (0.125 per cent), Sampyo Enc. (0.1 per cent), 
Doohan construction (0.05 per cent)  
 
                                                                        
                                                                                                                Source: MLTM 
Figure 6-5: The Sosa-Wonsi National Railway project map JI HONG PARK    Ch.6 The National Railway Cases 
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6.3.2 Analysis factors and assumptions for the Modified VFM 
 
Although this project has already being implemented by the BTL scheme, in order to verify the 
impact of transferable risks on the PPP decisions and the appropriateness of the PPP decision 
for this case in terms of the year 2007, this case study considers three alternative procurement 
options: the conventional delivery, the BTL and the BTO. 
Basic analysis factors for Modified VFM are as follows: 
  PPP model: BTO and BTL  
  Discount rate: 6.5 per cent (real) 
  Decision-making time: 2007; price base year: 2007 
  Five-year exchequer bond interest rate:
92 5.4 per cent (nominal)  
  Three-year non-guaranteed corporate bond:
93 5.85 per cent (nominal) 
  Construction deflator:
94 5.60 per cent (nominal, on average from 2002 to 2007) 
  Consumer price index:
95 2.92 per cent (nominal, on average from 2002 to 2007) 
  BTL lease profitability:
96 6.17 per cent (five-year exchequer bond interest rate + 0.77 
per cent, nominal) 
  BTL finance interest rate:
97 6.85 per cent (three-year non-guaranteed corporate bond 
(AA-) + 1.0 per cent, nominal)  
                                         
92 A five-year exchequer bond interest rate is calculated by a weighted average method, which applies 0.1, 
0.2, 0.3 and 0.4 to the first, second, third and fourth quarter value (MOSF, 2009a). The quarterly five-year 
exchequer bond interest rate is provided by the Korea Bond Information Service 
(http://www.kofiabond.or.kr).  
93 A three-year non-guaranteed corporate bond interest rate is also provided by the Korea Bond 
Information Service (http://www.kofiabond.or.kr). It is estimated in the same way as the five-year 
exchequer bond interest rate, following Korea’s BTL guidelines (MOSF, 2009a). 
94 Construction deflator means construction investment deflator in Expenditure on Gross Domestic 
Product on National Accounts and it is provided by the Bank of Korea (http://www.bok.or.kr).  
95 The consumer price index is also provided by the Bank of Korea (http://www.bok.or.kr). 
96 BTL lease profitability is expressed as a “five-year exchequer bond interest rate + mark-up rate” and 
mark-up is composed of a premium for long term investment and risk premium for construction and 
operation (MOSF, 2009a). Regarding the mark-up rate, 0.77 per cent, an average rate used in rail BTL 
project pre-qualification reports (Wonju-Gangrung: 0.77, Gyungjun/Junla line: 0.87, Bujeon-Masan: 0.74, 
Sosa-Wonsi: 0.77, Daegok-Sosa: 0.72), is considered in the National Railway cases. 
97 BTL finance interest rate is expressed as a “three-year non-guaranteed corporate bond interest rate + 
mark-up rate” (MOSF, 2009a) and, according to Kim et al. (2005), the mark-up rate seems to be 
distributed from 0.66 per cent to 2.00 per cent. As a mark-up rate, 1.0 per cent is used in the National JI HONG PARK    Ch.6 The National Railway Cases 
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  BTL finance terms: level debt service during operation period 
  BTL finance structure: equity 15 per cent, debt 85 per cent 
  Operation period: 20 years; construction duration: five years 
 
In addition, the same assumptions (see 4.3.2) for the Modified VFM used in the National 
Highway cases are also used in the National Railway cases. 
 
 
6.3.3 Main cost items for the VFM and the Modified VFM analysis 
 
From equation (3-7), (3-8) and (3-9), main calculation items for the Modified VFM are the asset 
cost of a PSC (     ), the operation cost of a PSC (     ) and a BTL (     ), the lease fee of 
a BTL (     	   	   ), revenue (       ), the subsidy (          ) from the Korean 
government, the minimum revenue guarantee cost (      ) and the benefit difference (ΔB).  
 
Asset cost of the PSC (     ) 
The basic asset cost data shown in Table 6-4 are collected from the BTL research report on the 
Sosa-Wonsi National Railway (KOTI, 2007). Among the building cost items, the bracketed 
values are the designed price of each item before each item’s WBR is reflected. With respect to 
the design cost and construction cost of the PSC, these are calculated by multiplying each 
designed price and an average WBR (90.71 per cent) of the turn-key/alternative bids in the 
National Railway projects between 2000 and 2007 (Kim et al., 2008a). In addition, with respect 
to the design cost and construction cost of the PPP, the same values as in the PSC are used 
because the detailed cost of each work element is not available for this project. 
In addition, in order to estimate the Modified VFM, the yearly asset costs of the PSC are 
distributed according to Table 4-3. With respect to longer construction duration considering 
completion delay, new yearly distribution ratios using interpolation method and Table 4-3 will 
be applied to the calculation of the Modified VFM. 
 
Operation cost for the PSC and the BTL (     ,     ) 
In the same way as for road cases, the yearly base operation costs for the PSC (     ) are 
calculated by multiplying the mean values of the operation costs
98 (KRW/PCKT) from the 
                                                                                                                         
Railway cases, considering rail BTL project pre-qualification reports (Wonju-Gangrung: 1.0, 
Gyungjun/Junla line: 1.0, Bujeon-Masan: 1.0, Sosa-Wonsi: 1.0, Daegok-Sosa: 1.0). 
98 From the historical observations, the mean values of operation cost items (2005 price) are as follows: 1) 
personnel cost /PCKT = 4,898.1 KRW/PCKT; 2) management cost/VKT = 3,068.0 KRW/PCKT; and 3) 
maintenance cost/VKT = 749.7 KRW/PCKT.  JI HONG PARK    Ch.6 The National Railway Cases 
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historical observations and yearly PCKT data of this project from the feasibility and schematic 
design report on the Sosa-Wonsi National Railway (KORAIL, 2003).  
 
Table 6-4: Basic asset cost for the PSC and the PPP (BTL/BTO) 










                         23.6 (25.9)
Earth work/Structure 15.1 (16.6) 
Building/Equipment 2.4 (2.6) 
Track 0.9 (1.0) 
Electricity 3.0 (3.3) 
Signal 1.2 (1.3) 
Communication 1.0 (1.1)
                         23.6 (25.9)
Earth work/Structure 15.1 (16.6) 
Building/Equipment 2.4 (2.6) 
Track 0.9 (1.0) 
Electricity 3.0 (3.3) 
Signal 1.2 (1.3) 
Communication 1.0 (1.1)
Sub total 1,369.70 1,369.70
0 (38.2) 0 (38.2)
                               30.8 
Design inspection 2.8 
Construction inspection 19.9 
Traffic impact assessment  0.1 
Environmental impact assessment 0.8 
Disaster impact assessment 0.1 
Energy use plan 0.1 
Construction management  3.6 
Waste disposal 3.4 
                                32.4 
Design inspection 2.8 
Construction inspection 19.9 
Traffic impact assessment  0.1 
Environmental impact assessment 0.8 
Disaster impact assessment 0.1 
Energy use plan 0.1 
Construction management  3.6 
Waste disposal 3.4 
Insurance 1.1 
financial cost 0.5 
                                80.0 
Bedding measurement 0.1 
Track management 0.5 
Building equipment 0.1 
Electricity facility 0.7
Signal/communication 1.8 
Automatic fare collection system 0.2 
Management information system 0.5 
Train 76.1
                                 80.0 
Bedding measurement 0.1 
Track management 0.5 
Building equipment 0.1 
Electricity facility 0.7  
Signal/communication 1.8 
Automatic fare collection system 0.2 






                     1,345.4 (1,483.2)
Earth work/Structure 998.4 (1,089.6)
Building/Equipment 135.0 (148.8) 
Track 36.0 (39.7)
Electricity 107.5 (118.6) 
Signal 41.5 (45.8) 
Communication 37.0 (40.8)
                     1,345.4 (1,483.2)
Earth work/Structure 998.4 (1,089.6)
Building/Equipment 135.0 (148.8) 
Track 36.0 (39.7)
Electricity 107.5 (118.6) 
Signal 41.5 (45.8) 
Communication 37.0 (40.8)
Compensation cost
Note: 1. Compensation cost is provided by the Korean government, so it is not included in the Modified VFM assessment.  2. 
All values in the Table come from the BTL research report on the Sosa-wonsi National Railway (KOTI, 2007) and the bracketed 
building cost values are designed prices before including winning bid ratios.   3. According to KOTI (2007), contractor’s all risk 
insurance for the PSC is neglected and at the same time it is neglected in the PPP, which is possible in terms of competitive 




                                   0.6 
Test drive cost 0.6
                                  4.5 
Test drive cost 0.6 
Organisation cost 0.2 
Business commence cost 2.7 
Stock issue cost 1.1 
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Maintenance cost tends to gradually increase over time because of the increasing decrepitude of 
the facility. However, there is currently no available way to consider the decrepitude of the 
railways. Thus, for a simple calculation, the assumption is made that the historical observations 
are collected from railways with a 10-year decrepitude
99; yearly maintenance costs are 
converted using normalisation and the relative yearly ratios in roads from the preliminary 
feasibility guideline (KDI, 2008b). Yearly maintenance cost distribution ratios for the PSC in 
National Railway are given in Table 6-5. As reviewed in 4.3.3 regarding Table 4-3, though it 
seems to be oversimplified from the theoretical perspective, it seems that Table 6-5 can be 
carefully utilised in the calculation of maintenance costs, considering the impact of lack of 
maintenance funds, the superposition of various maintenance cost items with different 
maintenance periods and the unavailability of historical observations regarding railway 
maintenance. Moreover, train replacement costs during the operation period are also included in 
the PSC (     ).  
 
Table 6-5: Yearly cost distribution ratios for maintenance costs of the PSC 
 
 
In addition, when it comes to the operation cost of the BTL (     ), the same operation cost as 
the PSC will be applied in the Modified VFM. 
 
 
Lease fee for the BTL (     	      ) 
According to Korea’s BTL guidelines (MOSF, 2009a), the yearly lease fee in nominal terms is 
calculated as equation (4-1). The asset cost of the PPP (BTL) in real terms in Table 6-4 is 
                                         
99 It is difficult to know the degree of decrepitude of the railway which produces the historical 
observations because the railway is always maintained. Therefore, considering operation period (20 years) 
in PPP railways in Korea, the historical observations are assumed to be obtained from the railways with 
a10-year decrepitude. 
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Maintenance cost ratio 0.93 1.11 1.31 1.55 1.82 2.13 2.49 2.88 3.32 3.8
Normalised ratio 0.24 0.29 0.34 0.41 0.48 0.56 0.66 0.76 0.87 1
Year 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Maintenance cost ratio 4.32 4.87 5.45 6.04 6.63 7.23 7.81 8.36 8.89 9.37
Normalised ratio 1.14 1.28 1.43 1.59 1.74 1.9 2.06 2.2 2.34 2.47
Note: 1. Maintenance cost ratios regarding decrepitude is from road sectors in the preliminary feasibility guideline (KDI, 2008a) 
because those of railways are currently not available. 2. Normalised ratio in each year is calculated by dividing maintenance cost 
ratio value in each year by 3.8 (maintenance cost ratio of the 10th year).JI HONG PARK    Ch.6 The National Railway Cases 
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delivered as a form of equity (15 per cent) and debt (85 per cent) according to the BTL finance 
structure. Considering the construction deflator and BTL finance interest rate, the total 
investment of private sector, including principal and interest, becomes 2,177.1 (billion KRW, 
nominal term) at the completion time, which is the sum of (a), (b) and (C) in Table 6-6.  
 
Table 6-6: Calculation of the private sector investment 
 
 
Consequently, in this case study, the lease fee in nominal terms for the BTL is calculated as 
follows: 
     (  , .    ) =  
1




     	    =
2,177.1	






Considering the inflation index and the economic discount rate, the lease fee in nominal terms in 
each year will be transformed into real terms to be applied to the Modified VFM.  
 
Revenue, subsidy and MRG for the BTO (       ,          ,      ) 
As shown in equation (3-7), revenue, subsidy and MRG cost tends to reduce M.VFMBTO when 
comparing the PSC and the BTO. Revenue is calculated using distance matrix, origin-
destination matrices from the BTL research report on the Sosa-Wonsi National Railway (KOTI, 
2007) and the rail fare system.
100 In addition, the subsidy in the BTO can be calculated using the 
following equation when operation cost and IRR are known (MOSF, 2009b).  
 
 
   
   
(  +  ) 
 
   
=	  
    −    
(  +  ) 
 
     
+	 
    
(  +  ) 
 
   
  (6-1) 
 
                                         
100 As of 2007, the basic rate is 900 KRW within 10 km and 100 KRW is added every five kilometres. 
Real (2007 price) Nominal Real (2007 price) Nominal
2010 16.0 18.8 90.4 106.5
2011 30.9 38.5 175.3 217.9 7.3
2012 51.7 67.9 293.1 384.8 22.2
2013 71.6 99.3 405.8 562.8 48.6
2014 52.8 77.3 299.1 438.0 87.1
Total 223.0 301.9 (a) 1,263.7 1,710.0 (b) 165.2 (c)
Year
Equity (15%) Debt (85%) Interest 
(nominal)
Private sector investment (P = a + b + c) 2,177.10JI HONG PARK    Ch.6 The National Railway Cases 
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where,   = completion time,   = the end of the operation term,     = yearly asset cost 
excluding subsidy (purely construction costs),     = the yearly revenue,
101     = the yearly 
operation cost (corporate tax excluded),      = the yearly net profit from subsidiary enterprise, 
  = IRR. 
From equation (6-1), assuming no subsidiary enterprise, as construction cost, revenue stream 
and operation cost are already known, the subsidy can be calculated only if IRR is known.  
As shown in Table 6-7, comparing the IRR of road and railway BTO projects between 1995 and 
2005, railway BTO projects have a 0.95 per cent higher IRR than road BTO projects on average. 
Additionally, five road projects suggested from the private sector or contracted after 2006 have 
a 5.43 per cent IRR on average. As a result, rail BTO projects in 2007 could be assumed to have 
a 6.38 per cent IRR in real terms.  
Table 6-7: IRRs of BTO projects 
 
Source: Gil (2012), PIMAC (2009c), PIMAC (2009d) and PIMAC (2009b) 
 
From equation (6-1), using the IRR (6.38 per cent), given operation cost and revenue stream, the 
subsidy can be calculated, assuming that there is no subsidiary enterprise. As seen in Table 6-8, 
considering the revenue stream, the Korean government needs to give as much as 84 per cent of 
PPP asset cost as a construction subsidy. This amount of subsidy is far beyond the governmental 
subsidy limitation
102 (50 per cent of BTO asset cost). In addition, considering the maximum 
                                         
101 Yearly revenue does not include operation subsidy (public service obligation) from the Korean 
government. According to the Framework Act on Rail Industry Development (Article 32, 33), when a rail 
operating company provides a public service not yielding profit by the request of the central or local 
government, the company can receive a public service subsidy from the request through agreement 
between the two parties. Therefore, the public service subsidy is not included in this case. 
102 According to MOSF (2010), the maximum subsidy is a half of the asset cost in the BTO in case of 
railways.  
1995 ~ 2005 After 2006
Incheon international Airport Expressway (9.70%), 
Daegu-Busan (9.38%), Seoul beltway (9.52%), 
Daegu beltway (10.47%), Chunan-Nonsan (9.23%), 
Kwangju 2
nd
 beltway (8.86%), Chunmasan tunnel 
(8.56%), Manwolsan tunnel (8.85%), Misiryung 
tunnel (9.52%), Suwon-Pyungtaek (7.40%)
Incheon-Gimpo (5.07%), Anyang-Sungnam (5.49%), 
Songsan-Bongdam (5.03%), Gimpo-Hwado (6.04%), 
Osan-Gwangju (5.54%)
Average = 9.15% Average = 5.43%
Choep light rail (10.48%), Seoul-Hannam 10.48%), 
Busan-Kimhae (10.24%), Incheon International 
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subsidy, the revenue stream needs to increase twice more than the given one, in order to attain 
real IRR of 6.38 per cent. Accordingly, it seems that, in practice, the BTO option cannot be 
selected as a procurement option with such a small revenue stream. However, this project still 
produces an IRR level (6.38 per cent, real) with the help of the governmental subsidy of 84 per 
cent on the BTO asset cost, so the BTO will be considered as a procurement option. 
 
Table 6-8: The relationships among IRR, revenue stream and subsidy 
 
 
With respect to MRG cost for the BTO, the MRG condition for decision-making time in Korea 
is considered. As shown in Table 6-9, for a solicited project in 2007, as here, the Korean 
government guarantees up to 75 per cent (year 1 to 5) and 65 per cent (year 6 to 10) of the 
contract revenue for the first ten years after opening. However, it does not guarantee this when 
the actual revenue is lower than a half of contract revenue. In addition, the Korean government 
redeems the revenue exceeding 125 per cent (year 1 to 5) and 135 per cent (year 6 to 10) of the 
contract revenue for the first ten years in operation period. 
Although the MRG cost is zero when forecast traffic volume is realised, in reality there is some 
discrepancy between forecast and actual volume. Using the traffic volume risk, the MRG cost 
will be calculated in the Modified VFM analysis.  
 
Table 6-9: The change of MRG condition in BTO projects 




Revenue stream (times) 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 2.06







First 15 years of operation 
period




▪ Solicited: 90% 
▪ Unsolicited: 80%
▪ Solicited: 90/80/70% 
                    every 5 years 
▪ Unsolicited: 80/70/60%  
                    every 5 years 
▪ No guarantee when lower 
  than  50 % of revenue
▪ 75/65%  
   every 5 year 
▪ No guarantee 
  when lower than 
  50 % of revenue
Redemption 
level
▪ Solicited: 110% 
▪ Unsolicited: 120%
▪ Solicited: 110/120/130% 
                    every 5 years 
▪ Unsolicited: 120/130/140%
                    every 5 years 
▪ 125/135%  
   every 5 year 
Jun.  2003 ~ Dec. 2005
Jan. 2006 ~ Sep. 2010 After 
Oct. 2010
Abolition Abolition
1999 ~ May 2003JI HONG PARK    Ch.6 The National Railway Cases 
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Social benefit difference (   ) 
Social benefits for the Modified VFM analysis are collected from the feasibility and schematic 
design report on the Sosa-Wonsi National Railway (KORAIL, 2003). The social benefit 
difference (ΔB) beween the PSC and the PPP alternatives, considering completion delay of the 
conventional delivery, can be calculated by using these data. In addition, with respect to the 
relationship of traffic volume and social benefit, it seems that social benefits could be different 
when actual traffic volume is different from forecast, because traffic volume could have an 
influence on above benefit factors directly or indirectly. In order to establish this relationship, it 
appears necessary to carry out a new traffic demand analysis for the project. However, if this is 
difficult in practice, using empirical method this relationship could be estimated roughly.  
As with the research of Kim et al. (2011) regarding the National Highways, using the data of 
BCR, traffic volume and capacity regarding 24 National Railway projects
103 provided in the 
master plan research report on the 21
st century National Railway network of Korea (KOTI, 
2004), the relationship between BCR and volume-capacity ratio (V/C) can be estimated as 
shown in equation (6-2) and in Figure 6-6 as follows: 
 
      =  .    ×
 
 
+  .   	(   =  .  )  (6-2) 
 
 
Figure 6-6: Relationship between BCR and V/C in the National Railways 
 
 
Considering equation (4-4) and equation (6-2), as traffic volume becomes k times, social benefit 
changes to b times, as follows: 
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Where, B = social benefit with current traffic volume, B = social benefit change when traffic 
volume changes to k times, BCR = benefit cost ratio.  
Accordingly, in the Sosa-Wonsi case, with BCR of 1.12, when the traffic volume drops to 50.7 
per cent of the forecast one, the social benefits also drop to 71.5 per cent of the forecast one. 
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6.3.4.1 The Modified VFM (with no completion delay) 
 
In order to verify the impact of the inclusion of construction cost risk and traffic volume risk on 
the Modified VFM when there is no completion delay in the conventional delivery, four 
different Modified VFM (M.VFM) using the mean value of each risk are conducted: 1) M.VFM 
without risks; 2) M.VFM with construction cost risk; 3) M.VFM with traffic volume risk; and 4) 
M.VFM with both risks (construction cost risk and traffic volume risk). The results of M.VFM 
are shown in Table 6-10. 
 
Table 6-10: The Modified VFM results according to risk inclusion 
(Discounted value, billion KRW, 2007 price)
 
 
M.VFM with no risk inclusion 
According to Korea’s BTL guidelines (MOSF, 2009a), 90.71 per cent, an average WBR of turn-
key/alternative bids in the National Railways between 2000 and 2007 (Kim et al., 2008a) is 
applied to calculate the asset cost of the PSC, as shown in the first row of Table 6-10.  
The results of M.VFM with no risk inclusion (Table 6-10, the first row) show that it is not the 
best option to implement this project with the PPP alternatives, indicating negative values, 
M.VFMBTL of -14.7 (billion KRW) and M.VFMBTL of -31.1 (billion KRW). This appears to be 
because lease fee and subsidy are so excessive in the BTL and the BTO respectively, compared 
with the public sector cost in the conventional delivery. Therefore, with no risk inclusion, the 
conventional delivery is more favourable than any other PPP alternatives for this project.  




















870.9 161.8 331.1 885.6 161.8 732.7 0.0 0.0 -14.7 -31.1 16.3
2) M.VFM
(+const. risk)
892.0 161.8 331.1 885.6 161.8 732.7 0.0 0.0 6.4 -10.0 16.3
3) M.VFM
(+volume risk)
870.9 155.7 167.9 885.6 161.8 732.7 39.5 0.0 -20.8 86.5 -107.3
4) M.VFM
(+both risks)
892.0 155.7 167.9 885.6 161.8 732.7 39.5 0.0 0.3 107.6 -107.3
Note: 1.  M.VFM (+no risks) = the Modified VFM without considering risks, based on the BTL guidelines of Korea, M.VFM (+const. risk) = the 
Modified VFM considering the mean values of winning bid ratio risk and construction cost overrun risk, M.VFM (+volume risk) = the Modified 
VFM value considering the mean value of traffic volume risk, and M.VFM (+both risks) = the Modified VFM value considering the mean values of 
winning bid ratio risk, cost overrun risk and traffic volume risk. 
2. AC PSC = Asset cost in the PSC, OC PSC = Operation cost in the PSC, Revenue = Revenue, Lease fee  BTL = Lease fee in the BTL, OC BTL = 
Operation cost in the BTL Subsidy BTO  = Subsidy from the Korean government, MRG BTO = MRG cost and B = social benefit difference 
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M.VFM with construction cost risk 
From equation (3-10), an application ratio, indicating construction cost risk, consists of WBR 
risk and construction cost overrun risk. Using the mean values of the WBR risks (Fig 6-2) and 
construction cost overrun risks (Figure 6-1) of the six major work elements in the National 
Railways, the application ratios can be calculated as shown in Table 6-1. Using these 
application ratios the asset cost of the PSC can be freshly calculated. Considering each 
construction cost of the six major elements, the construction cost weighted application ratio can 
be calculated as 93.02 per cent.
104  
The results (Table 6-10, the second row) show that M.VFMBTL and M.VFMBTO considering the 
construction cost risk are respectively 6.4 and -10.0 (billion KRW), which are 21.1 (billion 
KRW) lower than those with no risk inclusion. This is because the mean values of WBR risks 
and construction cost overrun risk of the six elements make a new application ratio of 93.02 per 
cent, which is 2.31 per cent higher than an average winning bid ratio (90.71 per cent) of the 
turn-key/alternative bids used according to Korea’s BTL guidelines (MOSF, 2009a). This 
means that M.VFMBTL and M.VFMBTO with no risk inclusion based on Korea’s BTL guidelines 
(MOSF, 2009a) could be underestimated by as much as the difference of 2.31 per cent more 
than the situation in reality. 
However, M.VFMBTL-BTO (the Modified VFM difference between the BTL and the BTO) is not 
changed because this is not related to the asset cost of the PSC, though it is affected by WBR 
and construction cost overrun, according to equation (3-10). 
 
M.VFM with traffic volume risk 
To verify the effect of traffic volume risk on M.VFM, the mean value of traffic volume risk 
(50.7 per cent) shown in Figure 6-3 is applied to the analysis. The results (Table 6-10, the third 
row) show that M.VFMBTL decreases by 6.1 (billion KRW), whereas M.VFMBTO increases by 
117.6 (billion KRW), as compared to those with no risk inclusion.  
The decrease of M.VFMBTL is due to the decrease in the operation cost in the PSC by traffic 
volume reduction. In addition, the main reason for the M.VFMBTO increase is that with traffic 
volume decreasing the decrease of revenue is much greater than the MRG increase. 
                                         
104 93.02 (%) = 
∑    ×    ×(    )  
   
∑    
 
   
 
Where,    = construction cost,     = winning bid ratio and α= construction cost overrun,   = six major 
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As a result, M.VFMBTL-BTO is changed to a negative value (-107.3) from a positive value (16.3). 
In other words, the BTO option becomes more favourable than the BTL for this project when 
actual traffic volume is expected to be 50.7 per cent of forecast traffic volume.  
 
M.VFM with both risks 
When both risks are included in the analysis, Table 6-10 (the last row) shows that M.VFMBTL 
and M.VFMBTO become respectively 0.3 and 107.6 (billion KRW), which means that the BTL 
and the BTO option are more favourable than the conventional delivery for this project. In 
addition, among PPP alternatives the BTO option is better than the BTL because M.VFMBTL-BTO 
shows a negative value (-107.3 billion KRW). 
 
All in all, from a viewpoint of M.VFM not considering completion delay in the conventional 
delivery, it seems that the BTO option is the most favourable for this project, followed by the 




6.3.4.2 The Modified VFM (with completion delay) 
 
Impact of a completion delay in the conventional delivery 
To verify the impact of a completion delay in the conventional delivery on the PPP decision-
making, the Modified VFM analyses (M.VFMBTL, M.VFMBTO, and M.VFMBTL-BTO) with 
completion delay (zero to four years) are conducted. The Modified VFM values are calculated 
by considering a completion delay of conventional delivery, which affects not only yearly asset 
cost input but also the social benefit difference between the PSC and the PPP alternatives. 
The results are shown in Table 6-11. In the no risk inclusion case, as completion is delayed from 
zero to four years, M.VFMBTL soars from -14.7 to 246.9 (billion KRW) and M.VFMBTO also 
jumps from -31.1 to 304.3 (billion KRW). Similarly, in the risk (construction cost risk and 
traffic volume risk) inclusion case, M.VFMBTL and M.VFMBTO respectively rise from 0.3 and 
107.6 (billion KRW) to 142.5 and 287.2 (billion KRW) according to the completion delay. This 
dramatic change is mainly because the increase of the social benefit difference between the PSC 
and the PPP alternatives (BTL/BTO) due to a completion delay is much bigger than the 
decrease of the public sector cost in the PSC due to discounting. In consequence, as completion 
is delayed, the PPP alternatives seem to become more favourable than the conventional delivery. 
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With respect to M.VFMBTL-BTO, the BTL is more favourable than the BTO with no completion 
delay. However, if a completion delay occurs that is longer than one year, the BTO is more 
favourable than the BTL (Table 6-11, the last column). This means that completion delay in the 
conventional delivery has an influence on the selection of the PPP option between the BTL and 
the BTO.  
In addition, considering the mean value of the completion delay (3.36 years), the PPP 
alternatives are better than the conventional delivery for this project, and between the PPP 
alternatives the BTO is better than the BTL.  
 
Table 6-11: The Modified VFM result with completion delay 




Critical completion delay 
In order to determine the critical completion delay in the conventional delivery, which makes 
M.VFM zero, linear regression analyses were conducted using Table 6-11. As seen in Figure 6-7, 
depending on whether construction cost risk and traffic volume risk are included or not, the 
regression lines of M.VFM differ. 
In the case of no risk inclusion (Figure 6-7 (a)), with respect to M.VFMBTL, the regression line 
meets the horizontal axis at 0.15 years (1.80 months). This means that if the completion delay in 
conventional delivery occurs for a period longer than 0.15 years (1.80 months), the BTL option 
is better than the conventional delivery. In the same way, when the completion delay in the 
conventional delivery is longer than 0.30 years (3.60 months), the BTO scheme becomes 
feasible. In addition, when a completion delay in conventional delivery occurs for 0.82 years 


















0 870.9 161.8 331.1 885.6 161.8 732.7 0.0 0.0 -14.7 -31.1 16.3
1 840.2 151.9 310.9 885.6 161.8 732.7 0.0 113.5 58.3 62.2 -3.9
2 810.7 142.6 291.9 885.6 161.8 732.7 0.0 220.2 126.0 148.9 -22.9
3 782.0 133.9 274.1 885.6 161.8 732.7 0.0 320.3 188.8 229.5 -40.7
3.36 763.5 131.0 268.0 885.6 161.8 732.7 0.0 354.5 201.5 248.3 -46.8
4 754.3 125.8 257.3 885.6 161.8 732.7 0.0 414.3 246.9 304.3 -57.4
0 892.0 155.7 167.9 885.6 161.8 732.7 39.5 0.0 0.3 107.6 -107.3
1 860.6 146.2 157.6 885.6 161.8 732.7 39.5 81.2 40.6 158.2 -117.6
2 830.4 137.3 148.0 885.6 161.8 732.7 39.5 157.4 77.6 204.9 -127.2
3 801.1 128.9 139.0 885.6 161.8 732.7 39.5 229.0 111.5 247.8 -136.2
3.36 782.1 126.0 135.9 885.6 161.8 732.7 39.5 253.5 114.1 253.5 -139.3







Note: 1.  No risk inclusion = the Modified VFM without considering risks, based on the BTL guidelines of Korea, Risk inclusion = the Modified VFM  
considering construction cost risk and traffic volume risk. 
2. AC PSC = Asset cost in the PSC, OC PSC = Operation cost in the PSC, Revenue = Revenue, Lease fee  BTL = Lease fee in the BTL, OC BTL = Operation 
cost in the BTL Subsidy BTO  = Subsidy from the Korean government, MRG BTO  = MRG cost and DB = social benefit difference between the PSC and 
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(9.84 months), the BTL scheme is better than the BTO. In other words, the BTO scheme is more 
favourable than the BTL if the conventional delivery is expected to be delayed by more than 
0.82 years (9.84 months). This is because the discounted revenue is diminished as completion is 
delayed. 
 
(a) No risk inclusion 
 
(b) Risk inclusion 
Figure 6-7: The Modified VFM result according to completion delay 
 
When it comes to risk inclusion case, regression lines and critical completion delays are shown 
in Figure 6-7 (b). With respect to M.VFMBTL, when developing a linear regression line, the 
intercept of the horizontal axis (critical completion delay) becomes -0.10 years (-1.20 months). 
This means that even when the conventional delivery is completed earlier than the BTL by up to 
0.10 years (1.20 months), the BTL is better than the conventional delivery for this project, to say 
nothing of positive completion delays. Regarding M.VFMBTO, the critical completion delay 
becomes -2.48 years (29.76 months) when the linear regression line is extended. This means 
that even if the conventional delivery completes this project earlier than the BTO by 2.48 years 
(29.76 months), the BTO is better than the conventional delivery for this project. In other words, JI HONG PARK    Ch.6 The National Railway Cases 
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even if the construction in the BTO starts 2.48 years (29.76 months) later than the conventional 
delivery, the BTO is more favourable than the conventional delivery. Furthermore, if the 
conventional delivery is expected to complete this project 11.55 years (138.60 months) earlier 
than the PPP (BTO/BTL), the BTL is better than the BTO for this project. In reality, as 
construction duration is assumed to last five years for this project, it appears impossible to 
complete a project with the conventional delivery 11.55 years earlier than the PPP alternatives. 
Therefore, it is reasonable that the BTO is better than the BTL irrespective of the completion 
delay of the conventional delivery.  
 
 




M.VFM results can differ depending on how large values are used as analysis factors. In order to 
examine the behaviour of M.VFM depending on the change of analysis factors, a sensitivity 
analysis is conducted. For this sensitivity analysis, the following 11 analysis factors are 
considered: 1) PPP construction cost; 2) PPP operation cost; 3) BTL lease profitability; 3-1) 
five-year exchequer bond interest rate; 4) BTL finance interest rate; 5) discount rate; 6) 
construction deflator; 7) consumer price index; 8) social benefits; 9) revenue; and 10) BTO 
profitability (IRR).  
Unlike in the Suwon-Pyungtaek case and the Bongdam-Songsan case, in this project the detailed 
cost of each work element from the private sector is not available, so some factors, such as PPP 
construction cost, PPP operation cost, revenue and BTO profitability (IRR), are used as analysis 
factors. Among 11 factors, BTL lease profitability is composed of the five-year exchequer bond 
interest rate and mark-up rate, so the five-year exchequer bond interest rate seems unnecessary 
to include as an analysis factor in M.VFMBTL. However, in the calculation of M.VFMBTO and 
M.VFMBTL-BTO, this rate needs to be considered, so inevitably both BTL lease profitability and 
the five-year exchequer bond interest rate are considered in the sensitivity analysis. In addition, 
some factors not related to M.VFMBTL, M.VFMBTO and M.VFMBTL-BTO are neglected. For an 
example, revenue and BTO profitability do not affect the calculation of M.VFMBTL, so they are 
not considered in the calculation of M.VFMBTL. As a result, as seen in Figure 6-8 and in Table 6-
12, the number of factors considered in M.VFMBTL, M.VFMBTO and M.VFMBTL-BTO is nine, eight 
and ten respectively.  
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Analysis results 
The changes of M.VFM with risk inclusion and a 3.36-year delay are shown in Figure 6-8 when 
the analysis factors vary from -20 to +20 per cent on each factor’s given value, and the 
summary of sensitivity analysis is shown in Table 6-10.  
In the case of M.VFMBTL (Figure 6-8 (a), Table 6-12), the results are similar to those in the 
National Highway cases and in the National Expressway cases. Among nine analysis factors, 
PPP construction cost and BTL lease profitability are most influential, having unit change 
values of 8.17 and 4.40 respectively in terms of absolute value. The sensitivity analysis results 
(Figure 6-8 (a)) also show that M.VFMBTL values are always positive with the fluctuation of each 
factor, except PPP construction cost. Considering PPP construction cost does not seem to rise 
12 per cent more than that of the PSC, regardless of the fluctuation of each factor, M.VFMBTL 
seems to be positive, which means that the BTL option is better than the conventional delivery.  
With respect to M.VFMBTO (Figure 6-8 (b), Table 6-12), PPP construction cost and social benefit 
size is also strongly influential, having a unit value of 8.19 in terms of absolute value. Moreover, 
the BTO is more favourable than the conventional delivery regardless of the fluctuation of the 
analysis factors with positive M.VFMBTO values.  
When it comes to M.VFMBTL-BTO (Figure 6-8 (c), Table 6-12), it shows a negative value in all 
cases regardless of the fluctuation of analysis factors, implying that the BTO is better than the 
BTL. In addition, BTL lease profitability is the most influential factor among ten analysis 
factors in the calculation of M.VFMBTL-BTO, having the largest unit change value (-4.40) in terms 
of absolute value, as shown in Table 6-12.  
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1. PPP construciton 
    cost
Decrease -8.17
The increase of PPP (BTL) construction cost makes private 
investment and lease fee rise, so M.VFM BTL decreases.
2. PPP operation 
    cost
Decrease -1.47
The increase of PPP (BTL) operation cost naturally makes 
M.VFM BTL decrease.
3. Lease 
   profitability
Decrease -4.40
The rise of lease profitability makes lease fee rise, so M.VFM BTL 
decreases
3-1. Exchequer
   bond interest rate
Decrease -1.80
The rise of 5 year exchequer bond rate means the rise of lease 
profitability, making lease fee rise, so M.VFM BTL decreases.
4. BTL finance 
    interest rate
Decrease -0.67
The increase of BTL finance interest rate makes lease fee rise, so 
M.VFM BTL decreases
5. Discount rate Increase 1.96
The increase of discount rate makes cost items fall.  Among them, 
lease fee has largest drop, so M.VFM BTL decreases.  
6. Construction 
    deflator
Decrease -2.59
The rise of construction deflator makes private investment and lease 
fee increase, so M.VFM BTL decreases.
7. Consumer price 
    index 
Increase 2.54
Nominal lease fee is converted to real by CPI. The rise of CPI, 
making real lease fee drop, means M.VFM BTL increases.
8. Social benefits Increase 2.53 The rise of social benefits makes M.VFM BTL increase.
1. PPP cosntruction 
    cost
Decrease -8.19
The increase of PPP (BTO) construction cost causes subsidy to 
increase, so M.VFM BTO decreases
2. PPP operatin 
    cost
Decrease -1.24
Considering constant IRR, the incrase of PPP (BTO) operation cost 
causes subsidy to increase, so M.VFM BTO decreases
3-1. Exchequer   
   bond interest rate
Increase 0.13
The rise of 5 year exchequer bond rate means the rise of the asset 
cost in the PSC, so M.VFM BTO increases.
5. Discount rate Increase -1.13
The increase of discount rate makes cost items fall.  Among them, 
revenue has a largest drop, so M.VFM BTO decreases.  
7. Consumer price 
    index
Decrease -0.07
The rise of CPI makes the borrowing cost of the public sector in real 
term drop, so M.VFM BTO decreases.
6. Social benefits Increase 2.53 The rise of social benefits makes M.VFM BTO increases.
9. Revenue Increase 1.03
Revenue rise makes subsidy drop considering constant IRR. Subsidy 
drop is bigger than revenue rise, so M.VFM BTO increases.
10. BTO profitability 
    (IRR)
Decrease -0.93 IRR rise causes subsidy increase, so M.VFM BTO decreases
1. PPP construction 
    cost
Increase 0.02
As a result of lease fee rise and subsidy rise due to PPP constuction 
cost rise, M.VFM BTL-BTO increases slightly
2. PPP operation 
    cost
Decrease -0.23
M.VFM BTL reduction is bigger than M.VFM BTO reduction according 
to PPP operation cost rise, so M.VFM BTL-BTO drops
3. Lease 
    profitability
Decrease -4.40
The rise of lease profitability makes lease fee rise, so M.VFM BTL-BTO 
decreases
3-1. Exchequer  
   bond interest rate
Decrease -1.93
The 5 year exchequer bond rate rise (the lease profitability rise) 
makes lease fee rise, so M.VFM BTL-BTO decreases.
4. BTL finance   
    interest rate
Decrease -0.67
The increase of BTL finance interest rate makes lease fee rise, so 
M.VFM BTL-BTO  decreases
5. Discount rate Increase 3.09
The lease fee reduction due to the discount rate increase is bigger than 
the revenue decrease, so M.VFM BTL-BTO increases.
6. Construction 
    deflator
Decrease -2.59
The rise of construction deflator makes private investment and lease 
fee increase, so M.VFM BTL-BTO decreases.
7. Consumer price
    index
Increase 2.61
The lease fee drop and the borrowing cost drop in the PSC make 
M.VFM BTL-BTO increase.
9. Revenue Decrease -1.03
Revenue rise makes subsidy drop considering constant IRR. Subsidy 
drop is bigger than revenue rise, so M.VFM BTL-BTO drops.
10. BTO profitability 
    (IRR)
Increase 0.93 IRR rise causes subsidy increase, so M.VFM BTL-BTO rises





M.VFM changes due to the increase of analysis factors
M.VFM BTL
M.VFM BTO 
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6.3.4.4 The Monte Carlo Simulations 
 
The MCS is conducted to identify the impact of the following 18 risk variables (shown in 
Figure 6-1~Figure 6-4, Figure 4-4 and Figure 4-6~Figure 4-7) from historical observations: six 
WBRs, six construction cost overruns, traffic volume, maintenance cost, construction deflator, 
consumer price index, five-year exchequer bond interest rate, and three-year non-guaranteed 
corporate bond interest rate. 
Figure 6-9 shows the MSC results with no completion delay and with a 3.36-year completion 
delay, which is an average completion delay in the National Railways, as shown in Table 6-2.  
In case of no completion delay (Figure 6-9 (a)), the mean value of M.VFMBTL is 57.9 (billion 
KRW) and the probability that M.VFMBTL is positive is 65.8 per cent. This implies that the BTL 
option is more favourable than the conventional delivery. With respect to M.VFMBTO, its mean 
value is 150.4 (billion KRW) and the probability that it is positive is 80.3 per cent, which 
implies the BTO option is more favourable than the conventional option. Additionally, 
M.VFMBTL-BTO has a mean value of -92.5 (billion KRW) and the probability that it is positive is 
26.4 per cent, which implies the BTO option is better than the BTL option. Accordingly, 
assuming no completion delay in the conventional delivery, the most appropriate delivery 
option for this project is the BTO, followed by the BTL option and the conventional delivery. 
Similarly, in the case of 3.36-year completion delay (Figure 6-9 (b)), the mean value of 
M.VFMBTL is 174.6 (billion KRW) and the probability that it is positive is 84.9 per cent. This 
implies that the BTL option is better than the conventional delivery. With respect to M.VFMBTO, 
its mean value is 299.1 (billion KRW) and the probability that it is positive is 100 per cent, 
which implies the BTO option is more favourable than the conventional option. Furthermore, 
M.VFMBTL-BTO has a mean value of -124.5 (billion KRW) and the probability that it is positive is 
20.3 per cent, which implies the BTO option is better than the BTL option. Accordingly, 
considering an average completion delay in the conventional delivery (3.36 years), the most 
appropriate delivery option is the BTO, followed by the BTL and the conventional option. 
Consequently, as a completion delay increases, the mean values of M.VFM and the probabilities 
that the PPP options are better increase. Considering all the risk factors, including the 3.36-year 
completion delay, it is ideal to implement the Sosa-Wonsi case with the BTO option, followed 
by the BTL. However, considering the limitation of governmental subsidy, as shown in Table 6-
6, the BTL option seems to be a more practical procurement option for this project. 
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i) M.VFMBTL  i) M.VFMBTL 
ii) M.VFMBTO  ii) M.VFMBTO 
iii) M.VFMBTL-BTO  iii) M.VFMBTL-BTO 
(a) No delay  (b) 3.36 year completion delay 
 
Figure 6-9: Probability distribution of the Modified VFM with a 3.36-year completion 
delay 
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6.4 Case 2: The Bujeon-Masan case 
 
6.4.1. Project overview 
 
The Bujeon-Masan National Railway was planned to go through Busan, Gimhae, Changwon 
and Masan, connecting the Seoul-Pusan line, the Busan-Ulsan line, the Samrangjin-Jinju line 
and the Busan New Port line (Figure 6-10). The distance from Busan to Masan using the current 
National Railway network, connecting the Seoul-Busan line and the Samrangjin-Jinju line, is 
approximately 78 kilometres; however, with this project completed this distance is reduced to 
53 kilometres.  
The construction master plan for this project was established in 2000. In 2008, notwithstanding 
low economic feasibility (BCR = 0.63), this project was selected as one of 30 leading projects 
for “Mega-city Region Development Strategy”, which was adopted by the Korean government 
in order to achieve the balanced national development with respect to a presidential election 
pledge in 2007. In the same year, the Bujeon-Masan project was also designated as a BTL 
project, and a negotiation process is in progress.  
With respect to planning this project, in order to avoid overlapping investment, construction 
investment will be done on 51 per cent (green solid line in Figure 6-10) of total operation 
distance from Bujeon to Masan by sharing 49 per cent of total operation distance from the 
current National Railway network (the green dot line in Figure 6-10). 
According to KOTI (2009), although this project shows a fairly low economic feasibility (BCR 
= 0.63), considering the necessity in the aspect of the governmental policy, it needs to be 
implemented. In addition, with regard to procurement option, the BTL scheme is more 
favourable than the conventional procurement for this project (KOTI, 2009). The overview of 
this project (KOTI, 2009, PIMAC, 2009a) is as follows: 
 
  Title: Bujeon-Masan National Railway BTL project 
  Location: Bujeon-dong, Jin-gu, Busan ~ Shinwol-ri, Jinrye-myon, Gimhae 
  Length: 32.0 km (electrified double track) 
  PPP type: BTL 
  Construction duration: 72 months; operation duration: 20 years 
  Five-year exchequer bond interest rate: 5.13 per cent (nominal) 
  PSC Project cost: 1,312,4 (billion KRW, 2008 price) JI HONG PARK    Ch.6 The National Railway Cases 
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  Benefit cost ratio: 0.63  
  Construction deflator: 3 per cent (assumed); consumer price index: 3 per cent 
(assumed) 
  Lease profit rate: 5.87 per cent (nominal) 
  BTL finance interest rate: 6.87 per cent (nominal) 
  BTL finance structure: equity 10 per cent, debt 90 per cent 
 
 
Figure 6-10: The Bujeon-Masan National Railway project map 
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6.4.2 Analysis factors and assumptions for the Modified VFM 
 
This project will be reviewed through two procurement options: the conventional and the BTL 
scheme, because the revenue stream of this project is so small that the BTO profit rate cannot be 
calculated. From equation (6-1), using revenue stream,
105 operation cost
106 for the BTO option, 
and assuming no subsidiary enterprise, the subsidy level can be obtained, shown in Table 6-13. 
As seen in Table 6-13, IRR cannot be obtained even if the Korean government gives a subsidy 
to match the BTO asset cost.
107 In the same way, even if the revenue stream increases 1.6 times 
and the Korean government supports 100 per cent of the BTL asset cost, the BTO cannot 
produce any profit rates.  
 
Table 6-13: The relationships among IRR, revenue stream and subsidy 
 
 
In addition, in order to produce an IRR of 6.38 per cent in real terms, which is a notional BTO 
profit rate for rail projects after 2006 (see 6.3.3), if the revenue stream is doubled, the 
governmental subsidy should be larger than 92 per cent of the asset cost. In the same way, 
considering the subsidy limit for rail projects is 50 per cent of the BTO asset cost (MOSF, 2010), 
the revenue stream should rise to about 4.9 times. This means that the BTO scheme is, in 
practice, not appropriate for this project, so this case study considers only the conventional and 
BTL options.   
 
Basic factors for the Modified VFM in this case are as follows: 
  PPP model: BTL  
  Discount rate: 5.5  per cent in real terms 
  Decision-making time: 2009; price base year: 2008 
  Construction deflator:
108 4.82 per cent (average between 2005 and 2009) 
                                         
105 Revenue stream is calculated using distance matrix, origin-destination matrices (KOTI, 2009) and rail 
fare system. As of 2008, the basic rate is 900 KRW within 10 km and 100 KRW is added every 5 km. 
106 The BTO operation cost is assumed to be the same as the BTL operation cost. 
107 The BTO asset cost is assumed to be the same as the BTL asset cost. 
108 Construction deflator means construction investment deflator in Expenditure on Gross Domestic 
Product on National Accounts, which is provided by the Bank of Korea (http://ecos.bok.or.kr), and 
Real IRR (%) N/A N/A
Revenue stream (times) 1 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2 3 4 4.86
Subsidy/asset cost 1 1 0.96 0.95 0.93 0.92 0.77 0.63 0.50
6.38JI HONG PARK    Ch.6 The National Railway Cases 
  212   
  Consumer price index:
109 2.99 per cent (average between 2005 and 2009) 
  Five-year exchequer bond interest rate:
110 4.72 per cent (2009) 
  BTL Lease profitability:
111 5.49 per cent  
 (Five-year exchequer bond interest rate + 0.77 per cent, nominal) 
  BTL finance interest rate:
112 6.62 per cent  
 (Three-year non-guaranteed corporate bond (AA-),
113 5.62 per cent + 1.0 per 
cent, nominal) 
  BTL finance structure: equity 15 per cent, debt 85 per cent 
  BTL finance terms: level debt service during operation period 
  Operation period: 30 years; construction duration: 5 years 
 
In addition, the same assumptions (see 4.3.2) for the Modified VFM used in the National 
Highway cases are also used in the National Railway cases. 
 
 
                                                                                                                         
according to Korea’s BTL guidelines (MOSF, 2009a), it is used in the calculation of the private sector 
investment for the lease fee calculation. For a more accurate private sector investment calculation, it is 
used instead of the consumer price index.  
109 Consumer price index, which is used as inflation in operation period, is provided by the Bank of Korea 
(http://ecos.bok.or.kr). 
110 The five-year exchequer bond interest rate is calculated by a weighted average method, which applies 
0.1, 0.2, 0.3 and 0.4 to the first, second, third and fourth quarter value (MOSF, 2009a). The quarterly five-
year exchequer bond interest rate is provided by the Korea Bond Information Service 
(http://www.kofiabond.or.kr). 
111 BTL lease profitability is expressed as a “five-year exchequer bond interest rate + mark-up” and the 
mark-up rate is composed of a premium for long term investment and risk premium for construction and 
operation (MOSF, 2009a). Regarding the mark-up rate, 0.77 per cent, an average rate used in rail BTL 
project pre-qualification reports (Wonju-Gangrung: 0.77, Gyungjun/Junla line: 0.87, Bujeon-Masan: 0.74, 
Sosa-Wonsi: 0.77, Daegok-Sosa: 0.72), is considered in the National Railway cases.  
112 BTL finance interest rate is expressed as a “three-year non-guaranteed corporate bond interest rate + 
mark-up” (MOSF, 2009a) and, according to Kim et al. (2005), the mark-up rate seems to be distributed 
from 0.66 per cent to 2.00 per cent. As a mark-up rate, 1.0 per cent is used in the National Railway cases, 
considering rail BTL project pre-qualification reports (Wonju-Gangrung: 1.0, Gyungjun/Junla line: 1.0, 
Bujeon-Masan: 1.0, Sosa-Wonsi: 1.0, Daegok-Sosa: 1.0).  
113 The three-year non-guaranteed corporate bond (AA-) interest rate is calculated by a weighted average 
method, which applies 0.1, 0.2, 0.3 and 0.4 to the first, second, third and fourth quarter value (MOSF, 
2009a). The quarterly three-year non-guaranteed bond (AA-) interest rate is provided by the Korea Bond 
Information Service (http://www.kofiabond.or.kr). JI HONG PARK    Ch.6 The National Railway Cases 
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6.4.3 Main calculation items for the Modified VFM 
 
From equation (3-8), the main calculation items for the Modified VFM are the asset cost of a 
PSC (     ), the operation cost of a PSC (     ) and a BTL (     ), the lease fee of a BTL 
(     	   	   ) and the benefit difference (ΔB).  
 
Asset cost of the PSC (     ) 
The basic asset cost data, shown in Table 6-14, are collected from the BTL research report on 
the Bujeon-Masan National Railway (KOTI, 2009). Among building cost items, the bracketed 
values are the designed price of each item before reflecting each item’s WBR. With respect to 
the design cost and construction cost of the PSC, they are calculated by multiplying each 
designed price and an average WBR (90.71 per cent) of turn-key/alternative bids in the National 
Railway projects between 2000 and 2007 (Kim et al., 2008a). In addition, with respect to the 
design cost and construction cost of the BTL, the same values as in the PSC are used because 
this case includes no contract cost or proposed cost from the private sector, differing in that 
from the Suwon-Pyungtaek case and the Bongdam-Songsan case. 
In addition, in order to estimate the Modified VFM, according to Table 4-3, the yearly asset 
costs of the PSC are distributed. With respect to longer construction duration considering 
completion delay, new yearly distribution ratios using interpolation method and Table 4-3 will 
be applied to the calculation of the Modified VFM. 
 
Operation cost for the PSC and the BTL (     ,     ) 
As with the road cases, the yearly base operation costs for the PSC (     ) are calculated by 
multiplying the mean values of the operation costs
114 (KRW/PCKT) from the historical 
observations and yearly PCKT data from the PPP pre-qualification report on the Bujeon-Masan 
National Railway (PIMAC, 2009a). 
Maintenance costs tend to gradually increase over time because of the increasing decrepitude of 
the facility. However, there is currently no available way to consider the decrepitude of the 
railways. Thus, for a simple calculation, it is assumed that the historical observations are 
collected from railways with ten years of decrepitude in this case and yearly maintenance costs 
are converted using normalisation and the relative yearly ratios in roads (Table 6-5) from the 
                                         
114 From the historical observations, the mean values of operation cost items (2005 price) are as follows: 1) 
personnel cost /PCKT = 4,898.1 KRW/PCKT; 2) management cost/VKT = 3,068.0 KRW/PCKT; 3) 
maintenance cost/VKT = 749.7 KRW/PCKT.  JI HONG PARK    Ch.6 The National Railway Cases 
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preliminary feasibility guideline (KDI, 2008b). Train replacement costs during the operation 
period are also included in the PSC (     ).  
When it comes to operation cost of the BTL (     ), the same operation cost as the PSC will 
be applied as in the Modified VFM. 
 
Table 6-14: Basic asset cost for the PSC and the BTL 







                         22.2 (24.5)
Earth work/Structure 15.5 (17.1) 
Building/Equipment 1.2 (1.3) 
Track 1.2 (1.3) 
Electricity 1.5 (1.7) 
Signal 1.2 (1.3) 
Communication 1.7 (1.8)
                         22.2 (24.5)
Earth work/Structure 15.5 (17.1) 
Building/Equipment 1.2 (1.3) 
Track 1.2 (1.3) 
Electricity 1.5 (1.7) 
Signal 1.2 (1.3) 
Communication 1.7 (1.8)
Sub total 1,369.70 1,369.70
0 (129.4) 0 (129.4)
                               39.4 
Design inspection 1.5 
Construction inspection 31.5
Cultural asset survey 1.2 
Traffic impact assessment  0.1 
Environmental impact assessment 1.5 
Disaster impact assessment 0.03 
Energy use plan 0.1 
Construction management  2.3 
Waste disposal 1.2 
                                40.4 
Design inspection 1.5 
Construction inspection 31.5
Cultural asset survey 1.2 
Traffic impact assessment  0.1 
Environmental impact assessment 1.5 
Disaster impact assessment 0.03 
Energy use plan 0.1 
Construction management  2.3 
Waste disposal 1.2
Insurance 1.0
                                66.1 
Bedding measurement 0.04 
Track management 0.6 
Building equipment 0.1 
Electricity facility 0.5
Signal/communication 0.8 
Automatic fare collection system 0.2 
Train 63.9
                                 66.6 
Bedding measurement 0.04 
Track management 0.6 
Building equipment 0.1 
Electricity facility 0.5  
Signal/communication 0.8 
Automatic fare collection system 0.2 




Note: 1. Compensation cost is provided by the Korean government, so it is not included in the Modified VFM assessment.  2. 
All values in the Table come from the BTL research report on the Bujeon-Masan National Railway (KOTI, 2009) and the 
bracketed building cost values are designed prices before including winning bid ratios.   3. According to KOTI (2009), 
contractor’s all risk insurance for the PSC is neglected and at the same time it is neglected in the PPP, which is possible in terms 
of competitive neutrality according to the BTL guidlelines of Korea (MOSF, 2009).  4. The management information system 
(MIS) cost of operation facility cost in the PSC is neglected because there exists MIS in use for public sector.  5. According to 
KOTI (2009), the financial cost in BTL is not considered because the report regarded it was assumed to be included in the mark-




                                   0.3 
Test drive cost 0.3
                                  4.0 
Test drive cost 0.3 
Organisation cost 0.2 
Business commence cost 0.7 





                     1,293.6 (1,426.1)
Earth work/Structure 1,054.8 (1,162.8)
Building/Equipment 42.1 (46.5) 
Track 69.3 (76.4)
Electricity 54.9 (60.5) 
Signal 42.3 (46.7) 
Communication 30.1 (33.2)
                     1,293.6 (1,426.1)
Earth work/Structure 1,054.8 (1,162.8)
Building/Equipment 42.1 (46.5) 
Track 69.3 (76.4)
Electricity 54.9 (60.5) 
Signal 42.3 (46.7) 
Communication 30.1 (33.2)JI HONG PARK    Ch.6 The National Railway Cases 
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Lease fee for the BTL (     	      ) 
According to Korea’s BTL guidelines (MOSF, 2009a), the yearly lease fee in nominal terms is 
calculated as equation (4-1). The asset cost of the BTL in real terms in Table 6-14 is delivered 
as a form of equity (15 per cent) and debt (85 per cent), according to the BTL finance structure. 
Considering construction deflator and BTL finance interest rate, the total investment of the 
private sector, including principal and interest, becomes 2,004.3 (billion KRW, nominal term) at 
the completion time, which is the sum of (a), (b) and (C) in Table 6-15.  
 
Table 6-15: Calculation of the private sector investment 
 
 
Consequently, in this case study, the lease fee in nominal terms for the BTL is calculated as 
follows: 
     (  , .    ) =  
1
(1 + 0.0549) 
  
   
= 11.9563 
     	    =
2,004.3	






Considering the inflation index and the economic discount rate, the lease fee in nominal terms in 
each year will be transformed into real terms to be applied to the Modified VFM.  
 
Social benefit difference (   ) 
Social benefits for the Modified VFM analysis is collected from the BTL research report on the 
Bujeon-Masan National Railway (KOTI, 2009). The social benefit difference (ΔB) between the 
PSC and the BTL alternative, considering the completion delay of the conventional delivery, 
can be calculated by using these data. 
As with the Sosa-Wonsi case, using equation (6-3) and the BCR (=0.63) of the Bujeon-Masan 
case, when the traffic volume drops to 50.7 per cent of the forecast one, the social benefits also 
drop to 87.6 per cent of the forecast one. 
Real (2008 price) Nominal Real (2008 price) Nominal
2011 16.0 18.4 90.7 104.5
2012 29.9 36.1 169.6 204.7 6.9
2013 50.1 63.4 283.8 359.1 20.5
2014 69.1 91.7 391.8 519.7 44.2
2015 49.2 68.5 279.1 388.0 78.6
Total 214.3 278.1 (a) 1,215.0 1,576.0 (b) 150.2 (c)
Year
Equity (15%) Debt (85%) Interest 
(nominal)
Private sector investment (P = a + b + c) 2,004.3JI HONG PARK    Ch.6 The National Railway Cases 





6.4.4.1 The VFM analysis results (with no completion delay) 
To verify the impact of the inclusion of construction cost risk and traffic volume risk on the 
Modified VFM when there is no completion delay in the conventional delivery, four different 
Modified VFM (M.VFMBTL) using the mean value of each risk are conducted: 1) M.VFMBTL 
without risks; 2) M.VFMBTL with construction cost risk; 3) M.VFMBTL with traffic volume risk; 
and 4) M.VFMBTL with both risks (construction cost risk and traffic volume risk). The results of 
M.VFMBTL are shown in Table 6-16. 
 
Table 6-16: The VFM results according to risk inclusion 




M.VFMBTL with no risk inclusion 
According to Korea’s BTL guidelines (MOSF, 2009a), 90.71 per cent, an average WBR of turn-
key/alternative bids in the National Railways between 2000 and 2007 (Kim et al., 2008a) is 
applied to calculate the asset cost of the PSC, shown in the first row of Table 6-16. The result of 
M.VFMBTL with no risk inclusion shows that the BTL is preferable to the conventional delivery 
with M.VFMBTL having a positive value of 35.8 (billion KRW). 
 
M.VFMBTL with construction cost risk 
From equation (3-10), an application ratio, indicating construction cost risk, consists of WBR 











1) M.VFM BTL 
(+no risks)
843.3 232.4 807.5 232.4 0.0 35.8
2) M.VFM BTL
(+const. risk)
853.6 232.4 807.5 232.4 0.0 46.1
3) M.VFM BTL
(+volume risk)
843.3 223.4 807.5 232.4 0.0 26.7
4) M.VFM BTL
(+both risks)




Note: 1.  M.VFM BTL (+no risks) = the Modified VFM value without considering risks based on the BTL guidelines of Korea, M.VFM BTL 
(+const. risk) = the Modified VFM value considering the mean values of winning bid ratio risk and construction cost overrun risk, 
M.VFM BTL (+volume risk) = the Modified VFM value considering the mean value of traffic volume risk, and M.VFM BTL (+both risks) = 
the Modified VFM value considering the mean values of winning bid ratio risk, cost overrun risk and traffic volume risk. 
2. AC PSC = Asset cost in the PSC, OC PSC = Operation cost in the PSC, Lease fee  BTL = Lease fee in the BTL, OC BTL = Operation cost 
in the BTL and DB = social benefit difference between the PSC and the BTL.JI HONG PARK    Ch.6 The National Railway Cases 
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and construction cost overrun risks (Figure 6-1) of the six major work elements in the National 
Railways, application ratios can be calculated as shown in Table 6-1. Using these application 
ratios, the asset cost of the PSC can be freshly calculated. Considering each construction cost of 
the six major elements, the construction cost weighted application ratio can be calculated as 
91.86 per cent.
115  
The results (Table 6-16, the second row) show that M.VFMBTL considering the construction cost 
risk are 46.1 (billion KRW), which are 10.3 (billion KRW) higher than those with no risk 
inclusion. This is because the mean values of WBR risks and construction cost overrun risk of 
the six elements make a new application ratio of 91.86 per cent, which is 1.15 per cent lower 
than an average winning bid ratio (90.71 per cent) of turn-key/alternative bids used, according 
to Korea’s BTL guidelines (MOSF, 2009a). This means that M.VFMBTL with no risk inclusion 
based on Korea’s BTL guidelines (MOSF, 2009a) could be underestimated by as much as the 
difference of 1.15 per cent more than the situation in reality. 
 
M.VFMBTL with traffic volume risk 
To verify the effect of traffic volume risk on M.VFM, the mean value of traffic volume risk 
(50.7 per cent) shown in Figure 6-3 is applied to the analysis. The results (Table 6-16, the third 
row) show that M.VFMBTL decreases by 9.1 (billion KRW). This is due to the decrease in the 
maintenance cost by traffic volume reduction.  
 
M.VFMBTL with both risks 
When both risks are included in the analysis, Table 6-16 (the last row) shows that M.VFMBTL 
becomes 37.0 (billion KRW), which means that the BTL is more favourable than the 
conventional delivery for this project.  
 
All in all, from a viewpoint of M.VFMBTL, and not considering completion delay in the 
conventional delivery, it seems that the BTL option is preferable to the conventional delivery 
regardless of whether the construction and traffic volume risks are included or not. 
   
                                         
115 91.86 = 
∑    ×    ×(    )  
   
∑    
 
   
 
Where,    = the construction cost,    = the winning bid ratio, α	= the construction cost overrun and	 	= 
six major work elements. JI HONG PARK    Ch.6 The National Railway Cases 
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6.4.4.2 The Modified VFM (with completion delay) 
 
Impact of a completion delay in the conventional delivery 
To verify the impact of a completion delay in the conventional delivery on the PPP decision-
making, M.VFMBTL with completion delay (zero to four years) is conducted. M.VFMBTL is 
calculated by considering a completion delay for conventional delivery, which affects not only 
yearly asset cost input but also the social benefit difference between the PSC and the BTL. 
M.VFMBTL results are shown in Table 6-17. In the no risk inclusion case, M.VFMBTL slightly 
rises from 35.8 to 39.5 (billion KRW) as a completion is delayed from zero to four years. This is 
because the increase of the social benefit difference between the PSC and the BTL due to a 
completion delay is slightly bigger than the decrease of the public sector cost (asset cost and 
operation cost) in the PSC due to discounting. The slight rise of M.VFMBTL is due to the low 
BCR (0.63) of this project and the graph (blue line in Fig 6-11) of M.VFMBTL against completion 
delay is nearly flat, which differs from the Sosa-Wonsi case (blue line in Fig 6-7 (a)).  
However, in the risk (construction cost risk and traffic volume risk) inclusion case, M.VFMBTL 
drops from 37.0 to 23.2 (billion KRW) according to completion delay. This is because the 
increase in the social benefit difference between the PSC and the BTL due to a completion delay 
is smaller than the decrease of the public sector cost in the PSC due to discounting: the social 
benefit difference between the PSC and the BTL is diminished due to traffic volume risk 
inclusion, compared to the figure without risk inclusion.  
Looking at the risk inclusion rows in Table 6-17, when completion is delayed from 0 to 4 years, 
asset cost in the PSC decreases by 98.1 (billion KRW) and operation cost in the PSC also 
decreases by 43.1 (billion KRW), whereas social benefit difference between the PSC and the 
BTL increases by 127.4 (billion KRW). Consequently, due to completion delay (0 to 4 years), 
M.VFMBTL decreases by 13.8 (billion KRW) from 37.0 (billion KRW, no delay) to 23.2 (billion 
KRW, 4 year delay). In addition, comparing with Table 6-11 in the Sosa-Wonsi case, the 
biggest difference comes from the size of social benefit difference. With respect to the values of 
risk inclusion rows composing M.VFMBTL in Table 6-11 (Sosa-Wonsi case), according to 
completion delay (from 0 to 4 years) asset cost in the PSC decreases by 119.4 (billion KRW) 
and operation cost in the PSC also decreases by 34.8 (billion KRW), whereas social benefit 
difference between the PSC and the BTL increases by 296.4 (billion KRW). Accordingly, due 
to completion delay (0 to 4 years), M.VFMBTL increases by 142.2 (billion KRW) from 0.3 
(billion KRW, no delay) to 142.5 (billion KRW, 4 year delay). Considering the sizes of asset 
cost, operation cost and social benefit difference in the two cases, the decrease in M.VFMBTL in JI HONG PARK    Ch.6 The National Railway Cases 
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Bujeon-Masan case according to completion delay comes mainly from the relatively small 
social benefit difference between the PSC and the BTL, which has resulted from the small social 
benefit ratio (0.63) of the case.  
 
Table 6-17: The Modified VFM result with completion delay 





Additionally, regardless of how long the completion delay from zero to four years is, the BTL 
scheme is better than the conventional option for this project, to say nothing of considering the 
mean value of the completion delay (3.36 years, Table 6-2) in the National Railways. 
 
Critical completion delay 
In order to determine the critical completion delay in the conventional delivery, which makes 
the M.VFMBTL zero, a linear regression analysis was conducted, using Table 6-15. As seen in 
Figure 6-11, depending on whether construction cost risk and traffic volume risk are included or 
not, the regression line of M.VFMBTL differs. 
In the no risk inclusion case, when the linear regression line is extended, it meets the horizontal 
axis at -39.58 years. This means that even if the conventional delivery completes this project 
earlier than the BTL by up to 39.58 years, the BTL is better than the conventional delivery. 
However, the earlier completion of 39.58 years in the conventional delivery cannot be realised 
in practice, considering the construction duration of five years in the BTL option. Consequently, 
the BTL option is more favourable than the conventional delivery in terms of a viable 











0 843.3 232.4 807.5 232.4 0.0 35.8
1 818.1 220.3 807.5 232.4 39.4 37.8
2 793.5 208.8 807.5 232.4 76.7 39.1
3 769.5 197.8 807.5 232.4 112.0 39.4
3.36 761.1 194.2 807.5 232.4 124.2 39.5
4 746.3 187.6 807.5 232.4 145.5 39.5
0 853.6 223.4 807.5 232.4 0.0 37.0
1 828.1 211.8 807.5 232.4 34.5 34.3
2 803.2 200.7 807.5 232.4 67.1 31.1
3 779.0 190.3 807.5 232.4 98.1 27.4
3.36 770.4 186.7 807.5 232.4 108.7 25.8
4 755.5 180.3 807.5 232.4 127.4 23.2
Risk
inclusion
Note: 1. AC PSC = Asset cost in the PSC, OC PSC = Operation cost in the PSC, Lease fee BTL= Lease fee in the BTL, OC BTL = Operation cost in
the BTL and ∆B= the social benefit difference between the PSC and the BTL. 2. Risk inclusion = construction cost risk (winning bid ratio and
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  220   
 
Figure 6-11: The Modified VFM result according to completion delay 
 
In the same way, regarding M.VFMBTL with risk inclusion (construction cost risk and traffic 
volume risk), the intercept of the horizontal axis (the critical completion delay) becomes 10.88 
years and the slope of the regression line is negative. This means that if the completion in the 
conventional delivery is delayed by up to 10.88 years, the BTL is better than the conventional 
delivery. In other words, when a completion delay of more than 10.88 year is expected in the 
conventional delivery, the conventional delivery can be a more appropriate delivery option than 
the BTL.  
This result differs strongly from those in other cases. This difference comes from the fact that 
this project has such a small BCR that M.VFMBTL cannot increase according to completion delay. 
In other words, when including construction cost risk and traffic volume risk, the increase of the 
social benefit difference between the PSC and the BTL due to a completion delay is smaller 
than the decrease of the public sector cost in the PSC due to discounting. 
 
6.4.4.3 Sensitivity analysis 
M.VFMBTL results can differ depending on how large values are used as analysis factors. In the 
same way as with the Todang-Gwansan case, in order to examine the behaviour of M.VFMBTL, 
according to the change of analysis factors, a sensitivity analysis is conducted. For a sensitivity 
analysis, the following eight analysis factors are considered: 1) BTL construction cost; 2) BTL 
operation cost; 3) BTL finance interest rate; 4) discount rate; 5) BTL lease profitability; 6) 
construction deflator; 7) consumer price index; and 8) the size of social benefits.  
The changes of M.VFMBTL with risk inclusion and a 3.36-year delay are shown in Figure 6-12, 
when the analysis factors vary by from -20 to 20 per cent on each factor’s given value. The 
summary of the sensitivity analysis is shown in Table 6-18.  JI HONG PARK    Ch.6 The National Railway Cases 
  221   
 
Figure 6-12: Sensitivity analysis of analysis factors (risk inclusion, 3.36-year delay) 
 
The sensitivity analysis results, shown in Figure 6-12, show that M.VFMBTL values with risk 
inclusion and a 3.36-year delay can be negative, which means the conventional delivery can be 
better than the BTL, when lease profitability goes up by about 7 per cent, the discount rate drops 
by about 14 per cent or the consumer price index drops by about 9 per cent. In addition, when 
construction deflator or BTL operation cost rises by about 12 per cent, the conventional delivery 
is better than the BTL. In the case of BTL construction cost, though the Modified VFM 
becomes negative when it goes up by about 6 per cent, it is difficult to imagine that the 
construction cost of the BTL is likely to be bigger than that of the PSC. 
Among the eight analysis factors, as seen in Table 6-18 and Figure 6-12, as discount rate, 
consumer price index or social benefits increase, M.VFMBTL rises with a positive slope mainly 
because these factors make the lease fee drop. However, when other factors increase, M.VFMBTL 
falls with a negative slope because they make the lease fees rise or lead to a direct increase in 
the public sector cost (BTL operation cost) in the BTL.  
In addition, the sensitivity results show that among the factors, BTL construction cost and lease 
profitability are most influential on the Modified VFM: they have the steepest slopes when they 
rise by from -20 to 20 per cent point based on each factor’s given value, which is the same result 
as found in the National Highway cases. 
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Table 6-18: Sensitivity of analysis factors on the Modified VFM 
 
Accordingly, when the viability of the BTL is needed in terms of the government policy, it 
could be achieved by reducing BTL construction cost or lease profitability. For this reason, in 
reality, according to Kim (2011), when conducting the VFM analysis, many BTL projects adopt 
a lower BTL construction cost (93.8 per cent on average) than PSC construction cost without 
any appropriate evidence to support this. 
 
 
6.4.4.4 The Monte Carlo Simulations 
 
The MCS is conducted to identify the impact of the following 18 risk variables when they are 
reflected at the same time, shown in Figure 6-1~Figure 6-4 and Figure 4-6~Figure 4-7, from 
historical observations: six WBRs, six construction cost overruns, traffic volume, maintenance 
cost/PCKT, construction deflator, consumer price index, the five-year exchequer bond interest 
rate, and the three-year non-guaranteed corporate bond interest rate. 
Figure 6-13 shows the MSC results with no completion delay and with a 3.36-year completion 
delay. In the case of no completion delay (Figure 6-13 (a)), M.VFMBTL is distributed between -
222 and 287 (billion KRW) with 90 per cent probability and the mean value is 36.6 (billion 
KRW). Additionally, the probability that M.VFMBTL is positive is 60.3 per cent, which shows 






1. BTL construction cost Decrease -7.44
The increase of BTL construction cost makes private 
investment and lease fee rise, so M.VFM BTL decreases.
2. BTL operation cost Decrease -2.19
The increase of BTL operation cost naturally makes 
M.VFM BTL decrease.
3. BTL finance interest rate Decrease -0.61
The increase of BTL finance interest rate makes lease fee rise, 
so M.VFM BTL decreases
4. Discount rate Increase 1.58
The increase of discount rate makes cost items fall.  Among 
them, lease fee has a largest drop, so M.VFM BTL decreases.  
5. Lease profitability Decrease -3.68
The rise of lease profitability makes lease fee rise, so 
M.VFM BTL decreases
6. Construction deflator Decrease -2.04
The rise of construction deflator makes private investment 
and lease fee increase, so M.VFM BTL decreases.
7. Consumer price index 
   (CPI)
Increase 2.57
Nominal lease fee is converted to real term by consumer price 
index.  The rise of CPI makes lease fee in real term drop, so 
M.VFM BTL increases.
8. Social benefits Increase 1.09
The rise of social benefits makes the social benefit difference 
grow, so M.VFM BTL increases.
Analysis factors
M.VFM BTL changes due to the increase of analysis factors
Note; Unit change means the change of M.VFM BTL when an analysis factor rises by 1 per cent on its given value.JI HONG PARK    Ch.6 The National Railway Cases 
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With respect to the case of a 3.36-year completion delay (Figure 6-13 (b)), M.VFMBTL is 
distributed between -225 and 264 (billion KRW) with 90 per cent probability; the mean value is 
24.4 (billion KRW). The probability that M.VFMBTL is positive is 57.5 per cent, meaning the 
BTL scheme is feasible for this project even considering the average completion delay of the 
National Railways.  
The overall results from the MCS are similar to the single-value estimation result (6.4.4.1 & 
6.4.4.2). Regardless of the completion delay in the conventional delivery, the BTL option is 
better than this option. In addition, as a completion delay goes up, and the mean value 
M.VFMBTL and the probability that the BTL is better also go down. This appears to be because 
this project has such a small BCR that M.VFMBTL cannot increase according to completion delay. 
In other words, the increase in the social benefit difference between the PSC and the BTL due to 
a completion delay is smaller than the decrease of the public sector cost in the PSC due to 
discounting. Finally, the PPP decision for the Bujeon-Masan National Railway project to use the 
BTL option in 2009 seems to be appropriate considering all the results.  
 
(a) No delay 
 
(b) 3.36-year completion delay 
Figure 6-13: Probability distribution of the Modified VFM JI HONG PARK    Ch.6 The National Railway Cases 




In order to find out the impact of transferable risks on the PPP decisions and which delivery 
option is the most appropriate in the National Railway programme, the Modified VFM analysis 
on the Sosa-Wonsi case and the Bujeon-Masan case were conducted. Through these two case 
studies, several characteristics were found. 
 
1) Regarding construction cost risk, M.VFMBTL and M.VFMBTO using an average WBR of turn-
key/alternative bids based on Korea’s BTL guidelines (MOSF, 2009a) can be underestimated, 
compared with those using winning bid ratio risks and construction cost overrun risks from the 
historical observations of six major work elements in railway projects.  
According to Kim et al. (2008a), the average WBR of turn-key/alternative bid between 2000 
and 2007 is 90.71 per cent, while a construction cost weighted application ratio from 339 
contracts of 32 National Railway projects gives 93.02 and 91.86 per cent in the Sosa-Wonsi 
case and in the Bujeon-Masan case, respectively. Due to these differences (2.31 and 1.15 for 
respective project) the VFM results (M.VFMBTL and M.VFMBTO) based on Korea’s BTL 
guidelines are smaller than those using the historical observations. This is because the 
application ratio with construction cost weights from historical observations is higher than that 
based on Korea’s BTL guidelines. In fact, the typical bid system for the National Railway is 
design-bid-build as with road programmes and WBRs of design-bid-build are usually lower than 
those of turn-key/alternative bid, which can be inferred from Table 6-1. However, the 
construction cost overrun ratios of six major work elements in the National Railways are much 
higher than that of road projects, as given in Table 6-1. Accordingly the application ratio with 
construction cost weights exceeds the average WBR of turn-key/alternative bids based on 
Korea’s BTL guidelines. As a result, for a more accurate PPP decision in National Railway, an 
application ratio using the historical observations regarding six major work elements is 
recommended to estimate the asset cost in the PSC, instead of an average WBR of turn-
key/alternative bids in the National Railways.  
This result differs markedly from the result for the road programmes. The difference seems to 
come from whether a project is delivered separately or not. In other words, it seems that 
separate delivery with six different contracts for major elements in railways could cause more 
inefficiency than the combined delivery in roads. According to Lee (2002) and Yu (2001), the 
separate contract system in Korean construction industry could cause an inefficiency in terms of 
construction cost and duration because of the difficulties of collaboration and coordination JI HONG PARK    Ch.6 The National Railway Cases 
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among contractors. With respect to this, the National Bureau of Economic Research of the 
United States revealed that the compulsory multiple contractor system of the New York State 
could cause construction costs to increase by 8 percentage points (Ashenfelter et al., 1997).  
 
2) Traffic volume risk seems to affect PPP decisions in the National Railway. When including 
traffic volume risk (50.7 per cent), M.VFMBTL values decrease by 6.1 and 9.1 (billion KRW) in 
the Sosa-Wonsi case and in the Bujeon-Masan case respectively, compared to those without 
traffic volume risk. This is due to the decrease in the operation cost in the PSC by the PCKT 
decrease in the projects from traffic volume reduction (from 100 to 50.7 per cent). On the other 
hand, when including traffic volume risk (50.7 per cent), M.VFMBTO value increases by 117.6 
(billion KRW) in the Sosa-Wonsi case, compared to those without traffic volume risk. This is 
mainly because the decrease of revenue due to the traffic volume risk inclusion makes 
M.VFMBTO soar. In addition, when considering traffic volume risk in the no completion delay 
case, the most favourable procurement option is changed to the BTO option from the BTL 
option in the Sosa-Wonsi case.  
 
3) A completion delay in the conventional delivery can also make a critical impact on the PPP 
decisions. In the Sosa-Wonsi case, according to the completion delay in the conventional 
delivery, the values of M.VFMBTL and M.VFMBTO increase, mainly because the increase of the 
social benefit difference between the PSC and the PPP alternatives is much bigger than the 
decrease of the public sector cost in the PSC due to discounting. On the other hand, M.VFMBTL-
BTO decreases as completion is delayed from zero to four years mainly because revenue stream 
drops due to discounting effect. This implies that as completion is delayed the BTO option 
become more and more preferable to the BTL option. 
However, with respect to the Bujeon-Masan case, when including construction cost risk and 
traffic volume risk, M.VFMBTL decreases because the increase of the social benefit difference 
between the PSC and the PPP alternatives is smaller than the decrease of the public sector cost 
in the PSC due to discounting. In other words, the Bujeon-Masan case has such a small BCR 
(0.63) that M.VFMBTL does not increase but decrease according to completion delay. 
  
4) A critical completion delay in each project provides important information in PPP decisions. 
Considering risk inclusion (construction cost risk and traffic volume risk), the critical 
completion delays regarding M.VFMBTL, M.VFMBTO and M.VFMBTL-BTO are respectively -0.10, -
2.48 and -11.55 years in the Sosa-Wonsi case. This implies that even if the BTL or the BTO 
respectively start up to 0.10 or 2.48 years later than the conventional delivery, the BTL or the 
BTO is preferable to the conventional delivery. Moreover, even if the conventional delivery JI HONG PARK    Ch.6 The National Railway Cases 
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completes the project 11.55 years earlier than the PPP alternatives (BTO/BTL), the BTO option 
is more favourable than the BTL. Considering that earlier completion by 11.55 years in the 
conventional delivery is impractical, the BTO option always seems to be preferable to the BTL 
in reality. 
With respect to the Bujeon-Masan case with risk inclusion, the critical completion delay 
regarding M.VFMBTL is 10.88 years. This means that if the completion in the conventional 
delivery is delayed by up to 10.88 years, the BTL is better than the conventional delivery 
because the regression line regarding M.VFMBTL has a negative slope, differing from the other 
cases. In other words, when a more than 10.88-year completion delay is expected in the 
conventional delivery, the conventional delivery can be a more appropriate delivery option than 
the BTL.  
 
5) The sensitivity analysis results show that, when considering risk inclusion (construction and 
traffic volume risk) and an average completion delay (3.36 years) in the National Railway 
projects, the procurement option selection could change depending on the project and the 
procurement option. For the Sosa-Wonsi case, PPP construction cost is the most influential in 
the M.VFMBTL and M.VFMBTO calculation, whereas BTL lease profitability is the most 
influential in the M.VFMBTL-BTO calculation. With respect to the Bujeon-Masan case, M.VFMBTO, 
BTL construction cost and BTL lease profitability are the most influential factors.  
 
6) Regarding the MCS using 18 risk variables from historical observations, the results from the 
two cases are different. With respect to the Sosa-Wonsi case, as a completion delay goes up, the 
expected values (mean values) of the Modified VFM as well as the probabilities that the PPP 
alternatives are better than the conventional delivery all go up. In addition, the BTO option is 
the most favourable for this case, followed by the BTL.  
On the contrary, with the Bujeon-Masan case, as a completion delay goes up, the expected value 
of Modified VFM and the probability that the BTL option is better than the conventional 
delivery go down. This is because the Bujeon-Masan case has such a small BCR (0.63) that 
M.VFMBTL does not increase but decrease according to completion delay. In other words, the 
increase in the social benefit difference between the PSC and the BTL due to a completion delay 
is smaller than the decrease of the public sector cost in the PSC due to discounting 
 
7) Most significantly, the size of the revenue stream seems to be very important in PPP 
decisions in the National Railway cases. With respect to the Sosa-Wonsi case, considering the 
transferable risks (construction cost risk, traffic volume risk and completion delay), the BTO 
option seems to be the most appropriate option. However, considering the maximum JI HONG PARK    Ch.6 The National Railway Cases 
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governmental subsidy, the BTL can be a practical alternative for the Sosa-Wonsi case because 
the BTO scheme cannot produce an acceptable profit without a subsidy far beyond the subsidy 
limitation.  
In addition, with respect to the Bujeon-Masan, the revenue stream is so small that the BTO 
option cannot produce acceptable profitability even when the Korean government supports all 
the BTO asset cost as a subsidy. 
 
In conclusion, the PPP decisions for the Sosa-Wonsi case and the Bujeon-Masan case to use the 
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Through the six case studies from three transport programmes (the National Highway, the 
National Expressway and the National Railway), it has been shown how the Modified VFM 
results and PPP decisions can be changed depending on whether the transferable risks, such as 
completion delay, construction cost risk and traffic volume risk, are included or not. The aim of 
this chapter is thus to extract some valuable conclusions and insights through analysis of the 
case studies, covering the research objectives 2-2 and 2-3. This chapter concentrates on a case 
or programme-specific analysis which is directly related to the impact of the transferable risks 
and the three transport programmes. 
With respect to the case or programme-specific analysis, this chapter first examines the impact 
of completion delay (7.2), construction cost risk (7.3) and traffic volume risk (7.4) on the 
Modified VFM and PPP decisions in roads and railways in Korea, also providing a brief 
explanation of respective quantified transferable risk. Some detailed discussion on each risk’s 
impact on PPP option selections, the Modified VFM and participants will also be given in this 
chapter. Specifically, regarding the impact of traffic volume risk on participants in BTO projects 
in Korea, a new BTO contract scheme considering traffic volume risk sharing will be suggested 
in order to minimise potential monetary damage that could happen in both the public and private 
sector in the near future, when actual revenue stays far below contract revenue.  
Before suggesting the new traffic volume risk sharing scheme, the general principles for the 
success of a BTO project will also be briefly reviewed. In addition, considering the quantified 
risks and governmental subsidy limitations in Korea, the most favourable PPP option for each 
transport programme is also reviewed here (7.5). 
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7.2 The impact of completion delay 
 
 
7.2.1 Completion delay in the conventional delivery in Korea 
 
Completion delay in construction refers to the time overrun beyond what was initially planned, 
such as the completion time speciﬁed in a contract (Assaf and Al-Hejji, 2006), and it can occur 
due to various unexpected changes in circumstances: 1) contract management; 2) site conditions; 
3) changes in requirements or design; 4) weather; 5) unavailability of labour, material, or 
equipment; 6) defective plans and specifications; and 7) owner’s interference (Bramble and 
Callahan, 2011).  
However, in Korea, completion delay is expected to occur more systematically due to the 
unusual national budget system, i.e. the LEC system (Kim et al., 2008b). According to the LEC 
system,
116 an infrastructure project starts by reflecting its first-year expenditure in the Budget 
Book settled by the National Assembly, even if the total expenditure of the project is not 
secured there. Using this system, too many infrastructure projects compared with the size of the 
budget tend to be implemented by reason of political necessity, such as the requirement to set a 
balanced regional development policy. As a result, each project under construction experiences 
project budget constraints and systematic completion delays occur.  
In order to consider systematic completion delay in the conventional delivery in the calculation 
of the Modified VFM, the completion delay in transport programmes of Korea were quantified 
from the historical observations, as described in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. As shown in Table 7-1, 
completion delays are respectively 2.74, 1.30 and 3.36 years on average in the National 
Highways, the National Expressways and the National Railways.  
 
Table 7-1: Completion delay in transport programmes of Korea 
 
                                         
116 The LEC is outlined in Article 21 of the Act on Contracts, to which the State is a party. The 
inefficiency of the LEC is criticised by NGOs like the Citizen’s Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ). 
The CCEJ (2010) criticised it for inducing too many projects to start without considering the budget 
available.  
National Highway National Expressway National Railway
Completion delay 
(conventional delivery)
2.74 years 1.30 years 3.36 years
Related Section 4.2.1.2 (Figure 4-3) 5.2.1.2 (Figure 5-3) 6.2.1.2 (Table 6-2)JI HONG PARK    Ch.7 Analysis of Case studies 
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7.2.2 The impact of completion delay 
 
The most important finding in this research is that a completion delay in the conventional 
delivery can make a critical impact on quantitative PPP decisions in roads and railways. This is 
because it generally leads to an increase in the Modified VFM by producing the social benefit 
difference between the conventional and the PPP alternatives, which is considered afresh here, 
along with other elements in the calculation of the Modified VFM.  
This result was clearly revealed in five out of the six case studies. As the completion delay 
period in the conventional delivery becomes longer, the Modified VFM tends to increase, which 
means that the viability of the PPP option also increases. In addition, the Monte Carlo 
Simulation results reflecting all the risk variables quantified for this research support this 
finding. As shown in Table 7-2, the probability that the Modified VFM with an average 
completion delay is positive is clearly higher than that with no completion delay. This also 
proves therefore that completion delay could be a very important factor in PPP decisions.  
 
Table 7-2: The Monte Carlo Simulation results for six cases 
 
 
In contrast, in the case of the Bujeon-Masan project, the probability that the BTL option is better 
than the conventional delivery decreases when an average completion delay (3.36 years) is 
included. This is because the BCR of the Bujeon-Masan is so small (0.63
117) that the Modified 
                                         
117 A BCR of 0.63 seems to be too small to be acceptable in investment decision. However, 
notwithstanding low economic feasibility (BCR = 0.63), the Bujeon-Masan project was selected as one of 
30 leading projects for “Mega-city Region Development Strategy”, which was adopted by the Korean 
government in order to achieve the balanced national development with respect to a presidential election 













No delay 37.90% 20.20% 52.30% 45.60% 65.80% 60.30%
Average  delay
* 84.90% 41.00% 90.30% 65.30% 84.90% 57.50%
No delay - - 56.70% 66.50% 80.30% -
Average  delay
* - - 99.60% 76.70% 100% -
No delay - - 55.30% 66.40% 73.60% -
Average  delay
* - - 62.20% 70.60% 79.70% -










National Highway National Expressway National RailwayJI HONG PARK    Ch.7 Analysis of Case studies 
  231   
VFM value slightly decreases when the completion delay is considered. When a project has an 
acceptable BCR, the completion delay usually causes not only the asset cost of the PSC to drop 
by discounting but also the benefit difference between the PSC and the PPP option to rise. 
However, if a project has a small BCR, it could be the case that the decrease in the asset cost of 
the PSC is bigger than the increase in the social benefit difference when considering the 
completion delay. In this case, the Modified VFM could drop, even if a reasonable completion 
delay is considered.  
In addition, the completion delay also affects the selection of PPP alternatives. As seen in Table 
7-2 (the third row), the BTO option seems to be preferable to the BTL when including an 
average completion delay drawn from historical observations. This is because the Modified 
VFM difference between the BTL and the BTO options (M.VFMBTL-BTO) decreases as 
completion is delayed, mainly because the revenue stream becomes reduced due to the 
discounting effect. This implies that as completion is delayed, the BTO option become more and 
more preferable to the BTL option. 
In summary, considering the impact of completion delay, the public sector needs to include the 
completion delay factor in the quantitative PPP decisions in the transport sector in Korea. As 
completion delay in the conventional delivery lengthens, the PPP options become preferable to 
the conventional delivery. In addition, between the PPP options, the BTO becomes preferable to 
the BTL option when a project has an acceptable BCR. In addition, it seems important in PPP 




7.2.3 Critical completion delay 
 
Introduction of critical completion delay 
In this research, in order to identify the impact of a completion delay in the conventional 
delivery on the PPP decisions, the concept of a critical completion delay, making the Modified 
VFM zero, was introduced from the regression lines using completion delays (zero to four years) 
and the Modified VFM values in the six cases. Depending on whether the risk factors 
(construction cost risk or the traffic volume risk) are included or not, the critical completion 
delay for the conventional delivery is changed as in Table 7-3. 
Five of the six cases, regardless of risk inclusion, the regression lines of the Modified VFM 
(M.VFMBTL, M.VFMBTO) have positive slopes, which mean that as a completion delay increases 
the Modified VFM increases. This is because a completion delay leads to an increase in the JI HONG PARK    Ch.7 Analysis of Case studies 
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Modified VFM by producing social benefit difference between the conventional and the PPP 
alternatives. However, in case of the Bujeon-Masan case, the regression line slope changes from 
a positive to a negative value according to risk inclusion. This is because the slope is so close to 
zero that risk inclusion makes it a negative value, which is very close to zero. Accordingly the 
critical completion delay changes drastically (from -39.57 to 10.88), shown in Table 7-3 (the 
last row) 
 
Table 7-3: The critical completion delay in six cases 
 
 
Interpretation of critical completion delay 
When a regression line has a positive slope regardless of risk inclusion, it is clear from Table 7-
3 that, if the expected completion delay of the conventional delivery for a project is larger than 
the critical delay, the right-side delivery method in the delivery selection column in Table 7-3 
(excluding the Bujeon-Masan case) can be selected as a favourable delivery method.  
In addition, the critical completion delay can be effectively used even after a comprehensive 
PPP decision including a quantitative method as well as a qualitative method. As shown in 
Figure 7-1 (a), the critical completion delay with a positive value in Table 7-3 (excluding the 
Bujeon-Masan case) means the lower boundary of the completion delay of the conventional 
delivery in which the right-side delivery method in the delivery selection column in Table 7-3 is 
preferable to the left-side one. As an example, as shown in Figure 7-1 (a), if the conventional 
No risk inclusion Risk inclusion
Todang-Gwansan 
(9.2km, BCR = 2.14)
PSC vs. BTL -0.35 years 0.26 years
Dongup-Hanlim
 (7.3 km, BCR = 1.23)
PSC vs. BTL -0.17 years 1.51 years
PSC vs. BTL -0.31 years -0.16 years
PSC vs. BTO 0.41 years -0.34 years
BTL vs. BTO 3.66 years -1.21 years
PSC vs. BTL -0.63 years 0.02 years
PSC vs. BTO 1.19 years -1.50 years
BTL vs. BTO 3.82 years -3.89 years
PSC vs. BTL 0.15 years -0.10 years
PSC vs. BTO 0.30 years -2.48 years
BTL vs. BTO 0.82 years -11.55 years
Bujeon-Masan
 (32.3km, BCR = 0.63)










The critical completion delay of the 






(38.5km, BCR = 2.72)
Bongdam-Songsan
 (18.5km, BCR = 1.17)
Sosa-Wonsi 
(23.3, BCR = 1.12)
Tranport 
programmeJI HONG PARK    Ch.7 Analysis of Case studies 
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delivery is used to implement the project in the first row of Table 7-3, the government needs to 
draw up a budget in order to complete the project within the lower boundary of the completion 
delay time (0.26 years, risk inclusion case).  
 
 
(a) Critical completion delay with a positive value 
 
(b) Critical completion delay with a negative value 
Figure 7-1: Schematic diagram of the critical completion delay in PPP decisions 
 
Conversely, as shown in Figure 7-1 (b), the critical completion delay with a negative value in 
Table 7-3 means the upper boundary of the delay in starting construction in the PPP delivery, 
compared with the conventional delivery. For example, from the first row in Table 7-3, even 
when a delay in starting construction in the BTL option, compared with the conventional JI HONG PARK    Ch.7 Analysis of Case studies 
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delivery, is within 0.35 years (shown as -0.35 in Table 7-3), the BTL option (the right-side 
delivery method in the delivery method section column) is preferable to the PSC (the left-side 
one). A delay in starting construction can occur for various reasons, such as a delayed 
negotiation or a delay in private fund agreements. Therefore, if the BTL delivery is decided on 
to implement the case study project, the government seems to need to make a greater effort to 
break ground within the upper boundary (0.35 years) of the delay in starting construction delay 
in the BTL. In addition, when a delay in starting construction becomes longer than the upper 
boundary (0.35 years), it seems that the previous PPP decision becomes invalid and therefore 
that a new decision should be made for the project. According to the master plan of PPP (MOSF, 
2009b) of Korea, a PPP option already decided for a project can be replaced with a conventional 
option and vice versa when it is difficult to conduct the already decided option. However, there 
are no examples that a PPP option is replaced with a conventional option seemingly because 
there are not clear criteria for the decision change. The concept of critical completion delay can 
be used as one of the decision change criteria when it is necessary (Park and Preston, 2013a).  
 
The behaviour of critical completion delays according to risk inclusion 
Depending on whether the risks (construction cost risk and traffic volume risk) are included or 
not, the critical completion delay seems to show differing behaviours between roads and 
railways.  
With respect to the comparison between the conventional delivery and the BTL (PSC vs. BTL 
rows in Table 7-3), for the road case studies the regression line moves to the right, which means 
the critical completion delay increases when construction cost risk and traffic volume risk are 
included (Figure 7-2 (a) roads). This is because the regression line has a positive slope with an 
acceptable BCR, and the intercept of the Modified VFM axis goes down according to risk 
inclusion. For roads, the reason for the decrease in the intercept of the Modified VFM is that 
construction cost risk reduces the asset cost of the PSC; also, the traffic volume risk causes the 
operation cost of the PSC to decrease. Accordingly, the Modified VFM goes down as these risks 
are included.  
On the other hand, for railway case studies (Figure 7-2 (a) rail), when including construction 
cost risk and traffic volume risk, the regression line moves to the left, indicating that the critical 
completion delay decreases, as opposed to roads. This is because the regression line has a 
positive slope with an acceptable BCR, and the intercept of the Modified VFM axis increases 
according to risk inclusion. In railways, the reason for the increase in the intercept of the 
Modified VFM is that the increase of the asset cost of the PSC due to construction cost risk is 
bigger than the decrease in the operation cost of the PSC due to traffic volume risk. However, in 
the case of the Bujeon-Masan project, the slope of the regression line seems to be close to zero JI HONG PARK    Ch.7 Analysis of Case studies 
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because it has such a small BCR (0.63). Accordingly, in contrast to the Sosa-Wonsi case, the 
critical completion delay varies markedly (from -39.57 to 10.88) according to the inclusion of 
the risks.   
When it comes to a comparison between the conventional delivery and the BTO (PSC vs. BTO 
in Table 7-2), as shown in Figure 7-2 (b), the critical completion delay moves to the left when 
construction cost risk and traffic volume risk are included. This is because the regression line 
has a positive slope and the intercept of the Modified VFM axis goes up. The increase of the 
Modified VFM is mainly due to the decrease in the revenue stream, as shown in equation (3-7).  
 
< Roads > 
 
< Rail > 
(a) M.VFMBTL 
 
< Roads/Rail > 
 
< Roads/Rail > 
(b) M.VFMBTO  (c) M.VFMBTL-BTO 
Figure 7-2: The behaviour of critical completion delay according to risk inclusion JI HONG PARK    Ch.7 Analysis of Case studies 
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In addition, in the comparison between the BTL and the BTO (BTL vs. BTO in Table 7-2), as 
show in Figure 7-2 (c), the critical completion delay moves to the left when the risks are 
included because the regression line has a negative slope and the intercept of the Modified VFM 
axis goes down mainly due to the decrease in the revenue stream.  
These different behaviours are due to the components of the Modified VFM in the delivery 
option comparison (equations (3-7), (3-8) and (3-9)); they are also the result of the discounting 





7.3 The impact of construction cost risk 
 
 
7.3.1 Application ratio for the asset cost of the PSC 
 
According to Korea’s BTL guidelines (MOSF, 2009a), the asset cost of the PSC is calculated by 
multiplying an average WBR (the ratio of winner’s price to estimated price) of the turn-
key/alternative bid
118 and the construction cost from the design stage. The reason for using an 
average WBR of turn-key/alternative bids is that these bid systems usually do not allow 
construction cost increases, except in the case of inflation and when the delivery authority is 
responsible for the increases. This means the public sector does not have to consider 
construction cost overruns when estimating the asset cost for the PSC.  
However, although some projects use a turn-key/alternative bid, the typical bid system in terms 
of conventional delivery is not turn-key/alternative bid but design-bid-build. Additionally, it 
remains unclear how much the construction cost will rise between the start of construction and 
completion in each transport programme in Korea.  
For this reason, in this research, a substitute for an average WBR of turn-key/alternative bid – 
which I call the application ratio (equation (3-10)) – is developed using historical observations. 
                                         
118 Public works in Korea are delivered using turn-key bid, alternative bid and design-bid-build. In turn-
key and alternative bids, the designer selected through bidding process becomes the contractor for the 
project, whereas in design-bid-build bid the designer and the contractor are different each other. The 
difference between turn-key and alternative bid is a design scope. In turn-key bid, the design scope is all 
the parts of the project, whereas in alternative bid it is restricted to main part of the project which a 
delivery authority determines.   JI HONG PARK    Ch.7 Analysis of Case studies 
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An application ratio is composed of the WBR risk and construction cost overrun risk quantified 
from historical observations, as mentioned in Chapter 3 (see 3.4.3.1). In addition, an average 
WBR of turn-key/alternative bids by Korea’s BTL guidelines (MOSF, 2009a) can be a kind of 
application ratio with no construction cost overrun.
119 With respect to this, the impact of 
construction cost risk in each transport programme is shown in Table 7-4. 
 
 
7.3.2 The impact on transport programmes 
 
National Highways 
As seen in Table 7-4, the impact of considering construction cost risk is different depending on 
the transport programmes. For the National Highways, the application ratio (construction cost 
risk) from historical observations is quantified as 84.58 per cent, which is 3.97 per cent lower 
than an average WBR of turn-key/alternative bid (88.55 per cent) based on Korea’s BTL 
guidelines (MOSF, 2009a). This is because the representative bid system for the National 
Highways is not turn-key/alternative but design-bid-build and the WBRs of design-bid-build are 
usually lower than those of turn-key/alternative bid. In addition, even if construction cost 
overrun risk is included, the application ratio from historical observations is lower than that 
based on Korea’s BTL guidelines, which means an average WBR of turn-key/alternative bid. 
Due to this difference, when construction cost risk is included, namely when an application ratio 
from the historical observations is used instead of an average WBR of turn-key/alternative bids 
in the National Highway projects, the Modified VFM is reduced by 4.6 (billion KRW) in the 
Todang-Gwansan case, and by 4.3 (billion KRW) in the Dongup-Hanlim case. Accordingly, 
when estimating the Modified VFM of a National Highway project using Korea’s BTL 
guidelines, the Modified VFM appears to be overestimated by 3.97 per cent on the construction 
cost of the PSC, compared with that using the historical observations. 
 
National Expressways 
As with the National Highways, when estimating the Modified VFM using Korea’s BTL 
guidelines (MOSF, 2009a), the Modified VFM can also be exaggerated. The application ratio 
(construction cost risk) from the historical observations is quantified as 78.80 per cent, which is 
3.34 per cent lower than an average WBR of turn-key/alternative bids (82.14 per cent) based on 
                                         
119 From equation (3-10), an application ratio can be expressed as (winning bid ratio) × (1+construction 
cost overrun) when using historical observations. Considering an average turn-key/alternative winning 
bid ratio without construction cost overrun according to Korea’s BTL guidelines, an application ratio in 
equation (3-10) becomes simply the average turn-key/alternative winning bid ratio. JI HONG PARK    Ch.7 Analysis of Case studies 
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Korea’s BTL guidelines (MOSF, 2009a). Due to this difference, when construction cost risk is 
included, the Modified VFM decreases by 16.6 (billion KRW) in the Suwon-Pyungtaek case 
and by 9.1 (billion KRW) in the Bongdam-Songsan case.  
 
Table 7-4: Impact of construction cost risk in six cases 
 
Note: 1) An application ratio is (WBR) × (1+construction cost overrun) when using historical observations. It also 
means the WBR of turn-key/alternative bids without construction cost overrun by Korea’s BTL guidelines. 2) and 3) 
are obtained from the status of WBRs of turn-key/alternative bids in National Highways and National Expressways 
(MLTM, 2012b), based on Korea’s BTL guidelines (MOSF, 2009a). 4) is obtained from Kim et al. (2008a). 5) The 
values are estimated considering construction cost weights because the National Railways are usually delivered by six 




On the other hand, with respect to the National Railways, the application ratio (construction cost 
risk) from historical observations considering construction cost weights are 93.02 and 91.86 per 
cent in the Sosa-Wonsi case and in the Bujeon-Masan case respectively, whereas the average 
WBR of turn-key/alternative bid is 90.71 per cent between 2000 and 2007, according to Kim et 
al. (2008a). This means that the application ratios from historical observations are respectively 
2.31 and 1.15 per cent higher than an average WBR of turn-key/alternative bids, based on 
Korea’s BTL guidelines (MOSF, 2009a).  In fact, the typical bid system for the National 
Railway is design-bid-build as with road programmes and WBRs of design-bid-build are 
usually lower than those of turn-key/alternative bid. However, the construction cost overrun 
ratios of six major work elements in the National Railways are much higher than that of road 
projects, as given in Table 6-1. Accordingly the application ratio with construction cost weights 
exceeds the average WBR of turn-key/alternative bids based on Korea’s BTL guidelines. 
Due to these differences, when construction cost risk is included, the Modified VFM increases 
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case. In other words, when estimating the Modified VFM of a National Railway project using 
Korea’s BTL guidelines (MOSF, 2009a), it appears that the Modified VFM can be 
underestimated, compared with the estimation using the historical observations.  
 
Reason for the difference  
Compared with the results of the National Highways and the National Expressways, the results 
for the National Railways are quite different. When estimating the Modified VFM using 
Korea’s BTL guidelines (MOSF, 2009a), the Modified VFM can be exaggerated in road 
projects, while it can be underestimated in railway projects, compared with the estimation using 
the historical observations. In other words, when using Korea’s BTL guidelines (MOSF, 2009a), 
PPP options can have an advantage over the conventional option in roads. In contrast, with 
railways the conventional option has an advantage over the PPP options.  
This difference between roads and railways seems to come from whether a project is delivered 
separately on the work element basis or not. It seems that a separate delivery with six different 
contracts for major elements in railways could cause more inefficiency than a single delivery in 
roads, showing bigger construction cost overruns. According to Lee (2002) and Yu (2001), the 
separate contract system in the Korean construction industry could cause inefficiency in terms 
of construction cost and duration because of the difficulties of collaboration and coordination 
among contractors. With respect to this, the National Bureau of Economic Research of the 
United States revealed that New York State’s compulsory multiple contractor system could 




7.4 The impact of traffic volume risk 
 
 
7.4.1 Impact on PPP option selection 
 
The details of changes of traffic volume in individual projects are difficult to obtain, so traffic 
volume risk (actual traffic volume divided by forecast traffic volume) is quantified using the 
relevant literature. As shown in Table 7-4, the quantified traffic volume risk (mean value) of 
roads is estimated at 0.686, and that of railways is 0.507. 
When considering traffic volume risk, the behaviour of the Modified VFM is different 
depending on the PPP option considered. In the BTL option, the Modified VFM drops relatively JI HONG PARK    Ch.7 Analysis of Case studies 
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slightly. As seen in Table 7-5 (percentage on PSC asset cost columns), the Modified VFM drops 
by as much as from 0.7 to 4.2 per cent on the asset cost of the PSC depending on project and 
transport programme, because the maintenance cost in the PSC is reduced as the traffic volume 
ratio (actual/forecast) goes down, as is assumed in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.  
 
Table 7-5: Impact of traffic volume risk on transport programmes 
 
Note: 1) There are no comments on traffic volume risk in Korea’s BTL guidelines, so it is assumed that actual traffic 
is the same as forecast traffic in this research. 2) 0.686 is obtained by digitising the traffic volume inaccuracy graph in 
the road sector in the research of Kim (2007). 3) 0.507 is quantified using the following literature on railway traffic 
volume changes: i) Kim (2010b); ii) MLTM, quoted in Gil (2012); and iii) Park (2012). Detailed data for rail are 
shown in Table 6-3. 
 
However, in the BTO option, when including the mean value of the traffic volume risk, the 
Modified VFM soars by as much as from 13.5 to 39.2 per cent of the asset cost of the PSC 
depending on project and transport programme, mainly because the revenue stream, which 
causes the Modified VFM to decrease according to equation (3-7), is reduced as the traffic 
volume ratio (actual/forecast) goes down. Following the considerable change in the Modified 
VFM by traffic volume risk, the most favourable delivery option changes from the BTL to the 
BTO option in all the cases with tariffs (the Suwon-Pyungtaek case, the Bongdam-Songsan case 
and the Sosa-Wonsi case).  
 
 
7.4.2 Impact on participants in BTO projects 
 
Cooperation between participants 
Whether to initiate the BTO option for a project or not can depend on the participants, as shown 
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BTO option can produce more VFM than any other options in terms of the Modified VFM. 
However, the private sector, especially financial investors, will only participate in the BTO 
project when they can gain acceptable profit above a certain level in terms of a return on 
investment (ROI), which is usually not open to the public because it is considered as 
confidential business. Apart from construction investors, who usually participate in the project 
to obtain the right to construct, financial investors participate in order to maximise financial 
profits by mixing equity, senior debt and subordinate debt. In addition, usually the private 
financial investors invest in the project when the IRR of the project is equal or greater than the 
minimum acceptable rate of return (Greer and Kolbe, 2003, Moyer et al., 2012), ROI is related 
to the IRR of the project, because IRR shows that the project is an attractive investment.  
Therefore, in order to launch a BTO project, the project must show performances above an 
acceptable level in terms of the Modified VFM assessment, IRR and ROI. In this sense, 
participants should be aware that a BTO project can be launched only when it passes two 
different decision-making procedures in both sectors, regardless of which method it uses (i.e. 
solicited or unsolicited method), as seen in Figure7-3. As a result, mutual consideration and 
cooperation between participants in a BTO are a prerequisite for the success of a BTO project.   
 
Why traffic volume risk sharing in Korea? 
In Korea, the biggest threat to a BTO project after launch seems to be a shortfall of revenue due 
to traffic volume risk. A revenue shortfall causes the IRR of the project to decrease, which is 
related not only to the profit of the private sector but also to the provision of infrastructure 
services. Therefore, traffic volume risk sharing becomes important to both participants in terms 
of the mutual consideration and cooperation between participants in a BTO project.  
There are two reasons why traffic volume risk needs to be shared in Korea. The first reason is 
that private sector does not seem to manage traffic volume risk sufficiently. According to some 
research (Ke et al., 2010, Roumboutsos and Anagnostopoulos, 2008, Li et al., 2005), operation 
revenue risk, which is directly related to traffic volume risk, should be taken on by the private 
sector, based on questionnaire surveys in several countries, such as the UK, China, Hong Kong 
and Greece. However, in some environments where traffic volumes are mainly dependent on 
economic development, fuel price and other macro-economic variables, it is difficult for the 
private sector to fully take on this risk (Mackie and Smith, 2005). Generally speaking, it is 
inadvisable to transfer too much risk to the private sector on the grounds that the private sector 
has better risk management ability than the public sector, because transferring excessive risk 
could make the total cost of the public sector increase instead of decrease (Sun et al., 2010, 
Cooper et al., 2005). Therefore, appropriate traffic volume risk sharing seems to be essential in 
a BTO. JI HONG PARK    Ch.7 Analysis of Case studies 




Figure 7-3: Decision-making determinants of participants in the BTO scheme 
 
The second reason is related to the efficiency of private sector financing for a BTO project. In 
Korea, the operation revenue sharing system, MRG, was abolished in 2009. After that, BTO 
projects have experienced difficulties in delivering required capital from the finance market, 
because financial institutes tend to think BTO projects are very risky without MRG condition so 
they are reluctant to lend money to them (Park, 2010). As a result, after the abolition of MRG, 
the start of construction of many BTO projects has been delayed in Korea. Accordingly, 
appropriate traffic volume risk sharing seems to be a prerequisite for the smooth progress of 
BTO projects in Korea. 
 
Impact of traffic volume risk on participants 
Suppose there is a BTO contract without traffic volume risk sharing scheme contract 1 in Table 
7-6. In this case, the private sector fully takes on the risk, which is actually beyond its ability, 
regardless of revenue ratio (R, actual revenue/contract revenue).  JI HONG PARK    Ch.7 Analysis of Case studies 
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Table 7-6: Impact of traffic volume risk on participants and related suggestions 
 
Note: 1) Investment ratio; i) public sector = all subsidy / (private sector investment + all subsidy), ii) private sector = 
private sector investment/(private sector investment + all subsidy); 2) Current governmental construction subsidy 
limit: i) roads = 30 per cent; and ii) railways = 50 per cent of the asset cost of the BTO (MOSF, 2010). 
 
To begin with, the ideal situation is that contract revenue is realised in practice (R=1). In this 
case, each participant will be fully satisfied with the situation. 
If actual revenue is above the contract revenue (R>1), the two parties will be overall satisfied 
with a stable infrastructure service provision for the public sector and more profit than expected 
for the private sector. However, if excessive revenues occur and are not shared between two 
parties, this situation, in fact, could be more than satisfactory for the private sector but less than 
satisfactory for the public sector.  
In addition, when actual revenue is slightly below the contract revenue, the SPV becomes 
unstable because the cash inflow and the IRR of the project drop. At the same time, the ROI for 
financial investors also drop because dividends will be diminished. Although this situation is 
not fully satisfying from an investor’s point of view, it still seems to be bearable because the 
profits are mainly from interest on debts. On the other hand, the public sector feels superficially 
satisfied regardless of how much actual revenue occurs because it does not have to pay any 
more. The contract seems ideal to the public sector in this aspect.  
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However, if actual revenue falls far below contract revenue (R<<1), the situation can be serious 
for the both sectors. In the event of a serious revenue shortfall, the SPV can go into bankruptcy, 
which can mean it cannot provide infrastructure services for the public and cannot pay 
dividends and interest to the private sector. Therefore, the bankruptcy of the SPV means a great 
loss to the both sectors. In this case, the project fails to obtain its ultimate objective: 
infrastructure service provision. The public sector is not free from the responsibility for the 
failure.   
Consequently, a BTO contract without traffic volume risk sharing undermines the principle of 
mutual consideration and cooperation and is also unfair. In the end, it would be too risky for the 
both participants.  
 
How to share traffic volume risk: a suggestion 
According to Irwin (2005), various fiscal supports from the public sector are applied to share 
traffic volume risk in PPPs globally, considering each country’s PPP environment. These 
include: shadow-toll (the UK and Portugal); annuity or availability payment (India and central 
Europe); debt guarantee (Poland); exchange rate guarantee (Chile and Colombia); and revenue 
guarantee (Korea). 
However, the MRG system was abolished in 2009, so there is no traffic risk sharing system in 
Korea. In addition, considering the existing economic burden
120 from the previous BTO 
contracts with the MRG system that public sector should take in the future (BAI, 2012) and the 
public’s unfavourable view of the MRG system and the traffic volume forecast (Jung, 2011, 
Kang, 2012), it seems impossible to re-introduce the MRG system in the BTO scheme. Thus, 
instead of the MRG system a new risk sharing method is suggested for Korea, as shown in 
Table 7-6 (contract 2).  
The essence of this suggestion is to depreciate the value of a BTO project by reducing the 
contract revenue stream, considering the traffic volume risk, if the BTO project is viable in this 
case. In doing so, the public sector pays a higher subsidy and the private sector accepts reduced 
profitability (IRR), compared with the current contract scheme (contract 1 in Table 7-6). For the 
both participants to take some loss in terms of mutual consideration and cooperation, the project 
is expected to provide a good and stable infrastructure service. The suggestion in the BTO 
option has three advantages.  
                                         
120 The MRG burden in the future is expected to be 18.5 trillion KRW from the previous BTO projects, 
according to BAI (2012). JI HONG PARK    Ch.7 Analysis of Case studies 
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The first is that this method considers the reduced revenue stream as reflecting traffic volume 
risk instead of forecast revenue in order to avoid an extreme cost burden for each participant. 
This is shown in contract 2 in Table 7-6. Accordingly, this method means that the public sector 
takes some traffic volume risk beforehand by giving more construction subsidies to the SPV, 
compared with the existing contract method, which does not require risk to be taken on 
beforehand (contract 1 in Table 7-6). 
The second is that this method considers governmental construction subsidy limitations with 
respect to fiscal support. Thus, if a total construction subsidy for an acceptable IRR and an 
acceptable toll level is beyond the government limitation, the BTO option should be discarded 
and other options will need to be considered.  
The third, and most important, advantage relates to sharing the excessive or deficient revenue 
(or IRR) between participants. In other words, when actual revenue is beyond contract revenue, 
considering the reduced revenue stream, the excess more than the contract revenue is shared, 
being based on how much each party invests in the project (investment ratio). Similarly, when 
actual revenue is below contract revenue, the deficiency is also shared considering the 
investment ratio. In this case, the public sector will be able to consider the following ways to 
address its deficiency: 1) the provision of further fiscal support; 2) toll level adjustment; and 3) 
operation duration adjustment
121.  
The bottom line of the suggestion is to make the two parties make a profit or loss according to 
how much they invest in the project. In addition, generally speaking, the public sector provides 
compensation cost as well as construction subsidy in the BTO option in Korea, so the case that 
the private sector takes all the revenue risk does not happen.  
In addition, the suggestion is similar to the cap and collar mechanism
122 in the rail franchise bid 
in the UK, in that the excessive and deficient revenue is shared between the public sector and 
the private sector in order to protect taxpayers as well as the private sector exogenous revenue 
                                         
121 Operation duration adjustment is related to a variable length contract. In this respect, the suggestion 
has something in common with the Least-Present-Value-of-Revenue Auction scheme where the lowest 
bid in terms of revenue wins and the contract ends as soon as that amount has been collected (Engel et al., 
2001). 
122 The cap-and-collar mechanism was introduced in the rail franchise in the UK in 2003 and abandoned 
with the change of government in 2010, when it was replaced by a GDP factor in some cases. The cap-
and-collar mechanism shares revenue risk between participants, recognising that the private sector has not 
the ability to control a significant portion of revenue growth or decline, though revenues are intrinsically 
related not only to the general pattern of economy and employment, but also to the performance by the 
rail operator (Stokes and Demmer, 2012). JI HONG PARK    Ch.7 Analysis of Case studies 
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risk (DfT, 2010, Brown, 2013). However, it differs markedly from the cap-and-collar 
mechanism in that excessive or deficient revenue is shared based on how much each participant 
invests in the project (investment ratio), whereas revenue risk sharing is conducted based on the 
revenue sharing threshold parameters that the bidders propose in the bidding process 
(Competition Commission, 2006). In fact, the cap and collar mechanism has following typical 
revenue risk sharing features when the first four years have passed after the franchise contract 
(or earlier where negotiations have occurred): 1) Department for Transport (DfT) shares 50% of 
any fares revenues exceeding 102% of the train operation company (TOC)’s original forecasts; 
2) DfT gives a support equivalent to 50% of any revenue shortfall below 98% of the TOC’s 




Gil (2012) claimed that the appropriate MRG level for a BTO project can be determined using 
the difference of the saved public sector cost (M.VFM BTL-BTO in this research) by adopting the 
BTO scheme instead of the BTL scheme, meaning a saved public sector cost by transferring 
traffic volume risk to the private sector. With respect to the suggestion in this study, the saved 
public sector cost by transferring volume risk (M.VFM BTL-BTO) can be used in designing a new 
restriction on the total governmental subsidy limitation.  
With respect to the Suwon-Pyungtaek National Expressway case, an example calculation of the 
monetary loss of the two parties with various approaches to traffic volume risk sharing is shown 
in Table 7-7.  It is assumed that contract 1 is awarded by using forecast revenue stream with 
traffic volume risk unknown, while contract 2 is awarded by using reduced revenue stream 
considering road traffic volume risk (0.686, see Figure 4-4) and an additional construction 
subsidy. As seen in Table 7-7, contract 1 includes three cases; no MRG condition, stepwise 
MRG condition (which is practically applied to the Suwon-Pyungtaek case), and Gil’s approach. 
Following Gil’s approach, the marginal traffic volume that makes M.VFM BTL-BTO zero is 75.5 
per cent of forecast volume and the additional subsidy that can be given to the private sector is 
25.3 billion KRW in the Suwon-Pyungtaek case, which is the difference between the BTO and 
the BTL in terms of the Modified VFM shown in Table 5-3 (the third row). Therefore, 
additional construction subsidy (25.3 billion KRW) is applied to contract 2. In addition, the IRR 
is estimated using equation (6-1) (see Section 6.3.3). 
With respect to contract 1, when actual revenue decreases below the forecast, revenue shortage 
occurs and becomes a private sector monetary loss. The monetary loss of the public sector 
means the MRG cost that is given to the private sector, so this makes the private sector 
monetary loss reduced. Comparing the monetary loss of the two parties in contract 1, Gil’s JI HONG PARK    Ch.7 Analysis of Case studies 
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approach is most favourable to the private sector because the public sector gives the most 
monetary support to the private sector. For example, when actual revenue drops to half of the 
forecast one, the public sector gives an MRG support of 88.1 (billion KRW) according to Gil’s 
approach, while MRG support is only 71.7 (billion KRW) in stepwise MRG condition. The total 
public sector loss in Gil’s approach becomes 171.6 (billion KRW), while that in stepwise MRG 
condition becomes 188.0 (billion KRW).  
When it comes to contract 2, revenue shortage starts to occur when actual revenue drops below 
68.6 per cent of the forecast one because contract revenue considers road traffic volume risk 
(0.686) from the historical observations. In addition, additional construction subsidy (25.3 
billion KRW) makes the private sector investment reduced, so it can help the contract 
profitability (IRR) of the SPV increase. The impact of traffic volume risk on BTO viability is 
addressed separately in the next section (7.4.3).  
 
Table 7-7: Example calculation of the monetary loss for the two parties 
(Unit: discounted billion KRW, 2002 price) 
 
 
Comparing contract 1 with contract 2, the monetary loss of the private sector is minimal in 
contract 2. For example, when actual revenue drops to half of the forecast one, the total public 
sector loss in Gil’s approach (contract 1) becomes 171.6 (billion KRW), while that in contract 2 
becomes 39.6 (billion KRW). In addition, contract 2 can also make money
123 for the private 
sector when actual revenue is greater than contract revenue (0.686× forecast revenue). However, 
                                         



























1.2 -103.9 0.0 -103.9 (9.46) 0.0 -103.9 (9.46) 0.0 -103.9 (9.46) -266.8 25.3 -132.3 -109.2 (7.09)
1.1 -52.0 0.0 -52.0 (8.64) 0.0 -52.0 (8.64) 0.0 -52.0 (8.64) -214.9 25.3 -101.6 -87.9 (6.68)
1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 (7.78) 0.0 0.0 (7.78) 0.0 0.0 (7.78) -162.9 25.3 -70.9 -66.7 (6.25)
0.9 52.0 0.0 52.0 (6.83) 0.0 52.0 (6.83) 0.0 52.0 (6.83) -111.0 25.3 -40.3 -45.4 (5.80)
0.8 103.9 0.0 103.9 (5.81) 0.0 103.9 (5.81) 0.0 103.9 (5.81) -59.0 25.3 -9.6 -24.2 (5.34)
0.755 127.5 0.0 127.5 (5.31) 5.7 121.8 (5.41) 0.0 127.5 (5.31) -35.4 25.3 4.4 -14.5 (5.12)
0.7 155.9 0.0 155.9 (4.68) 12.5 143.3 (4.90) 18.9 137.0 (5.06) -7.1 25.3 21.1 -2.9 (4.85)
0.686 162.9 0.0 162.9 (4.52) 15.9 147.0 (4.80) 23.6 139.3 (4.99) 0.0 25.3 25.3 0.0 (4.78)
0.6 207.8 0.0 207.8 (3.40) 37.1 170.7 (4.12) 53.5 154.3 (4.54) 44.9 25.3 51.8 18.4 (4.34)
0.5 259.8 0.0 259.8 (1.92) 71.7 188.0 (3.47) 88.1 171.6 (3.95) 96.8 25.3 82.5 39.6 (3.80)
Revenue ratio
(actual/forecast)
(Note) 1. Loss (G) = the loss of the public sector, Loss (P) = the loss of the private sector.  2. IRR = internal rate of return (real). 3. Above table was analysed based on
M.VFM BTL-BTO (+volume risks) in Table 5-3 (Section 5.3.4.1). 4. Stepwise = the MRG condition of the Suwon-Pyungtaek case (the government guarantees up to 80% (1 to 5
years), 70% (6 to 10 years) and 60% (11 to 15 years) and redeems revenue exceeding 120% (1 to 5 years), 130% (6 to 10 years) and 140% (11 to 15 years)  . 5. Gil's
approach = MRG condition is determined to 75.5% (1 to 15 years) which makes M.VFMBTL-BTO zero. 6. For contract 2, the government investment includes compensation
cost (567.8 billion KRW), construction subsidy (248.5 billion KRW) and additional construction subsidy (25.3 billion KRW), and the private sector investment is 583.1
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for the public sector, losses start to occur when actual revenue falls below approximately 76.9 
per cent
124 of the forecast. These losses exceed the MRG Stepwise when actual revenue falls 
below 74.8 per cent
125 of the forecast and is higher than Gil’s suggestion when actual revenue 
falls below 76.9 per cent
126 of the forecast. Other example calculations for the Bongdam-
Songsan case and the Sosa-Wonsi case also show that contract 2 minimises the private sector 
monetary loss compared to contract 1 (see Appendix F).   
In addition, with this new traffic volume risk sharing scheme, both sectors can avoid the worst 
case scenario (the bankruptcy of the SPV and the failure of service provision) that could happen 
to a BTO project in Korea in the near future. Also, the suggestion seems to help prevent 
unanticipated consequences, such as the moral hazard of the private sector, which can occur in 
the MRG system and cap-and-collar mechanism by directly linking the effort to make revenue 
increase of the private sector to their profits. In terms of moral hazard, the MRG system could 
inflate the revenue stream of the project which is proposed by the private sector because inflated 
revenue means more profits for the private sector (Song, 2011), and the private sector can make 
profits without the effort to make the revenue increase given MRG conditions. With respect to 
the cap-and-collar mechanism, it can almost inevitably cause the moral hazard behaviour of the 
private sector by sharing revenue risk, which leads bidders to submit and win based on the 
tactics that have the chance of winning, requiring more generous terms for the train operation 
company (Kain, 2007) though rogue bids with excessively high revenue forecasts can be 
detected. 
Using this new contract scheme, it seems that a BTO contract will be fairer and more reasonable 
for the both participants, and the BTO option will then be more attractive in the PPP market in 
Korea.  
 
   
                                         
124 In contract 2 (Loss (G) column), the loss of the public sector is zero when revenue ratio 
(actual/forecast) becomes 76.9 per cent. 
125 When revenue ratio (actual/forecast) becomes 74.8 per cent, the loss of the public sector in the MRG 
stepwise condition in contract 1 becomes equal to that in contract 2, which is 6.58 (billion KRW). 
126 When revenue ratio (actual/forecast) becomes 76.9 per cent, the loss of the public sector in contract  2 
becomes equal to that in Gil’s approach contract 1, the value of which is zero (billion KRW). JI HONG PARK    Ch.7 Analysis of Case studies 
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7.4.3 Impact on BTO viability 
 
Generally speaking, the concept of IRR
127, shown in equation (6-1), is used by private investors 
to estimate and compare the profitability of a project in a capital investment decision. In 
particular, if the IRR of a project is equal or greater than the minimum acceptable rate of return, 
the project can be invested in by the private financial investors (Greer and Kolbe, 2003, Moyer 
et al., 2012). However, it is difficult to know the minimum acceptable rate of return for financial 
investors because it is not open to the public and considered as a confidential.  
With respect to this, in order to assess the BTO viability of the National Expressways in Seoul 
metropolitan region, the Korea Research Institute for Human Settlements (KRIHS, 2008) 
suggested 5.0 per cent (real) as a minimum acceptable IRR for the BTO viability, based on the 
six suggested BTO projects
128. Using this information, the BTO viability of three projects (the 
Suwon-Pyungtaek case, the Bongdam-Songsan case and the Sosa-Wonsi case) considering 
contract 2 scheme can be reviewed. 
To begin with, in case of the Suwon-Pyungtaek case, it seems possible to be implemented by 
BTO option when using contract 2 is applied, though the IRR is reduced from 7.78 (contract 1 
in Table 7-7) to 4.78 per cent (real) (contract 2 in Table 7-7), which is lower than 5 per cent 
(real). This is because most of revenue risk is reduced for the private sector, so this project using 
BTO option can be attractive to the private sector. 
In case of the Bongdam-Songsan case, the IRR is reduced from 5.77 (contract 1 in Appendix F) 
to 2.7 per cent (real) (contract 2 in Appendix F). It seems difficult for this project to get BTO 
funding from the private sector because the IRR is too low even if most of the revenue risk is 
reduced for the private sector. This implies that the BTL option without traffic volume risk 
could be better than the BTO option including traffic volume risk. In addition, this result 
indicates that contract 2 (the suggestion) can be meaningful only when revenue stream is so 
sufficient that the BTO can be viable even if traffic volume risk is considered in estimating the 
IRR. 
When it comes to the Sosa-Wonsi case, the IRR drops to a negative value when including traffic 
volume risk regardless of contract 1 and contract 2 (Appendix F). This means that the BTO is 
not viable for this project, which is in agreement with Chapter 6 (section 6.5). 
                                         
127 As show in equation (6-1), the IRR means the discount rate that the net present value of cash inflows 
equals to that of cash outflows. 
128 The six projects include Seoul-Choonchun, Suwon-Pyungtaek, Pyungtaek-Sihung, Incheon-Gimpo, 
Anyang-Sungnam and Yongin-Seoul. JI HONG PARK    Ch.7 Analysis of Case studies 
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In the National Highway cases, when considering the transferable risks (completion delay, 
construction cost risk and traffic volume risk), the BTL option is more favourable than the 
conventional delivery for both the Todang-Gwansan case and the Dongup-Hanlim case. 
However, some different results were revealed when the Monte Carlo Simulations were 
conducted, considering eight other risks (three maintenance cost risks, construction deflator, 
consumer price index (CPI), five-year exchequer bond interest rate and three-year non-
guaranteed corporate bond interest rate), as well as three transferable risks. Although the BTL 
option is still favourable in the Todang-Gwansan case, this is no longer the case in the Dongup-
Hanlim case. This difference seems to occur because some analysis factors estimated by 
following Korea’s BTL guidelines (MOSF, 2009a) differ considerably from their expected 
values (mean value), as derived from historical observations. For example, the five-year 
exchequer bond interest rate in the single-value estimation method is 3.77 per cent, while the 
historical observations produce 5.10 per cent as an expected value. As the five-year exchequer 
bond interest rate is directly related to BTL profitability, it can cause the Monte Carlo 
Simulation result of M.VFMBTL to drop considerably.  
Therefore, it is hard to definitively determine whether the BTL or the conventional option is 
more favourable in the National Highway programme. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable, if 
possible, to apply the Monte Carlo Simulation using historical risk observations. 
 
National Expressways 
With respect to the National Expressway cases, when considering the transferable risks 
(completion delay, construction cost risk and traffic volume risk), PPP alternatives are better 
than the conventional option in terms of the Modified VFM. Between PPP alternatives, the BTO 
option is the most favourable for the Suwon-Pyungtaek case as well as the Bongdam-Songsan 
case. In addition, this result is also supported by the Monte Carlo Simulation results. 
However, when estimating the IRR considering traffic volume risk, the BTO viability of the 
Bongdam-Songsan seems difficult to be achieved.  
Accordingly, it is difficult to definitely determine whether the BTO or the BTL is more 
favourable for the National Expressway programme. Nevertheless, it is possible to draw a 
careful conclusion that the BTO option is the most favourable for the National Expressway JI HONG PARK    Ch.7 Analysis of Case studies 
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programme, provided that the BTO viability can be achieved in terms of the IRR when traffic 
volume risk is included. 
 
National Railways 
When it comes to the National Railways, theoretically the BTO seems to be the most favourable 
option, as for the National Expressway, if the revenue stream is so large that the BTO option 
can be an affordable option within the limitations of governmental subsidy. Unfortunately, 
however, the BTO option cannot be considered in the Bujeon-Masan case because this project 
cannot produce the required level of profitability for the BTO option however much 
governmental support is given. Similarly, in the Sosa-Wonsi case, the BTO option can show 
acceptable profitability only when the governmental subsidy is far beyond a reasonable level. 
For this reason, the BTL option is, in practice, the most favourable option when considering the 
risk factors.    JI HONG PARK    Ch.7 Analysis of Case studies 






As stated above, based on the results of risk quantification and the six case studies, this chapter 
has examined the impact of the three transferable risks (completion delay, construction cost risk 
and traffic volume risk) on the Modified VFM and the procurement option selection. The main 
conclusions are outlined below. 
First and most importantly, from the viewpoint of a quantitative PPP decision, it is reasonable to 
consider a completion delay in the conventional delivery regarding the respective transport 
programme when estimating the Modified VFM. As the completion delay in the conventional 
delivery lengthens, the PPP options become more favourable than the conventional delivery and 
between PPP options the BTO becomes more favourable than the BTL option when a project 
has an acceptable BCR. In addition, the critical completion delay, making the Modified VFM 
zero, also seems to be used effectively by the public sector in managing a project, as well as in 
making a procurement option selection. Other than that, according to the master plan of PPP 
(MOSF, 2009b) of Korea, a PPP option already decided for a project can be replaced with a 
conventional option and vice versa when it is difficult to conduct the already decided option. 
However, there are no examples that a PPP option is replaced with a conventional option 
seemingly because there are not clear criteria for the decision change. The concept of critical 
completion delay can be used as one of the decision change criteria when it is necessary.  
In addition, with respect to construction cost risk, when using an average turn-key/alternative 
bid ratio, as is suggested by Korea’s BTL guidelines (MOSF, 2009a), the viability of PPP 
options is exaggerated in roads but underestimated in railways, compared with when using an 
application ratio  from the historical observations. Thus, for a more convincing PPP decision, it 
seems reasonable to use an application ratio reflecting the historical observations in estimating 
the Modified VFM.  
Traffic volume risk also has a great influence on the choice of PPP options of transport 
programmes with tariffs such as the National Expressways and the National Railways. The most 
favourable delivery option changes from BTL to BTO in selecting PPP options when traffic 
volume risk is included. This is mainly because traffic volume risk directly means a shortfall of 
revenue, which, as a consequence, makes the BTO option more favourable. However, when 
including traffic volume risk, the BTO viability of the Bongdam-Songsan case does not seem to 
be achieved, implying that BTL could be better than the BTO for this project. In addition, in the 
railway cases, the BTL option can be a practical alternative because their revenue stream is so JI HONG PARK    Ch.7 Analysis of Case studies 
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small that the BTO option is not affordable, even considering the maximum governmental 
subsidy condition.  
Finally, it is also important that, considering that the private sector cannot, in practice, take on 
the traffic volume risk in its entirety, a new BTO contract scheme with traffic volume risk 
sharing is suggested for BTO projects in Korea, one using a reduced revenue stream considering 
traffic volume risk and sharing the revenue shortfall or excess according to the investment level 
of each participant. With this scheme, it seems that a BTO contract will be fairer and more 
reasonable for all the participants, and the BTO option can be more attractive in the PPP market 
in Korea.  
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To date, in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, through the six case studies from three transport programmes 
(the National Highway, the National Expressway and the National Railway), it has been shown 
how the Modified VFM results and PPP decisions can be changed depending on whether the 
transferable risks, such as completion delay, construction cost risk and traffic volume risk, are 
included or not. In addition, in Chapter 7, through a case or programme-specific analysis, the 
impact of the transferable risks on PPP decision in each transport programme has been 
scrutinised and the most favourable option for each transport programme has also been dealt 
with.  
In this chapter, in order to draw a more generalised and transferable conclusion on the land 
transport programmes (including roads and railways), meta-analysis is used. There are three 
reasons for using meta-analysis: 1) to examine the impact of qualitative variables as well as 
quantitative variables on the Modified VFM, 2) to scrutinise the elasticity of the Modified VFM 
with respect to explanatory variables, and 3) to probe interaction effects on the Modified VFM 
among explanatory variables. A detailed literature review on meta-analysis is given in Section 
3.7. This chapter is largely composed of five sections, covering the research objective 3-1; 1) 
meta-analysis (8.2), 2) data collection (8.3), 3) identification of the relevant variables (8.4), 4) 
regression model (8.5), and 5) estimation results (8.6). 
Using meta-regression analysis, based on 216 Modified VFM values with various conditions 
from six cases, the impact of some quantitative and qualitative variables on the Modified VFM 
in the land transport programme (roads and railways) of Korea is examined, including the 
direction and magnitude of the impact. By estimating the relationship between 
quantitative/qualitative causes and effects through meta-regression models, some valuable 
insights and conclusions will be drawn in the later part of this chapter. 
In order to verify the direction and size of causes on the Modified VFM values from the six case 
studies in the land transport programme, the STATA-based meta-regression algorithm (metareg) 
using the random-effects meta-regression model is employed.  JI HONG PARK    Ch.8 Meta-analysis 





The six case studies on the National Highways, the National Expressways and the National 
Railways, reveal many important findings on the different transport programmes. However, in 
spite of the importance of these findings, they are all restricted to the specific case studies or 
programmes. Thus, this chapter suppose an imaginary land transport programme, including 
roads and railways. Though the land transport programme does not exist in the budgetary 
investment programmes in Korea, sometimes the government needs to explain the relationship 
between the land transport and the PPPs with respect to the budget examination in the National 
Assembly.  
Accordingly, this research needs to synthesise the results from the six case studies in order to 
extract some more generalised or transferable findings for land transport systems in Korea – in 
essence taking a specific to general approach. This is different from the more usual application 
of meta-analysis which is usually used to define key impact variables and to draw transferable 
conclusion from a mass of previous studies where the relationships between cause and effect are 
little known - which is akin to a general to specific approach.  
This research adopts a specific to general methodology to achieve three objectives: 1) to 
examine influence factors of the Modified VFM and their impacts, 2) to scrutinise influence 
factor elasticity of the Modified VFM, and 3) to probe interaction effects on the Modified VFM 
among influence factors. The way of using meta-analysis in the thesis is different from the usual 
way, in that meta-analysis in the thesis uses the results of six case studies where the 
relationships of cause and effect are already known. However, the objectives to be obtained in 
this chapter cannot be achieved by specific case studies.  
In this chapter, the research employs the random-effects meta-regression technique (see Section 
3.7 for literature review). From the viewpoint of the land transport programme (roads and 
railways) of Korea, the quantitative and qualitative causes of the Modified VFM are reviewed. 
In addition, the relationship between the Modified VFM (effects) and the causes, such as 
direction, magnitude, elasticity and interaction effects will be scrutinised using meta-analysis.  
 
 
8.3 Data collection 
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The effect value in this meta-analysis is the Modified VFM, so 216 Modified VFM values with 
various conditions are collected from the six case studies. As stated in the previous three 
chapters, the Modified VFM values with various analysis factors were calculated by taking into 
account whether construction cost risk or traffic volume risk are included or not and for how 
long a completion delay in the conventional delivery occurs. Regarding transferable risk 
inclusion and completion delay, the numbers of cases used in estimating the Modified VFM are 
respectively four and six for each project with a PPP option, so the number of the Modified 
VFM values becomes 24 in total in each project with a PPP option. The details and descriptive 
statistics of subgroups are shown in Table 8-1.  
As can be seen from Table 8-1, total data collection is composed of nine subgroups with 
different projects and PPP options. In order to use the metareg (STATA-based meta-regression 
algorithm for the random-effects meta-regression), a standard error data set for each effect size 
(the Modified VFM value in this case) is needed, so it is assumed that each Modified VFM 
value has a standard error of the subgroup that it belongs to. 
 
Table 8-1: Number of Modified VFM values in the meta-analysis 
 
 
   
Mean Median Max. Min. S.D.
Todang-
Gwansan
BTL 24 34.26 35.95 76.90 -4.40 22.88
Dongup-
Hanlim
BTL 24 9.83 9.31 30.01 -7.25 9.92
BTL 24 266.74 236.60 620.70 8.00 177.38
BTO 24 272.57 255.45 629.50 -104.60 208.54
BTL 24 43.95 40.05 103.00 -1.40 28.39
BTO 24 59.72 69.70 156.90 -56.60 58.80
BTL 24 107.79 103.50 265.30 -20.80 82.90
BTO 24 185.10 216.80 322.70 -31.10 95.85
Bujeon-
Masan
BTL 24 34.17 36.40 49.03 14.08 11.14
216 112.68 52.20 629.50 -104.60 140.57
Programme Project












1. The cases regarding risk inclusion: 1) No risk inclusion, 2) Only construction cost risk inclusion, 3) 
Only traffic volume risk inclusion, and 4) Construction cost risk + traffic volume risk inclusion
2. The cases regarding completion delay: 1) No delay,  2) 1 year delay, 3) 2 year delay, 4) 3 year delay, 5) 
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8.4 Identification of the relevant variables 
 
 
8.4.1 Quantitative variables 
 
Given the reason why a meta-analysis is used, the dependent variable in the random-effects 
regression model (equation (3-21)) should be the Modified VFM value (billion KRW). In order 
to examine the impact of the causes on the Modified VFM, both quantitative and qualitative 
independent variables are considered in the meta-regression.  
The quantitative independent variables mean the quantified characteristics of a project or 
common elements in the calculation of the Modified VFM in the BTL and the BTO option. 
Therefore, the quantitative variables include project size, completion delay, BCR, discount rate, 
CPI, five-year exchequer bond interest rate, application ratio for the construction cost 
calculation of the PSC, and traffic volume ratio (actual traffic volume/forecast traffic volume). 
The descriptive statistics for the quantitative variables are shown in Table 8-2. 
 




8.4.2 Qualitative variables 
 
Aside from various quantitative variables, several qualitative variables are examined in terms of 
their impact on the Modified VFM. Qualitative variables include transport mode, PPP option 








Number of data 216 216 216 216
Mean 23.23 2.05 1.57 6.39
Median 23.3 2 1.17 6.5
Maximum 38.5 4 2.72 7.5
Minimum 7.29 0 0.63 5.5
Standard deviation 10.77 1.35 0.72 0.88
CPI (%)






Number of data 216 216 216 216
Mean 3.23 5.45 85.56 81.33
Median 2.99 5.4 84.57 84.32
Maximum 3.77 6.9 93.03 100
Minimum 2.92 3.38 78.8 50.71
Standard deviation 0.31 1.17 5.18 19.65JI HONG PARK    Ch.8 Meta-analysis 
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considered in this research because it is difficult to find a meaningful reference year that 
categorises decision-making times.




This variable is introduced to make it possible to examine which transport mode between roads 
and railways has more influence on the Modified VFM. Thus, 216 data sets from six case 
studies are categorised into road (144 sets) and railway (72 sets). As seen in Table 8-3, road data 
sets have a Modified VFM of 114.5 (billion KRW) on average, which is slightly higher than the 
figure for the railway data sets. In addition, the standard deviation of the Modified VFM (158.7) 
in road data sets is much higher than that in railways data sets (95.4). In the meta-regression, 
dummy values of 0 and 1 are assigned to roads and railways respectively.  
 
Table 8-3: Descriptive statistics for the quantitative variables 





The PPP option can also have a different impact on the Modified VFM. Thus, 216 data sets 
from the six case studies are categorised into BTL (144 sets) and BTO (72 sets). As shown in 
Table 8-3, the Modified VFM using the BTL option has a Modified VFM of 82.8 (billion KRW) 
on average, which is lower than the figure obtained when using the BTO option (172.5). In 
                                         
129 On the one hand, the use of decision making time does not seem to need to be included as one of 
qualitative variables because some quantitative variables such as discount rate, consumer price index and 
five-year exchequer bond interest rate already consider the effect of decision-making time. In addition, 
considering the decision-making time in the six cases is the relatively short term (from 2002 to 2009), the 
detailed grouping using four different decision-making times (the Todang-Gwansan case: 2002, the 
Dongup-Hanlim case: 2011, The Suwon-Pyungtaek case: 2002, The Bongdam-Songsan case: 2009, The 







Road 144 114.51 158.69
Railway 72 109.02 95.36
Total 216 112.68 140.57
BTL 144 82.79 118.9
BTO 72 172.46 161.01
Total 216 112.68 140.57
Gyeonggi 168 138.59 149.42
Gyungnam 48 22.00 16.13
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addition, the standard deviation of the Modified VFM in BTL data sets (118.9) is also lower 
than that in BTO data sets (161.0). For the meta-regression, dummy values of 0 and 1 are 
assigned to BTL and BTO respectively. 
 
Region 
The locations of the six case studies are largely divided into two categories, as seen in Figure 3-
4, with all being in either Gyeonggi Province or Gyungnam Province. As with other qualitative 
variables, using this variable the impact from regional difference on the Modified VFM can be 
estimated. Two hundred and sixteen data sets from six case studies are divided into Gyeonggi 
(168 sets) and Gyungnam (48 sets). As seen in Table 8-3, there is a very broad distinction 
between the two regions. The Modified VFM in Gyeonggi Province is 138.6 (billion KRW) on 
average, which is much higher than in Gyungnam Province (22.0). Additionally, the standard 
deviations in the two regions also show similar results. With respect to meta-regression, 




8.5 Regression model 
 
Using eight quantitative variables and three qualitative variables, a multivariate regression 
model can be constructed. In this research, a basic regression model explaining the relationship 
between dependent variable and independent variables is selected by comparing the goodness of 
fit values (adjusted R-square values in this study) among five candidate models. Firstly, full 
transformation models are considered by taking various transformations between dependent 
variable and all independent variables: 1) linear-linear, 2) log
130-linear, 3) linear-log and 4) log-
log. In addition, a mixed transformation model is considered by examining the relationship 
between dependent variable and each independent variable based on the R-square table and 
scatter plots (Appendix H). Considering R-square value and scatter plots between dependent 
variable and each independent variable, for most independent variables linear-linear seems 
appropriate, however log-linear seems to appropriate for CPI and traffic volume ratio
131. Using 
these results, a mixed transformation model with linear terms and exponential terms can be 
constructed. Adjusted R-square values in regard to the five candidate models are shown in Table 
                                         
130 Some Modified VFMs are negative values, so double of the absolute value of the lowest Modified 
VFM is added to all the Modified VFM before log-transformation. 
131 The transformation shows that the highest R-square or best fit between the Modified VFM and each 
explanatory variable (Appendix H). JI HONG PARK    Ch.8 Meta-analysis 
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8-4 (Appendix G). As the linear-linear model shows the highest adjust R-square (0.7509), this 
model is selected as a basic regression model.  
 
Table 8-4: Adjust R-square values for five candidate regression models 
 
 
However, when conducting meta-regression with 11 variables using the metareg, it is shown 
that among three variables (BCR, discount rate and CPI) there is a collinearity
132 problem (see 
Appendix I), which occurs when variance inflation factor (VIF
133) is more than 10 (StataCorp, 
2013). Accordingly, these three variables cannot be included simultaneously in a regression 
model because a regression result cannot be trusted when there is a collinearity problem 
(Kennedy, 2003). Inevitably, therefore, three different regression models, including one variable 
among BCR (model 1), discount rate (model 2) and CPI (model 3), are used for meta-regression.  
Consequently, the regression model in this research can be expressed as follows: 
 
M.VFM = f (length, completion delay, BCR or discount rate or CPI, five-year exchequer bond 
interest rate, application ratio, traffic volume ratio, transport mode, PPP option, region)+	   
namely: 
 
   .    =    +      +	     +	  	   +      +	     +      




where   ,    …    = the regression coefficients composing the vector  ,   = project size (km), 
   = completion delay (year),   = BCR or discount rate (per cent) or CPI (per cent),   = five-
                                         
132 Collinearity means that there is an exact or similar linear relationship between two independent 
variables.  The reason for the existence of collinearity in this research seems to come from the fact that all 
data set is from only six cases, so each explanatory variable is categorised into less than or equal to six. In 
the metareg package, when there is a collinearity problem between variables, the variables causing this 
are automatically dropped. The results showing collinearity are included in Appendix I.  
133 VIF = 1 / (1-  
 ), where   
  is the coefficient of determination of a regression regarding independent 
variable j. 
Linear-Linear Log-Linear Linear-Log Log-Log
Adj-R
2 0.7509 0.7431 <10
-4 <10
-4 0.7508
Full transformation Mixed 
transformation
Quantitative variables 
Qualitative variables JI HONG PARK    Ch.8 Meta-analysis 
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year exchequer bond interest rate (per cent),   = application ratio (per cent),   = traffic volume 
ratio (per cent),    = dummy variable for transport mode (road = 0, railway =1),   = dummy 
variable for PPP option (BTL = 0, BTO =1),   = dummy variable for region (Gyeonggi 
Province = 0, Gyungnam Province =1), and   = the error term. 
The coefficient of each quantitative variable with linear relationship in equation (8-1) explains 
how much the Modified VFM changes according to the unit change of each independent 
variable. With respect to the coefficients of the qualitative variables, they show the direction and 
size of the impact of a variable on the Modified VFM, as compared with the reference group. In 
addition, this regression model can be extended in order to examine interaction effects between 
explanatory variables by adding interaction terms. 
 
 
8.6 Estimation results 
 
 
Using three regression models, meta-regression analysis was conducted and the results obtained 
are shown in Table 8-5. The adjusted R-square of the regression is equal to 0.75 in each 
regression analysis, which gives strong evidence of the satisfactory fit of the regression. From 
Table 8-5, it can be seen that six out of the nine variables in the regression model are statically 
significant at the 5 per cent significance level. Those are project size, completion delay, BCR of 
model 1 (discount rate of model 2, CPI of model 3), five-year exchequer bond interest rate, PPP 
option, and region. As shown in Table 8-5, the existence of between-study variance (	  ) 
supports the finding that it is proper to use the random-effects model allowing for residual 
heterogeneity (Debrezion et al., 2007) .  
 
8.6.1 Quantitative variables 
 
With respect to quantitative variables, first of all the length of the project has a statistically 
significant impact on the Modified VFM in land transport projects. Table 8-5 shows that as 
project size increases by 1 km the Modified VFM increases by 5.2 to 8.5 (billion KRW), 
depending on the regression model being used.  
Completion delay in the conventional delivery also has a statically significant impact on the 
Modified VFM in land transport projects, which can be expected from the six case studies. As JI HONG PARK    Ch.8 Meta-analysis 
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the length of the completion delay lengthens, the Modified VFM increases 44.9 (billion KRW) 
per year, which is given by all the regression models.   
When it comes to BCR, discount rate and CPI in models 1, 2 and 3 respectively, their unit 
increases produce positive change (or percentage change) of the Modified VFM in land 
transport projects, as shown in Table 8-5. The result on BCR and discount rate can be inferred 
from sensitivity analysis (e.g. Figure 4-11) on the six case studies. From Figure 4-11, the 
Modified VFM increases according to the increase of BCR or discount rate or CPI, indicating 
that the signs of each explanatory variable’s coefficient are positive values. The signs of the 
coefficient of BCR is also known from the Modified VFM equations (3-7 ~ 3-9), showing that 
as BCR increases the Modified VFM increases. As BCR increases by 0.1, the Modified VFM 
goes up as much as 16.5 (billion KRW). In addition, a 1 per cent increase in the discount rate 
and CPI respectively means a 137.8 (billion KRW) increase and 255.9 (billion KRW) increase 
in the Modified VFM. 
The five-year exchequer bond interest rate shows a statistically significant impact on the 
Modified VFM in land transport projects as well. The result can also be inferred from sensitivity 
analysis (e.g. Figure 4-11) on the six case studies. According to the Korea’s BTL guideline 
(MOSF, 2009a), BTL lease profitability to the private sector is expressed as “five-year 
exchequer bond interest rate + mark-up rate” (see Section 4.3.2 and footnote 45), thus the 
increase of five-year exchequer bond interest rate means the increase of BTL lease profitability 
to the private sector. Accordingly, from Figure 4-11, the Modified VFM decreases according to 
the increase of BTL lease profitability, indicating that the sign of the coefficient of five-year 
exchequer bond interest rate is a negative value.  A 1 per cent increase in the five-year 
exchequer bond interest rate causes the Modified VFM to decrease by between 38.0 and 104.6 
(billion KRW) depending on the regression models.  
Other than that, the traffic volume ratio and application ratio respectively have a positive 
influence on the Modified VFM in the land transport programme. The results show that a 1 per 
cent increase in the traffic volume ratio and application ratio for the calculation of the asset cost 
in the PSC respectively produce 0.3 and 3.2 (billion KRW) in the Modified VFM. However, 
they do not show a statically significant impact on the Modified VFM in land transport projects 
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8.6.2 Qualitative variables 
 
With respect to the qualitative variables, first of all the coefficient for transport mode is positive 
or negative depending on the regression model, which means that the transport mode does not 
show a consistent direction or size regarding its impact on the Modified VFM. In other words, 
from a statistical viewpoint, it is impossible to say which transport mode – road or rail – has a 
greater impact on the Modified VFM.  
 




                                         
134 More detailed regression results are to be found in Appendix J. 
Model Coefficients Std. Err. t statistics p statistics
1 5.240 1.059 4.950 0.000
2 8.515 0.944 9.020 0.000
3 8.515 0.944 9.020 0.000
1 44.885 3.722 12.060 0.000
2 44.885 3.722 12.060 0.000
3 44.885 3.722 12.060 0.000
BCR 1 164.929 23.462 7.030 0.000
Discount rate (%) 2 137.802 19.603 7.030 0.000
CPI (%) 3 255.947 36.410 7.030 0.000
1 -65.070 12.174 -5.340 0.000
2 -104.559 16.645 -6.280 0.000
3 -38.013 9.817 -3.870 0.000
1 3.223 3.193 1.010 0.314
2 3.223 3.193 1.010 0.314
3 3.223 3.193 1.010 0.314
1 0.297 0.260 1.150 0.253
2 0.297 0.260 1.150 0.253
3 0.297 0.260 1.150 0.253
1 63.844 44.352 1.440 0.152
2 -63.121 34.677 -1.820 0.070
3 47.346 42.788 1.110 0.270
1 34.581 12.499 2.770 0.006
2 34.581 12.499 2.770 0.006
3 34.581 12.499 2.770 0.006
1 -93.832 21.560 -4.350 0.000
2 -100.272 21.599 -4.640 0.000
3 -210.739 27.503 -7.660 0.000
1 -316.816 260.031 -1.220 0.224
2 -755.823 238.383 -3.170 0.002
3 -1,077.293 232.105 -4.640 0.000
X3
Variables





5 year exchequer 









(Note) No. of data = 216, between study variance (τ
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In addition, the coefficient for the PPP option is positive, indicating that the impact of BTO on 
the Modified VFM is greater than BTL (the base group in the estimation). More specifically, the 
Modified VFM using a BTO option is expected to be 34.6 (billion KRW) larger than the figure 
obtained using a BTL option in the land transport projects, which is also statistically significant 
at the 1 per cent significance level.  
The results also show that the Modified VFM in the land transport programme is clearly 
affected by the regional factor. The coefficient for region is negative, meaning that the impact of 
Gyeonggi Province as the project location on the Modified VFM is greater than that of 
Gyungnam Province. In other words, the Modified VFM of a project in Gyeonggi Province is 
expected to be from 93.8 to 210.7 (billion KRW) larger than in Gyungnam Province, depending 
on the regression model. The result seems to be related to the regional difference of population 
and car ownership though there could be various and complex causes. Gyeonggi Province and 
Seoul surrounding Gyeonggi Province are much larger than Gyungnam Province and 






As a tool for measuring how the Modified VFM changes with respect to the change of an 
explanatory variable, elasticity can be used. Elasticity can usually be defined as the ratio of 
proportionate change (percentage change) in an independent variable to the proportionate 
change (percentage change) in an explanatory variables (Brons et al., 2008, Taylor, 2009). 
Accordingly, using mean values of each variables, the elasticity of the Modified VFM (Ei) with 
respect to explanatory variables (  ) can be expressed as follows; 
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 .   
   
  
=	
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 .   
  (8-2) 
 
                                         
135 The population, population density and car ownership of Gyeonggi and Seoul are about three times 
greater than the figures for Gyungnam and Busan.  
 
                                                                                   Source: http://kostat.go.kr (retrieved on 28 May 2013) 
Gyeonggi Seoul Gyungnam Busan
Population (persons) 12,093,299 10,195,318 3,319,314 3,538,484
Population density (persons/km
2
) 1,119 16,189 300 4,452
Car ownership (cars) 3,496,083 2,455,274 1,138,044 928,401JI HONG PARK    Ch.8 Meta-analysis 
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Considering the regression coefficients (βi) in equation (8-2) and the mean values 
(    , .              )	of the variables from Table 8-1 to Table 8-3, point elasticity of Modified VFM 
with respect to explanatory variable can be defined as follows; 
 
 
   = 	   ∙
    
 .                (8-3) 
 
Based on equation (8-3), the elasticity of the Modified VFM with respect to explanatory 
variables is calculated in Table 8-6 according to the models. In Table 8-6, the elasticity of 
dummy variables (transport mode, PPP option and region) is excluded because it is difficult to 
give it a special meaning when the variables are not continuous.  
The regression coefficients in shaded cells mean that they are statistically significant at the 1 per 
cent significance level according to Table 8-5 and elasticities using them are also shaded. As 
seen in Table 8-6, considering shaded cells, project size, completion delay, BCR, discount rate 
and CPI have a positive elasticity, which means that the Modified VFM increases according to 
the rise of these variables. In addition, discount rate, CPI, BCR and project size have an 
elasticity of more than 1, which means that when these variables go up 1 per cent, the Modified 
VFM goes up more than 1 per cent. In particular, the impact of discount rate and CPI on the 
Modified VFM is most influential, showing an elasticity of 7.81 (discount rate) and 7.34 (CPI).  
 




On the contrary, five-year exchequer bond interest rate has a negative elasticity, meaning that 
the Modified VFM decreases according to the rise of this variable.  The absolute value of 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
X1 23.23 5.24 8.52 8.52 1.08 1.76 1.76







) 164.93 137.80 255.95 2.30 7.81 7.34
X4 5.45 -65.07 -104.56 -38.01 -3.15 -5.06 -1.84
X5 85.56 3.22 3.22 3.22 2.45 2.45 2.45
X6 81.33 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.21 0.21 0.21
X7 0.33 63.84 -63.12 47.35 ­ - -
X8 0.33 34.58 34.58 34.58 - - -




(Note) 1. Mean value of BCR in Model 1. 2. Mean value of discount rate in Model 2, 3. Mean value of CPI in Model 3.JI HONG PARK    Ch.8 Meta-analysis 
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elasticity of five-year exchequer bond interest rate is between 1.84 and 5.06 (more than 1) 
depending on models, which is very elastic. In addition, regarding dummy variables, as 
discussed earlier, PPP option has a positive impact on the Modified VFM whereas region has a 
negative impact on the Modified VFM when these variables go up from 0 to 1. On the other 
hand, it is difficult to say the direction of the impact of transport mode on the Modified VFM 
because the signs of the regression coefficient vary according to the models. 
Consequently, the most influential factors on the Modified VFM in the imaginary land transport 
in Korea are discount rate, CPI and five-year exchequer bond interest rate. Therefore, when 
estimating the Modified VFM, the choice of discount rate, CPI and five-year exchequer bond 
interest rate seems to be critical in PPP decisions in the land transport. 
 
 
8.6.4 Interaction effects 
 
Two way interactions 
Interaction effects were examined based on the model 1 using BCR, referring to the correlation 
matrix shown in Appendix H: BCR is selected among the variables (e.g. BCR, discount rate and 
CPI) that are collinear because it has the highest correlation with the Modified VFM.  
Six variables (i.e. length, completion delay, BCR, five-year exchequer bond interest rate, PPP 
option and region) are selected for the meta-regression including interaction effects because 
they have high correlation coefficients with statistically significant p-values, which are shown in 
Table 8-5. All the possible two way interaction effects based on the six variables (in total 15 
cases) were examined and the results are given in Appendix K. The results show that there are 
five cases that increase explanatory power (adjusted R-square) of the model as well as 
producing statistically significant estimates at the 1 per cent level: 1) length and completion 
delay, 2) completion delay and BCR, 3) completion delay and five-year exchequer bond interest 
rate, 4) completion delay and PPP option, and 5) completion delay and region.  
The important implication is that the statistically significant interaction effects are all related to 
completion delay. Accordingly, it seems that completion delay is not only meaningful as a 
single explanatory variable, but also plays an important role in reducing information set of five 
other explanatory variables in regard to the Modified VFM. In particular, the interaction effects 
of completion delay are remarkable when it is combined with length, PPP option and region. In 
other words, regarding the three explanatory variables, their explanatory power on the Modified 
VFM related to completion delay is greater than their individual explanatory power on the 
Modified VFM.  JI HONG PARK    Ch.8 Meta-analysis 
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The best interaction model can be composed by adding these five two way interaction terms to 
the basic regression model (equation (8-1)) as follows: 
 
 
 .    =    +      +	     +	  	   +      +	     +      +	     +	    
+	     +    	  	   +    	  	   +    	  	   +    	  	  
+    	  	   +   
(8-4) 
 
The estimation results are given in Table 8-7. As seen in Table 8-7, by adding two way 
interaction terms to a basic regression model (equation (8-1)), the explanatory power is 
improved by approximately 26 per cent
136.  
 
Table 8-7: Estimation results using two way interaction terms 
 
 
 From Table 8-7, the Modified VFM changes according to the unit change of the six 
independent variables (e.g. project size, completion delay, BCR, five-year exchequer bond 
interest rate, PPP option and region), which show statistically significant p-values in Table 8-5, 
can be determined as follows: 
 
 
                                         
136  (94.84-75.09)/75.09 = 0.263 
Variables Coefficients Std. Err. t statistics p statistics
X1 0.204 0.685 0.300 0.766
X2 -4.310 13.886 -0.310 0.757
X3 58.911 15.048 3.910 0.000
X4 -29.882 9.115 -3.280 0.001
X5 2.922 1.557 1.880 0.062
X6 0.270 0.126 2.130 0.034
X7 67.328 21.626 3.110 0.002
X8 -4.348 11.513 -0.380 0.706
X9 -29.545 16.496 -1.790 0.075
X1X2 2.569 0.219 11.710 0.000
X2X3 55.576 4.847 11.460 0.000
X2X4 -17.097 3.359 -5.090 0.000
X2X8 20.258 4.751 4.260 0.000
X2X9 -26.623 6.176 -4.310 0.000
(Constanct) -205.840 129.851 -1.590 0.114
(Note) No. of data = 216, between study variance (τ
2) = 926.3, Adjusted R
2 = 94.84%JI HONG PARK    Ch.8 Meta-analysis 
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  .   
   
= 0.204 + 2.569    (8-5) 
 
  .   
   
= −4.310 + 2.569   + 55.576   − 17.097  
+ 20.258   − 26.623   
(8-6) 
 
  .   
   
= 58.911 + 55.576    (8-7) 
 
  .   
   
= −29.882 − 17.097    (8-8) 
 
  .   
   
= −4.348 + 20.258    (8-9) 
 
  .   
   
= −29.545 − 26.623    (8-10) 
 
Based on equation (8-5) ~ (8-10), using the minimum and maximum values of the independent 
variables shown in Table 8-2, the Modified VFM change according to the unit change of each 
variable is given in Figure 8-1. In Figure 8-1, dot lines mean the Modified VFM change 
according to the unit change of each variable without interaction effects as given in Table 8-5. 
In addition, solid lines indicate the Modified VFM change according to the unit change of each 
variable with interaction effects and the values by the line mean the minimum and maximum 
value respectively.  
As seen from equation (8-5) to equation (8-10) and Figure 8-1, the Modified VFM changes 
according to the unit change of project size, BCR, five-year exchequer bond interest rate, PPP 
option and region are all affected by completion delay. In particular, as completion delay 
increases, the Modified VFM changes according to the unit change of project size, BCR and 
PPP option increase, whereas the Modified VFM changes according to the unit change of those 
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(a) Project size  (b) Completion delay 
   
(c) BCR  (d) five-year exchequer bond interest rate 
   
(e) PPP option  (f) Region 
 
Figure 8-1: The Modified VFM change according to the unit change of each variable 
 
 
With respect to project size (Figure 8-1 (a)), looking at project size and BCR in Table 7-3, two 
among three programmes (67 per cent) show that the bigger project size is, the higher is the 
BCR. This means that it is possible that a project with bigger size has a bigger social benefit 
difference according to completion delay. Therefore, the Modified VFM change with respect to 
the unit change of project size has a positive slope according to completion delay.      
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In addition, with respect to BCR (Figure 8-1 (b)), it seems natural that the Modified VFM 
change with respect to the unit change of BCR has a positive slope according to completion 
delay.  
 
When it comes to five-year exchequer bond interest rate (Figure 8-1 (d)), it is shown that the 
Modified VFM changes with respect to the unit change of five-year exchequer bond interest rate 
decreases according to completion delay. Five-year exchequer bond interest rate can affect the 
Modified VFM by influencing three items in the Modified VFM: 1) the total interest composing 
asset cost in the PSC that government needs to pay to delivery construction cost by issuing five-
year exchequer bond, 2) the government subsidy in the BTO, which is delivered by issuing the 
bond, and 3) the lease fee in the BTL (BTL lease profitability for private sector is composed of 
five-year exchequer bond interest rate and mark-up rate). Among these three items, the 
government subsidy in the BTO and the lease fee in the BTL do not change according to 
completion delay in the conventional delivery. However, the total interest in real terms that 
government needs to pay decreases according to completion delay due to the discounting effect, 
though the total interest in nominal terms does not change according to completion delay. 
Therefore, the Modified VFM change with respect to the unit change of the five-year exchequer 
bond interest rate has a negative slope according to completion delay.  
 
Similarly, the signs of the slopes in Figure 8-1 (e) and (f) also can be explained using the change 
of social benefit difference according to completion delay. From Table 8-3, the values of 
Modified VFM in the BTO option is bigger than  in the BTL option. In addition, a BTO project 
needs a bigger transport demand (or traffic volume), which is directly related to social benefit 
size according to the empirical relationship (equation (4-2) and (6-2)). Accordingly, the 
Modified VFM change with respect to the unit change of PPP option (from BTL to BTO) has a 
positive slope according to completion delay (Figure 8-1 (e)).  
 
In addition, with respect to region (Figure 8-1 (f)), it is possible that a project in Gyeonggi 
province has a bigger social benefit that Gyungnam province according to Table 8-3. Therefore, 
the Modified VFM change with respect to the unit change of region (from Gyeonggi to 
Gyungnam) has a negative slope according to completion delay in the conventional delivery.   
 
Consequently, completion delay in the conventional delivery can play an important role in 
making interaction effects with other variables in PPP decisions, by increasing social benefit 
difference between the PSC and PPP options and public sector cost in the PSC. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to include completion delay in the conventional delivery in the quantitative PPP 
decision in Korea. JI HONG PARK    Ch.8 Meta-analysis 
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Elasticity considering interaction effects 
Using equation (8-5) ~ (8-10), point elasticity of the modified VFM with respect to some 
variables such as project size, completion delay, BCR, five-year exchequer bond interest rate, 
PPP option and region can be newly calculated, which is shown in Table 8-8.  
 
Table 8-8: Elasticity of the Modified VFM considering two way interactions (Model 1) 
Variables      
Elasticity  
  .   
   
    
 .                
Calculations  Results 
X1  23.23  (0.204 + 2.569    ) ×
    
 .                1.13 
X2  2.05  (−4.310 + 2.569     + 55.576     − 17.097     + 20.258	     − 26.623	    ) ×
    
 .                0.91 
X3  1.57  (58.911 + 55.576    ) ×
    
 .                2.41 
X4  5.45  (−29.882 − 17.097    ) ×
    
 .                -3.14 
X8  0.33  (−4.348 + 20.258    ) ×
    
 .                0.11 
X9  0.22  (−29.545 − 26.623    ) ×
    
 .                -0.17 
 
 
As seen in Table 8-8, project size, completion delay, BCR and PPP option have a positive 
elasticity respectively, which means that the Modified VFM increases according to the rise of 
these variables. In addition, BCR and project size have an elasticity of more than 1, which 
means that when these variables go up 1 per cent, the Modified VFM goes up more than 1 per 
cent. On the contrary, the five-year exchequer bond interest rate and region have a negative 
elasticity, meaning that the Modified VFM decreases according to the rise of these variables. 
Comparing with elasticities (Model 1) in Table 8-6, the tendency (size and direction) of 
elasticity is almost same though there are some differences in size.  
 
 
Three way and four way interaction effects 
In the same manner as two way interaction effects, three way interaction effects and four way 
interaction effects can be estimated. Based on two way interaction effects, all the possible three 
way interaction effects (in total 10 cases) were examined and the results are given in Appendix 
K. The results show that there are six cases that increase explanatory power (adjusted R-square) 
of the model as well as producing statistically significant estimates at the 1 per cent level: 1) 
length, completion delay and BCR, 2) length, completion delay and five-year exchequer bond JI HONG PARK    Ch.8 Meta-analysis 
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interest rate, 3) length, completion delay and region, 4) completion delay, BCR and five-year 
exchequer bond interest rate, 5) completion delay, BCR and region and 6) completion delay, 
five-year exchequer bond interest rate and region. However, no combinations of three way 
interaction terms produce more than a 2 per cent increase in explanatory power compared in two 
way interaction effects model (adjust R-square 94.84%).  
In addition, with regard to four way interaction effects, all the possible case were examined  (in 
total 4 cases, Appendix K) based on the three way interaction effects: 1) length, completion 
delay, BCR and five-year exchequer bond interest rate, 2) length, completion delay, BCR and 
region, 3) length, completion delay, five-year exchequer bond interest rate and region, and 4) 
completion delay, BCR, five-year exchequer bond interest rate and region. As with three way 
interaction models, no combinations of four way interaction terms produce by more than 2 per 
cent in explanatory power compared with the two way interaction effects model (adjust R-
square 94.84%).  
Accordingly, considering the difficulties of interpretation and the possibility of miss-
specification, the introduction of three way or higher interaction terms does not seem to be of 
any practical use in this study.  Therefore, this study dealt with a basic regression model and a 
two way interaction effects model.   
 
   JI HONG PARK    Ch.8 Meta-analysis 





In this chapter, using meta-regression model, based on 216 Modified VFM values with various 
conditions from the six cases, the impact of quantitative and qualitative variables on the 
Modified VFM in the land transport programme (roads and railways) of Korea was examined, 
including elasticity (direction and magnitude). In addition, interaction effects between 
explanatory variables were also scrutinised. The main conclusions are outlined below. 
 
Considering the land transport programme (roads and railways) of Korea, in regard to 
quantitative variables, the Modified VFM is positively influenced by project size, completion 
delay, BCR, discount rate and CPI, whereas it is negatively influenced by five-year exchequer 
bond interest rate. The most influential factors on the Modified VFM in the land transport in 
Korea are discount rate, CPI and five-year exchequer bond interest rate. Therefore, when 
estimating the Modified VFM, the choice of discount rate, CPI and five-year exchequer bond 
interest rate seems to be critical in PPP decisions in the land transport.  
In addition, with respect to qualitative variables, the BTO option and Gyeonggi Province have a 
stronger influence on the Modified VFM than the BTL option and Gyungnam Province 
respectively. In particular, the impact difference between the two regions on the Modified VFM 
seems to be related to the regional difference of population and car ownership though there 
could be various and complex causes.  
With respect to interaction effects, it seems that completion delay is not only meaningful as a 
single explanatory variable, but also plays an important role in reducing information set of other 
explanatory variables in regard to the Modified VFM. In addition, completion delay in the 
conventional delivery can be important in making interaction effects with other variables in PPP 
decisions, by increasing social benefit difference between the PSC and PPP options and public 
sector cost in the PSC. 
In conclusion, when estimating the Modified VFM, the choice of discount rate, CPI and five-
year exchequer bond interest rate seems to be critical in PPP decisions in the land transport. In 
addition, considering interaction effects of completion delay, it is reasonable to include 
completion delay in the conventional delivery in the quantitative PPP decision in Korea. In 
some respects, these results are obtained because they were used as input factors to calculate the 
Modified VFM, which could raise circularity issue. However, the results are meaningful in that 
this research shows three critical variables among various variables of the Modified VFM 
calculation in the land transport.JI HONG PARK    Ch.9 Conclusions 
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This research was conducted with a view to achieving three main research objectives, as 
mentioned in Chapter 1. One is to develop a new quantitative PPP decision methodology, 
considering the reality of the conventional delivery system of Korea, in order to overcome the 
limitations of the current quantitative VFM assessment due to the assumption that there are no 
differences of completion and effectiveness between a PSC and a PPP alternative. Another is to 
establish the impact of transferable risks, such as completion delay, construction cost risk and 
traffic volume risk, on the PPP decisions in the transport sector of Korea using case studies and 
the new quantitative PPP decision methodology. The final objective is to scrutinise the influence 
factors on PPP decision in the land transport (roads and railways) based on case studies. 
To this end, a Modified VFM was developed in order to consider the systematic completion 
delay in the conventional delivery of Korea and the difference of benefit occurring time between 
a PSC and a PPP option, using the current VFM assessment methodology and the net present 
value concept. Then, transferable risks were quantified through historical observations and 
related literature. With respect to the completion delay of conventional delivery and 
construction cost risk for each transport programme (the National Highway, the National 
Expressway and the National Railway), the risks were quantified using historical observations, 
whereas traffic volume risk was quantified using the literature. Based on the Modified VFM and 
quantified transferable risks, in total six case studies (two per each transport programme) were 
conducted to scrutinise the impact of transferable risks on PPP decisions in each transport 
programme. Besides, in order to draw a more generalised and transferable conclusion on the 
land transport programme including roads and railways, meta-regression analysis is conducted, 
using 216 Modified VFM values with various conditions from the six cases.  
In this chapter, the main conclusions on the three main research objectives are summarised; 
these were set out more fully in Chapters 3, 7 and 8. In addition, this chapter also discusses the 
contribution of the thesis to knowledge as well as the PPP in transport in Korea. In the later part 
of this chapter, there is a consideration on the limitation of the thesis, and a discussion of 
possible further study in transport PPPs in Korea.  
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9.2 Main conclusions 
 
 
This research has three research objectives, as stated in Chapter 1: 1) the development of a new 
quantitative VFM assessment considering systematic completion delay in the conventional 
delivery of Korea; 2) the impact of transferable risks on the PPP decisions of the three transport 
programmes; and 3) the influential factors on the PPP decision on the land transport programme 
(roads and railways) and their impact. These research objectives were achieved, as mentioned in 
the previous chapters, through the development of methodology, risk quantification, case studies 
and meta-analysis. The main conclusions on the three research objectives are as follows. 
 
 
9.2.1 Development of the Modified VFM 
 
 
As the most common PPP decision-making methodology, the VFM assessment is popular in 
many countries when using PPPs, assuming that there are no completion differences between 
procurement alternatives. However, quantitative VFM assessment can be problematic due to the 
assumption in some countries where public sector cannot deliver sufficient, or any, funds 
without the help of private sector. When using quantitative VFM for PPP decisions, these 
countries have to pretend that a PSC could be a possible alternative, despite these being 
impossible in reality.  
Therefore, from the viewpoint of the Korean context, considering the systematic completion 
delay in the conventional delivery due to lack of budget, the Modified VFM was developed to 
overcome the limitation of the assumption of the VFM analysis, as seen in equation (3-5) in 
Chapter 3. The Modified VFM has an importance in quantitative PPP decision methodology in 
three ways.   
Firstly, the Modified VFM is simple, easy to understand and practical to use in PPP decisions. 
According to Grimsey and Lewis (2005), reviewing PPP decision practices in the world, the 
PPP decision methodology can be divided into two categories; 1) full cost-benefit analysis, 2) 
VFM assessment. A full cost-benefit analysis is generally used to decide whether to implement 
a project or not in the aspect of traditional procurement. It seems surprising that this method is 
used for PPP decision in Germany because notwithstanding the powerfulness of this method 
considering all the costs and benefits it is expensive, complicated and low in accuracy due to JI HONG PARK    Ch.9 Conclusions 
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many assumptions (Grimsey and Lewis, 2005, Grout, 2005, Pearce and Nash, 1981). When it 
comes to VFM assessment, though it is simple and easy to understand, it seems problematic due 
to an assumption that there is no difference in completion time and effectiveness between the 
PSC and the PPP options and it can also be meaningless for low income developing countries 
when the PSC is not available as a delivery alternative (Leigland and Shugart, 2006). However, 
with respect to the Modified VFM, on the one hand, it connects public sector cost 
(characteristics of VFM assessment) and social benefit (characteristics of full cost-benefit 
analysis), comparing the PSC and the PPP options. On the other hand, it is simple, easy to 
understand and practical, which are the characteristics of VFM assessment. In other words, the 
Modified VFM is the product of negotiation between full cost-benefit analysis and VFM 
assessment. 
Another reason that the Modified VFM can be used universally, though it is developed in order 
to solve the distinctive Korean problem (systematic completion delay in the conventional 
delivery), is that any other duration delay in the PPP as well as the PSC can be analysed in the 
Modified VFM calculation depending on countries. For example, the Modified VFM can 
embrace duration delays such as gestation, negotiation and financial closure delay in the PSC or 
PPP options, which are not rare in Korea. In Korea, due to lack of public funds, the Korean 
government tends to delay the start of the final design of transport projects, so gestation periods 
can be elongated in public delivery. Similarly, PPPs can also be delayed when negotiations or 
financial closure are delayed like the Bongdam-Songsan case in Korea. 
The last importance in the Modified VFM is related to the viewpoint on project implementation. 
The current quantitative VFM methodology seems to represent the finance authority which 
wants to spend less of its budget, if possible. However, for the transport decision makers or 
transport service consumers, the time when the transport service is available can also be as 
important as spending less. Accordingly, the Modified VFM methodology considers the 
viewpoint of transport decision makers and transport service consumers as well as that of the 
finance authority, in terms of quantitative assessment. Consequently, in that the Modified VFM 
considers the differences of public sector cost and social benefit between procurement 
alternatives, the Modified VFM is more reasonable and more general than the current VFM in 
terms of quantitative assessment.  
 
 
9.2.2 Impact of transferable risks 
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One of the most important conclusions in this research is that a completion delay in the 
conventional delivery can make a critical impact on the PPP decisions in roads and railways in 
two ways.  
One is that a completion delay in the conventional delivery has an influence on which 
procurement option to choose: the conventional or a PPP (BTL/BTO) alternative. As the 
completion delay in the conventional delivery lengthens, the Modified VFM tends to increase, 
which means that the viability of PPP (BTL/BTO) option increases, which was found in five 
case studies. This is because of the impact of the social benefit difference between the 
conventional and the PPP alternatives due to the completion delay in the calculation of the 
Modified VFM. However, in the case of the Bujeon-Masan project, the probability that the BTL 
option is better than the conventional delivery decreases as the completion delay becomes 
longer. This is because the BCR of the Bujeon-Masan is so small (0.63) that the Modified VFM 
value decreases slightly when the completion delay is considered. In contrast to the projects 
with an acceptable BCR, if a project has a small BCR, the decrease of the asset cost of the PSC 
due to discounting effect may be bigger than the increase by the social benefit difference as the 
completion delay lengthens. 
Another is that the completion delay also affects the selection of PPP alternatives. As seen in 
Table 7-2, the BTO option seems to be more favourable than the BTL according to the inclusion 
of an average completion delay from the historical observations. This is because the Modified 
VFM comparing PPP options (M.VFMBTL-BTO) decreases as completion is delayed mainly 
because the government revenue stream becomes reduced due to discounting effect. This 
implies that as completion is delayed, the BTO option become increasingly preferable to the 
BTL option. 
In addition, in this research, in order to identify the impact of a completion delay in the 
conventional delivery on the PPP decisions for a project, the concept of the critical completion 
delay, making the Modified VFM zero, was introduced. Using a critical completion delay in the 
conventional delivery, a favourable delivery option can be selected for a certain project. An 
important implication of critical completion delay is that critical completion delay can be 
effectively used in PPP decisions and related management decisions such as budget invest 
planning in the conventional delivery and negotiation duration planning in PPP projects.  
 
For example, as shown in Figure 7-1 (a), if the government decided to use conventional delivery 
for a project and critical completion delay is 0.26 years, the government needs to draw up a 
budget in order to complete the project within 0.26 years. In addition, as shown in Figure 7-1 (b), JI HONG PARK    Ch.9 Conclusions 
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if the government decided to use a PPP option for a project and critical completion delay is -
0.35 years, the government needs to make a greater effort to break ground within 0.35 years 
because negotiation and financial closure can be delayed in PPP procurements. In addition, 
when a delay in starting construction in a PPP option becomes longer than 0.35 years, it seems 
that the previous PPP decision becomes invalid and therefore that a new decision should be 
made for the project. According to the master plan of PPP (MOSF, 2009b) of Korea, a PPP 
option already decided for a project can be replaced with a conventional option and vice versa 
when it is difficult to conduct the already decided option. However, there are no examples that a 
PPP option is replaced with a conventional option seemingly because there are not clear criteria 
for the decision change. The concept of critical completion delay can be used as one of the 
decision  criteria when it is necessary (Park and Preston, 2013a).  
 
Consequently, it is crucial to include completion delay in the conventional delivery in PPP 
decisions in Korea and for a more reasonable PPP decision, it is essential to quantify the 
completion delay in specific infrastructure programme and to include the completion delay in 
calculating the quantitative assessment such as the Modified VFM. 
 
 
Impact of construction cost risk 
 
In this study, the construction cost risk from historical observations is composed of WBR risk 
and construction cost overrun risk that consider various bid systems like turn-key/alternative bid 
and design-bid-build. However, when following Korea’s BTL guidelines, instead of including 
construction cost risk, only the turn-key/alternative bid is considered, ignoring construction cost 
overrun risk.  
With respect to the National Highways and the National Expressways, the Modified VFM 
considering construction cost risk from historical observations is lower than the figure 
calculated according to Korea’s BTL guidelines. This is because the representative bid system 
for roads is not turn-key but design-bid-build and the WBRs of design-bid-build are usually 
lower than that of turn-key/alternative bid. Therefore, this result implies that when estimating 
the Modified VFM using Korea’s BTL guidelines, the Modified VFM values in roads can be 
exaggerated, compared with those considering historical observations. 
On the contrary, with respect to the National Railways, usually separately delivered by six 
different major work element contracts, the Modified VFM considering construction cost risk 
from historical observations is higher than the figure calculated according to Korea’s BTL 
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Korea’s BTL guidelines, the Modified VFM values in railways can be underestimated, 
compared with those considering historical observations. This is mainly because construction 
cost overrun risk of each work element is much higher than that of roads.  
In particular, this difference between roads and railways seems to come from whether a project 
is delivered separately on the work element basis or not. It seems that a separate delivery with 
six different contracts for major elements in railways could cause more inefficiency than a 
single delivery in roads, suggesting that there may be economies of scope.  
Consequently, for a more convincing PPP decision, it seems reasonable to use an application 
ratio reflecting the historical observations in estimating the Modified VFM and in order to avoid 
distortion of PPP decisions in Korea, Korea’s BTL guidelines seem to be corrected to use 
historical observations instead of an average turn-key/alternative bid ratio of similar projects.  
 
 
Impact of traffic volume risk 
 
Traffic volume risk can make an impact not only on PPP option selections in transport 
programme with tariffs (e.g. the National Expressways and the National Railways) but also on 
the participants of BTO projects.  
With respect to the impact on PPP option selections, when including the mean value of the 
traffic volume risk (actual/forecast traffic volume ratio), the most favourable delivery option 
changes from the BTL to the BTO option in all the cases considering both PPP options (the 
Suwon-Pyungtaek case, the Bongdam-Songsan case and the Sosa-Wonsi case). This is mainly 
because revenue stream, which is the public sector cost in the BTO option, is reduced as the 
traffic volume ratio (actual/forecast) goes down.  
In addition, traffic volume risk can make a serious impact on the participants of BTO projects. 
When including the mean value of traffic volume risks (roads: 0.687; railways: 0.507), actual 
revenue falls far below contract revenue and the situation could be very serious for the public 
sector and the private sector. According to the serious revenue shortfall, a SPV can go into 
bankruptcy, which can stop the provision of the infrastructure service, causing a great loss to the 
private sector. In addition, in this case, the project fails to achieve the ultimate objective, 
infrastructure service provision. The public sector is not free from the responsibility for the 
failure. Therefore, a BTO contract without traffic volume risk sharing is not favourable and is 
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In the case of Korea, the MRG system for traffic volume risk sharing was abolished in 2009, so 
there is no longer a traffic risk sharing system. In addition, considering the existing economic 
burden that public sector should take in the future by MRG and traffic volume risk, it seems 
impossible to re-introduce MRG in the BTO scheme. Thus, instead of MRG system this 
research has suggested a new traffic volume risk sharing system.  
The essence of the new risk sharing method is to depreciate the value of a BTO project by 
reducing contract revenue stream, considering traffic volume risk. By doing so, the public sector 
needs to pay some more subsidies and the private sector to take some less profitability, 
compared with the current contract scheme. For both participants to take some loss in terms of 
mutual consideration and cooperation, the project is expected to provide a good and stable 
infrastructure service. According to the suggested method, the excessive or deficient revenue 
compared to contract one is shared between participants based on investment ratio between 
parties. Using this method, it seems that a BTO contract will be fairer and more reasonable 
between participants, and the BTO option can be more attractive in PPP markets in Korea.  
 
 
Most favourable procurement option 
 
When considering the transferable risks (completion delay, construction cost risk and traffic 
volume risk), it is hard determine which between the BTL and the conventional delivery option 
is more favourable in the National Highway programme because the most favourable 
procurement option is different depending on impact analysis methods: single-value estimation 
and the Monte Carlo Simulation.  
With respect to the National Expressway cases, PPP alternatives are better than the conventional 
option in terms of the Modified VFM. Between PPP alternatives, the BTO option is the most 
favourable for the Suwon-Pyungtaek case and the Bongdam-Songsan case. This finding is also 
supported by the Monte Carlo Simulation results. However, when estimating the IRR 
considering traffic volume risk, the BTO viability of the Bongdam-Songsan seems difficult to 
be achieved. Therefore, it is difficult to definitely determine whether the BTO or the BTL is 
more favourable for the National Expressway programme. Nevertheless, it is possible to draw a 
careful conclusion that the BTO option is the most favourable for the National Expressway 
programme, provided that the BTO viability can be achieved when traffic volume risk is 
included. 
When it comes to the National Railways, theoretically the BTO seems to be the most favourable 
option if the revenue stream is so large that the BTO option can be an affordable option within JI HONG PARK    Ch.9 Conclusions 
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the limitation of governmental subsidy. Unfortunately, however, the BTO option cannot be 
considered in both the Bujeon-Masan case and the Sosa-Wonsi case because they have such a 
small revenue stream. For this reason, the BTL option is in practice the most favourable option 
when considering the risk factors and the size of revenue stream for the National Railways.  
 
This result implies that, as a matter of fact, the revenue stream size is a decisive factor in 
deciding which type of PPPs is most favourable in the National Expressways and National 
Railways in Korea. In addition, the result also implies that the PPP types being used in Korea 




9.2.3 Influential factors on the PPP decisions in the land transport programme 
 
In order to draw a more generalised and transferable conclusion on the land transport 
programme including roads and railways, meta-regression analysis is conducted, using 216 
Modified VFM values with various conditions from the six cases. By estimating the relationship 
between quantitative/qualitative causes and the effect (the Modified VFM) through meta-
regression models, some valuable insights and conclusions have been reached.  
With regard to quantitative variables, the Modified VFM is positively influenced by project size, 
completion delay, BCR, discount rate and CPI, whereas it is negatively influenced by five-year 
exchequer bond interest rate. The most influential factors on the Modified VFM in the land 
transport in Korea are discount rate, CPI and five-year exchequer bond interest rate. This 
implies that when estimating the Modified VFM, the choice of discount rate, CPI and five-year 
exchequer bond interest rate can be critical in PPP decisions in the land transport.  
In particular, being different with CPI and five-year exchequer bond interest rate, discount rate 
cannot be acquired by historical observations but estimated considering socio-economic 
condition in Korea. Therefore, it seems that the government need to provide more detailed 
guidelines for the application of discount rate. The guidelines need to include the following: 1) 
sensitivity analysis range, 2) whether to use the same discount rate (with a different approach to 
risk assessment) or not for different risk band programmes (e.g. transport programme vs. 
environment programme), 3) whether to use the same discount rate or not between feasibility 
study and bidding process.    
In addition, in regard to qualitative variables, the BTO option and Gyeonggi Province have a 
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respectively. In particular, this result implies that the impact difference between the two regions 
on the Modified VFM seems to be related to the regional difference of population and car 
ownership though there could be various and complex causes. 
With respect to interaction effects, it seems that completion delay is not only meaningful as a 
single explanatory variable, but also plays an important role in reducing information set of other 
explanatory variables in regard to the Modified VFM. In addition, completion delay in the 
conventional delivery can be important in making interaction effects with other variables (such 
as project size, BCR, five-year exchequer bond interest rate, PPP option and region) in PPP 
decisions, seemingly it is because completion delay increases social benefit difference between 
the PSC and PPP options and decrease public sector cost in the PSC, combined with other 
variables. This implies that it is essential to include completion delay in the conventional 
delivery in the quantitative PPP decision in Korea.  
 
 
9.3 Contribution of the thesis 
 
 
This thesis has developed the Modified VFM in order to consider systematic completion delay 
in the conventional delivery in Korea in terms of quantitative assessment, and has analysed the 
impact of transferable risks on the PPP decision using the six case studies and the Modified 
VFM. In addition, the thesis has dealt with the most favourable PPP option for the National 
Expressways and the National Railways, considering transferable risks and the revenue stream 
size of each transport programme. Other than that, the influence factors on the Modified VFM 
in the land transport (roads and railways) has also been scrutinised in the thesis. The thesis 
makes several contributions not only to knowledge but also to the PPP in transport in Korea. 
 
The first and most important contribution is that it suggests a new quantitative PPP decision 
methodology, the Modified VFM, in order to consider public sector cost as well as completion 
delay. The methodology can be adopted in some countries like Korea where completion delay is 
expected to occur in the conventional delivery due to a lack of budget, as compared with PPP 
procurement. According to Mott MacDonald (2002), even the UK experiences works duration  
or gestation period delay, though the reasons of the delay can be different from the completion 
delay in Korea. Therefore, if the completion time difference between a PSC and a PPP is known 
or able to be quantified when procurement option decision for a project is made, the Modified 
VFM methodology can also be utilised in other countries as well as in Korea.  In doing so, this JI HONG PARK    Ch.9 Conclusions 
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methodology is expected to make it possible to take more reasonable PPP decisions in the 
transport sector with completion delay in the conventional delivery.  
The second is that the thesis is the first study in which completion delay and construction cost 
risks are quantified and considered in the PPP decisions in the Korean transport. In particular, in 
doing so, construction cost risk is defined using WBR risk and construction cost overrun risk, 
which is also the first example in the PPP research.  
In addition, the thesis first introduces the concept of critical completion delay in the 
conventional delivery where the most favourable procurement option changes in a certain 
project. Thus, using completion delay, the most favourable delivery option can be selected. In 
addition, critical completion delay also means the boundary value where a PPP decision already 
made in the past is valid, so it can be effectively used to decide whether a new PPP decision 
should be made or not, even after a PPP decision has already been made. According to the 
master plan of PPP (MOSF, 2009b) of Korea, a PPP option already decided for a project can be 
replaced with a conventional option and vice versa when it is difficult to conduct the already 
decided option. However, there are no examples that a PPP option is replaced with a 
conventional option seemingly because there are not clear criteria for the decision change. The 
concept of critical completion delay can be used as one of the decision change criteria when it is 
necessary.  
Another important contribution is that this thesis suggests a new traffic volume risk (revenue 
shortfall risk) sharing system using reduced revenue stream, where the excessive or deficient 
revenue compared to contract one is shared between participants based on the investment ratio 
between parties. Using this method, a BTO contract can be fairer and more reasonable between 
participants and the BTO option can be more attractive in PPP markets in Korea.  
Finally, the thesis provides some evidence that the PPP types being used for each transport 
programme seem appropriate in Korea, albeit with one caveat. In the Korean PPP practice, the 
BTO option is predominantly used for the National Expressways and the BTL option is usually 
used for the National Railways. The thesis suggests that, considering all the risk quantified and 
the revenue stream size of each transport programme, the BTL option is favourable in the 
National Railways, while the BTO option is the most favourable alternative for the National 
Expressways, provided (this is the caveat) that the BTO viability can be achieved in terms of the 
IRR.   
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9.4 Limitation of the thesis and future research 
 
In spite of the contributions it makes, this thesis also has some limitations with respect to the 
assumption used in this research. This section discusses the limitation of the thesis as well as 
future research.  
 
Limitation 
Firstly, although social benefits could be different depending on procurement alternatives for 
various reasons, such as level of tariffs or traffic volume, this research assumes that the 
alternatives produce the same social benefits. In addition, for a simple calculation, social 
benefits from the literature are assumed to vary depending on traffic volume risk, though social 
benefits need to be estimated again through a traffic demand analysis. Besides, this research also 
ignores the social costs that could be induced by each procurement alternatives because of the 
difficulty of assessment. Therefore, if the social benefits and costs are included more properly, 
the PPP decision will be more persuasive.   
Secondly, the delay in construction start in PPPs can also occur due to delayed negotiation or 
delayed private finance delivery and it could make a different result on the PPP decisions. 
However, this research assumes that there are no delays in construction start date because the 
historical observations regarding the delay in construction start are currently not available. 
Therefore, if the historical data on the delay in construction start in PPPs are accumulated and 
available, a more reasonable PPP decision can be made by using them.  
Thirdly, completion delay is assumed to occur only in the conventional delivery due to a lack of 
budget and the long term expenditure contract system in Korea. However, even excluding a lack 
of budget, there are various causes that lead to a completion delay, such as unexpected changes 
in contract management, site condition and available resources. In addition, a completion delay 
can occur even in PPP options though there seems to be no evidence of this in Korea to date. 
Thus, the considerations of the causes of completion delay between the conventional and PPP 
options will make for a more robust PPP decision.  
 
Future research 
Firstly, it is needed to research on the difference in effectiveness between a conventionally 
procured project and a PPP project, ignoring completion delay effects in the conventional 
delivery, because it is important to know how different effectiveness can be produced by 
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be related to different taxation effects, private finance effects and innovation and creativity, to 
say nothing of general social benefit items in a conventionally procured project. In addition, it is 
recommended to consider the distortion of completion regarding tax exemption (or reduction) in 
PPPs, when comparing the difference in effectiveness between alternatives.    
Secondly, there is much room for further research in time delay in the conventional delivery or 
PPP delivery for PPP decisions. Completion delay in construction practice can be different 
depending on project size, project difficulties and environments like geological condition and 
weather. In addition, gestation and negotiation periods in conventional and PPP delivery can be 
different depending on infrastructure programme. In particular, PPPs can also have elongated 
negotiations (and re-negotiation) which leads to delays in construction start and completion and 
makes costs (such as transaction cost) increase. Therefore, the quantification of time duration 
(or delay) considering detailed conditions can make a contribution to reasonable PPP decisions. 
Thirdly, it is recommended to do research on risk identification and allocation in PPPs in Korea. 
Although much research on risk identification and allocation in PPPs have been conducted 
globally such as Li et al. (2005), Roumboutsos and Anagnostopoulos (2008) and Ke et al. 
(2010), it is very difficult to find some research on this field in Korea. As this field is a 
fundamental of risk management process in PPP projects and risk allocation is little bit different 
depending countries, the research on risk identification and allocation in PPPs in Korea seems 
very important not only in PPP decisions but also PPP management.      
Fourthly, although discount rate is very important in investment decisions and PPP decisions, 
the research on discount rate is very rare in Korea practically and academically. In particular, 
the public sector in Korea tends to use discount rate provided by KDI without critical thinking 
that it is appropriate for a specific project or a specific project stage. Therefore, it is 
recommended to develop detailed guidelines for the application of discount rate, in order that 
the public sector can conduct an appropriate decision depending on project risk band and project 
stage. 
Fifthly, it is needed to carry out PPP research using the meta-analysis. To date the meta-analysis 
research on PPPs are very rare. In this research, the meta-analysis is restricted to a specific 
country (Korea) with two PPP types. Therefore, it is recommended to extend the meta-analysis 
with respect to PPPs by including more types of PPP schemes, more transport modes and 
international comparisons. It is expected that the meta-analysis will make PPP research 
bountiful. Finally, qualitative assessment for the PPP decisions seems to become more 
important recently, looking at the evolution of the PPP guidelines in some countries like the UK 
(KDI, 2012). Nevertheless, in this research, a qualitative approach was not included, focusing JI HONG PARK    Ch.9 Conclusions 
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on quantitative VFM, because it could be vulnerable to a government policy and an appraiser’s 
will. However, there exist many other qualitative factors affecting PPP decisions, such as 
flexible fiscal management and employment opportunities, depending on countries. In addition, 
the research methodology on systematic qualitative assessment does not seem to be established 
yet in spite of recent research using interview technique and analytic hierarchy process 
technique. Therefore, for better PPP decision-making, along with the research on quantitative 
approaches, it is recommended that future research on the selection of qualitative factors and 
systematic qualitative assessment methodology should be carried out.    JI HONG PARK    Appendix 
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Appendix A    Turn-key/alternative winning bid ratio between 2002 
and 2011(The National Highway projects) 
 
(Price unit: 1,000KRW 0.58 GBP) 
 
Source: MLTM (2012b) 







Total 33 5,602,328,018 4,960,861,892 88.55
Seoul office 3 531,392,505 505,387,000 95.11
Sungnam-Janghowon2 Turnkey 2002 302,900,000 285,318,000 94.2
Pangsung-Osung Alternative 2009 169,085,722 162,060,000 95.84
Jucksung-Junkok2 Alternative 2009 59,406,783 58,009,000 97.65
Wonju office 3 339,609,000 306,122,000 90.14
Shinbook-booksan Turnkey 2004 172,500,000 163,496,000 94.78
Taebak-Dogae Alternative 2007 126,309,000 104,078,000 82.4
Donggangbridge Turnkey 2007 40,800,000 38,548,000 94.48
Deajun office 3 668,201,000 631,007,700 94.43
Yongdoo-Gumga Alternative 2002 165,765,000 159,001,000 95.92
Boryung-Taeahn1 Turnkey 2010 396,810,000 373,802,000 94.2
Boryung-Taeahn2 Turnkey 2010 105,626,000 98,204,700 92.97
Iksan office 19 3,143,716,276 2,749,456,760 87.46
Sorok-Guguem Turnkey 2002 233,340,000 208,372,000 89.3
Jukguem-Youngnam Turnkey 2002 203,000,000 192,730,000 94.94
Aphae-Woonam Alternative 2003 122,412,456 100,015,688 81.7
Goonoe-Namchang Alternative 2004 137,655,000 110,369,000 80.18
Soonchang-Woonam4 Alternative 2004 93,234,000 78,836,000 84.56
Dongsan-Whatae Turnkey 2004 127,200,000 101,124,000 79.5
Chungho-Samho Alternative 2004 195,191,000 156,242,000 80.05
Goha-Juckgyo Turnkey 2004 274,000,000 258,654,000 94.4
Woodoo-Jongwha Turnkey 2005 79,952,554 70,700,000 88.43
Saepoong-Joonggoon Turnkey 2006 234,358,406 215,514,772 91.96
Yongjung-Yongjin Alternative 2006 238,622,000 190,547,000 79.85
Goonjang bridge Turnkey 2008 155,320,000 150,815,000 97.1
Hongnong-Baeksoo Turnkey 2008 59,499,000 55,802,300 93.79
Gogoonsam2 Turnkey 2009 111,000,000 104,573,000 94.21
Shinji-Gogeum Turnkey 2010 68,039,000 67,970,000 99.9
Aphae-Amtae1 Turnkey 2010 240,863,000 227,912,000 94.62
Aphe-Amtae2 Turnkey 2010 308,834,000 248,877,000 80.59
Whayang-Juckgeum2 Turnkey 2011 131,487,000 87,439,000 66.5
Whayang-Juckgeum3 Turnkey 2011 129,708,860 122,964,000 94.8
Busan office 5 919,409,237 768,888,432 83.63
Gyungjoo-Gampo2 Alternative 2003 175,683,350 140,546,680 80
Namchun-Chungdo1 Alternative 2003 154,486,000 123,588,800 80
Woongdong-Jangyu Alternative 2006 220,957,990 176,766,392 80
Gyori-Soosang Alternative 2007 149,219,836 118,667,560 79.53
Gohyun-HadongIC2 Alternative 2009 219,062,061 209,319,000 95.55JI HONG PARK    Appendix 
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Appendix B    Present value interest factor of an annuity (PVIFA) 
 
 
The equation of PVIFA used in calculating the lease fee has other form.  Considering annuity a, 
rate of return k and duration n, the present value of total annuity P can be expressed as follows; 
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Multiplying both sides in equation (1) by (1+k),  
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Subtracting equation (B-1) from equation (B-2) and dividing by k, P can be arranged as follows; 
 





(1 +  )   =   
(1 +  )  − 1
 (1 +  )     (B-3) 
 
Finally comparing equation (B-1) and equation (B-3), PVIFA is summarised as follows; 
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Appendix C    Detailed derivation of equation (4-3) 
 
For a certain infrastructure project with a constant cost and a constant capacity, assuming that 
the relationship between BCR (benefit cost ratio) and volume capacity ratio follows the linear 
equation shown in below figure, change of social benefit can be supposed by change of traffic 




From  above  figure,  considering  point  1  changes  to  point  2  according  as  changes  by	D , 
following two equations can be obtained.  
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If the traffic volume changes from   to   + D 	(=  ), equation (C-2) can be arranged as 
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Dividing equation (C-3) by equation (C-1) and considering 
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Therefore, if social benefit changes   times from the initial social benefit according as traffic 
volume changes   time,   can be expressed as follows; 
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Appendix D    Turn-key/alternative winning bid ratios between 2002 
and 2011 (The National Expressway projects) 
 
(Price unit: 1,000KRW 0.58 GBP) 
 







Total (26) 4,622,315,674 3,796,643,039 82.14
National Expressway 14 
(Gochang-Jangsung 2)
Alternative 2002 95,234,168 82,507,700 86.64
National Expressway 40 
(Umsung-Pyungtaek 6)
Turnkey 2002 154,200,000 146,451,700 94.98
National Expressway 40 
(Umsung-Pyungtaek 7)
Turnkey 2002 128,300,000 121,243,000 94.50
National Expressway 
detour ITS 1
Turnkey 2003 44,638,000 37,400,000 83.79
National Expressway 45 
(Yeojoo-Yangpyung 3)
Alternative 2003 168,913,706 143,069,300 84.70
Incheon Grand Bridge 
Connecting road 1
Turnkey 2005 90,700,000 85,838,500 94.64
Incheon Grand Bridge 
Connecting road 2
Turnkey 2005 183,600,000 172,480,000 93.94
Incheon Grand Bridge 
Connecting road 3
Turnkey 2005 179,100,000 165,300,000 92.29
Incheon Grand Bridge 
Connecting road 4
Turnkey 2005 162,300,000 153,795,400 94.76
Incheon Grand Bridge 
Connecting road 5
Turnkey 2005 87,100,000 82,396,600 94.60
National Expressway 10 
(Janghung-Gwangyang 8)
Alternative 2006 191,015,220 154,045,000 80.65
National Expressway 10 
(Janghung-Gwangyang 9)
Alternative 2006 197,546,302 156,847,000 79.40
National Expressway 12 
(Damyang-Sungsan 4)
Alternative 2008 225,609,232 121,825,000 54.00
National Expressway 12 
(Damyang-Sungsan 5)
Alternative 2008 186,106,072 126,500,000 67.97
National Expressway 12 
(Damyang-Sungsan 6)
Alternative 2008 182,649,192 163,680,000 89.61
National Expressway 12 
(Damyang-Sungsan 12)
Alternative 2008 231,866,963 216,409,200 93.33
National Expressway 104
 (Nangjung-Busan 4)
Alternative 2009 221,443,968 201,080,000 90.80
National Expressway 551 
(Nangjung-Busan 5)
Alternative 2009 163,638,038 103,700,000 63.37
National Expressway 551 
(Nangjung-Busan 6)
Alternative 2009 129,373,480 78,160,000 60.41
National Expressway 551 
(Nangjung-Busan 7)
Alternative 2009 129,899,350 120,185,879 92.52
National Expressway 12 
(Damyang-Sungsan 10)
Turnkey 2009 153,234,918 79,640,000 51.97
National Expressway 60 
(Donghongchun-Yangyang 11)
Alternative 2009 190,646,705 177,277,000 92.99
National Expressway 60 
(Donghongchun-Yangyang 14)
Alternative 2009 543,943,279 500,751,000 92.06
National Expressway 600 
(Busan outer beltway 6)
Alternative 2011 114,738,475 102,183,400 89.06
National Expressway 600
 (Busan outer beltway 8)
Alternative 2011 209,696,034 131,450,000 62.69
National Expressway 600 
(Busan outer beltway 9)
Alternative 2011 256,822,572 172,427,360 67.14JI HONG PARK    Appendix 
A-6 




Source: MLTM (2004) 
 







Kyungbu line Seoul-Sihung (3 double track) 1.13 171 160 0.936
Cheonan-Onyang (doble track) 1.39 38 27 0.711
Onyang-Shinjanghang (single track) 1.29 35 25 0.714
Iksan-Dongsoonchun (double track) 1.44 45 42 0.933
Dongsooncheon-Yeosoo (double track) 1.04 38 30 0.789
Chungyangri-Wonju (double track) 1.53 52 45 0.865
Wonju-Jaechun (double track) 0.85 53 41 0.774
Jaechun-Dodam (double track) 1.29 41 49 1.195
Nakdongang-Jinju (double track) 1.11 41 31 0.756
Jinju-Gwangyang (double track) 0.84 22 22 1.000
Gwangyang-Soonchun (double track) 1.03 22 22 1.000
Soonchun-Bosung (double track) 0.31 24 13 0.542
Bosung-Songjungri (double track) 0.65 28 15 0.536
Kyungchoon line Chungyangri-Choonchun (double track) 1.14 31 21 0.677
Jaechun-Ssangyong (double track) 1.17 49 48 0.980
Ssangyong-Baeksan (double track) 0.62 33 29 0.879
Youngju-Baeksan (double track) 0.46 30 16 0.533
Baeksan-Donghae (double track) 0.82 36 39 1.083
Donghae-Kangrung (double track) 0.84 33 13 0.394
Gyoei line Nunggok-Uijungbu (double track) 0.34 15 5 0.333
Busanjin-Ulsan (double track) 0.9 36 29 0.806
Ulsan-Pohang (double track) 0.86 40 33 0.825
Gunsan line Iksan-Daeya (double track) 1.16 23 10 0.435




Note: 1. These data are collected from the master-plan research report on the 21st century National Railway 
network of Korea (MLTM, 2004); BCR (425-427 page), capacity & traffic volume (239 page).  2. Capacity, 
meaning line capacity, is defined as the maximum throughput in trains per day in Korea.  The calculation method for 
capacity is not officially established in Korea, so Yamakishi's formula, developed in Janpan in 1945, is usually used.  
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Appendix F    Example calculations for the private sector monetary 
loss for the Bongdam-Songsan and the Sosa-Wonsi 
 
1. The Bongdam-Songsan case 
(Unit: discounted billion KRW, 2006 price) 
 
 
2. The Sosa-Wonsi case 























1.2 -64.5 0.0 -64.5 7.78 0.0 -64.5 7.78 -165.6 40.9 -61.4 -63.2 5.51
1.1 -32.2 0.0 -32.2 6.81 0.0 -32.2 6.81 -133.3 40.9 -41.5 -50.9 5.01
1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.77 0.0 0.0 5.77 -101.1 40.9 -21.6 -38.6 4.50
0.9 32.2 0.0 32.2 4.63 0.0 32.2 4.63 -68.9 40.9 -1.7 -26.3 3.96
0.813 60.3 0.0 60.3 3.56 0.0 60.3 3.56 -40.8 40.9 15.7 -15.6 3.46
0.8 64.5 0.0 64.5 3.39 2.8 61.7 3.49 -36.6 40.9 18.3 -14.0 3.39
0.7 96.7 0.0 96.7 1.97 24.5 72.2 2.93 -4.4 40.9 38.2 -1.7 2.79
0.686 101.1 0.0 101.1 1.76 27.4 73.7 2.85 0.0 40.9 40.9 0.0 2.70
0.6 129.0 0.0 129.0 0.3 46.2 82.8 2.27 27.9 40.9 58.1 10.6 2.15
0.5 161.2 0.0 161.2 -1.81 67.8 93.4 1.46 60.1 40.9 78.0 23.0 1.47
(Note) 1. Loss (G) = the loss of the public sector, Loss (P) = the loss of the private sector.  2. IRR = internal rate of return 
(real). 3. Above table was analysed based on M.VFM BTL-BTO (+volume risks) in Table 5-8 (Section 5.4.4.1). 4. Gil's approach = 
MRG condition is determined to 81.3% (1 to 15 years) which makes M.VFMBTL-BTO zero. 5. For contract 2, the government 
investment includes compensation cost (259.9 billion KRW), construction subsidy (61.7 billion KRW) and additional 
construction subsidy (40.9 billion KRW), and the private sector investment is 223.9 (264.8-40.9) billion KRW. Therefore, the 




(contract revenue = forecast revenue)
Contract 2


































1.2 -66.2 0.0 -66.2 9.84 0.0 -66.2 9.84 0.0 -66.2 9.84 -229.4 107.3 -104.2 -17.9 -5.08
1.1 -33.1 0.0 -33.1 8.2 0.0 -33.1 8.2 0.0 -33.1 8.2 -196.3 107.3 -73.7 -15.3 -6.02
1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.38 0.0 0.0 6.38 0.0 0.0 6.38 -163.2 107.3 -43.1 -12.7 -7.12
0.951 16.2 0.0 16.2 5.4 0.0 16.2 5.4 0.0 16.2 5.4 -146.8 107.3 -28.1 -11.5 -7.77
0.9 33.1 0.0 33.1 4.31 0.0 33.1 4.31 10.1 23.0 4.94 -130.1 107.3 -12.6 -10.1 -8.53
0.8 66.2 0.0 66.2 1.86 0.0 66.2 1.86 30.2 36.1 3.91 -97.0 107.3 17.9 -7.6 -10.69
0.7 99.3 0.0 99.3 -1.27 10.0 89.3 -0.5 50.2 49.1 2.63 -63.8 107.3 48.4 -5.0 N.A.
0.6 132.4 0.0 132.4 -6.08 30.0 102.4 -3.02 70.2 62.2 0.89 -30.7 107.3 79.0 -2.4 N.A.
0.507 163.2 0.0 163.2 N.A. 48.6 114.5 -8.66 88.8 74.4 -1.67 0.0 107.3 107.3 0.0 N.A.
0.5 165.5 0.0 165.5 N.A. 50.1 115.5 -10.16 90.2 75.3 -1.96 2.4 107.3 109.5 0.2 N.A.
(Note) 1. Loss (G) = the loss of the public sector, Loss (P) = the loss of the private sector.  2. IRR = internal rate of return (real). 3. Above 
table was analysed based on M.VFM BTL-BTO (+volume risks) in Table 6-10 (Section 6.3.4.1). 4. Stepwise = the MRG condition of the 
Sosa-Wonsi case (the government guarantees up to 75% (1 to 5 years) and 65% (6 to 10 years) and redeems revenue exceeding 125% (1 to 
5 years) and 135% (6 to 10 years). 5. Gil's approach = MRG condition is determined to 95.1% (1 to 10 years) which makes M.VFMBTL-BTO 
zero. 6. For contract 2, the government investment includes compensation cost (238.6 billion KRW), construction subsidy (1,245 billion 
KRW) and additional constructin subsidy (107.3 billion KRW), and the private sector investment is 134.4 (241.7-107.3) billion KRW. 




(contract revenue = forecast revenue)
Contract 2
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Appendix G    Regression model selection 
 
 




2. Linear-Log (full transformation) 
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3. Log-Linear (full transformation) 
 
 
4. Log-Log (full transformation) 
 
 
5. Mixed transformation  
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Appendix H    R-square Table, Scatter plots and Correlation matrix 
 
 
1. R-square between M.VFM and independent variables with various transformations 
 
 
(Note) 1. The shaded cell means selected relationship because of the highest R-square in each 




2. Scatter plots 
 
 
(1) M.VFM vs. length  (2) M.VFM vs. completion delay 
(3) M.VFM vs. BCR  (4) M.VFM vs. discount rate 
   
 
linear-linear log-linear linear-log log-log
Length (km) 0.30007 0.16115 0.25612 0.14035
Completion delay (year) 0.20203 0.09285 <10
-5 <10
-5
BCR 0.24479 0.12624 0.20863 0.10929
Discount rate (%) 0.23788 0.14136 0.24098 0.14564
CPI (%) 0.00798 0.02102 0.00943 0.02185
5 year exchequer bond interest rate (%) 0.22516 0.11797 0.22063 0.11624
Application ratio (%) 0.02898 0.01469 0.03050 0.01479
Traffic volume ratio (%) 0.00207 0.00234 0.00220 0.00273




   
(5) M.VFM vs. CPI  (6) M.VFM vs. 5 year exchequer bond 
(7) M.VFM vs. application ratio  (8) M.VFM vs. traffic volume ratio 
 
 






















M.VFM 1 0.542 0.441 0.484 0.479 0.033 0.466 0.003 0.305 -0.346 -0.151 0.038
Length 1 -0.028 0.361 0.357 -0.230 0.483 0.238 0.224 -0.161 -0.136 0.000
Completion 
delay
1 -0.059 -0.013 -0.018 -0.027 0.091 -0.028 0.049 0.108 0.000
BCR 1 0.873 0.546 0.814 -0.565 0.102 -0.476 -0.517 0.000
Discount
rate
1 0.318 0.936 -0.161 0.076 -0.540 -0.110 0.000
CPI 1 0.072 -0.614 -0.242 0.325 -0.265 0.000
exchequer 
bond rate
1 -0.146 0.125 -0.642 -0.208 0.000
Transport 
mode
1 0.007 0.186 0.834 0.000
PPP option 1 -0.379 -0.173 0.000
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Appendix I    The collinearity problem in the regression model 
 
1) When all (11) independent variables are included in the regression model, collinearity 
problems occur, CPI and discount rate being dropped. 
 
2) When ten independent variables (without BCR or discount rate or CPI) are included in the 
regression model, a collinearity problim occurs. As an example, discount rate is dropped. 
 
3) When nine independent variables (excluding BCR and discount rate, discount rate and CPI or 
CPI and BCR), no collinearity problem occurs. 
 
 It is possible to know that there is a collinearity problem among BCR, discount rate and CPI. JI HONG PARK    Appendix 
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Appendix J    Meta-regression result using metareg package 
 
1. Model 1 
 
2. Model 2 
 
3. Model 3 
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Appendix K    Meta-regression results (interaction effects) 
 
1. Two way interaction effects 
1) length and completion delay 
 
2) length and BCR  
 
3) length and exchequer bond interest rate 
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4) length and PPP option 
 
5) length and region  
 
6) completion delay and BCR 
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7) completion delay and exchequer bond interest rate  
 
8) completion delay and PPP option  
 
9) completion delay and region  
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10) BCR and exchequer bond interest rate 
 
11) BCR and PPP option  
 
12) BCR and region  
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13) exchequer bond interest rate and PPP option 
 
14) exchequer bon interest rate and region 
 
15) PPP option and region  
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2. Three way interaction effects 
1) length, completion delay and BCR 
 
2) length, completion delay and five-year exchequer bond 
 
3) length, completion delay and PPP option 
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4) length, completion delay and region 
 
5) completion delay, BCR and five-year exchequer bond 
 
6) completion delay, BCR and PPP option 
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7) completion delay, BCR and region 
 
8) completion delay, five-year exchequer bond and PPP option 
 
9) completion delay, five-year exchequer bond and region 
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3. Four way interaction effects 
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2) length, compeltion delay, BCR and PPP option 
 
3) length, compeltion delay, BCR and region 
 
4) completion delay, BCR, five-year exchequer bond and region 
 JI HONG PARK    Appendix 
A-24 
Appendix L    Historical observations 
 






















Seoul Hyunri-Shinpal 9.18 01/07/2002 01/12/2010 116,363               139,568                 76.02
Wonju Gimwha detour 4.7 24/12/2004 29/09/2010 43,665                 47,238                   79.69
Wonju Murung-Sabuk 4.1 30/12/2000 29/01/2010 93,524                 126,285                 75.80
Wonju Bukmyun-Yongdae 2 10.9 24/06/2004 11/09/2010 78,663                 96,514                   54.85
Iksan Doam-Ganjin            9.94  01/11/2002 01/06/2010 46,442                 58,564                   79.67
Iksan Junghung-Wangji          13.60  01/12/1997 01/09/2010 124,389               170,335                 68.67
Iksan Taein-Wonpyung2            7.11  01/11/2002 01/07/2010 55,750                 69,354                   79.73
Iksan Mujuansung dutour            6.80  01/12/2004 01/12/2010 44,146                 58,229                   79.87
Iksan Yongjung-Chunpo            7.60  01/12/2002 01/12/2010 75,997                 91,755                   54.64
Iksan Eyang-Nungju1            8.50  01/11/2002 01/11/2010 81,490                 98,083                   79.71
Iksan Eyang-Nungju2              8.0  02/11/2002 10/10/2010 63,597                 83,936                   79.75
Iksan Haksan-Jusanri              8.7  01/12/2004 01/12/2010 76,231                 81,133                   79.82
Daejeon Eonhaeng-Okchun 6.1 01/10/2002 01/09/2010 65,198                 90,077                   79.69
Daejeon Buyeoeonsan detour 2.8 01/09/2002 01/11/2010 26,470                 32,473                   83.92
Daejeon Hangmok-Jungbang 6.6 01/12/2002 01/12/2010 86,100                 115,282                 58.86
Daejeon Boeon-Naebuk 16.4 01/12/1996 01/12/2010 151,320               183,086                 86.11
Busan Sannae-Sanoe 4.1 01/11/2002 01/04/2010 54,679 69,517 79.60
Busan Gisung-Wonnam 11.9 01/10/2003 01/12/2010 94,460 145,464 50.90
Busan Daeryung-Sunggok 4.1 01/02/2004 01/12/2010 70,104 124,670 79.60
Busan Mari-Songjung 6.1 01/05/1999 01/12/2010 80,529 92,732 69.30
Busan Samchunpo-Sachun1 7.9 01/11/2004 01/12/2010 71,712 99,129 57.50
Busan Samchunpo-Sachun2 10.1 01/10/2002 01/12/2010 88,638 118,343 80.10
Busan Seohoo-Pyungeon 9.9 01/11/2002 01/12/2010 87,332 104,894 79.70
Busan Anyui-Mari 12.3 01/12/2000 01/12/2010 82,836 114,359 79.90
Busan Jindong detour 5.9 01/03/2000 01/12/2010 96,497 158,820 73.00
Busan Chungam-Sanjang 7.5 01/09/2003 01/12/2010 27,844 37,446 83.80
Busan Chilgok-Garae 4.3 01/11/2004 01/12/2010 38,976 50,426 79.80
Wonju Munkok-Munung 6.5 30/12/2000 30/12/2009 103,252               126,285                 75.10
Wonju wongjinri 7.5 30/08/2001 31/12/2009 67,200                 79,392                   80.00
Wonju Bukmyun-Wonduk 9.7 13/06/2003 31/12/2009 68,261                 87,586                   52.12
Wonju Wonduk-Gunduck 10.3 19/06/2001 31/12/2009 79,339                 117,802                 60.29
Wonju Bukmyung-Yongdae1 7.4 28/10/2003 31/12/2009 64,551                 74,233                   50.62
Iksan Taein-Wonpyung1            3.75  01/11/2002 01/05/2009 44,461                 49,870                   79.72
Iksan Buanbaeksan detour            2.48  01/12/2004 31/12/2009 11,152                 22,346                   83.98
Iksan Buanbyunsan detour            2.87  01/11/2002 31/12/2009 20,479                 25,096                   83.74
Iksan Hampyung IC-Suhori            0.80  01/12/2008 01/05/2009 2,086                   2,806                    86.75
Iksan Wando-Gunoe            9.12  01/05/1999 01/07/2009 62,137                 82,335                   69.26
Iksan Bosung-Eyang            3.51  01/12/2002 01/07/2009 105,609               114,183                 60.78
Daejeon Buyeo-Tanchun 11.9 01/12/2000 31/12/2009 65,577                 89,657                   79.57
Daejeon Seosangobuk detour 4.2 01/09/2002 31/12/2009 26,280                 39,135                   88.65
Daejeon Suanbo IC-Suan 6.6 01/01/2004 31/12/2009 53,984                 69,744                   79.61
Daejeon Buyeo-Nonsan 17.4 01/10/1996 31/12/2009 80,147                 159,746                 70.34
Daejeon Whasan-Okdong 6.2 01/02/2002 31/12/2009 77,037                 92,857                   79.64
Daejeon Goesan-Yungpung 2 8.6 01/02/2003 01/01/2009 92,624                 114,397                 53.37
Busan Gamchun-Yechun 13.1 01/11/2002 31/12/2009 98,002 115,056 80.30
Busan Munduk-Woobok 6.5 01/11/2002 31/12/2009 79,288 112,064 60.00
Busan Bunggok-Pyunghae 14.0 01/09/2003 31/12/2009 94,794 120,181 75.50
Busan Sunsan-Dogae 4.6 01/07/2001 31/12/2009 80,567 107,442 86.40
Busan Sinsuk-Yongsan 6.5 01/12/2001 31/12/2009 57,977 85,137 80.20
Busan Ssangbaek-Hapchun 12.3 01/10/2002 31/12/2009 110,061 124,013 75.50
Busan Andong-Seohoo 6.1 01/11/2002 31/12/2009 52,976 62,622 79.70
Busan Jiphun-Sangbiryang 7.8 01/12/2002 31/12/2009 82,690 102,150 52.10
Busan Hapchun-Ssangrim 13.0 01/03/1997 31/12/2009 87,431 116,957 70.20
Busan Pyunghae-Gisung 10.1 01/09/2003 31/12/2009 66,580 76,182 54.84
Seoul Woojung-Jangan 8.1 01/12/2000 01/06/2008 65,406                 63,600                   79.67
Seoul Jangan-Balan 8.1 01/07/2002 01/06/2008 90,806                 103,932                 79.68
Seoul Doopo-Chunchun 10.64 01/05/1999 01/06/2008 67,119                 100,645                 70.33
Wonju Hungup-Gwansul 11.7 28/04/1999 01/01/2008 136,949               152,450                 73.42
Wonju Sindong-Gasa 5.2 17/10/2003 01/12/2008 69,527                 76,748                   79.6
Wonju Gasa-Monkok 5.8 13/10/2003 01/12/2008 70228 75104 79.62
Iksan Wongpyung-Gumgu          10.16  01/12/2000 01/08/2008 89,686                 100,650                 76.36
Iksan Gui-Eseo          10.50  01/05/1999 01/01/2009 108,569               214,185                 85.30
Iksan Eseo-Yongjung            7.00  01/12/2001 01/12/2008 58,107                 73,837                   79.97




Iksan Sumoon detour            4.28  01/12/2002 01/03/2008 23,088                 24,771                   83.86
Iksan Gwangju-Jangsung          13.62  01/11/2002 01/12/2008 110,324               138,322                 58.80
Iksan Jangsung-Yaeon            5.40  01/09/2003 01/12/2008 37,438                 44,572                   79.72
Daejeon Yesan-Sinyang 7.1 01/10/2002 01/12/2008 42,649                 48,449                   79.71
Daejeon Hongsung Detour (south) 8.7 01/11/1999 01/12/2008 87,821                 100,031                 74.63
Daejeon Hapduk-Sinraewon 1 6.6 01/10/2001 01/12/2008 75,340                 100,229                 79.58
Daejeon Hapduk-Sinraewon 2 6.6 01/10/2001 01/04/2008 70,553                 67,765                   79.51
Daejeon Guryong-Buyeo 8.4 01/12/1997 01/12/2008 154,500               179,339                 94.79
Busan Gimchun-Nammyun 9.2 01/11/2002 01/12/2008 80,804 87,241 79.60
Busan Nammyun-Yakmok 10.0 01/11/2002 01/12/2008 75,595 82,745 79.70
Seoul Sanung-Hopyung 6.134 01/02/1998 01/06/2007 100,417               128,564                 94.00
Seoul Yeoju detour 9.816 01/01/2000 01/12/2007 137,883               167,907                 73.01
Wonju Guirae detour 6.3 29/12/1999 20/07/2007 69,700                 83,926                   77.88
Wonju Gusungpo-Doochun 10.6 30/12/2000 20/12/2007 95,917                 134,495                 75.30
Wonju Miro-Samchuk 7.9 09/04/1999 24/12/2007 149,808               177,809                 69.81
Wonju Ero-Songjung 7.9 14/08/1998 31/08/2007 72,625                 86,145                   69.00
Iksan Haseo-Buan 13.95 01/02/1998 01/05/2007 142,162               139,329                 94.69
Iksan Sungduk-Daeya 17.36 01/08/1998 01/04/2007 189,464               214,185                 91.68
Iksan Samsan-Haebo 11.4 01/06/1999 01/08/2007 74,439                 86,257                   69.03
Iksan Younggwang-Haebo 21 01/12/1996 01/12/2007 192,554               213,440                 91.17
Iksan Daejeon-Damyang 16.9 01/05/1999 01/12/2007 105,548               135,057                 68.96
Iksan Nokdong-Doduk 9.8 01/07/2001 01/12/2007 63,124                 72,253                   79.59
Iksan Doduk-Gohung 9.07 01/06/2001 01/10/2007 60,938                 74,306                   79.61
Iksan Sunwoonsa-Hungduk 10.27 01/12/2000 01/07/2007 85,289                 96,040                   80.14
Iksan Bosung detour 3.7 01/01/2000 01/12/2007 49,790                 43,669                   79.66
Iksan Joosang-Gwangchi 6.4 01/05/1999 01/12/2007 51,975                 68,264                   68.97
Iksan Munnae-Whangsan 17.5 01/12/1997 01/12/2007 120,530               140,195                 94.73
Iksan Gunsan-Daejeon 18.66 01/12/2000 01/12/2007 102,102               122,336                 79.58
Daejeon Asan-Umbong 7.6 01/02/1999 01/12/2007 70,215                 69,271                   69.20
Daejeon Bungchun-Yongduri 3.2 01/05/2003 01/12/2007 34,279                 34,686                   79.66
Daejeon Chungyangmokmyun detour 3.6 01/05/2003 01/12/2007 24,346                 25,643                   83.81
Daejeon Haksan-Youngdong 20.3 01/12/1996 01/12/2007 187,663               224,222                 71.16
Daejeon Duksan-Yesan 22.8 01/12/1997 01/12/2007 204,494               244,627                 94.75
Daejeon Okchun-Sojung 11.0 01/12/1997 01/12/2007 93,711                 136,655                 69.70
Busan Bongwha-Bubjeon 17.0 01/02/1997 01/12/2007 144,198 186,099 93.70
Busan Sungjoo-Oegwan 10.9 01/02/1997 01/12/2007 95,826 118,198 69.70
Busan Jundo IC-Shinwol 4.0 01/05/2001 01/12/2007 59,144 76,923 79.50
Busan Toerae-Nongso 10.5 01/03/1998 01/12/2007 238,000 257,990 94.10
Busan Woolsan-Gangdong 13.1 01/09/1998 01/12/2007 214,999 251,753 84.10
Busan Sanoe-Sangbuk 8.7 01/06/2000 01/12/2007 237,260 270,200 -
Busan Hamchang-Buljung 8.7 01/04/1999 01/08/2007 85,446 93,339 69.00
Seoul Ildong-Youngjoong 7.11 01/06/1999 01/09/2006 88,495                 95,518                   71.63
Seoul Ildong-Edong 16.96 01/05/1999 01/09/2006 153,880               185,032                 83.62
Seoul Gimpo detour 8.02 01/01/2000 01/12/2006 122,637               132,324                 72.97
Wonju Jigyung-Gimwha 7.4 19/04/1999 01/11/2006 47,650                 49,127                   69.06
Wonju Munhae-Jigyung 5 30/12/2000 01/12/2006 40,162                 48,634                   79.68
Wonju Eoron-Namjung 12.6 12/08/1998 01/12/2006 118,485               168,846                 93.86
Wonju Sabuk-Gohan 8.2 15/04/1997 01/12/2006 232,246               317,058                 92.91
Wonju Duchon-Eoron 10.7 30/12/2000 01/12/2006 95,917                 111,891                 79.50
Iksan Iksan-Seosu 7.16 01/12/1998 01/03/2006 53,258                 57,261                   69.77
Iksan the 2nd Jindo bridge 0.7 01/12/1998 01/03/2006 48,362                 54,247                   97.60
Iksan Wando-Sinji 2.36 01/10/1997 01/03/2006 36,439                 39,301                   94.98
Iksan Samseo-Jangsung 21.6 01/09/1995 01/03/2006 149,248               152,321                 89.14
Iksan Muan detour 8.9 01/10/1997 01/09/2006 64,937                 76,696                   92.68
Iksan Mangwoon-Hyungyung 4.33 01/12/2002 01/08/2006 37,077                 47,537                   79.85
Iksan Bongdong-Whasan 10.32 01/02/1998 01/10/2006 148,568               143,003                 94.61
Iksan Hampyung-Hampyung IC 10.03 01/12/2000 01/12/2006 56,092                 59,265                   79.55
Iksan Susoo-Gunsan 11.21 01/08/1998 01/12/2006 98,590                 108,394                 69.72
Daejeon Jinchungewol detour 4.0 01/09/2002 01/12/2006 32,771                 34,619                   79.75
Daejeon Eomsung-Sangguk 18.7 01/02/1999 01/12/2006 132,339               159,713                 69.99
Daejeon Chobu-Daejeon 10.2 01/02/2001 01/12/2006 107,068               139,553                 75.99
Daejeon Haemi-Duksan1 6.9 01/10/2001 01/12/2006 58,556                 63,481                   79.51
Daejeon Haemi-Duksan2 5.0 01/10/2001 01/12/2006 57,535                 57,760                   79.57
Daejeon Danyang IC-Daegang 1.6 01/05/2003 01/11/2006 9,642                   9,946                    85.67
Daejeon Gongju-Ein 15.9 01/12/1996 01/08/2006 87,690                 106,640                 69.08
Daejeon Dooma-Banpo 10.1 01/11/1998 01/12/2006 158,559               208,469                 72.10
Daejeon Namdong-Hangmok 12.7 01/03/1998 01/07/2006 93,160                 109,525                 94.45
Busan Dogye-Gyungjoo 11.2 01/05/1999 01/12/2006 52,161 62,645 69.90
Busan Sangrim-Haepyung 17.7 01/02/1997 01/08/2006 176,632 194,312 94.10
Busan Jinju-Jiphung 10.2 01/12/1996 01/12/2006 106,555 145,872 85.30
Busan Hyungdong-Naeseo 6.4 01/03/1997 01/12/2006 125,229 170,763 96.90
Busan Naeseo-Jungri 8.2 01/02/1997 01/12/2006 104,952 126,081 94.40
Busan Jinju-Wansan 10.1 01/12/1997 01/12/2006 146,647 156,294 92.70
Busan Doowang-Moogue 6.2 01/02/2001 01/12/2006 72,975 89,354 80.10
Busan Moonduk-Yugang 5.6 01/03/1998 01/12/2006 120,760 127,968 94.80



























Suwon 2010 440.9 27207 4004 11794 3626 8896
Suwon 2009 470.8 28378 4508 17002 1247 9431
Suwon 2008 470.8 27738 3607 16086 776 4083
Suwon 2007 459.3 29329 3533 11020 10340 2925
Suwon 2006 469.8 27083 3611 16210 7625 2438
Uijungbu 2010 452.6 20958 3627 9158 5823 13907
Uijungbu 2009 579.3 20425 3434 18901 9242 16090
Uijungbu 2008 579.3 20445 3985 16123 6016 5839
Uijungbu 2007 579.3 20601 3580 18524 7214 5494
Uijungbu 2006 579.3 21773 3213 17194 6744 4097
Hongchun 2010 494.6 11877 4112 26097 4865 12864
Hongchun 2009 815.1 10063 4756 43380 3629 14822
Hongchun 2008 823.9 9583 3874 33235 2913 9621
Hongchun 2007 823.2 10223 3823 30497 2324 9663
Hongchun 2006 827.9 10176 3899 31879 2467 9889
Gangnung 2010 419.3 11464 2588 27044 82 14177
Gangnung 2009 539.9 10968 2490 47508 731 14873
Gangnung 2008 546.7 10727 2723 26510 411 9331
Gangnung 2007 546.7 11379 2473 23558 422 21288
Gangnung 2006 546.7 11277 2556 22953 2034 13538
Jungsun 2010 343.3 8855 2594 33527 2258 1963
Jungsun 2009 343.3 8468 2716 41127 1869 5386
Jungsun 2008 387.9 8553 2554 33889 1427 3412
Jungsun 2007 388.8 8883 2683 24729 1099 11409
Jungsun 2006 388.8 8628 2223 16162 4136 12481
Nonsan 2010 324 15007 2661 7996 686 6728
Nonsan 2009 408 13237 2436 11561 1286 10428
Nonsan 2008 410 13744 2350 11037 240 5480
Nonsan 2007 408 14807 2474 9946 1912 4346
Nonsan 2006 400 14793 2272 12448 2359 5869
Choongju 2010 365.4 12202 3444 8964 2533 7085
Choongju 2009 479.9 10849 3223 10091 5545 11129
Choongju 2008 479.9 10176 2791 6172 4833 8474
Choongju 2007 479.9 10400 3003 6587 4859 9573
Choongju 2006 480.9 10408 2924 7192 3667 7218
Boeon 2010 413.4 14702 2491 7289 3090 10919
Boeon 2009 413.8 12390 2324 13548 2361 10919
Boeon 2008 413.8 12320 2163 8174 1596 3743
Boeon 2007 419 13682 2497 9909 818 1724
Boeon 2006 420.5 13575 2433 8690 2872 2983
Yesan 2010 605.9 17826 2942 11022 4170 15411
Yesan 2009 759.8 16543 2911 12347 5993 11585
Yesan 2008 758.3 17007 3016 11271 855 4107
Yesan 2007 753.6 18499 2976 19044 2783 2522
Yesan 2006 753.4 17790 2330 6446 3547 5724
Gwangju 2010 706.1 10147 4561 9849 13607 14938
Gwangju 2009 1031.8 9700 4730 15125 3658 22494
Gwangju 2008 1031.9 9737 4756 12708 8001 28017
Gwangju 2007 1031.8 10752 4418 9705 5922 16465
Gwangju 2006 1040 11175 3951 14270 5435 13725









Namwon 2009 588.9 6043 2483 12152 2203 8526
Namwon 2008 590 5439 2572 11997 1123 13183
Namwon 2007 588.9 6712 2716 15753 4831 8842
Namwon 2006 588.9 6933 2318 16514 3696 7366
Soonchun 2010 523.7 10377 3307 9498 1763 10744
Soonchun 2009 765.2 9115 3523 16028 2815 14511
Soonchun 2008 765 8954 3785 8953 1745 11968
Soonchun 2007 763.9 9119 3569 7614 2133 25620
Soonchun 2006 763.1 9650 3049 11575 1750 19594
Junju 2010 534.3 12056 1607 9466 3194 6831
Junju 2009 503.7 11322 1695 16477 2417 8839
Junju 2008 572.2 10827 1738 15484 5164 5020
Junju 2007 573 11382 1686 10772 4438 999
Junju 2006 579 12672 1269 15507 4348 1747
Daegu 2010 538 11492 3627 19235 658 8455
Daegu 2009 573.8 10524 3059 18426 3319 8495
Daegu 2008 724.7 10643 3210 11942 219 9029
Daegu 2007 724.7 11424 3067 15614 489 14565
Daegu 2006 710.3 11354 3067 4344 9842 10772
Jinju 2010 730.2 11306 3380 7658 2494 7135
Jinju 2009 943.9 10099 3470 19639 2789 10717
Jinju 2008 944.3 9660 3796 13671 2131 10508
Jinju 2007 953.7 9862 3779 10506 5381 23083
Jinju 2006 954.8 9615 3781 18207 6267 21053
Pohang 2010 570.2 14956 5288 15223 2512 6551
Pohang 2009 698.7 13728 5086 26427 2894 13337
Pohang 2008 704.3 13630 5173 24145 3594 5494
Pohang 2007 704.3 14398 4065 24265 6261 5232
Pohang 2006 704.3 14104 4351 18944 3700 5797
Youngju 2010 413.6 9074 2638 12441 1506 7527
Youngju 2009 557.3 8463 2753 12733 542 9441
Youngju 2008 550.7 8004 3016 15688 582 4702
Youngju 2007 552.5 8213 2623 17001 514 1468
Youngju 2006 552.5 8227 2970 22220 1643 3048
Jinyoung 2010 456 19265 4346 11435 767 12062
Jinyoung 2009 584 16479 4426 9921 1685 8482
Jinyoung 2008 528 16991 4439 9363 3267 5915
Jinyoung 2007 538 17888 3497 8062 1370 3880
Jinyoung 2006 574 17100 3013 8344 3454 4531JI HONG PARK    Appendix 
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Dangjin-Seochun 1 14.30 96-12 157,080               01-11 178,244               89.00
Dangjin-Seochun 2 12.82 96-12 108,300               01-11 106,732               89.00
Dangjin-Seochun 3 10.10 96-12 97,559                 01-11 105,888               84.00
Dangjin-Seochun 4 12.60 96-12 128,500               01-11 139,088               89.00
Dangjin-Seochun 5 10.22 96-12 104,171               01-11 112,546               87.00
Dangjin-Seochun 6 10.29 96-12 118,800               01-11 129,827               89.00
Dangjin-Seochun 7 12.40 96-12 106,311               01-11 120,163               88.00
Dangjin-Seochun 8 10.90 96-12 79,159                 01-11 112,099               67.00
Dangjin-Seochun 9 10.37 96-12 102,990               01-11 116,852               88.00
Gumi-Dongdaegu 1 11.62 97-12 155                     03-12 169                     96.33
Gumi-Dongdaegu 2 9.90 97-12 140                     03-12 151                     95.60
Gumi-Dongdaegu 4 10.46 97-12 160                     03-12 171                     94.29
Gumi-Dongdaegu 5 8.56 98-10 153                     03-12 161                     69.86
Gumi-Dongdaegu 6 9.76 98-10 132                     03-12 141                     71.11
Daegu-Pohang 1 13.30 01-11 79,841                 07-12 134,695               69.68
Daegu-Pohang 2 9.10 01-11 98,585                 07-12 126,281               65.98
Daegu-Pohang 3 4.40 01-11 59,950                 07-12 83,473                 55.47
Daegu-Pohang 4 2.61 01-11 76,546                 07-12 87,620                 82.33
Daegu-Pohang 5 3.41 01-11 95,117                 07-12 113,197               67.76
Daegu-Pohang 6 4.62 01-11 76,135                 07-12 82,221                 82.05
Daegu-Pohang 7 7.50 01-11 82,169                 07-12 101,533               69.59
Daegu-Pohang 8 6.00 01-11 79,005                 07-12 98,052                 81.06
Daegu-Pohang 9 6.26 01-11 111,376               07-12 129,511               69.64
Jinju-Tongyoung 1 13.24 97-05 120,560               05-12 213,000               95.22
Jinju-Tongyoung 2 10645.00 97-05 203,000               05-12 217,100               -
Jinju-Tongyoung 3 11.42 97-05 133,000               05-12 150,200               80.31
Jinju-Tongyoung 4 12.60 97-05 212,900               05-12 247,400               -
Hyungpoong-Gimchun 1 8.42 01-12 107,437               07-12 145,404               66.65
Hyungpoong-Gimchun 2 12.30 01-12 120,900               07-12 164,776               65.77
Hyungpoong-Gimchun 3 14.60 01-12 95,227                 07-12 120,140               66.46
Hyungpoong-Gimchun 4 14.50 01-12 129,500               07-12 161,064               59.29
Hyungpoong-Gimchun 6 6.04 01-12 98,670                 07-12 121,667               67.07
Mooan-Gwangju 1 10.34 02-12 69,379                 07-12 77,887                 61.04
Mooan-Gwangju 2 9.03 02-12 67,940                 07-12 75,823                 58.65
Mooan-Gwangju 3 7.70 02-12 66,292                 07-12 66,652                 61.76
Mooan-Gwangju 4 8.76 02-12 68,099                 09-11 86,948                 61.11
Mooan-Gwangju 5 5.53 02-12 72,671                 08-08 92,977                 78.07
Daejeon-Dangjin 1 8.54 01-12 134,037               09-12 167,428               67.34
Daejeon-Dangjin 2 10.90 01-12 83,315                 09-08 108,301               66.55
Daejeon-Dangjin 3 8.80 01-12 103,078               09-08 142,563               70.01
Daejeon-Dangjin 4 9.04 01-12 150,348               09-08 197,830               68.36
Daejeon-Dangjin 5 8.54 01-12 133,232               09-08 159,992               67.73
Daejeon-Dangjin 6 8.82 01-12 103,587               09-08 138,038               68.15
Daejeon-Dangjin 7 9.70 01-12 132,990               09-08 161,311               67.82
Daejeon-Dangjin 8 14.54 01-12 108,032               09-08 134,184               76.34
Daejeon-Dangjin 9 12.98 01-12 101,982               09-11 134,939               77.76
Seochun-Gongju 1 10.85 01-12 119,130               09-08 149,506               67.64
Seochun-Gongju 2 7.00 01-12 79,981                 09-08 105,090               64.62
Seochun-Gongju 3 9.90 01-12 94,437                 09-08 112,084               69.25
Seochun-Gongju 4 10.24 01-12 81,930                 09-08 98,452                 65.81
Seochun-Gongju 5 6.74 01-12 69,925                 09-08 91,200                 80.62
Seochun-Gongju 6 7.58 01-12 60,802                 09-08 75,971                 80.82
Seochun-Gongju 7 9.05 01-12 70,068                 09-08 102,852               63.67
Choonchun-Donghongchun 1 4.56 04-03 58,080                 09-12 71,276                 50.93
Choonchun-Donghongchun 2 4.58 04-03 54,436                 09-12 89,036                 54.58
Choonchun-Donghongchun 3 3.92 04-03 61,000                 09-12 71,592                 59.28
Choonchun-Donghongchun 4 4.03 04-03 87,658                 09-12 111,657               65.99
Junju-Namwon 1 7.20 04-12 88,432                 10-12 113,875               73.08
Junju-Namwon 2 7.30 04-12 81,776                 10-12 91,517                 59.85
Junju-Namwon 3 4.00 04-12 64,049                 10-12 79,836                 56.49
Junju-Namwon 4 4.90 04-12 62,386                 10-12 79,712                 57.00
Junju-Namwon 5 6.90 04-12 67,930                 10-12 82,809                 56.32
Junju-Namwon 6 7.60 04-12 67,433                 10-12 83,264                 60.23
Junju-Namwon 7 10.90 05-03 90,006                 10-12 102,511               56.99
Yangje-Gihung 1 7.73 06-06 72,589                 10-11 96,226                 55.25























Seoul metroplitan Incheon 2010 49 155437 11759 4083 1027 1074
Seoul metroplitan Incheon 2009 49 150687 14993 4003 901 2204
Seoul metroplitan Incheon 2008 49 145858 15340 3601 490 1563
Seoul metroplitan Incheon 2007 49 147352 14249 3329 428 5013
Seoul metroplitan Incheon 2006 49 138929 13969 3143 768 129
Seoul metroplitan Sihung 2010 51 134748 18864 4203 1064 571
Seoul metroplitan Sihung 2009 51 132235 22130 4357 1032 2492
Seoul metroplitan Sihung 2008 51 124858 23609 4081 1706 1448
Seoul metroplitan Sihung 2007 51 126757 21805 3745 828 464
Seoul metroplitan Sihung 2006 51 123589 19849 3068 731 2117
Seoul metroplitan Gunpo 2010 52 131489 16660 4504 1608 2351
Seoul metroplitan Gunpo 2009 52 129273 19124 4332 2188 2168
Seoul metroplitan Gunpo 2008 52 128427 21541 3689 3293 3295
Seoul metroplitan Gunpo 2007 52 126782 20162 3341 1934 6436
Seoul metroplitan Gunpo 2006 51 121046 18735 3275 3864 4960
Seoul metroplitan Suwon 2010 56 159125 22955 4484 120 934
Seoul metroplitan Suwon 2009 56 152214 29168 4838 1777 2650
Seoul metroplitan Suwon 2008 56 154241 32079 4715 2293 345
Seoul metroplitan Suwon 2007 56 164536 29001 4287 2155 961
Seoul metroplitan Suwon 2006 56 158416 27610 3726 1632 300
Seoul metroplitan Gyungan 2010 72 68225 15478 3558 413 65
Seoul metroplitan Gyungan 2009 72 66101 17741 3619 1821 4393
Seoul metroplitan Gyungan 2008 72 64543 19060 3289 918 3186
Seoul metroplitan Gyungan 2007 72 63568 18065 3644 248 4639
Seoul metroplitan Gyungan 2006 72 60011 17565 3408 1530 1507
Seoul metroplitan Dongseoul 2010 48 166910 16271 4643 2566 12856
Seoul metroplitan Dongseoul 2009 48 164935 21955 4487 2129 12055
Seoul metroplitan Dongseoul 2008 48 157550 23318 4064 1963 11763
Seoul metroplitan Dongseoul 2007 48 160040 21287 3883 2186 8076
Seoul metroplitan Dongseoul 2006 48 151888 20185 3549 1818 3501
Gangwon Wonju 2010 72 39937 8543 3248 95 1837
Gangwon Wonju 2009 72 36611 9474 3037 2065 1129
Gangwon Wonju 2008 72 36848 11 2748 2073 3313
Gangwon Wonju 2007 72 41762 9362 2193 1359 87
Gangwon Wonju 2006 72 40148 10107 2159 1608 0
Gangwon Daegwanryung 2010 74 23870 12929 3292 1490 768
Gangwon Daegwanryung 2009 74 21650 15736 3503 2344 1035
Gangwon Daegwanryung 2008 74 21497 15906 3064 1672 2494
Gangwon Daegwanryung 2007 74 22349 15189 3056 0 338
Gangwon Daegwanryung 2006 74 22551 15063 2754 1161 2293
Gangwon Gangnung 2010 75 11073 10798 2492 - 85
Gangwon Gangnung 2009 60 9990 11230 2504 695 144
Gangwon Gangnung 2008 60 10840 12527 1977 538 -
Gangwon Gangnung 2007 60 10364 11310 2936 267 -
Gangwon Gangnung 2006 60 9721 11484 1814 334 -
Gangwon Hongchun 2010 74 18492 7627 2632 - 2162
Gangwon Hongchun 2009 74 17517 8947 2904 1049 1252
Gangwon Hongchun 2008 74 14549 9648 2874 2444 604
Gangwon Hongchun 2007 74 14652 9113 2763 759 13
Gangwon Hongchun 2006 74 14251 8863 2156 678 1290
Choonchung Jaechun 2010 66 17492 10944 2849 394 2201
Choonchung Jaechun 2009 66 12646 10404 2666 - 3253
Choonchung Jaechun 2008 66 12633 11104 3372 352 3658
Choonchung Jaechun 2007 66 15790 10236 2393 152 -
Choonchung Jaechun 2006 66 15024 10249 1940 1223 -
Choonchung Chungju 2010 89 34794 9764 2625 662 264
Choonchung Chungju 2009 71 37006 10289 3026 837 165
Choonchung Chungju 2008 71 35013 11293 2348 598 169
Choonchung Chungju 2007 71 36117 10969 2266 0 134
Choonchung Chungju 2006 71 37061 11431 1808 51 -
Choonchung Chunan 2010 56 105630 8832 3344 335 568
Choonchung Chunan 2009 56 103079 10221 4128 150 918
Choonchung Chunan 2008 56 105314 11366 3383 - 423
Choonchung Chunan 2007 56 103764 10831 4075 336 -
Choonchung Chunan 2006 56 100124 11277 3881 8 -
Choonchung Daejeon 2010 57 73482 9842 3754 265 317
Choonchung Daejeon 2009 57 70140 12603 4260 218 1306
Choonchung Daejeon 2008 57 69027 14089 3809 174 1135
Choonchung Daejeon 2007 57 78470 12889 3878 73 270





Choonchung Nonsan 2010 65 36753 9685 2930 - 713
Choonchung Nonsan 2009 65 35522 8364 3191 70 456
Choonchung Nonsan 2008 65 32593 11512 2747 321 150
Choonchung Nonsan 2007 65 30807 10508 2772 155 143
Choonchung Nonsan 2006 65 30336 11032 2741 - -
Choonchung Jinchun 2010 81 47438 11492 4654 1794 -
Choonchung Jinchun 2009 81 41944 10936 3278 1394 -
Choonchung Jinchun 2008 59 38581 10480 3110 266 -
Choonchung Jinchun 2007 59 48604 10159 3266 398 -
Choonchung Jinchun 2006 59 46644 9872 2933 189 -
Choonchung Youngdong 2010 55 35070 8008 3059 966 478
Choonchung Youngdong 2009 55 32332 9225 3056 1476 -
Choonchung Youngdong 2008 55 30083 9654 2930 - 130
Choonchung Youngdong 2007 55 47489 9008 3209 - -
Choonchung Youngdong 2006 55 44026 9458 2632 445 -
Choonchung Mooju 2010 84 19414 12372 3207 1499 -
Choonchung Mooju 2009 84 16796 14211 3762 - -
Choonchung Mooju 2008 84 15978 14635 3211 - -
Choonchung Mooju 2007 84 19779 14487 3203 788 -
Choonchung Mooju 2006 84 20710 14318 2527 - -
Choonchung Dangjin 2010 74 41163 11395 2456 238 1407
Choonchung Dangjin 2009 74 39541 13201 2851 808 401
Choonchung Dangjin 2008 72 42471 13188 2539 420 413
Choonchung Dangjin 2007 72 40018 12198 2149 245 284
Choonchung Dangjin 2006 72 37059 12744 2043 534 -
Choonchung Boryung 2010 72 24527 10833 2512 1524 1232
Choonchung Boryung 2009 72 24957 10728 2628 4055 387
Choonchung Boryung 2008 76 23553 10898 2215 404 300
Choonchung Boryung 2007 68 22446 9434 2131 539 -
Choonchung Boryung 2006 68 20773 9769 1958 - -
Choonchung Boeon 2010 79 26306 9036 2641 - 159
Choonchung Boeon 2009 79 20979 11414 2632 - 382
Choonchung Boeon 2008 79 20332 11162 2189 - -
Choonchung Gongju 2010 79 20551 9983 2460 - 239
Choonchung Gongju 2009 79 18860 5681 1210 - -
Choonchung Buyeo 2010 75 12788 10094 2410 452 24
Choonchung Buyeo 2009 75 11163 6954 1368 343
Honam Junju 2010 73 34940 10827 3232 713 344
Honam Junju 2009 73 32095 12497 3919 1014 146
Honam Junju 2008 73 32282 13604 4169 2841 536
Honam Junju 2007 73 31696 12581 3886 508 610
Honam Junju 2006 73 33304 12585 3313 2580 860
Honam Gwangju 2010 74 36545 12144 3327 748 606
Honam Gwangju 2009 74 32858 14315 3519 500 786
Honam Gwangju 2008 76 29598 15144 3284 2328 220
Honam Gwangju 2007 76 31133 15371 4439 341 248
Honam Gwangju 2006 76 32992 14028 3449 2260 283
Honam Soonchun 2010 73 27006 10494 3698 696 509
Honam Soonchun 2009 73 24260 12528 3388 1200 1904
Honam Soonchun 2008 73 22698 13382 3481 1031 2702
Honam Soonchun 2007 73 21946 12276 3273 1500 1649
Honam Soonchun 2006 73 22486 11946 3456 2310 -
Honam Namwon 2010 88 9262 7029 2195 874 140
Honam Namwon 2009 88 8315 8424 2452 - -
Honam Namwon 2008 88 7917 9018 2639 508 -
Honam Namwon 2007 88 7471 7333 2543 926 -
Honam Namwon 2006 90 6570 7116 2799 - 1450
Honam Hampyung 2010 80 15573 9392 3283 202 156
Honam Hampyung 2009 80 14421 11614 3324 1630 419
Honam Hampyung 2008 79 13229 13152 3174 1228 160
Honam Hampyung 2007 77 9337 9680 2891 930 231
Honam Hampyung 2006 77 10797 8967 2209 - -
Honam Booan 2010 80 19443 10545 2893 2779 2290
Honam Booan 2009 80 16990 12003 3142 5740 895
Honam Booan 2008 79 15226 12207 2784 1973 -
Honam Booan 2007 69 11425 11917 2735 2082 -
Honam Booan 2006 69 10921 11842 2404 1921 -
Honam Damyang 2010 65 19052 8127 2636 584 -
Honam Damyang 2009 65 17302 10455 3070 1832 481
Honam Damyang 2008 65 15693 10462 2755 1878 -
Honam Damyang 2007 - - 1524 - 506 -
Honam Damyang 2006 - - - - - -
Honam Jinan 2010 59 11422 10328 2190 94 -
Honam Jinan 2009 59 8744 12061 2177 - 12





Honam Jinan 2007 - - 1924 1991 - -
Honam Jinan 2006 - - - - - -
Youngnam Gumi 2010 73 70143 8835336 2867867 399000 603000
Youngnam Gumi 2009 73 64295 9746814 3093362 275000 122000
Youngnam Gumi 2008 73 61315 10880050 2163918 - -
Youngnam Gumi 2007 73 82412 10449131 2607650 43000 -
Youngnam Gumi 2006 73 78949 10239119 2146000 - -
Youngnam Daegu 2010 72 70352 13152 3778 390 145
Youngnam Daegu 2009 72 64297 14344 2776 765 662
Youngnam Daegu 2008 72 61099 15285 2319 1631 239
Youngnam Daegu 2007 72 64722 14575 2749 1245 250
Youngnam Daegu 2006 72 60677 13601 2090 - -
Youngnam Goryung 2010 88 12202 8247 2153 887 -
Youngnam Goryung 2009 88 10786 9628 2266 295 756
Youngnam Goryung 2008 88 9933 11046 2273 416 819
Youngnam Goryung 2007 88 9723 9677 1654 433 864
Youngnam Goryung 2006 88 9386 9107 2085 - -
Youngnam Gunwi 2010 85 32589 15466 3112 1058 1513
Youngnam Gunwi 2009 85 39758 18481 3573 462 429
Youngnam Gunwi 2008 85 38652 19813 3591 1009 691
Youngnam Gunwi 2007 85 40729 17352 2461 1809 235
Youngnam Gunwi 2006 85 40271 18475 3246 2107 0
Youngnam Youngju 2010 68 14238 7790 2423 549 1867
Youngnam Youngju 2009 68 13686 9582 2530 408 618
Youngnam Youngju 2008 68 12884 10552 2351 351 -
Youngnam Youngju 2007 68 13058 9274 1724 180 -
Youngnam Youngju 2006 68 13004 9933 1851 660 -
Youngnam Youngchun 2010 69 23503 10304 2663 - 259
Youngnam Youngchun 2009 69 21434 11418 2584 462 121
Youngnam Youngchun 2008 68 19897 13209 1674 - -
Youngnam Youngchun 2007 68 19408 12159 1912 - -
Youngnam Youngchun 2006 68 19396 11604 1622 - -
Youngnam Woolsan1 2010 47 21510 9091 1969 - -
Youngnam Woolsan1 2009 47 20697 8611 3125 - -
Youngnam Woolsan1 2008 47 14390 47 6 - -
Youngnam Woolsan2 2010 44 44130 2120 1580 88 3938
Youngnam Woolsan2 2009 44 37714 2738 1731 0 2603
Youngnam Woolsan2 2008 67 36756 10339 2374 135 1074
Youngnam Woolsan2 2007 67 48262 9913 2751 158 2600
Youngnam Woolsan2 2006 67 44937 9430 1964 400 7804
Youngnam Yangsan 2010 76 71379 17561 3717 1354 6203
Youngnam Yangsan 2009 76 68235 22687 4266 1442 3210
Youngnam Yangsan 2008 53 67806 21664 3027 5155 310
Youngnam Yangsan 2007 53 77856 18211 2624 286 3956
Youngnam Yangsan 2006 53 74623 18076 2326 608 4550
Youngnam Changryung 2010 68 39749 3183 163 806 1314
Youngnam Changryung 2009 68 35270 2847 190 1742 2728
Youngnam Changryung 2008 68 33936 2401 171 718 4573
Youngnam Changryung 2007 68 29816 2072 294 616 2140
Youngnam Changryung 2006 68 29530 2058 256 876 432
Youngnam Changwon 2010 80 68565 18761 4593 1545 4272
Youngnam Changwon 2009 80 65386 19104 4173 800 7437
Youngnam Changwon 2008 80 64428 21037 3610 1117 2482
Youngnam Changwon 2007 80 63986 18568 3496 2758 162
Youngnam Changwon 2006 80 63693 18528 3149 1653 2000
Youngnam Jinju 2010 75 43878 14099 3076 1025 4473
Youngnam Jinju 2009 75 41116 13435 3020 2972 1959
Youngnam Jinju 2008 75 39461 13350 2627 1414 250
Youngnam Jinju 2007 75 40370 12973 3005 2000 500
Youngnam Jinju 2006 75 40693 11511 2381 3069 150
Youngnam Sanchung 2010 79 21038 6734 3234 874 1091
Youngnam Sanchung 2009 79 18989 6735 3352 833 1648
Youngnam Sanchung 2008 79 18194 7047 2650 561 3170
Youngnam Sanchung 2007 79 20399 5713 2372 1383 91
Youngnam Sanchung 2006 79 21283 5340 2173 1446 300JI HONG PARK    Appendix 
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High Speed Railway Kyungbu line Busan train depot constructon Earth work/Structure 2002-01-11 2004-04-21 109,260 126,936                  70.28
High Speed Railway Kyungbu line Section 1-1 Earth work/Structure 1996-04-25 2004-03-31 222,794 371,324                  91.40
High Speed Railway Kyungbu line Section 10-4 Earth work/Structure 2002-10-23 2007-10-31 78,355 92,599                    69.18
High Speed Railway Kyungbu line Section 10-5 Earth work/Structure 2002-11-06 2007-12-31 96,965 112,514                  69.19
High Speed Railway Kyungbu line Section 11-1 Earth work/Structure 2002-06-18 2007-10-31 100,575 123,460                  70.04
High Speed Railway Kyungbu line Section 11-2 Earth work/Structure 2003-03-13 2007-10-12 78,900 93,649                    59.05
High Speed Railway Kyungbu line Section 11-3 Earth work/Structure 2003-02-24 2007-11-23 78,900 81,494                    57.87
High Speed Railway Kyungbu line Section 11-4 Earth work/Structure 2003-03-03 2008-06-30 67,509 83,489                    58.03
High Speed Railway Kyungbu line Section 12-2 Earth work/Structure 2004-01-13 2008-07-30 57,483 69,347                    53.17
High Speed Railway Kyungbu line Secton 12-2 Earth work/Structure 2004-01-13 2008-05-30 54,500 64,803                    50.85
High Speed Railway Kyungbu line Section 12-4 Earth work/Structure 2004-02-20 2009-04-30 63,256 111,940                  56.13
High Speed Railway Kyungbu line Section 12-5 Earth work/Structure 2004-02-20 2008-10-31 65,910 86,952                    51.80
High Speed Railway Kyungbu line Section 13-1 Earth work/Structure 2005-03-31 2009-01-31 107,900 130,634                  63.61
High Speed Railway Kyungbu line Section 13-2 Earth work/Structure 2005-04-19 2009-04-10 94,779 122,545 63.63
High Speed Railway Kyungbu line Section 13-3 Earth work/Structure 2003-11-27 2009-06-26 169,261 184,121                  87.11
High Speed Railway Kyungbu line Section 12-4 Earth work/Structure 2003-11-27 2008-12-30 139,033 158,838                  82.39
High Speed Railway Kyungbu line Section 14-1 Earth work/Structure 2002-07-08 2009-03-31 141,874 207,900                  69.07
High Speed Railway Kyungbu line Seciton 14-2 Earth work/Structure 2002-11-18 2009-05-04 170,566 193,521                  82.91
National Railway Kyungwon line (double track) Uijungbu-Dongdoochun 1 Earth work/Structure 1997-12-29 2007-12-31 88,330 149,598                  94.70
National Railway Kyungwon line (double track) Uijungbu-Dongdoochun 2 Earth work/Structure 1997-10-08 2008-05-31 98,670 209,754                  93.25
National Railway Kyungwon line (double track) Uijungbu-Dongdoochun 3 Earth work/Structure 1997-10-08 2008-06-30 119,130 185,899                  94.88
National Railway Ori-Suwon Ori-Jukjun Earth work/Structure 2002-09-16 2008-06-30 43,636 85,623                    100.00
National Railway Chungryangri-Dukso Chungryangri-Dukso 1 Earth work/Structure 1998-12-28 2009-12-31 57,129 129,764                  72.10
National Railway Chungryangri-Dukso Chungryangri-Dukso 2 Earth work/Structure 1997-10-08 2006-06-30 68,552 105,772                  72.75
National Railway Nambuk line Entrance facility site development Earth work/Structure 2005-10-26 2007-12-24 36,811 40,457                    73.77
National Railway Suwon-Chunan Suwon-Chunan 1 Earth work/Structure 1996-10-28 2006-07-30 33,588 76,904                    92.30
National Railway Suwon-Chunan Suwon-Chunan 5 Earth work/Structure 1996-09-10 2005-04-30 37,150 61,957                    93.65
National Railway Suwon-Chunan Suwon-Chunan 6 Earth work/Structure 1996-11-19 2005-08-15 35,270 70,956                    90.60
National Railway Kyungbu line Okchun-Jitan improvement Earth work/Structure 2003-12-24 2007-08-31 30,613 37,230                    80.19
National Railway Jochiwon-Daegu Daepyung over-crossing Earth work/Structure 2007-08-27 2008-12-26 6,428 7,496                      84.56
National Railway Jochiwon-Daegu Whanggan-Chupoongryung improvement Earth work/Structure 2002-12-24 2006-12-27 21,697 26,088                    84.23
National Railway Samrangjin-Jinju Section 5 Earth work/Structure 2003-12-23 2009-12-31 161,900 197,021                  94.79
National Railway Kyungchoon line Section 3 Earth work/Structure 2002-12-24 2007-11-20 71,987 122,323                  80.06
National Railway Daegu line (reconstruction) Section 1 Earth work/Structure 1997-08-27 2005-11-30 29,656 37,977                    94.04
National Railway Daegu line (reconstruction) Section 2 Earth work/Structure 1997-08-27 2004-12-20 39,633 52,545                    93.89
National Railway Daegu line (reconstruction) Section 3 Earth work/Structure 1997-09-25 2007-12-31 42,999 78,647                    75.79
National Railway Busan new port line Section 4 Earth work/Structure 2003-12-04 2008-11-10 152,332 167,313                  93.98
National Railway Youngnam cargo terminal line Site development Earth work/Structure 2006-12-05 2009-08-31 10,165 14,005                    78.37
National Railway Incheon International Airport line Railway under landingway Earth work/Structure 2005-07-11 2007-12-18 21,690 22,267                    78.00
National Railway Janghang line Janghang-Gunsan Earth work/Structure 2000-05-15 2009-12-20 160,373 203,045                  73.49
National Railway Janghang line Section 3 Earth work/Structure 2001-11-17 2009-12-20 81,570 117,379                  80.25
National Railway Janghang line Section 4 Earth work/Structure 2001-05-28 2009-12-20 107,013 171,228                  60.00
National Railway Janghang line Section 5 Earth work/Structure 2001-05-28 2009-12-20 149,166 206,967                  60.58
National Railway Janghang line Section 1-1 Earth work/Structure 2001-11-15 2009-12-20 61,479 89,328                    80.20
National Railway Janghang line Secton 1-2 Earth work/Structure 2001-11-17 2009-12-20 57,812 72,412                    80.27
National Railway Janghang line Setion 2-1 Earth work/Structure 2001-11-17 2009-12-20 60,595 85,673                    80.27
National Railway Chungan-Onyangonchun Section 2-2 Earth work/Structure 2001-11-17 2009-12-20 64,676 77,051                    80.26
National Railway Chungan-Onyangonchun Track bed improvement Earth work/Structure 2000-05-04 2009-12-20 172,271 288,430                  73.00
National Railway Junla line Sinri-Soonchun 4 Earth work/Structure 1998-06-12 2005-04-30 116,100 140,515                  94.23
National Railway Junla line Sinri-soonchun 7 Earth work/Structure 1999-05-25 2004-12-09 67,364 81,970                    70.23
National Railway Jungbu cargo terminal line Track bed improvement Earth work/Structure 2006-11-06 2009-09-30 38,319 39,994                    78.26
National Railway Dukso-wonju Section 3 Earth work/Structure 2001-03-03 2009-12-31 182,935 196,112                  94.98
National Railway Honam cargo terminal line Track bed improvement Earth work/Structure 2002-11-25 2005-03-13 31,084 35,706                    79.75
National Railway Songjungri-Mokpo Section 7 Earth work/Structure 1999-05-20 2004-12-10 85,011 116,175                  71.24
National Railway DRMO Track bed improvement Earth work/Structure 2008-10-28 2009-06-30 223 222 87.00
High Speed Railway Kyungbu line Gwangmyung station Building/Equipment 1999-12-16 2004-04-30 86,468 118616 75.13
High Speed Railway Kyungbu line Daegu-Gomo track station Building/Equipment 2007-03-01 2008-06-05 6,102 5636 84.50
High Speed Railway Kyungbu line Youngdong Comprehesive maintenance centre Building/Equipment 2003-08-21 2004-09-30 7,983 10583 80.80
High Speed Railway Kyungbu line Chunan Asan station (Equipment) Building/Equipment 1997-03-10 2004-01-07 8,906 11647 71.15
High Speed Railway Kyungbu line Chunan Asan station Building/Equipment 1996-07-29 2004-03-31 99,814 66039 94.94
High Speed Railway Kyungbu line Whalchun equipment centre Building/Equipment 2008-01-08 2009-07-07 4,574 4557 84.56
High Speed Railway Kyungbu line Goyang train depot building Building/Equipment 2005-11-30 2006-10-31 2,872 3799 84.67
Metropolitan Railway Kyungwon line (double track) Dukjung station Building/Equipment 2005-07-27 2008-03-12 12,128 16261 79.15
Metropolitan Railway Kyungwon line (double track) Army base moving and reconstruction Building/Equipment 2003-12-30 2007-06-12 7,815 10155 91.99
Metropolitan Railway Yongsan-Munsan Seoul Train station building Building/Equipment 2002-12-16 2005-05-13 4,612 5924 85.48
Metropolitan Railway Yongsan-Munsan Susack Station Building/Equipment 2001-12-28 2009-09-15 7,427 10397 85.50
Metropolitan Railway Yongsan-Munsan Wolong Station Building/Equipment 2003-09-30 2005-11-11 3,070 4413 86.75
Metropolitan Railway Yongsan-Munsan Hangsin Station Building/Equipment 2003-09-15 2008-04-30 6,916 9618 86.21
Metropolitan Railway Yongsan-Munsan Susack Train Station Building/Equipment 2006-12-04 2008-12-31 4,095 4095 85.67
Metropolitan Railway Kyungwon line (double track) Naehang Station Building/Equipment 2004-11-20 2007-09-19 28,759 36628 78.12
Metropolitan Railway Kyungwon line (double track) Uijungbubukbu Station Building/Equipment 2004-08-12 2007-04-18 20,795 21841 78.76
Metropolitan Railway Chunryangri-Dukso Donong Substation Building/Equipment 2002-05-03 2005-08-22 3,586 4358 86.77
Metropolitan Railway Chunryangri-Dukso Guri and Sampae Station Building/Equipment 2002-10-21 2006-05-20 7,556 11450 85.30
Metropolitan Railway Chunryangri-Dukso Donong Station Building/Equipment 2002-01-25 2006-04-28 11,460 26757 85.10
Metropolitan Railway Chunryangri-Dukso Songgok Station Building/Equipment 2001-12-29 2006-06-30 4,155 6850 80.00
Metropolitan Railway Chunryangri-Dukso Hoegi Station Building/Equipment 2001-12-29 2006-06-30 8,262 16962 72.13
Metropolitan Railway Chunryangri-Dukso Joongwha station Building/Equipment 2004-09-22 2006-06-30 5,212 6543 83.00
National Railway Nambuk line Entrance facility  Building/Equipment 2006-09-11 2007-12-24 21,540 23341 78.02
National Railway Nambuk line Dorasan Station Building/Equipment 2004-10-01 2006-04-30 10,127 20027 78.15
National Railway Jeojin-38 line Jejin Station Building/Equipment 2003-12-29 2007-06-22 9,833 18523 84.47
National Railway Jochiwon-Daegu Sagok Substation Building/Equipment 2003-09-15 2006-08-31 6,863 8118 86.20
National Railway Jochiwon-Daegu Okchun Substation Building/Equipment 2003-09-18 2006-09-30 9,602 9909 85.08





National Railway Kyungin 2 Incheon Sation Building/Equipment 2002-07-03 2004-09-23 142 305 86.47
National Railway Kyungin 2 Jaemulpo station Building/Equipment 1999-11-17 2004-09-12 5,151 6764 81.19
National Railway Kyungchoon line Temporary replacement building Building/Equipment 2005-05-16 2005-11-11 2,039 2256 84.68
National Railway Kyungchoon line Pyungnae Station Building/Equipment 2005-02-21 2006-10-20 6,028 6621 83.00
National Railway Daegu line (reconstruction) Gachun Station Building/Equipment 2007-06-11 2007-12-07 1,068 1145 85.75
National Railway Daegu line (reconstruction) Gumgang Station Building/Equipment 2003-11-26 2005-10-20 940 1298 87.77
National Railway Daegu line (reconstruction) Daegu Substation  Building/Equipment 2004-06-09 2004-12-30 937 1375 84.81
National Railway Daegu line (reconstruction) Feight Station building Building/Equipment 2003-09-22 2005-09-15 1,664 1967 86.78
National Railway Dukso-wonju Yangsoo Station Building/Equipment 2007-12-26 2009-12-25 13,708 13708 78.02
National Railway Dukso-wonju Wonduk tempory station Building/Equipment 2008-06-30 2008-10-29 815 815 86.79
National Railway Dukso-wonju Jipyung Station Building/Equipment 2005-12-13 2009-12-13 1,848 1848 84.67
National Railway Dongbu train depot Dongbu Train office Building/Equipment 1997-11-25 2005-06-30 167,332 204233 98.60
National Railway Jeojin-38 line Entrance facility building Building/Equipment 2007-09-21 2008-09-20 14,210 14210 78.00
National Railway Suseo-Sunrung Gaepo 1 Station Building/Equipment 2003-04-21 2004-10-11 7,281 11546 91.99
National Railway Suwon-Chunan Seoujungri Station Building/Equipment 1998-10-12 2004-07-31 5,422 7201 91.93
National Railway Suwon-Chunan Sema Station Building/Equipment 2002-11-18 2006-02-28 4,050 5978 91.95
National Railway Suwon-Chunan Songtan Station Building/Equipment 1998-12-07 2004-07-31 5,787 7447 91.88
National Railway Suwon-Chunan Suchung and Habuk Station Building/Equipment 2002-11-18 2006-08-31 9,890 12676 91.83
National Railway Suwon-Chunan Jije Station Building/Equipment 2002-11-18 2006-07-31 7,745 12288 91.93
National Railway Suwon-Chunan Chunan temporary station Building/Equipment 2000-08-09 2004-12-19 5,950 20284 90.60
National Railway Soonchun-Yeosoo Soonchun train office Building/Equipment 2003-05-24 2004-08-31 2,458 2832 86.89
National Railway Donghae-Gangrung Mangsang Station 1 Building/Equipment 2003-11-12 2005-06-12 918 1256 86.74
National Railway Donghae-Gangrung Mangsang Station 2 Building/Equipment 2003-12-20 2005-06-24 2,526 3977 86.75
National Railway Onyangonchun-Sinchang Sinchang Station Building/Equipment 2007-12-25 2008-12-24 6,221 4170 84.50
National Railway Janghang line Daechun Station Building/Equipment 2006-11-20 2008-03-31 9,422 9667 78.13
National Railway Chunan-Onyangonchun Dogo-onchun Station Building/Equipment 2006-11-20 2008-12-31 10,193 10936 78.01
National Railway Janghang line Sinjanghang Station Building/Equipment 2006-11-20 2008-03-31 11,348 12446 78.07
National Railway Janghang line Yesan Station Building/Equipment 2007-07-10 2009-05-31 9,196 10100 78.20
National Railway Janghang line Pangyo Station Building/Equipment 2007-07-10 2009-05-31 7,633 10621 84.51
National Railway Janghang line Hongsung Station Building/Equipment 2007-07-09 2009-05-31 8,634 8072 78.02
National Railway Junla line Namwon Station Building/Equipment 2002-05-18 2004-08-14 5,498 7185 86.27
National Railway Jochiwon-Daegu Yongdong Substation Building/Equipment 2005-05-17 2006-09-16 4,669 4607 83.00
National Railway Jochiwon-Daegu Oegwan substation Building/Equipment 2005-05-19 2006-09-11 4,468 4594 83.03
National Railway Jochiwon-Daegu Ewon Substation Building/Equipment 2005-10-28 2006-04-26 1,780 1779 84.67
National Railway Chunan-Onyangonchun Bongmyung Station Building/Equipment 2007-08-01 2009-05-31 13,286 13886 87.04
National Railway Chunan-Onyangonchun Onyangonchun Station Building/Equipment 2005-06-09 2009-05-31 14,415 18406 78.13
National Railway Honam cargo terminal line Anpyung Station Building/Equipment 2003-11-26 2004-12-31 959 1107 86.71
National Railway Honam cargo terminal line Cargo terminal building Building/Equipment 2004-07-05 2004-12-21 474 508 85.50
National Railway Songjungri-Mokpo Mokpo staton Roof replacement Building/Equipment 2003-03-19 2004-02-19 1,694 2442 86.77
High Speed Railway Kyungbu line Gomo track installation Track 10/11/2005 20/12/2006 3,673 4,189                      85.00
High Speed Railway Kyungbu line Goyang train depot track installation Track 21/11/2005 31/12/2006 1,841 1,931                      84.70
Metropolitan Railway Kyungwon line (double track) Uijungbu-Dongan track installation Track 14/10/2004 28/12/2007 17,535 17,344                    80.43
Metropolitan Railway Yongsan-Munsan Woonjung-Munsan track installation Track 17/11/2000 30/06/2009 3,878 25,072                    87.05
Metropolitan Railway Dukso-wonju Songgok-Dukso track installation Track 19/06/2002 30/04/2006 3,476 6,832                      86.89
National Railway Jeojin-38 line Jeojin-38 line track installation Track 20/11/2003 01/11/2006 2,397 6,903                      86.81
National Railway Suwon-Chunan Byungjum train depot track installation Track 03/09/2009 31/12/2009 916 916                        86.49
National Railway Jochiwon-Daegu Naepan tunnel track installation Track 24/08/2004 31/08/2005 1,146 1,887                      84.67
National Railway Nambuk line Entrance facility track installation Track 16/08/2007 24/12/2007 1,259 1,287                      85.76
National Railway Kyungchoon line Sinnam-Namchoonchun track installation Track 27/12/2004 20/12/2005 2,449 2,135                      84.77
National Railway Youngnam cargo terminal line Youngnam cargo terminal track installation Track 22/02/2008 31/12/2009 3,702 4,081 85.79
National Railway Janghang line Mosan-Onyangonchun track installation Track 04/10/2005 31/05/2006 1,142 1,393                      85.13
National Railway Janghang line Sinjanghang-Daeya track installation Track 20/11/2006 31/12/2008 11,927 9,408                      78.53
National Railway Onyangonchun-Sinchang Onyangonchun-Sinsung track installation Track 07/12/2006 31/12/2009 19,358 20,766                    66.00
National Railway Janghang line Jupo-Sinjanghang track installation Track 20/11/2006 30/06/2009 14,490 14,770 78.48
National Railway Chunan-Onyangonchun Chunan-Onyangonchun track installation Track 23/06/2006 30/12/2008 8,077 8,725                      84.15
National Railway Junla line Iksan-Dongsoonchun track installation Track 01/08/2005 20/10/2006 4,143 4,065                      83.26
National Railway Jochiwon-Daegu Jochiwon-Daegu track installation Track 08/08/2005 31/12/2007 11,772 14,415                    80.46
National Railway Jungbu cargo terminal line Track installation Track 22/09/2008 31/12/2009 4,627 4,626                      85.58
National Railway Honam cargo terminal line Track installation Track 15/08/2004 28/02/2005 2,125 2,325                      84.77
National Railway DRMO Track installation Track 18/12/2008 30/06/2009 233 233                        87.00
High Speed Railway Kyungbu line Daegu-Busan grounding Electiricity 29/11/2003 30/06/2009 1,275                   1533 80.00
High Speed Railway Kyungbu line Daegu Substation power transmission  Electiricity 21/08/2008 28/02/2009 1,147                   1147 86.34
High Speed Railway Kyungbu line Daejeon-Daegu traction line Electiricity 05/07/2001 30/04/2004 21,359                  24977 83.46
High Speed Railway Kyungbu line Busan train depot power facility Electiricity 04/02/2002 31/03/2004 10,137                  11647 73.91
High Speed Railway Kyungbu line Busan train depot traction line Electiricity 30/05/2002 31/03/2004 5,135                   5854 81.37
High Speed Railway Kyungbu line Goyang train depot traction line Electiricity 21/11/2005 31/12/2006 836                      1029 84.67
High Speed Railway Kyungbu line Busanjin power facility Electiricity 22/02/2006 21/09/2009 7,758                   11410 78.09
High Speed Railway Youngnam cargo terminal line Terminal power facility Electiricity 19/02/2008 30/12/2008 2,550                   2486 85.69
Metropolitan Railway Kyungwon line (double track) Junae Staton power facility Electiricity 08/11/2004 28/12/2007 6,448                   9572 83.00
Metropolitan Railway Kyungwon line (double track) Army base moving and reconstruction (power facility) Electiricity 02/08/2004 30/06/2007 585                      699 84.67
Metropolitan Railway Kyungwon line (double track) Uijungbu-Bukbu electricity obstacles removing Electiricity 14/09/1998 31/12/2007 3,057                   6399 90.01
Metropolitan Railway Yongsan-Munsan Gajoa-Mousan power facility Electiricity 29/12/2003 16/01/2009 6,122                   6711 85.88
Metropolitan Railway Yongsan-Munsan Hangsin Station power facility Electiricity 21/11/2003 10/02/2008 705                      1438 86.75
Metropolitan Railway Suseo-Sunrung Bundang train depot traction line Electiricity 14/07/1997 20/12/2007 1,720                   3618 89.95
Metropolitan Railway Ori-Suwon Ori-train depot power facility Electiricity 06/09/2004 05/08/2008 6,318                   6151 83.08
Metropolitan Railway Dukso-wonju Dukso-Paldang power facility Electiricity 02/10/2007 31/12/2007 286                      306 85.67
Metropolitan Railway Chungryangri-Dukso Dukso-Palding electro-obstacles removing Electiricity 19/11/2004 20/12/2005 838                      891 84.67
Metropolitan Railway Chungryangri-Dukso Mangwoo-Dukson power facility Electiricity 19/10/2000 30/11/2006 10,702                  15686 83.26
Metropolitan Railway Dukso-wonju Guri Station power facility Electiricity 25/04/2002 26/05/2006 1,283                   3540 86.75
Metropolitan Railway Dukso-wonju Hogui station power facility Electiricity 29/04/2002 31/12/2009 1,498                   3727 86.75
Metropolitan Railway Chungryangri-Dukso Chungraying-Dukso power facility Electiricity 03/09/2001 30/06/2006 1,026                   2462 86.75
National Railway Yongsan-Munsan Dorasan station power facility Electiricity 22/10/2004 25/05/2006 819                      2084 84.67
National Railway Jeojin-38 line Jeojin-38 line power facility Electiricity 09/12/2003 30/06/2006 1,765                   2494 86.75
National Railway Suwon-Chunan Doonpo bridge lighting Electiricity 23/04/2001 25/05/2005 781                      897 87.00
National Railway Suwon-Chunan Seojungri staton power facility Electiricity 30/12/1998 25/05/2005 1,081                   3967 88.00
National Railway Suwon-Chunan Sema station power facility Electiricity 11/04/2005 30/06/2006 2,178                   2997 84.67
National Railway Suwon-Chunan Suwon-Osan tracktion line Electiricity 06/11/1998 08/12/2005 13,920                  25159 70.00
National Railway Suwon-Chunan Suwon-Chunan power facility Electiricity 29/11/2000 20/06/2005 903                      1609 86.81
National Railway Suwon-Chunan Suwon-Pyungtaek power facility Electiricity 29/12/1999 30/12/2004 1,666                   3559 83.00
National Railway Suwon-Chunan Osan-Pyungtaek traction line Electiricity 06/11/1998 08/12/2005 13,109                  18359 69.00
National Railway Suwon-Chunan Osan station power facility Electiricity 30/12/1998 30/12/2004 1,232                   2052 87.00
National Railway Suwon-Chunan Pyungtaek-Chunan power facility Electiricity 29/12/1999 30/12/2004 1,228                   1957 81.00
National Railway Suwon-Chunan Pyungtaek-Chunan traction line Electiricity 18/11/1998 08/12/2005 16,083                  23226 71.25
National Railway Dangjung station Dangjung station eletro-obstables removing Electiricity 13/08/2008 31/12/2009 2,137                   2137 86.36
National Railway Dangjung station Dangjung station power facility Electiricity 24/09/2008 26/02/2010 565                      564 86.34
National Railway Jochiwon-Daegu Apo-Sindong power facility Electiricity 25/09/2002 31/12/2007 22,944                  44042 83.84
National Railway Jochiwon-Daegu Okchun-Whanggna power facility Electiricity 23/07/2002 31/12/2006 22,813                  42193 79.57
National Railway Jochiwon-Daegu Jochwon-Daejeon power facility Electiricity 23/07/2002 30/09/2005 17,711                  32634 83.74
National Railway Jochiwon-Daegu Jochiwon-Whanggan power facility Electiricity 07/11/2002 31/12/2006 3,507                   6375 86.78





National Railway Jochiwon-Daegu Whanggan-Apo power facility Electiricity 23/07/2002 31/12/2006 25,520                  43503 82.36
National Railway Kyungin 2 Dongam station power facility Electiricity 13/12/1999 27/12/2004 1,439                   2034 80.40
National Railway Kyungin 2 Dongincheon station power facility Electiricity 24/05/2002 08/04/2006 282                      1246 86.75
National Railway Kyungin 2 Bupyung-Juan traction line Electiricity 14/07/1997 27/12/2004 7,337                   13161 93.97
National Railway Kyungin 2 Juan-Incheon power facility Electiricity 18/08/1999 26/12/2005 752                      1228 88.73
National Railway Kyungin 2 Juan-Incheon traction line Electiricity 03/09/1999 31/03/2006 7,680                   8841 73.64
National Railway Daegu line (reconstruction) Gachun station power facility Electiricity 11/06/2007 07/12/2007 246                      260 86.62
National Railway Daegu line (reconstruction) Dongdaegu-Chungchun power facility Electiricity 01/12/2000 31/08/2008 1,068                   2822 86.75
National Railway Suseo-Sunrung Suseo-Sunrung power facility Electiricity 13/12/2001 17/09/2004 250                      648 87.80
National Railway Ori-Suwon Yongdong station power facility Electiricity 28/12/2001 18/10/2004 2,624                   7968 83.00
National Railway Soonchun-Yeosoo Soonchun train office power facility Electiricity 04/09/2003 28/10/2004 435                      659 86.76
National Railway Donghae-Gangrung Donghae-Gangrung power facility 1 Electiricity 31/10/2003 30/11/2005 1,013                   2315 86.75
National Railway Donghae-Gangrung Donghae-Gangrung traction line Electiricity 29/05/2002 30/12/2005 9,388                   17071 83.97
National Railway Donghae-Gangrung Donghae-Gangrung power facility 2 Electiricity 02/12/2002 31/12/2005 308                      475 86.77
National Railway Janghang line Ganchi-Daeya power facility Electiricity 25/06/2007 30/12/2008 7,219                   6490 84.53
National Railway Janghang line Dogo-onchun Station power facility Electiricity 25/06/2007 31/05/2009 5,527                   6254 84.73
National Railway Janghang line Sinchang-Sinsung power facility Electiricity 25/06/2007 30/12/2008 4,498                   4430 84.51
National Railway Janghang line Sinchang Station power facility Electiricity 18/12/2007 31/12/2008 866                      858 85.67
National Railway Janghang line Yesan Station power facility Electiricity 02/06/2008 31/05/2009 4,585                   4606 86.38
National Railway Onyangonchun-Sinchang Onyangonchun-Sinsung power facility Electiricity 20/11/2007 31/12/2008 2,050                   2178 85.71
National Railway Onyangonchun-Sinchang Onyangonchun Station power facility Electiricity 30/11/2005 31/03/2009 1,515                   2732 84.67
National Railway Chunan-Onyangonchun Chunan-Onyangonchun power facility 1 Electiricity 22/07/2005 31/03/2009 11,648                  13946 78.24
National Railway Chunan-Onyangonchun Mosan station power facility Electiricity 17/09/2007 31/03/2009 1,461                   1692 85.67
National Railway Chunan-Onyangonchun Chunan-Onynagonchun Power facility 2 Electiricity 21/08/2007 31/03/2009 577                      610 85.67
National Railway Chunan-Onyangonchun Electro-obstacles removing Electiricity 30/11/2004 30/12/2005 207                      207 86.00
National Railway Janghang line Jupo station electro-obstacles removing Electiricity 20/08/2004 25/12/2004 38                        44 86.00
National Railway Junla line Namwon Station power facility Electiricity 15/04/2002 10/08/2004 1,055                   1824 86.75
National Railway Junla line Bongchun station power facility Electiricity 26/04/2001 31/05/2005 591                      1375 86.75
National Railway Junla line Seodo-Gumji power facility Electiricity 25/04/2002 10/08/2004 1,514                   2247 86.75
National Railway Soonchun-Yeosoo Soonchun-Yeosoo electro-obstacles removing Electiricity 31/07/2007 22/09/2008 433                      434 85.67
National Railway Jungbu cargo terminal line Terminal power facility Electiricity 18/12/2008 31/12/2009 4,409                   4409 86.36
National Railway Dukso-wonju Gooksoo-Gudon power lines Electiricity 17/06/2005 14/11/2005 657                      608 84.67
National Railway Dukso-wonju Yangpyung station power lines 1 Electiricity 07/11/2005 30/12/2005 150                      141 85.99
National Railway Dukso-wonju Yangpyung sation power lines 2 Electiricity 26/04/2006 30/07/2008 1,800                   1854 84.67
National Railway Dukso-wonju Yongmun station power facility Electiricity 23/05/2008 30/12/2009 556                      556 86.34
National Railway Dukso-wonju Paldang-Guksoo power facility Electiricity 30/05/2008 30/11/2008 1,000                   1000 86.34
National Railway Honam cargo terminal line terminal line power facility Electiricity 12/12/2003 31/12/2004 365                      906 86.75
National Railway Songjungri-Mokpo Hakgyo-Mokpo power facility Electiricity 01/06/2000 31/05/2004 2,660                   7994 82.98
National Railway Songjungri-Mokpo Anpyung Station power facility Electiricity 10/08/2004 17/10/2004 105                      105 84.00
National Railway Songjungri-Mokpo Anpyung Satation traction line Electiricity 05/11/2004 31/12/2004 423                      740 82.98
High Speed Railway Kyungbu line Daegu-Daejeon train communication system Communication 08/06/2001 29/04/2004 5,801 5475 80.66
High Speed Railway Kyungbu line Busan train depot communication system Communication 08/06/2002 31/03/2004 7,214 8217 81.45
Metropolitan Railway Kyungwon line (double track) Uijungbu-Dongan communication system Communication 15/11/2000 28/12/2007 2,008 4357 86.76
Metropolitan Railway Yongsan-Munsan Susack station communication system Communication 28/11/2002 10/12/2009 844 923 86.75
Metropolitan Railway Yongsan-Munsan Hangsin station communication system Communication 21/11/2003 30/11/2009 625 973 86.75
Metropolitan Railway Ori-Suwon Ori-Bungdang depot communication system Communication 18/07/2004 31/07/2008 725 708 84.69
Metropolitan Railway Dukso-wonju Guri station communication system Communication 29/04/2002 31/08/2006 1,763 3230 86.75
Metropolitan Railway Dukso-wonju Dukso-Yongmun communication system Communication 21/09/2007 31/12/2009 3,183 3183 85.67
National Railway Yongsan-Munsan Dorasan station communication system Communication 12/10/2004 25/05/2006 864 1415 84.67
National Railway Jeojin-38 line Jeojin-38 line communication system Communication 09/12/2003 30/06/2007 913 1705 86.96
National Railway Dangjung station Dangjung station communication system Communication 01/08/2008 26/02/2010 1,434 1433 86.34
National Railway Suwon-Chunan Seojungri station communication system Communication 28/12/1998 20/12/2004 874 1583 90.00
National Railway Suwon-Chunan Serew station communication system Communication 26/12/1998 20/12/2004 862 1539 90.00
National Railway Suwon-Chunan Suwon-Pyungtaek communication system Communication 18/09/1999 20/12/2004 1,991 2658 90.00
National Railway Jochiwon-Daegu Youngdong -Sindong communication system Communication 02/10/2002 31/12/2006 7,224 9409 85.60
National Railway Jochiwon-Daegu Jochiwon-Youngdong communication system Communication 02/09/2002 31/12/2006 3,875 6052 86.75
National Railway Jochiwon-Daegu Jochiwon-Daegu communication system Communication 01/06/2006 30/12/2006 2,544 2654 84.69
National Railway Suwon-Chunan Chunan station communication system Communication 13/12/2001 20/12/2004 1,232 2546 86.75
National Railway Suwon-Chunan Pyungtaek-Chunan communication system Communication 07/09/1999 20/12/2004 1,384 1961 90.00
National Railway Jochiwon-Daegu Pyungtaek station communication system Communication 07/10/2003 30/04/2005 693 1427 86.75
National Railway Kyungin 2 Youngdungpo-Incheon communication system Communication 30/07/2001 31/12/2005 353 486 86.75
National Railway Kyungin 2 Dowon station communication system Communication 20/12/1999 08/12/2004 283 444 84.95
National Railway Kyungin 2 Dongam station communication system Communication 04/08/1999 10/08/2004 988 1515 90.00
National Railway Kyungin 2 Dongincheon Station communication system Communication 03/06/2002 30/03/2006 416 1134 86.74
National Railway Kyungin 2 Bupyung-Incheon communication system Communication 13/09/1999 27/12/2005 547 989 90.00
National Railway Samrangjin-Jinju Samrangjin-Jinju communication system Communication 01/11/2007 31/12/2008 1,213 724 85.67
National Railway Busan-Woolsan Busan-Ilgwang communication system Communication 05/12/2008 20/12/2009 1,296 1296 86.36
National Railway Suseo-Sunrung Gaepo station communication system Communication 17/12/2001 18/10/2004 1,144 2488 86.76
National Railway Suseo-Sunrung Sunrung-Suseo communication system Communication 08/07/2002 31/08/2004 2,182 2331 86.75
National Railway Suwon-Chunan Suwon station communication system Communication 17/12/2001 30/06/2004 433 451 86.75
National Railway Soonchun-Yeosoo Soonchun train offince communication system Communication 04/09/2003 30/06/2005 362 659 86.75
National Railway Youngnam cargo terminal line Terminal communication system Communication 20/02/2008 31/12/2008 311 225 85.68
National Railway Donghae-Gangrung Donghae-Gangrung communication system Communication 12/08/2002 23/12/2005 3,453 6597 86.75
National Railway Janghang line Janghang line communication system 1 Communication 26/05/2005 27/12/2005 88 88 86.05
National Railway Janghang line Sinchang-Daeya communication system Communication 25/06/2007 31/08/2009 17,518 16225 78.45
National Railway Janghang line Yesan station communication system Communication 02/06/2008 30/06/2009 1,923 1826 86.38
National Railway Onyangonchun-Sinchang Sinchang station communication system Communication 10/12/2007 31/12/2008 381 340 85.84
National Railway Chunan-Onyangonchun Bongmyung station communication system Communication 27/08/2007 31/01/2009 561 559 85.73
National Railway Chunan-Onyangonchun Chunan-Onyangonchun communication systemCommunication 21/12/2004 31/03/2009 1,445 2644 84.67
National Railway Janghang line Janghang line communication system 2 Communication 15/07/2004 31/12/2004 405 419 84.67
National Railway Junla line Namwon station communication system Communication 01/06/2002 20/08/2004 442 808 86.76
National Railway Junla line Bongchun station communication system Communication 26/04/2001 21/07/2004 362 463 86.75
National Railway Junla line Sansung-Soonchun communication system Communication 19/06/2002 20/08/2004 1,484 1933 86.76
National Railway Soonchun-Yeosoo Soonchun-Yeosoo communication system Communication 01/08/2007 23/09/2008 589 590 85.67
National Railway Junla line Imsil-Gumji communication system Communication 11/06/2002 20/08/2004 494 508 86.84
National Railway Junla line Junju-Sansung communication system Communication 19/06/2002 20/08/2004 2,102 2338 86.75
National Railway Jungbu cargo terminal line Terminal communication system Communication 05/12/2008 04/12/2009 765 764 86.34
National Railway Dukso-wonju Yongmoon station communication system Communication 19/12/2008 31/12/2009 861 861 86.34
National Railway Dukso-wonju Jipyung station communication system Communication 04/07/2008 31/12/2009 433 433 86.43







National Railway DRMO Communication system Communication 24/12/2008 23/04/2009 47 47 87.03
High Speed Railway Kyungbu line Daejeon-Daegu signalling Signalling 28/07/2001 31/01/2004 16,500 18489 79.58
High Speed Railway Kyungbu line Busan train depot signalling Signalling 16/02/2002 31/03/2004 6,364 6190 81.77
High Speed Railway Kyungbu line Seoul-Daegu CTC  Signalling 31/01/2002 30/04/2004 957 1528 83.15
High Speed Railway Kyungbu line Busanjin Station Signalling Signalling 08/02/2006 31/08/2007 1,594 2730 84.70
High Speed Railway Kyungbu line Goyang train depot Signalling Signalling 08/11/2005 31/12/2006 789 1236 84.78
Metropolitan Railway Kyungwon line (double track) Jijang station Signalling Signalling 03/07/1999 31/12/2005 147 149 91.96
Metropolitan Railway Kyungwon line (double track) Uijungbu-Dongan Signalling 1 Signalling 07/10/2004 30/12/2007 518 605 84.70
Metropolitan Railway Kyungwon line (double track) Uijungbu-Dongan Signalling 2 Signalling 21/11/2004 30/12/2007 6,361 9946 83.37
Metropolitan Railway Kyungwon line (double track) Uijungbu station signalling 1 Signalling 09/06/1999 31/12/2005 85 55 92.69
Metropolitan Railway Kyungwon line (double track) Uijungbu station signalling 2 Signalling 20/07/1999 24/12/2005 125 202 94.75
Metropolitan Railway Kyungwon line (double track) Uijungbu station signalling 3 Signalling 24/05/1999 24/12/2005 510 1263 90.00
Metropolitan Railway Ori-Jukjeon Ori-Bungdang depot signalling 1 Signalling 28/07/2004 31/08/2008 248 227 84.70
Metropolitan Railway Ori-Jukjeon Ori-Bungdang depot signalling 2 Signalling 24/09/2004 31/08/2008 5,193 6467 84.46
Metropolitan Railway Dukso-wonju Dukso-Paldang signalling Signalling 20/09/2007 30/12/2007 1,517 2022 85.71
Metropolitan Railway Dukso-wonju Donong station signalling Signalling 01/07/2002 30/12/2005 103 252 86.89
Metropolitan Railway Chungryangri-Dukso Mangwoo-Dukso signalling Signalling 15/09/2000 30/06/2006 1,762 4387 86.79
National Railway Jeojin-38 line Jeojin-38 line signalling 1 Signalling 11/11/2003 31/12/2006 36 76 87.83
National Railway Jeojin-38 line Jeojin-38 line signalling 2 Signalling 15/12/2003 31/12/2006 1,236 2390 86.75
National Railway Suwon-Chunan Sungwhan-Chunan signalling Signalling 14/09/1998 04/06/2005 4,352 13399 90.00
National Railway Suwon-Chunan Sungwhan statin signalling removing Signalling 09/12/1999 30/12/2004 234 439 88.94
National Railway Suwon-Chunan Serew station signalling removing Signalling 04/12/1999 30/12/2004 239 453 91.52
National Railway Suwon-Chunan Suwon-Byungjum signalling Signalling 28/09/1998 30/04/2005 3,411 9520 90.10
National Railway Suwon-Chunan Osan-Pyungtaek signalling Signalling 01/09/1998 04/06/2005 3,822 13552 90.04
National Railway Suwon-Chunan Pyungtaek station signalling removing Signalling 04/12/1999 30/12/2004 241 357 89.34
National Railway Suwon-Chunan Suwon station signalling removing Signalling 18/10/2000 30/12/2004 179 362 86.82
National Railway Suwon-Chunan Chunan station signalling removing Signalling 19/10/2000 30/04/2005 164 389 86.91
National Railway Dangjung station Gunpo-Uiwang signalling Signalling 25/08/2008 28/02/2010 1,361 1360 87.11
National Railway Suwon-Chunan Byungjum train depot signalling Signalling 01/08/2008 31/01/2010 1,083 1082 86.35
National Railway Jochiwon-Daegu Bugang station signalling Signalling 21/11/2003 27/12/2004 155 225 86.75
National Railway Suwon-Chunan Semaoe sation signalling Signalling 13/12/2006 27/12/2006 70 70 97.46
National Railway Jochiwon-Daegu Apo-Sindong signalling Signalling 25/10/2002 31/12/2006 3,519 6458 86.88
National Railway Jochiwon-Daegu Yongdong station signalling Signalling 25/11/2003 29/12/2004 101 107 87.02
National Railway Jochiwon-Daegu Okchun-Whanggan signalling Signalling 25/10/2002 30/12/2006 3,706 7507 86.84
National Railway Jochiwon-Daegu Oegwan station signalling Signalling 21/11/2003 25/11/2004 144 139 86.98
National Railway Jochiwon-Daegu Jochiwon-Daejeon signalling Signalling 25/10/2002 27/10/2005 2,949 6303 86.76
National Railway Suwon-Chunan Chunan station signalling Signalling 23/12/2002 02/05/2005 583 1959 86.74
National Railway Jochwon-Daegu Whanggan-Apo signalling Signalling 04/11/2002 31/12/2006 4,469 7389 85.72
National Railway Nambuk line Entrance facility signalling Signalling 30/08/2007 24/12/2007 1,301 1380 85.74
National Railway Kyungin 2 Juan-Incheon signalling Signalling 28/09/2000 30/03/2006 1,765 3335 87.75
National Railway Daegu line (reconstruction) Dongdaegu-Chungchun signalling Signalling 01/12/1998 31/08/2008 2,630 5460 90.04
National Railway Busan-Woolsan Songjung-Joachun signalling Signalling 28/10/2004 24/12/2004 44 44 86.02
National Railway Youngnam cargo terminal line Terminal signalling Signalling 20/02/2008 31/12/2009 1,801 1897 85.69
National Railway Donghae-Gangrung Donghae-Gangrung signalling Signalling 05/08/2002 23/12/2005 1,387 5103 86.74
National Railway Janghang line Signalling obstacles removing Signalling 12/05/2005 30/12/2005 197 609 86.11
National Railway Janghang line Janghang line signalling Signalling 22/06/2007 30/12/2008 1,634 1207 85.77
National Railway Janghang line Sinchang-Hongsung signalling Signalling 16/07/2007 30/10/2009 8,643 10582 78.60
National Railway Janghang line Sinchang-Daeya signalling Signalling 16/07/2007 30/10/2009 11,313 8968 78.23
National Railway Chunan-Onyangonchun Chunan-Onyangonchun signalling Signalling 02/11/2004 31/03/2009 4,018 9210 84.97
National Railway Janghang line Hongsung-Woonchun signalling Signalling 16/07/2007 30/10/2009 8,646 7467 78.01
National Railway Janghang line Sigalling obstacles removing Signalling 28/07/2004 29/12/2004 592 592 84.67
National Railway Junla line Namwon station signalling 1 Signalling 08/10/2001 31/10/2004 327 718 87.22
National Railway Junla line Namwon station signalling 2 Signalling 22/07/2002 31/03/2005 782 2746 86.82
National Railway Junla line Bongchun station signalling 1 Signalling 04/07/2001 30/06/2005 149 356 91.58
National Railway Junla line Bongchun station signalling 2 Signalling 17/06/2001 30/06/2005 623 2805 86.76
National Railway Soonchun-Yeosoo Soonchun-Yeosoo signalling obstacles removing Signalling 03/08/2007 30/06/2009 987 987 85.79
National Railway Jungbu cargo terminal line Terminal signalling Signalling 10/12/2008 31/12/2009 2,094 2093 86.49
National Railway Dukso-wonju Dukso-Paldang signalling Signalling 22/12/2006 31/12/2007 615 942 85.75
National Railway Dukso-wonju Samgok-Dodam signalling Signalling 03/12/2004 23/12/2004 36 36 86.02
National Railway Dukso-wonju Sangok station signalling 1 Signalling 09/11/2005 25/08/2006 97 145 85.99
National Railway Dukso-wonju Sangok station signalling 2 Signalling 11/04/2006 22/12/2006 574 774 84.76
National Railway Dukso-wonju Yangpyung sation signalling obstacles removing Signalling 24/10/2005 23/12/2005 17 25 86.01
National Railway Honam cargo terminal line Terminal signalling 1 Signalling 05/08/2004 15/03/2005 97 102 84.90
National Railway Honam cargo terminal line Terminal signalling 2 Signalling 31/12/2003 15/03/2005 641 1064 86.77
National Railway Songjungri-Mokpo Mooan-Mokpo signalling Signalling 08/12/1999 31/03/2004 1,666 4522 83.04




























Kyungbu line 2010 332,721            305,279               84,646            Kyungui line 2010 19,288            10,689            4,278            
Kyungbu line 2009 346,040            290,550               94,811            Kyungui line 2009 32,339            18,242            4,307            
Kyungbu line 2008 383,397            336,484               91,271            Kyungui line 2008 34,939            24,379            5,062            
Kyungbu line 2007 339,125            331,106               110,964          Kyungui line 2007 28,958            21,104            2,192            
Kyungbu line 2006 321,534            337,415               74,020            Kyungui line 2006 22,857            20,209            1,656            
Kyungbu line 2005 278,784            375,265               67,710            Kyungui line 2005 21,898            24,476            1,595            
Kyungbu line 2004 769,215            Kyungui line 2004 39,293           
Kyungbu line 2003 934,338            Kyungui line 2003 37,275           
Kyungbu line 2002 842,186            Kyungui line 2002 33,146           
Kyungbu line 2001 785,186            Kyungui line 2001 28,204           
Honam line 2010 75,012              55,688                19,918            Gyioe line 2010 378                194                30                 
Honam line 2009 78,646              51,877                20,751            Gyioe line 2009 326                136                36                 
Honam line 2008 86,038              58,990                21,567            Gyioe line 2008 486                218                50                 
Honam line 2007 73,265              59,723                23,197            Gyioe line 2007 490                330                29                 
Honam line 2006 66,535              61,839                7,596             Gyioe line 2006 789                592                150               
Honam line 2005 55,658              65,421                8,712             Gyioe line 2005 880                629                196               
Honam line 2004 144,836            Gyioe line 2004 5,033            
Honam line 2003 168,065            Gyioe line 2003 6,265            
Honam line 2002 146,291            Gyioe line 2002 5,994            
Honam line 2001 144,397            Gyioe line 2001 6,049            
Joongang line 2010 137,647            77,382                25,898            Kyungbuk line 2010 7,621             4,870             998               
Joongang line 2009 141,432            71,655                34,433            Kyungbuk line 2009 7,352             4,012             907               
Joongang line 2008 156,308            84,905                35,719            Kyungbuk line 2008 7,737             4,140             872               
Joongang line 2007 129,618            81,295                39,998            Kyungbuk line 2007 6,004             4,119             1,045            
Joongang line 2006 121,174            82,960                40,533            Kyungbuk line 2006 6,793             4,758             1,054            
Joongang line 2005 117,458            89,715                41,363            Kyungbuk line 2005 6,258             4,865             1,116            
Joongang line 2004 252,766            Kyungbuk line 2004 41,266           
Joongang line 2003 249,951            Kyungbuk line 2003 27,409           
Joongang line 2002 225,998            Kyungbuk line 2002 22,297           
Joongang line 2001 215,656            Kyungbuk line 2001 18,868           
Junla line 2010 58,091              47,507                13,026            Gunsan line 2010
Junla line 2009 60,557              41,650                13,848            Gunsan line 2009
Junla line 2008 66,283              49,792                14,743            Gunsan line 2008
Junla line 2007 57,897              47,604                16,411            Gunsan line 2007 2,729             1,901             243               
Junla line 2006 54,891              50,190                17,720            Gunsan line 2006 3,593             2,434             516               
Junla line 2005 49,623              50,884                17,092            Gunsan line 2005 3,663             2,397             555               
Junla line 2004 101,841            Gunsan line 2004 9,726            
Junla line 2003 105,506            Gunsan line 2003 9,664            
Junla line 2002 93,293              Gunsan line 2002 7,480            
Junla line 2001 87,791              Gunsan line 2001 8,301            
Youngdong line 2010 58,282              28,963                7,318             Taebak line 2010 31,642            15,540            5,305            
Youngdong line 2009 59,382              27,481                9,622             Taebak line 2009 34,088            14,885            7,964            
Youngdong line 2008 66,238              30,049                10,011            Taebak line 2008 35,865            16,388            8,399            
Youngdong line 2007 60,957              33,710                12,120            Taebak line 2007 29,395            16,948            9,134            
Youngdong line 2006 56,312              34,043                9,649             Taebak line 2006 33,093            19,545            10,079           
Youngdong line 2005 49,103              33,477                9,282             Taebak line 2005 30,476            18,022            9,730            
Youngdong line 2004 110,857            Taebak line 2004 67,463           
Youngdong line 2003 103,022            Taebak line 2003 65,291           
Youngdong line 2002 93,419              Taebak line 2002 58,034           
Youngdong line 2001 89,451              Taebak line 2001 54,760           
Kyungjun line 2010 52,130              32,150                4,738             Donghae line 2010 62,438            37,034            7,234            
Kyungjun line 2009 52,830              28,492                4,805             Donghae line 2009 62,733            33,948            7,684            
Kyungjun line 2008 58,625              33,939                5,098             Donghae line 2008 67,231            38,143            7,676            
Kyungjun line 2007 48,756              33,619                5,841             Donghae line 2007 55,035            36,860            7,270            
Kyungjun line 2006 48,186              39,723                6,137             Donghae line 2006 40,846            28,867            6,528            
Kyungjun line 2005 43,651              40,930                5,706             Donghae line 2005 42,585            31,152            6,632            
Kyungjun line 2004 112,098            Donghae line 2004 95,858           
Kyungjun line 2003 117,211            Donghae line 2003 109,767         
Kyungjun line 2002 106,617            Donghae line 2002 100,165         
Kyungjun line 2001 97,089              Donghae line 2001 95,742           
Chungbuk line 2010 31,592              23,557                8,694             Jinhae line 2010 1,704             1,153             224               
Chungbuk line 2009 34,490              23,297                12,753            Jinhae line 2009 1,668             1,101             211               
Chungbuk line 2008 37,823              26,151                13,584            Jinhae line 2008 1,641             1,246             179               
Chungbuk line 2007 29,281              24,575                12,801            Jinhae line 2007 1,378             1,083             93                 
Chungbuk line 2006 35,004              28,539                16,210            Jinhae line 2006 1,488             1,074             63                 
Chungbuk line 2005 29,242              28,591                14,984            Jinhae line 2005 1,233             664                69                 
Chungbuk line 2004 66,281              Jinhae line 2004 4,548            
Chungbuk line 2003 68,109              Jinhae line 2003 4,704            
Chungbuk line 2002 58,869              Jinhae line 2002 4,288            
Chungbuk line 2001 54,049              Jinhae line 2001 3,958            
Kyungwon line 2010 27,248              15,472                1,800             Daegu line 2010 8,480             7,075             1,888            
Kyungwon line 2009 26,241              16,111                1,770             Daegu line 2009 8,679             6,577             2,064            
Kyungwon line 2008 22,795              15,378                1,841             Daegu line 2008 9,568             7,625             1,864            
Kyungwon line 2007 19,836              15,557                2,641             Daegu line 2007 7,585             6,946             1,883            
Kyungwon line 2006 21,838              17,828                3,009             Daegu line 2006 7,682             6,529             2,798            
Kyungwon line 2005 25,960              23,520                2,965             Daegu line 2005 10,278            9,076             2,513            
Kyungwon line 2004 103,425            Daegu line 2004 20,450           
Kyungwon line 2003 106,837            Daegu line 2003 20,749           
Kyungwon line 2002 99,444              Daegu line 2002 19,345           
Kyungwon line 2001 96,091              Daegu line 2001 17,983           
Kyungchoon line 2010 20,265              15,553                5,072             Janghang line 2010 36,060            31,449            9,351            
Kyungchoon line 2009 22,088              14,889                5,086             Janghang line 2009 36,593            28,428            9,376            
Kyungchoon line 2008 23,914              16,928                5,585             Janghang line 2008 42,709            32,826            9,197            
Kyungchoon line 2007 19,968              14,989                5,811             Janghang line 2007 34,182            27,880            9,764            
Kyungchoon line 2006 19,521              15,273                7,029             Janghang line 2006 33,036            30,166            10,197           
Kyungchoon line 2005 17,156              15,910                7,556             Janghang line 2005 27,574            27,158            9,877            
Kyungchoon line 2004 34,778              Janghang line 2004 56,390           
Kyungchoon line 2003 31,438              Janghang line 2003 53,759           
Kyungchoon line 2002 30,455              Janghang line 2002 49,318           
Kyungchoon line 2001 28,089              Janghang line 2001 47,625           JI HONG PARK    Appendix 
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trans_programme ppp project M_VFM SE_prj_ppp length completion_delay BCR discount_rate cpi exchequer_bondmode1_D ppp_D region_D application_ratio traffic_volume
National Highway BTL Todang-Gwansan 4.8 4.67066 9.24 0 2.136 7.5 3.5 6.9 0 0 0 88.55 100
National Highway BTL Todang-Gwansan 25 4.67066 9.24 1 2.136 7.5 3.5 6.9 0 0 0 88.55 100
National Highway BTL Todang-Gwansan 43.7 4.67066 9.24 2 2.136 7.5 3.5 6.9 0 0 0 88.55 100
National Highway BTL Todang-Gwansan 61 4.67066 9.24 3 2.136 7.5 3.5 6.9 0 0 0 88.55 100
National Highway BTL Todang-Gwansan 76.9 4.67066 9.24 4 2.136 7.5 3.5 6.9 0 0 0 88.55 100
National Highway BTL Todang-Gwansan 56.6 4.67066 9.24 2.742 2.136 7.5 3.5 6.9 0 0 0 88.55 100
National Highway BTL Todang-Gwansan 0.2 4.67066 9.24 0 2.136 7.5 3.5 6.9 0 0 0 84.5746 100
National Highway BTL Todang-Gwansan 20.6 4.67066 9.24 1 2.136 7.5 3.5 6.9 0 0 0 84.5746 100
National Highway BTL Todang-Gwansan 39.4 4.67066 9.24 2 2.136 7.5 3.5 6.9 0 0 0 84.5746 100
National Highway BTL Todang-Gwansan 52.4 4.67066 9.24 2.742 2.136 7.5 3.5 6.9 0 0 0 84.5746 100
National Highway BTL Todang-Gwansan 56.8 4.67066 9.24 3 2.136 7.5 3.5 6.9 0 0 0 84.5746 100
National Highway BTL Todang-Gwansan 72.9 4.67066 9.24 4 2.136 7.5 3.5 6.9 0 0 0 84.5746 100
National Highway BTL Todang-Gwansan 0.2 4.67066 9.24 0 2.136 7.5 3.5 6.9 0 0 0 88.55 68.6
National Highway BTL Todang-Gwansan 14.4 4.67066 9.24 1 2.136 7.5 3.5 6.9 0 0 0 88.55 68.6
National Highway BTL Todang-Gwansan 27.5 4.67066 9.24 2 2.136 7.5 3.5 6.9 0 0 0 88.55 68.6
National Highway BTL Todang-Gwansan 36.5 4.67066 9.24 2.742 2.136 7.5 3.5 6.9 0 0 0 88.55 68.6
National Highway BTL Todang-Gwansan 39.6 4.67066 9.24 3 2.136 7.5 3.5 6.9 0 0 0 88.55 68.6
National Highway BTL Todang-Gwansan 50.6 4.67066 9.24 4 2.136 7.5 3.5 6.9 0 0 0 88.55 68.6
National Highway BTL Todang-Gwansan -4.4 4.67066 9.24 0 2.136 7.5 3.5 6.9 0 0 0 84.5746 68.6
National Highway BTL Todang-Gwansan 10 4.67066 9.24 1 2.136 7.5 3.5 6.9 0 0 0 84.5746 68.6
National Highway BTL Todang-Gwansan 23.2 4.67066 9.24 2 2.136 7.5 3.5 6.9 0 0 0 84.5746 68.6
National Highway BTL Todang-Gwansan 35.4 4.67066 9.24 3 2.136 7.5 3.5 6.9 0 0 0 84.5746 68.6
National Highway BTL Todang-Gwansan 46.6 4.67066 9.24 4 2.136 7.5 3.5 6.9 0 0 0 84.5746 68.6
National Highway BTL Todang-Gwansan 32.3 4.67066 9.24 2.742 2.136 7.5 3.5 6.9 0 0 0 84.5746 68.6
National Highway BTL Dongup-Hanlim 0.78 2.02465 7.29 0 1.23 5.5 3.77 3.38 0 0 1 88.55 100
National Highway BTL Dongup-Hanlim 8.82 2.02465 7.29 1 1.23 5.5 3.77 3.38 0 0 1 88.55 100
National Highway BTL Dongup-Hanlim 16.35 2.02465 7.29 2 1.23 5.5 3.77 3.38 0 0 1 88.55 100
National Highway BTL Dongup-Hanlim 23.41 2.02465 7.29 3 1.23 5.5 3.77 3.38 0 0 1 88.55 100
National Highway BTL Dongup-Hanlim 30.01 2.02465 7.29 4 1.23 5.5 3.77 3.38 0 0 1 88.55 100
National Highway BTL Dongup-Hanlim 21.58 2.02465 7.29 2.742 1.23 5.5 3.77 3.38 0 0 1 88.55 100
National Highway BTL Dongup-Hanlim -3.54 2.02465 7.29 0 1.23 5.5 3.77 3.38 0 0 1 84.5746 100
National Highway BTL Dongup-Hanlim 4.62 2.02465 7.29 1 1.23 5.5 3.77 3.38 0 0 1 84.5746 100
National Highway BTL Dongup-Hanlim 12.28 2.02465 7.29 2 1.23 5.5 3.77 3.38 0 0 1 84.5746 100
National Highway BTL Dongup-Hanlim 17.6 2.02465 7.29 2.742 1.23 5.5 3.77 3.38 0 0 1 84.5746 100
National Highway BTL Dongup-Hanlim 19.46 2.02465 7.29 3 1.23 5.5 3.77 3.38 0 0 1 84.5746 100
National Highway BTL Dongup-Hanlim 26.18 2.02465 7.29 4 1.23 5.5 3.77 3.38 0 0 1 84.5746 100
National Highway BTL Dongup-Hanlim -2.93 2.02465 7.29 0 1.23 5.5 3.77 3.38 0 0 1 88.55 68.6
National Highway BTL Dongup-Hanlim 2.02 2.02465 7.29 1 1.23 5.5 3.77 3.38 0 0 1 88.55 68.6
National Highway BTL Dongup-Hanlim 6.63 2.02465 7.29 2 1.23 5.5 3.77 3.38 0 0 1 88.55 68.6
National Highway BTL Dongup-Hanlim 9.79 2.02465 7.29 2.742 1.23 5.5 3.77 3.38 0 0 1 88.55 68.6
National Highway BTL Dongup-Hanlim 10.92 2.02465 7.29 3 1.23 5.5 3.77 3.38 0 0 1 88.55 68.6
National Highway BTL Dongup-Hanlim 14.89 2.02465 7.29 4 1.23 5.5 3.77 3.38 0 0 1 88.55 68.6
National Highway BTL Dongup-Hanlim -7.25 2.02465 7.29 0 1.23 5.5 3.77 3.38 0 0 1 84.5746 68.6
National Highway BTL Dongup-Hanlim -2.17 2.02465 7.29 1 1.23 5.5 3.77 3.38 0 0 1 84.5746 68.6
National Highway BTL Dongup-Hanlim 2.56 2.02465 7.29 2 1.23 5.5 3.77 3.38 0 0 1 84.5746 68.6
National Highway BTL Dongup-Hanlim 6.97 2.02465 7.29 3 1.23 5.5 3.77 3.38 0 0 1 84.5746 68.6
National Highway BTL Dongup-Hanlim 11.06 2.02465 7.29 4 1.23 5.5 3.77 3.38 0 0 1 84.5746 68.6
National Highway BTL Dongup-Hanlim 5.81 2.02465 7.29 2.742 1.23 5.5 3.77 3.38 0 0 1 84.5746 68.6
National Expressway BTL Suwon-Pyungtaek 33.6 36.2076 38.5 0 2.717 7.5 3.5 6.9 0 0 0 82.14 100
National Expressway BTL Suwon-Pyungtaek 197.5 36.2076 38.5 1 2.717 7.5 3.5 6.9 0 0 0 82.14 100
National Expressway BTL Suwon-Pyungtaek 349.5 36.2076 38.5 2 2.717 7.5 3.5 6.9 0 0 0 82.14 100
National Expressway BTL Suwon-Pyungtaek 490.3 36.2076 38.5 3 2.717 7.5 3.5 6.9 0 0 0 82.14 100
National Expressway BTL Suwon-Pyungtaek 620.7 36.2076 38.5 4 2.717 7.5 3.5 6.9 0 0 0 82.14 100
National Expressway BTL Suwon-Pyungtaek 243.3 36.2076 38.5 1.296 2.717 7.5 3.5 6.9 0 0 0 82.14 100
National Expressway BTO Suwon-Pyungtaek -88.1 42.5677 38.5 0 2.717 7.5 3.5 6.9 0 1 0 82.14 100
National Expressway BTO Suwon-Pyungtaek 112.1 42.5677 38.5 1 2.717 7.5 3.5 6.9 0 1 0 82.14 100
National Expressway BTO Suwon-Pyungtaek 297.7 42.5677 38.5 2 2.717 7.5 3.5 6.9 0 1 0 82.14 100
National Expressway BTO Suwon-Pyungtaek 469.9 42.5677 38.5 3 2.717 7.5 3.5 6.9 0 1 0 82.14 100
National Expressway BTO Suwon-Pyungtaek 629.5 42.5677 38.5 4 2.717 7.5 3.5 6.9 0 1 0 82.14 100
National Expressway BTO Suwon-Pyungtaek 168.1 42.5677 38.5 1.296 2.717 7.5 3.5 6.9 0 1 0 82.14 100
National Expressway BTL Suwon-Pyungtaek 17.1 36.2076 38.5 0 2.717 7.5 3.5 6.9 0 0 0 78.8001 100
National Expressway BTL Suwon-Pyungtaek 181.7 36.2076 38.5 1 2.717 7.5 3.5 6.9 0 0 0 78.8001 100
National Expressway BTL Suwon-Pyungtaek 227.7 36.2076 38.5 1.296 2.717 7.5 3.5 6.9 0 0 0 78.8001 100
National Expressway BTL Suwon-Pyungtaek 334.3 36.2076 38.5 2 2.717 7.5 3.5 6.9 0 0 0 78.8001 100
National Expressway BTL Suwon-Pyungtaek 475.7 36.2076 38.5 3 2.717 7.5 3.5 6.9 0 0 0 78.8001 100
National Expressway BTL Suwon-Pyungtaek 606.7 36.2076 38.5 4 2.717 7.5 3.5 6.9 0 0 0 78.8001 100
National Expressway BTO Suwon-Pyungtaek -104.6 42.5677 38.5 0 2.717 7.5 3.5 6.9 0 1 0 78.8001 100
National Expressway BTO Suwon-Pyungtaek 96.2 42.5677 38.5 1 2.717 7.5 3.5 6.9 0 1 0 78.8001 100
National Expressway BTO Suwon-Pyungtaek 152.4 42.5677 38.5 1.296 2.717 7.5 3.5 6.9 0 1 0 78.8001 100
National Expressway BTO Suwon-Pyungtaek 282.5 42.5677 38.5 2 2.717 7.5 3.5 6.9 0 1 0 78.8001 100
National Expressway BTO Suwon-Pyungtaek 455.2 42.5677 38.5 3 2.717 7.5 3.5 6.9 0 1 0 78.8001 100
National Expressway BTO Suwon-Pyungtaek 615.4 42.5677 38.5 4 2.717 7.5 3.5 6.9 0 1 0 78.8001 100
National Expressway BTL Suwon-Pyungtaek 24.8 36.2076 38.5 0 2.717 7.5 3.5 6.9 0 0 0 82.14 68.64
National Expressway BTL Suwon-Pyungtaek 139.4 36.2076 38.5 1 2.717 7.5 3.5 6.9 0 0 0 82.14 68.64
National Expressway BTL Suwon-Pyungtaek 171.2 36.2076 38.5 1.296 2.717 7.5 3.5 6.9 0 0 0 82.14 68.64
National Expressway BTL Suwon-Pyungtaek 245.5 36.2076 38.5 2 2.717 7.5 3.5 6.9 0 0 0 82.14 68.64
National Expressway BTL Suwon-Pyungtaek 343.6 36.2076 38.5 3 2.717 7.5 3.5 6.9 0 0 0 82.14 68.64
National Expressway BTL Suwon-Pyungtaek 434.3 36.2076 38.5 4 2.717 7.5 3.5 6.9 0 0 0 82.14 68.64
National Expressway BTO Suwon-Pyungtaek 50.1 42.5677 38.5 0 2.717 7.5 3.5 6.9 0 1 0 82.14 68.64
National Expressway BTO Suwon-Pyungtaek 189.6 42.5677 38.5 1 2.717 7.5 3.5 6.9 0 1 0 82.14 68.64
National Expressway BTO Suwon-Pyungtaek 228.4 42.5677 38.5 1.296 2.717 7.5 3.5 6.9 0 1 0 82.14 68.64
National Expressway BTO Suwon-Pyungtaek 318.8 42.5677 38.5 2 2.717 7.5 3.5 6.9 0 1 0 82.14 68.64
National Expressway BTO Suwon-Pyungtaek 438.4 42.5677 38.5 3 2.717 7.5 3.5 6.9 0 1 0 82.14 68.64
National Expressway BTO Suwon-Pyungtaek 549.2 42.5677 38.5 4 2.717 7.5 3.5 6.9 0 1 0 82.14 68.64
National Expressway BTL Suwon-Pyungtaek 8 36.2076 38.5 0 2.717 7.5 3.5 6.9 0 0 0 78.8001 68.64
National Expressway BTL Suwon-Pyungtaek 123.2 36.2076 38.5 1 2.717 7.5 3.5 6.9 0 0 0 78.8001 68.64
National Expressway BTL Suwon-Pyungtaek 229.9 36.2076 38.5 2 2.717 7.5 3.5 6.9 0 0 0 78.8001 68.64
National Expressway BTL Suwon-Pyungtaek 328.6 36.2076 38.5 3 2.717 7.5 3.5 6.9 0 0 0 78.8001 68.64
National Expressway BTL Suwon-Pyungtaek 420 36.2076 38.5 4 2.717 7.5 3.5 6.9 0 0 0 78.8001 68.64
National Expressway BTL Suwon-Pyungtaek 155.2 36.2076 38.5 1.296 2.717 7.5 3.5 6.9 0 0 0 78.8001 68.64
National Expressway BTO Suwon-Pyungtaek 33.3 42.5677 38.5 0 2.717 7.5 3.5 6.9 0 1 0 78.8001 68.64
National Expressway BTO Suwon-Pyungtaek 173.4 42.5677 38.5 1 2.717 7.5 3.5 6.9 0 1 0 78.8001 68.64
National Expressway BTO Suwon-Pyungtaek 303.3 42.5677 38.5 2 2.717 7.5 3.5 6.9 0 1 0 78.8001 68.64





National Expressway BTO Suwon-Pyungtaek 534.9 42.5677 38.5 4 2.717 7.5 3.5 6.9 0 1 0 78.8001 68.64
National Expressway BTO Suwon-Pyungtaek 212.5 42.5677 38.5 1.296 2.717 7.5 3.5 6.9 0 1 0 78.8001 68.64
National Expressway BTL Bongdam-Songsan 12.7 5.79551 18.46 0 1.17 5.5 2.99 4.72 0 0 0 82.14 100
National Expressway BTL Bongdam-Songsan 37.4 5.79551 18.46 1 1.17 5.5 2.99 4.72 0 0 0 82.14 100
National Expressway BTL Bongdam-Songsan 60.7 5.79551 18.46 2 1.17 5.5 2.99 4.72 0 0 0 82.14 100
National Expressway BTL Bongdam-Songsan 82.5 5.79551 18.46 3 1.17 5.5 2.99 4.72 0 0 0 82.14 100
National Expressway BTL Bongdam-Songsan 103 5.79551 18.46 4 1.17 5.5 2.99 4.72 0 0 0 82.14 100
National Expressway BTL Bongdam-Songsan 44.3 5.79551 18.46 1.296 1.17 5.5 2.99 4.72 0 0 0 82.14 100
National Expressway BTO Bongdam-Songsan -47.5 12.0032 18.46 0 1.17 5.5 2.99 4.72 0 1 0 82.14 100
National Expressway BTO Bongdam-Songsan -6 12.0032 18.46 1 1.17 5.5 2.99 4.72 0 1 0 82.14 100
National Expressway BTO Bongdam-Songsan 33.2 12.0032 18.46 2 1.17 5.5 2.99 4.72 0 1 0 82.14 100
National Expressway BTO Bongdam-Songsan 70.1 12.0032 18.46 3 1.17 5.5 2.99 4.72 0 1 0 82.14 100
National Expressway BTO Bongdam-Songsan 104.9 12.0032 18.46 4 1.17 5.5 2.99 4.72 0 1 0 82.14 100
National Expressway BTO Bongdam-Songsan 5.7 12.0032 18.46 1.296 1.17 5.5 2.99 4.72 0 1 0 82.14 100
National Expressway BTL Bongdam-Songsan 3.6 5.79551 18.46 0 1.17 5.5 2.99 4.72 0 0 0 78.8001 100
National Expressway BTL Bongdam-Songsan 28.6 5.79551 18.46 1 1.17 5.5 2.99 4.72 0 0 0 78.8001 100
National Expressway BTL Bongdam-Songsan 35.5 5.79551 18.46 1.296 1.17 5.5 2.99 4.72 0 0 0 78.8001 100
National Expressway BTL Bongdam-Songsan 52 5.79551 18.46 2 1.17 5.5 2.99 4.72 0 0 0 78.8001 100
National Expressway BTL Bongdam-Songsan 74.1 5.79551 18.46 3 1.17 5.5 2.99 4.72 0 0 0 78.8001 100
National Expressway BTL Bongdam-Songsan 94.9 5.79551 18.46 4 1.17 5.5 2.99 4.72 0 0 0 78.8001 100
National Expressway BTO Bongdam-Songsan -56.6 12.0032 18.46 0 1.17 5.5 2.99 4.72 0 1 0 78.8001 100
National Expressway BTO Bongdam-Songsan -14.9 12.0032 18.46 1 1.17 5.5 2.99 4.72 0 1 0 78.8001 100
National Expressway BTO Bongdam-Songsan -3.1 12.0032 18.46 1.296 1.17 5.5 2.99 4.72 0 1 0 78.8001 100
National Expressway BTO Bongdam-Songsan 24.5 12.0032 18.46 2 1.17 5.5 2.99 4.72 0 1 0 78.8001 100
National Expressway BTO Bongdam-Songsan 61.7 12.0032 18.46 3 1.17 5.5 2.99 4.72 0 1 0 78.8001 100
National Expressway BTO Bongdam-Songsan 96.8 12.0032 18.46 4 1.17 5.5 2.99 4.72 0 1 0 78.8001 100
National Expressway BTL Bongdam-Songsan 7.7 5.79551 18.46 0 1.17 5.5 2.99 4.72 0 0 0 82.14 68.64
National Expressway BTL Bongdam-Songsan 25.8 5.79551 18.46 1 1.17 5.5 2.99 4.72 0 0 0 82.14 68.64
National Expressway BTL Bongdam-Songsan 30.7 5.79551 18.46 1.296 1.17 5.5 2.99 4.72 0 0 0 82.14 68.64
National Expressway BTL Bongdam-Songsan 42.7 5.79551 18.46 2 1.17 5.5 2.99 4.72 0 0 0 82.14 68.64
National Expressway BTL Bongdam-Songsan 58.5 5.79551 18.46 3 1.17 5.5 2.99 4.72 0 0 0 82.14 68.64
National Expressway BTL Bongdam-Songsan 73.4 5.79551 18.46 4 1.17 5.5 2.99 4.72 0 0 0 82.14 68.64
National Expressway BTO Bongdam-Songsan 48.6 12.0032 18.46 0 1.17 5.5 2.99 4.72 0 1 0 82.14 68.64
National Expressway BTO Bongdam-Songsan 78.1 12.0032 18.46 1 1.17 5.5 2.99 4.72 0 1 0 82.14 68.64
National Expressway BTO Bongdam-Songsan 86.4 12.0032 18.46 1.296 1.17 5.5 2.99 4.72 0 1 0 82.14 68.64
National Expressway BTO Bongdam-Songsan 106 12.0032 18.46 2 1.17 5.5 2.99 4.72 0 1 0 82.14 68.64
National Expressway BTO Bongdam-Songsan 132.2 12.0032 18.46 3 1.17 5.5 2.99 4.72 0 1 0 82.14 68.64
National Expressway BTO Bongdam-Songsan 156.9 12.0032 18.46 4 1.17 5.5 2.99 4.72 0 1 0 82.14 68.64
National Expressway BTL Bongdam-Songsan -1.4 5.79551 18.46 0 1.17 5.5 2.99 4.72 0 0 0 78.8001 68.64
National Expressway BTL Bongdam-Songsan 16.9 5.79551 18.46 1 1.17 5.5 2.99 4.72 0 0 0 78.8001 68.64
National Expressway BTL Bongdam-Songsan 34 5.79551 18.46 1.296 1.17 5.5 2.99 4.72 0 0 0 78.8001 68.64
National Expressway BTL Bongdam-Songsan 50.1 5.79551 18.46 2 1.17 5.5 2.99 4.72 0 0 0 78.8001 68.64
National Expressway BTL Bongdam-Songsan 65.2 5.79551 18.46 3 1.17 5.5 2.99 4.72 0 0 0 78.8001 68.64
National Expressway BTL Bongdam-Songsan 21.9 5.79551 18.46 4 1.17 5.5 2.99 4.72 0 0 0 78.8001 68.64
National Expressway BTO Bongdam-Songsan 39.4 12.0032 18.46 0 1.17 5.5 2.99 4.72 0 1 0 78.8001 68.64
National Expressway BTO Bongdam-Songsan 69.3 12.0032 18.46 1 1.17 5.5 2.99 4.72 0 1 0 78.8001 68.64
National Expressway BTO Bongdam-Songsan 97.4 12.0032 18.46 1.296 1.17 5.5 2.99 4.72 0 1 0 78.8001 68.64
National Expressway BTO Bongdam-Songsan 123.8 12.0032 18.46 2 1.17 5.5 2.99 4.72 0 1 0 78.8001 68.64
National Expressway BTO Bongdam-Songsan 148.7 12.0032 18.46 3 1.17 5.5 2.99 4.72 0 1 0 78.8001 68.64
National Expressway BTO Bongdam-Songsan 77.6 12.0032 18.46 4 1.17 5.5 2.99 4.72 0 1 0 78.8001 68.64
National Railway BTL Sosa-Wonsi -14.7 16.9217 23.3 0 1.169 6.5 2.92 5.4 1 0 0 90.71 100
National Railway BTL Sosa-Wonsi 58.3 16.9217 23.3 1 1.169 6.5 2.92 5.4 1 0 0 90.71 100
National Railway BTL Sosa-Wonsi 126 16.9217 23.3 2 1.169 6.5 2.92 5.4 1 0 0 90.71 100
National Railway BTL Sosa-Wonsi 188.8 16.9217 23.3 3 1.169 6.5 2.92 5.4 1 0 0 90.71 100
National Railway BTL Sosa-Wonsi 201.5 16.9217 23.3 3.357 1.169 6.5 2.92 5.4 1 0 0 90.71 100
National Railway BTL Sosa-Wonsi 246.9 16.9217 23.3 4 1.169 6.5 2.92 5.4 1 0 0 90.71 100
National Railway BTO Sosa-Wonsi -31.1 19.566 23.3 0 1.169 6.5 2.92 5.4 1 1 0 90.71 100
National Railway BTO Sosa-Wonsi 62.2 19.566 23.3 1 1.169 6.5 2.92 5.4 1 1 0 90.71 100
National Railway BTO Sosa-Wonsi 148.9 19.566 23.3 2 1.169 6.5 2.92 5.4 1 1 0 90.71 100
National Railway BTO Sosa-Wonsi 229.5 19.566 23.3 3 1.169 6.5 2.92 5.4 1 1 0 90.71 100
National Railway BTO Sosa-Wonsi 248.3 19.566 23.3 3.357 1.169 6.5 2.92 5.4 1 1 0 90.71 100
National Railway BTO Sosa-Wonsi 304.3 19.566 23.3 4 1.169 6.5 2.92 5.4 1 1 0 90.71 100
National Railway BTL Sosa-Wonsi 6.4 16.9217 23.3 0 1.169 6.5 2.92 5.4 1 0 0 93.027 100
National Railway BTL Sosa-Wonsi 78.7 16.9217 23.3 1 1.169 6.5 2.92 5.4 1 0 0 93.027 100
National Railway BTL Sosa-Wonsi 145.8 16.9217 23.3 2 1.169 6.5 2.92 5.4 1 0 0 93.027 100
National Railway BTL Sosa-Wonsi 207.8 16.9217 23.3 3 1.169 6.5 2.92 5.4 1 0 0 93.027 100
National Railway BTL Sosa-Wonsi 220.1 16.9217 23.3 3.357 1.169 6.5 2.92 5.4 1 0 0 93.027 100
National Railway BTL Sosa-Wonsi 265.3 16.9217 23.3 4 1.169 6.5 2.92 5.4 1 0 0 93.027 100
National Railway BTO Sosa-Wonsi -10 19.566 23.3 0 1.169 6.5 2.92 5.4 1 1 0 93.027 100
National Railway BTO Sosa-Wonsi 82.6 19.566 23.3 1 1.169 6.5 2.92 5.4 1 1 0 93.027 100
National Railway BTO Sosa-Wonsi 168.6 19.566 23.3 2 1.169 6.5 2.92 5.4 1 1 0 93.027 100
National Railway BTO Sosa-Wonsi 248.5 19.566 23.3 3 1.169 6.5 2.92 5.4 1 1 0 93.027 100
National Railway BTO Sosa-Wonsi 266.9 19.566 23.3 3.357 1.169 6.5 2.92 5.4 1 1 0 93.027 100
National Railway BTO Sosa-Wonsi 322.7 19.566 23.3 4 1.169 6.5 2.92 5.4 1 1 0 93.027 100
National Railway BTL Sosa-Wonsi -20.8 16.9217 23.3 0 1.169 6.5 2.92 5.4 1 0 0 90.71 50.71
National Railway BTL Sosa-Wonsi 20.2 16.9217 23.3 1 1.169 6.5 2.92 5.4 1 0 0 90.71 50.71
National Railway BTL Sosa-Wonsi 57.9 16.9217 23.3 2 1.169 6.5 2.92 5.4 1 0 0 90.71 50.71
National Railway BTL Sosa-Wonsi 92.5 16.9217 23.3 3 1.169 6.5 2.92 5.4 1 0 0 90.71 50.71
National Railway BTL Sosa-Wonsi 95.5 16.9217 23.3 3.357 1.169 6.5 2.92 5.4 1 0 0 90.71 50.71
National Railway BTL Sosa-Wonsi 124.1 16.9217 23.3 4 1.169 6.5 2.92 5.4 1 0 0 90.71 50.71
National Railway BTO Sosa-Wonsi 86.5 19.566 23.3 0 1.169 6.5 2.92 5.4 1 1 0 90.71 50.71
National Railway BTO Sosa-Wonsi 137.8 19.566 23.3 1 1.169 6.5 2.92 5.4 1 1 0 90.71 50.71
National Railway BTO Sosa-Wonsi 185.1 19.566 23.3 2 1.169 6.5 2.92 5.4 1 1 0 90.71 50.71
National Railway BTO Sosa-Wonsi 228.7 19.566 23.3 3 1.169 6.5 2.92 5.4 1 1 0 90.71 50.71
National Railway BTO Sosa-Wonsi 234.9 19.566 23.3 3.357 1.169 6.5 2.92 5.4 1 1 0 90.71 50.71
National Railway BTO Sosa-Wonsi 268.8 19.566 23.3 4 1.169 6.5 2.92 5.4 1 1 0 90.71 50.71
National Railway BTL Sosa-Wonsi 0.3 16.9217 23.3 0 1.169 6.5 2.92 5.4 1 0 0 93.027 50.71
National Railway BTL Sosa-Wonsi 40.6 16.9217 23.3 1 1.169 6.5 2.92 5.4 1 0 0 93.027 50.71
National Railway BTL Sosa-Wonsi 77.6 16.9217 23.3 2 1.169 6.5 2.92 5.4 1 0 0 93.027 50.71
National Railway BTL Sosa-Wonsi 111.5 16.9217 23.3 3 1.169 6.5 2.92 5.4 1 0 0 93.027 50.71
National Railway BTL Sosa-Wonsi 114.1 16.9217 23.3 3.357 1.169 6.5 2.92 5.4 1 0 0 93.027 50.71
National Railway BTL Sosa-Wonsi 142.5 16.9217 23.3 4 1.169 6.5 2.92 5.4 1 0 0 93.027 50.71
National Railway BTO Sosa-Wonsi 107.6 19.566 23.3 0 1.169 6.5 2.92 5.4 1 1 0 93.027 50.71
National Railway BTO Sosa-Wonsi 158.2 19.566 23.3 1 1.169 6.5 2.92 5.4 1 1 0 93.027 50.71
National Railway BTO Sosa-Wonsi 204.9 19.566 23.3 2 1.169 6.5 2.92 5.4 1 1 0 93.027 50.71
National Railway BTO Sosa-Wonsi 247.8 19.566 23.3 3 1.169 6.5 2.92 5.4 1 1 0 93.027 50.71
National Railway BTO Sosa-Wonsi 253.5 19.566 23.3 3.357 1.169 6.5 2.92 5.4 1 1 0 93.027 50.71
National Railway BTO Sosa-Wonsi 287.2 19.566 23.3 4 1.169 6.5 2.92 5.4 1 1 0 93.027 50.71
National Railway BTL Bujeon-Masan 35.78 2.27355 32 0 0.63 5.5 2.99 4.72 1 0 1 90.71 100
National Railway BTL Bujeon-Masan 37.77 2.27355 32 1 0.63 5.5 2.99 4.72 1 0 1 90.71 100
National Railway BTL Bujeon-Masan 39.06 2.27355 32 2 0.63 5.5 2.99 4.72 1 0 1 90.71 100
National Railway BTL Bujeon-Masan 39.61 2.27355 32 3 0.63 5.5 2.99 4.72 1 0 1 90.71 100
National Railway BTL Bujeon-Masan 39.51 2.27355 32 3.357 0.63 5.5 2.99 4.72 1 0 1 90.71 100
National Railway BTL Bujeon-Masan 39.48 2.27355 32 4 0.63 5.5 2.99 4.72 1 0 1 90.71 100
National Railway BTL Bujeon-Masan 46.05 2.27355 32 0 0.63 5.5 2.99 4.72 1 0 1 91.8648 100
National Railway BTL Bujeon-Masan 47.75 2.27355 32 1 0.63 5.5 2.99 4.72 1 0 1 91.8648 100
National Railway BTL Bujeon-Masan 48.75 2.27355 32 2 0.63 5.5 2.99 4.72 1 0 1 91.8648 100
National Railway BTL Bujeon-Masan 49.03 2.27355 32 3 0.63 5.5 2.99 4.72 1 0 1 91.8648 100
National Railway BTL Bujeon-Masan 48.82 2.27355 32 3.357 0.63 5.5 2.99 4.72 1 0 1 91.8648 100
National Railway BTL Bujeon-Masan 48.63 2.27355 32 4 0.63 5.5 2.99 4.72 1 0 1 91.8648 100
National Railway BTL Bujeon-Masan 26.75 2.27355 32 0 0.63 5.5 2.99 4.72 1 0 1 90.71 50.71
National Railway BTL Bujeon-Masan 24.31 2.27355 32 1 0.63 5.5 2.99 4.72 1 0 1 90.71 50.71
National Railway BTL Bujeon-Masan 21.4 2.27355 32 2 0.63 5.5 2.99 4.72 1 0 1 90.71 50.71
National Railway BTL Bujeon-Masan 17.98 2.27355 32 3 0.63 5.5 2.99 4.72 1 0 1 90.71 50.71
National Railway BTL Bujeon-Masan 16.53 2.27355 32 3.357 0.63 5.5 2.99 4.72 1 0 1 90.71 50.71
National Railway BTL Bujeon-Masan 14.08 2.27355 32 4 0.63 5.5 2.99 4.72 1 0 1 90.71 50.71
National Railway BTL Bujeon-Masan 37.02 2.27355 32 0 0.63 5.5 2.99 4.72 1 0 1 91.8648 50.71
National Railway BTL Bujeon-Masan 34.29 2.27355 32 1 0.63 5.5 2.99 4.72 1 0 1 91.8648 50.71
National Railway BTL Bujeon-Masan 31.1 2.27355 32 2 0.63 5.5 2.99 4.72 1 0 1 91.8648 50.71
National Railway BTL Bujeon-Masan 27.4 2.27355 32 3 0.63 5.5 2.99 4.72 1 0 1 91.8648 50.71
National Railway BTL Bujeon-Masan 25.83 2.27355 32 3.357 0.63 5.5 2.99 4.72 1 0 1 91.8648 50.71
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